

1 June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT : Chronological Record of White House Support

1. Attached are two chronologies: one covering, in summary, support given the White House at the request of David R. Young in connection with preparing and furnishing personality profiles on Daniel Ellsberg; the other summarizing general operational support provided E. Howard Hunt, and various requests from him.

2. It is noted that the two activities, while conducted separately, actually ran simultaneously in point of time. The Ellsberg affair started in mid-July 1971, concluding with a meeting and delivery of the final paper on 12 November 1971. Hunt's requests and the support given him ran from 22 July 1971 until mid-October 1971 when Hunt-- apparently through a completely independent and personal channel [redacted] -received his last help from the Agency. It is noted that Hunt was a participant in discussions on the Ellsberg matter, although he did not take the initiative in the relations with Agency personnel to the same degree that he was the action man in other dealings with the DDP (as then styled).

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3. During the period of the Agency's support both Young and Hunt were insistent on being given what they requested. Hunt, in discussing his requirements, kept alive the high-level nature of his work, invoking the White House's direct interest by citing Ehrlichman's specific approval of what he was doing. It is noted that the record does not fully support the view that the Agency finally did cut off Hunt cleanly. Dick Krueger, Deputy Chief of Technical Services Division (now Office of Technical Service) did react perceptively and positively, raising a question twice about how far things seemed to be going. Krueger first raised the question on 20 August, being told to proceed, and again about six days later, at which time limits were set on further support. Hunt was not told that he would receive no further support, but that he would not be given the back-stopping he requested without further authorization. Nor was

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EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE

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he turned down flatly in his request for a secretary; he would not accept a substitute for the one he specifically requested. Hunt did not seem to view the limits placed on his support as the end, as he contacted the case officer, Stephen Greenwood, again at the end of August, and later felt free to approach [redacted] Whatever the intent, the result was to achieve a stand down and virtually ended the operational support. As commendable as was Kruenger's challenge, and we think it worth note, the Agency's position was not as clean cut as it sometimes is presented. Of course, despite reservations expressed to members of the White House staff, they apparently took no action to modify the program.

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4. A note of warning. The dates for TSD's support to Hunt are uncertain after the beginning and until the end. The operation was viewed as sensitive, and few records were kept. The dates we have used are based in part on TSD memoranda, and partly on records of Karl Wagner's, which help fix time somewhat more precisely. One interesting conflict in dates is Greenwood's memory of his meeting when Hunt returned from the West Coast (where he undoubtedly had cased the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist before the 3 September break-in). Greenwood thinks it was 23 August 1971 (we think it was closer to 26 August). If it was 23 August, it coincides with the time shown in the Ellsberg chronology when Hunt was not available to meet with [redacted] to discuss the paper being prepared.

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[redacted]
William V. Broe
Inspector General

Attachments:

- (1) Chronology on Support to White House re Daniel Ellsberg
- (2) Chronology on Support to White House re E. Howard Hunt

CHRONOLOGY ON AGENCY SUPPORT TO WHITE HOUSE
IN PREPARING A PERSONALITY PROFILE ON
DANIEL ELLSBERG

Mid-July 1971 David Young phoned Howard Osborn to request a psychological profile similar to that done on Castro. Osborn said this required DCI approval, as it involved a US citizen. Young offered to have Ehrlichman call Helms and Osborn agreed to take it up.

Few Days Osborn discussed Young request with Helms who
Later "reluctantly approved" with stipulation that he see whatever goes before it is released.

29 July 1971 Osborn passed requirement to Tietjen, who passed it to [redacted] who discussed it with [redacted]

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5 August 1971 First draft completed.

9 August 1971 Paper reviewed in meeting of Tietjen, [redacted]

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10 August 1971 Paper, dated 9 August, delivered to Osborn (by hand) by Tietjen.

11 August 1971 Osborn cleared with Helms and had it delivered to Young by special Security Courier. The transmittal note stated "I know that you appreciate that however this is used, the Agency should not become involved."

Few Days Young phoned Osborn to express dissatisfaction. He
Later offered additional material and asked that "we try again."

12 August 1971 [redacted] met Young at EOB. Liddy joined them. Young stated the project had the highest priority from Kissinger and Ehrlichman. Hunt joined them. There was talk of "trying Ellsberg in public." At the end, Hunt asked [redacted] to not report his presence.

