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DCI's Opening Statement for Pike Committee
11 September 1975

As I understand the purpose of this hearing, it is to review the performance of intelligence in predicting various events abroad. I welcome this opportunity to address the substantive aspects of intelligence and to discuss with you what I consider the primary purpose of intelligence. This purpose is much broader than the prediction of events abroad. It is to provide those officials in our Government who are responsible for developing and implementing national security policy with authoritative information and assessments of what is going on abroad so that they can do their jobs.

Who are these officials? In the first instance they are the President and the other members of the National Security Council-- the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. They include the members of the Staff of the National Security Council and the appropriate staffs of the various members of the Council itself. Members of certain committees of the Congress are now being informed of foreign developments on a regular basis. These committees include Subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of the Senate and the House and the

Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the International Affairs Committee of the House. Other Committees and Members of the Congress are provided with intelligence on foreign developments in response to their specific requests.

The subject matter of intelligence has expanded from its older focus on foreign military capabilities to include foreign political dynamics, economic trends, scientific capabilities, and sociological pressures. Today's intelligence deals with foreign policy problems, ranging from the law of the seas to the oil boycott, from defense policy to arms control.

Along with this expansion of the scope of intelligence has come an increase in reliance on information acquired by sophisticated technical devices and open literature and a shift in direction of clandestine collection. Clandestine collection or espionage is now reserved for the most important information which cannot be acquired by other means. It is focused largely on the major closed societies, that could threaten our security, that do not have a free press, and that screen their military capabilities and much of their government process even from their own citizens.

Few would argue that there have been no fundamental changes in the world over the past three decades. So much has been written about these changes that many of the descriptive phrases have become cliches--the fragmentation of Stalin's monolithic communism, nuclear parity, an era of negotiation replacing an era of confrontation, shift from a bipolar to a multi-polar world, increased consciousness of the third world, the growth of the nuclear club, international economic competition replacing the threat of nuclear war, the food-population problem, the growing power of the oil-rich nations, and international terrorism. Hackneyed as these expressions may be, they evoke the images of change that have occurred in the last quarter century.

Against this backdrop of a changing world, this nation needs the best information and judgments about what is going on abroad so that it can survive and prosper--and its intelligence structure should be in a position to satisfy this need. This nation needs a basic understanding of the factors and trends that affect developments in the world abroad. This must be based on research and analysis of information from all sources, not just from secret and official sources of information, but also from the cornucopia of open literature and

academic research available on much of the developed world. Much of this information is highly fragmentary and much of the academic research is highly specialized. The task for intelligence is to analyze and integrate this material into assessments and judgments relevant to our nation's concerns abroad. From these assessments of the past and present must flow projections as far into the future as may be needed to permit policy formulation and planning for negotiations and action. And, a continuous flow of timely information and analyses is needed to update these assessments and projections and to alert our policy makers to new opportunities or potential crises so that they can plan accordingly.

In meeting these needs the Intelligence Community must measure up to a number of demanding standards. If intelligence is to provide meaningful and timely support, its reporting and analysis must cover and integrate all facets of foreign developments--military, political, economic, scientific, and sociological.

Intelligence must also be responsible--clear-cut; sharp; neither alarmist nor complacent--if it is to serve as a reliable basis for decision.

Effective intelligence must also avoid the bureaucratic penchant for ambiguities or delphic generalities which by anticipating all possible eventualities frustrate meaningful retrospective examination.

Finally, intelligence must be responsible by being independent of partisan preference or loyalty to preconceived judgments or purposely supportive of budgetary desires.

The forms intelligence may take in giving the policy maker the information he needs to do his job will vary. They range from the dissemination of single raw intelligence reports to complex analytical memoranda or national intelligence reports. They may include oral briefings or daily publications on world-wide developments. In fast-moving situations the Intelligence Community may issue special memoranda alerting the policy maker to an imminent crisis. In actual crises special situation reports are issued as frequently as developments warrant.

The critical test of intelligence, however, is not the reporting of observed events, but rather its early identification of future events.

If it is doing its job intelligence should be able to identify and describe the forces at work which are shaping the future. And it should be able to do this far enough in advance so that appropriate US policy or actions can be planned.

In looking at the future predicting specific events is only one aspect of the intelligence process. The Intelligence Community should not be judged by the exactitude of timing with which it predicted a coup; for example, the occurrence of an unfavorable event without some form of prior alert is much more an indication of an intelligence failure than is the failure to predict the precise date of a specific event.

Equally the Intelligence Community should not be a Cassandra who by overwarning about events dulls the sensitivities of consumers.

The overriding need in intelligence is to strike that careful balance between alerting policy officials to pending developments that will impact on our national interests and forecasting the precise timing of such events.

Since the members of the Intelligence Community are as fallible as all mortals, we lay no claim to being soothsayers. Our judgments on the future are of necessity probabilistic. We have and

we will make errors, but as I review the performance of the Intelligence Community I feel strongly that its overall record is good and that it is serving its country well. I believe we are doing well not only in the narrow task of prediction but more importantly in the function of preparing our Government officials with an understanding of the factors affecting foreign developments so that they can formulate proper policies and take appropriate actions even in unanticipated situations.

To give you some insight as to why I believe this I would like to report to you on some representative problems examined by the Intelligence Community over the past few years.

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The remaining text will cover six functional areas of production, as shown with text devoted to examples under each heading:

Development of Soviet and Chinese Strategic Weapons

- ICBM Programs
- ABM Program
- SAM Systems

Soviet Space Program

- Apollo-Soyuz
- Soviet Lunar Program

Deployment of Soviet and Chinese Strategic Weapons

- In the SALT context
- China Search Program

Science and Technology

- Africa/Middle East Locust Plague
- Soviet Computers

Political and Military Affairs

- Indochina
- Portugal
- Cyprus
- Italy

Economic Developments

- International Monetary Crisis
- Oil
- East-West Trade
- Soviet Economy