

23 January 1985

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

Issue for Decision

Concurrence with the interagency consensus update to the January 1984 conclusion that the USSR has violated its legal obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol. [redacted]

(b)(3)

Background

As a Party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Soviet Union undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or retain biological agents or toxins, and weapons and equipment for the use of such agents or toxins in hostile actions or armed conflict. The convention further prohibits the transfer to any recipient of such agents, toxins and weapons. [redacted]

(b)(3)

The 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating and poisonous gases and the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. [redacted]

(b)(3)

This issue has been raised with the USSR [redacted] in diplomatic channels. [redacted]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(2)
(b)(3)

Interagency analysis on this issue is complete. [redacted]

Finding of the January Report

"...the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of tricothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos and Kampuchea and...these toxins...were developed in the Soviet Union.... Tricothecene mycotoxins have been used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan.... These activities were judged to be in violation of legal obligations under customary international law,...the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1975. The continued construction at some of the suspect biological warfare research, production, and storage facilities...have given rise to additional serious concerns about Soviet compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The fact that mycotoxins have been widely used as warfare agents...confirms the continued existence of a development, production, and weaponization program...explicitly prohibited by the Convention. The Soviet Union...has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligations." [redacted]

(b)(3)

[Large redacted block]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

[redacted]

(b)(3)



~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

TAB A

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS

NSC Staff Recommendation: Concur with the interagency agreement.



~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)

36



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Decision

The issue:

Concur with the interagency agreement to update and confirm the January 1984 conclusion according to the above conclusions paragraphs.

NSC Staff
Recommend
Concur

A-2
~~SECRET~~

(b)(3)