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- 13 August 1971 [] received additional material from the White House. It seemed of Department of Justice origin and covered the following: (1) Ellsberg received "quasi-secret" material while he was in the service while applying for a PhD fellowship; (2) he volunteered for Vietnam service with State while getting divorced; (3) he had psychiatric treatment 1968-70 from a California psychiatrist; (4) he may have leaked information about a South Vietnamese in 1970 while receiving psychiatric treatment. (b)(3)
- 20 August 1971 [] and Tietjen met with Coffey to discuss a course of action. It was agreed that [] would meet with Young and explain the difficulties in providing what they want. (b)(3)
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- 23 August 1971 [] phoned Young saying ready to meet to discuss the materials. Young said Hunt was not available, but he would arrange for him to phone. (b)(3)
- 26 August 1971 Coffey's notes indicate that Tietjen reported that the meeting had occurred, but Coffey does not recall the substance. (This probably is in error, and may only have indicated that Tietjen called to say that [] had tried to get a meeting). (b)(3)
- 30 September 1971 Young phoned [] to suggest 27 October as a meeting date for Hunt. (b)(3)
- 12 October 1971 [] received more material from Hunt, with note asking report. (b)(3)
- 15 October 1971 Tietjen and [] met with Coffey. It was agreed that [] should see Young again, explaining difficulties and deficiencies of material on hand. (b)(3)
(b)(3)
- Late October 1971 [] went to see Coffey re guidance from Helms. There being none Coffey suggested that [] continue working on the paper. (b)(3)
(b)(3)
- 27 October 1971 [] met with Young and Hunt at EOB, and was told to write the report. (b)(3)

1 November
1971

Young phoned [] for the report the next day, and was told it was in the hands of [] supervisors.

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3 November
1971

More material received from Liddy.

8 November
1971

Tietjen forwarded the new paper, with the first, the note of transmittal being dated this date.

9 November
1971

Coffey phoned Tietjen saying the material had been reviewed (by the DCI) and to go ahead. (There is reference in Tietjen's statement, to a letter from the DCI to Young on this date).

12 November
1971

The date for a meeting at which the papers were delivered, [] meeting with Young, Hunt and Liddy.

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CHRONOLOGY ON AGENCY SUPPORT TO WHITE HOUSE

IN CONNECTION WITH REQUESTS BY

E. HOWARD HUNT

8 July 1971 The DDCI (General Cushman) noted at the morning meeting that Ehrlichman had phoned him to say that Howard Hunt had been appointed a security consultant for the White House

22 July 1971 Hunt met with Cushman to request assistance in "a highly sensitive mission by the White House to visit and elicit information from an individual whose ideology we aren't sure of." He wanted flash alias documentation and some degree of physical disguise. ". . . for a one-time op -- in and out."

(The transcript of the conversation shows Cushman expressing his unfamiliarity with how the Agency could perform, then:

"Mr. Hunt: Well, Ehrlichman said that you were the --

General Cushman: Yes, he called me. . ."

Later, Hunt said his phone extension was the same as "Chuck Colson.")

22 July 1971 Karl Wagner first telephoned EA/DDO [redacted] who referred him to AD/TSD (Dick Krueger). Krueger phoned [redacted] who gave the go ahead, saying he would brief the DDP. The true name of Hunt was not given, but the sensitive nature of the activity was emphasized, as was its high level nature.

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It was close to 1700 and Krueger quickly got his team together, first calling the [redacted]

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[redacted] who had no further part. who [redacted]

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selected Stephen Greenwood, [redacted] and [redacted] Unable to contact Hunt -- to be known as "Edward" -- it was settled that Greenwood would take the action the following day.

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23 July 1971

Greenwood went to the Office of the DDCI and picked up the keys to the safehouse from Karl Wagner. He only recalls the location as in the first block of Wisconsin Avenue after the intersection with Massachusetts Avenue. [redacted] said it was the Alto Towers. Greenwood went to the address where he waited until "Edward" appeared. He "programmed" him for disguise, phoning his description to [redacted] who turned the information over to [redacted] to prepare alias documentation, under the name of Edward J. Warren (a New York Drivers license, Social Security Card, RCA Record Club, National Rifle Association, NY Life Insurance Company, Continental Insurance Company, Wallachs charge identification card, First National City Bank card). These were not backstopped, being for "flash" identification purposes only. Hunt left and [redacted] delivered the cards in his absence, not meeting Hunt. Hunt returned and was given a wig, spectacles, and a speech alteration device. Greenwood also gave him his Agency telephone number.

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About week later

(30 July 1971)

Greenwood received a request from "Edward" to meet him and adjust his spectacles and also bring someone who could deliver a tape recorder. Non-backstopped business cards were also delivered. At this meeting "Edward" asked for a second speech device.

Greenwood thinks that "Edward" asked for credit cards (being told we didn't issue them), and a backstopped New York address and telephone number. (This may be a faulty recollection, as these did not become issues until later.) Greenwood also reports that "Edward" wanted another man disguised, which he says he reported to DC/TSD.

18 August 1971

Greenwood dated a report on use of a speech device on this date, but other records indicate the date may have been two days later.

