[NSC 1106/8/8]

Top Secret	
	(b)(3)



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

## Central Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

51

17 November 1972

(b)(3)

Approved for Release: 2018/08/22 C06762110



(b)(3)

The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President, the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the department of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and enclosed with brackets.

Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the light of further information, and more complete analysis.

Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated further, but only on a need-to-know basis.

The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is published in both a Top Secret Codeword and a Secret edition. Recipients of the more tightly held Codeword version should not discuss it or its Codeword contents with recipients of the Secret edition.

## WARNING

		(b)(3)

TOP SECRET

Approved for Release: 2018/08/22 C06762110

TOP SECRET

(b)(3)

SC No. 00276/72 17 November 1972

## Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS	
	NR Record
CYPRUS: Greek Cypriots concerned over activities	
CYPRUS: Greek Cypriots concerned over activities of forces loyal to Grivas. (Page 10)	
	NR Record
	• .

(b)(3)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET	
TOL SECKET	

(b)(3)

CYPRUS: Increased activity by forces loyal to General Grivas has created concern in the Greek Cypriot community, but President Makarios maintains that there is no reason for alarm.

Last week Greek Cypriot authorities uncovered a new undergound organization known as EOKA B, believed to be headed by Grivas, a persistent campaigner for enosis-union with Greece. Authorities have since intensified security precautions and increased police patrols around the island.

Makarios, in a conversation with a US Embassy official, played down the significance of groups such as EOKA B, claiming he can control any moves by Grivas supporters. At least some of his outward confidence may be for popular consumption; he may feel expressions of concern would only add to tensions within the Greek Cypriot community. In recent months, the community has seemed unusually united in its willingness to end differences with the Turkish Cypriots, and this has led to a more forthcoming attitude in the intercommunal talks.

In an attempt to undermine the talks by destroying this unity, Grivas could decide on a campaign of violence. The effects of such tactics would depend largely on the ability and willingness of Greek Cypriot security forces to ferret out Grivas supporters. Pro-Grivas sentiment is known to exist among some elements of the security forces. The outcome of Grivas' effort would also depend upon Makarios' success in turning the considerable support he enjoys within the Greek Cypriot community against Grivas.

(b)(3)

17 Nov 72

Central Intelligence Bulletin

10

TOP SECRET