

**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SECURITY COMMITTEE**

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SECOM-D-59
23 April 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Comments on Director of Central Intelligence
Directive No. 1/11, Security Committee

REFERENCE : Your memo of 22 April 1975 to me (attached)

1. Attached is a memorandum, with a copy of DCID 1/11, which can be utilized by Mr. Knoche as a talking paper in discussion with personnel of the Rockefeller Commission with regard to their concern that the wording of DCID 1/11 is such that it might constitute a "hunting license" to conduct investigations.

2. While I am confident DCID 1/11 will not be utilized in this manner, there are possible changes suggested in the attached paper (not recommended, just possible). It might be well for General Wilson or even the DCI to be consulted on this because if these changes are suggested to the Commission they may very well come back as a recommendation by the Commission.

Chairman

Attachments

This paper may be downgraded to Unclassified when removed from attachment.

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COMMENTS ON
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/11
"SECURITY COMMITTEE"

PURPOSE

To respond to the concern expressed by the Rockefeller Commission that DCID 1/11, which is the charter for the USIB Security Committee, is so worded that it might constitute a "hunting license" to conduct investigations.

BACKGROUND


DCID 1/11 (copy attached) was revised effective 23 August 1974. In connection with responsibilities of the Security Committee concerning unauthorized disclosures or compromise of intelligence sources and methods, three paragraphs of the Directive are pertinent:

"2. Mission

The mission of the Committee is to provide the means by which the Director of Central Intelligence, with the advice of United States Intelligence Board principals can:

- d. Ensure that appropriate investigations are made of any unauthorized disclosure or compromise of intelligence or of intelligence sources and methods

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and that the results of such investigations, along with appropriate recommendations, are provided to the Director of Central Intelligence.

"3. Function

c. On behalf of the Director of Central Intelligence to call upon departments and agencies to investigate any unauthorized disclosure or compromise of intelligence or of intelligence sources and methods occurring within their departments and agencies; to report the results of these investigations to the Director of Central Intelligence, through the United States Intelligence Board. Such reports will (1) assess the disclosure's impact on the US intelligence process, and its implications for national security and foreign relations, (2) describe corrective measures taken or needed to prevent such disclosures in the future or to minimize the adverse effects of the case at hand, and (3) recommend any appropriate additional actions.

"4. Community Responsibilities

b. Each USIB principal is responsible for investigation of any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence or intelligence sources and methods occurring

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within his department or agency. When investigation determines that the possibility of compromise cannot be discounted, and the interests of the USIB or another USIB principal are involved or affected, the results of investigation will be forwarded to the Security Committee for review and possible remedial action as determined appropriate by the Committee. "

COMMENTS

No investigation of unauthorized disclosures have been requested by the Security Committee since the revised DCID 1/11 became effective and none since I was appointed Chairman 9 July 1974. There has also been no occasion during this period for the Security Committee to make a report to the DCI on unauthorized disclosures. I certainly do not intend to utilize the DCID as any "hunting license" to conduct investigations. It is noted that the Chairman of the Security Committee from its inception until July 1974 was also the Director of Security, CIA, and so had dual responsibilities. The Chairman now is attached to the Intelligence Community Staff, serves under the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community and the DCI and has no dual responsibility with respect to CIA security.

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From a previous inquiry I believe the Commission is concerned with the surveillance conducted by the CIA Office of Security of Jack Anderson and Michael Getler. A copy of my memo to Mr. Alan E. Brody, Office of the Inspector General, dated 21 March 1975, concerning this inquiry by Mr. Roethe of the Commission, is attached. If the Commission desires to make recommendation along these lines, some changes could be suggested.

(a) In connection with paragraph 2(d), this is a general statement of the mission of the Security Committee. It establishes the body to which the DCI, with the advice of USIB principals, can turn to ensure appropriate investigations are made. It does not stipulate that the Committee will do any investigation on its own. I would suggest no changes in this paragraph.

(b) In connection with paragraph 3(c), a change could be suggested to require approval by the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community or by the Director of Central Intelligence before the Security Committee would "call upon departments and agencies to investigate any unauthorized disclosure." This would elevate the authority level required and require additional consideration before any investigation is called for by the Committee. This could

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be done by changing the word "behalf" to "approval" in the first line of paragraph 3(c). To limit the scope of any such investigation and preclude any possible interpretation that the statement of functions in paragraph 3(c) could serve as a "hunting license" an additional sentence could be added to read:

"No investigation shall be conducted under the authority of this Directive of any individual not affiliated by employment or contract with the Executive Branch of the Government. "

(c) In connection with paragraph 4(b), it is believed every USIB principal should rightfully be concerned with and responsible for unauthorized disclosures within his department or agency and I, therefore, do not believe paragraph 4(b) might be misconstrued to give unwarranted authority.

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