18 August 1971 Howard Hunt phoned Karl Wagner and asked that a secretary, specifically [redacted] be assigned to him. He said Ehrlichman had suggested that he call General Cushman. Wagner offered to try to find someone else, which was not acceptable to Hunt. (b)(3)

20 August 1971 DC/TSD (Krueger) has records indicating that he contacted Karl Wagner on this date to validate additional requirements from "Edward" for a tape recorder and business cards. Wagner instructed TSD to proceed.

Apparently at a meeting on this date "Edward" was met by an additional officer from TSD, [redacted] "Edward" wanted to record a conversation between himself and someone else under difficult conditions. [redacted] said that he needed a stereo recorder instead of the monaural he apparently had been using. "Edward" asked that it be procured for him. (b)(3)

25 August 1971 Greenwood met "Edward" again. His associate was also disguised (wig and glasses), his description being phoned to TSD for alias documentation. He was issued flash documents in the name of George F. Leonard (Kansas Drivers License, Social Security card, Bro-Dart Home Library card, RCA Record Club card, Continental Insurance card). [redacted] prepared the cards. (b)(3)

"Edward" also wanted a concealed camera, which was discussed between [redacted] and DC/TSD. [redacted] was dispatched with two cameras, and carried the documentation with him. (b)(3)

"Edward's" associate selected a Tessina camera in a tobacco pouch, and [redacted] instructed him in its use. (b)(3)

It was apparently at this meeting that "Edward" was given the recorder by [redacted] It was a Uher recorder, with two lavalier-type studio microphones (some 8" x 1-1/2") to be hung around the neck or stood on a stand (b)(3)

on a table (probably Sony manufacture). This equipment was carried in a typewriter case (not considered a concealment device by TSD). TSD states that the microphones are not suitable for audio surveillance, and reports that it is trying to reassemble a sample package similar to that given "Edward" at the time.

At this meeting "Edward" also requested credit cards again, and at this time (probably instead of 30 July) he first requested backstopped telephone and mail address in New York.

26 August 1971

When Greenwood reported "Edward's" requests, DC/TSD (Krueger) phoned Karl Wagner. The DDCI phoned back, expressing his concern and identifying "Edward" to Krueger (who did not tell anyone else in TSD at the time). Backstopped documentation was not to be authorized and Greenwood was to so inform Hunt.

About this time, and perhaps as a result of the conversation with DDCI (Krueger recalls it as 24 August), Krueger gave instructions to Greenwood to specify to "Edward" what the limits would be on future support.

- (1) A delay in future support until supervisors have further authorization on (a) photographic support, (b) backstopped documents, (c) audio equipment (although not requested to date).
- (2) Backstopping must be approved through the Director's office.
- (3) The camera loan was a one-time affair.
- (4) We would continue to assist with alias documentation for "Edward".
- (5) We wanted back the documents of his associate.
- (6) Don't press Greenwood, as he isn't authorized.
- (7) If further authorization is forthcoming further support would follow.

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26 August 1971
(continued)

Greenwood dates this as 23 August, but it must have been later, as it had to follow the 25 August meeting (which is dated from other information). Greenwood received a telephone call from "Edward" asking to be met at Dulles Airport at about 0600 the next morning, to pick up film.

Greenwood met the plane, "Edward" having his associate in company. The camera was returned along with film for Greenwood to develop. Arrangements had been made for [] to be ready to process it.

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The pictures seemed routine surveillance scenes-- parking lot, office building, etc. Greenwood was to return the film in the afternoon and met with Krueger before doing so. This seems to be the time that Krueger set up the limitations for further support of Hunt.

When Greenwood returned the photographs to "Edward" he began to state the restrictions, being interrupted about halfway through by "Edward", who said he thought he had the Agency's full cooperation. He said he would straighten it out.

27 August 1971

Krueger phoned Wagner to report Hunt's request of Greenwood, i. e., meeting the plane and processing film, as well as backstopped documents, address and phone.

27 August 1971

DDCI phoned Ehrlichman, his note of conversation stating "J.E. indicated he would call a halt to this."

30 August 1971

DDCI reported to Helms the telephone call to Ehrlichman, forwarding a copy of Wagner's memorandum of his 27 August telecon with Krueger. His buckslip note concluded with:

"John said he would restrain Hunt."

Helms noted -- "Good."

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31 August 1971 Greenwood received a telephone call at home from Hunt renewing his request for backstopped credit cards, which was turned down.

14-15 October 1971 Greenwood briefed General Cushman on the activity with Hunt, in preparation for a lunch that Cushman was planning to have with Hunt. (O/DDCI has checked Cushman's calendar for this information, to see if the lunch actually came off but no confirmation is available.)

October 1971 Hunt asked [redacted] Chief of EUR Division, about the possibility of obtaining some information about a leak of documents in the French government. [redacted] directed him to John Caswell, Executive Officer of the Division, who, on [redacted] instructions, provided Hunt with unclassified material concerning a 1954 case of leakage of government documents in France.

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