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
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
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
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Greece: A President and His Policies

George Papadopoulos' position has been strengthened, at least for a time, by the vote on 29 July that confirmed the new republic and made him president until June 1981. Key figures in the former military regime are now preoccupied with jockeying for position in the new government. Criticism of Papadopoulos' personal role will continue, however, and could still develop into a move by one or another of his colleagues to unseat him.

Papadopoulos worries about three broad categories of opposition forces:

--The least worrisome are the pre-revolutionary political leaders. The most vocal are in exile; they are a nuisance, not a threat. Many of them represent the extreme right or the extreme left of pre-revolutionary politics and have little or no following at home. More moderate politicians in this group, like former premier Karamanlis, are beginning to stir, and many cooperated prior to the plebiscite in urging a "no" vote. They have no leverage at all on the present government, and it will be a long time before they can hope to rally enough popular support--they would need an especially burning domestic issue--to make their presence felt.

--The second category is of more serious concern, but is one which Papadopoulos and his colleagues have so far been able to handle. This is an amorphous band of "super-revolutionaries" made up of younger officers of the Greek armed forces. They want to purify the revolution and carry it even further than their superiors.

--It is the third category, his comrades of the 1967 coup, that Papadopoulos must persuade or, more typically, outmaneuver if he is to stay

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in power. The big four--Pattakos, Makarezos, Angelis, and Ioannides--control, either directly or through their subordinates, most of the units in the armed forces. Ioannides alone could make or break a putsch through his control of the military's internal security apparatus and his personal following among second-rank officers. Papadopoulos has been able to play his coup colleagues off against each other, and most of them would rather have him out in front anyway. They know, however, that he would prefer to rule without them, and they rankle at the inroads he is making into their individual and collective authority.

Most of the trouble Papadopoulos encountered during the pre-plebiscite period came from his colleagues within the junta. Although most of the military leaders favored the abolition of the monarchy and the creation of a republic, there was consternation among them when Papadopoulos moved so swiftly, leaving them no time to object to details of his plans. They dislike the idea that Papadopoulos gains even more power under the new republic, while theirs may be diminished substantially. Some senior military people--like Ioannides--fear that parliamentary elections will open the door to the influences their 1967 coup was intended to suppress.

They chafe most of all, however, over Papadopoulos' secrecy, which has separated them from the making of policy. Most of Papadopoulos' senior military colleagues agree that they must watch him closely and find a way to make their own influence felt more heavily on his decisions.

During the next month or so, Papadopoulos and his senior colleagues will be testing each other's strengths. They will also be reorganizing the government apparatus for the new republic. The Supreme Court will validate the 78.4-percent affirmative vote in the next two weeks. The formal complaints of opposition politicians over voting irregularities will undoubtedly be ignored. There will be minor institutional changes; for example, a constitutional court

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may soon be set up to oversee the eventual formation of political parties. Extensive discussion over how many and what kind of parties should be allowed is probable. Some cabinet members may be installed in office, but the important posts will not be filled until fall. That should give Papadopoulos ample time to decide which of his military associates he can safely fire and which he must keep on.

Later in the fall, Papadopoulos will face renewed criticism from outside the regime. The students have promised to resume their agitation for educational reform. Their demonstrations last spring turned into an attack on the regime, and Papadopoulos' heavy-handed tactics were an embarrassment to many government leaders, including some key military officers. Inflation is another growing problem. Pro- test strikes could hit the big cities in consequence.

These and other problems may significantly weaken Papadopoulos' position. Military critics will almost certainly move to exploit all opportunities to preserve or enhance their positions at Papadopoulos' expense. In addition, having committed himself to elections in 1974, Papadopoulos will be under international pressure to meet that deadline. During the same period, resistance among the military to elections is likely to rise, and sometime before national elections actually take place Papadopoulos could face a concerted effort by his associates to bring him down. [REDACTED]

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