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Handwritten signature: J. R. S. (Records Center)

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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31 October 1967



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
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*Vietnam:

North Vietnam: Despite recent heavy MIG losses and damage to its principal airfields, Hanoi apparently intends to maintain at least a limited jet fighter capability.

[redacted] the runways at all of North Vietnam's major airfields again have serviceable landing surfaces. This includes the primary field at Phuc Yen where flight forecasts resumed on 28 October.

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By keeping a few MIGs at bases in the Hanoi/Hai-phong area and shuttling replacement aircraft to and from reserves in Communist China, North Vietnam can maintain a jet fighter threat. It would force US bomber groups to be accompanied by fighter cover while exposing only a small portion of Hanoi's air establishment.

There are no signs that Hanoi intends to operate directly out of Chinese bases. The distance from these fields to the Hanoi area would greatly reduce the time the MIGs could maintain defensive patrols.

[redacted] a third North Vietnamese artillery regiment may have shifted into the area just north of the Demilitarized Zone. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] Two North Vietnamese artillery regiments are already in the DMZ area.

South Vietnam: A marked increase in enemy activity in northern III Corps has been evident for several days, possibly as a result of the repositioning and reorganization of Communist units in the area.

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On 27 October the 88th North Vietnamese Army Regiment--a former subordinate of the B-3 Front in the Western Highlands--mounted a multibattalion attack against a South Vietnamese Army outpost near Phuoc Vinh. This was followed up by an assault on 29 and 30 October against two government outposts in the Loc Ninh area of northern Binh Long Province. Two battalions of the 273rd Regiment of the Viet Cong 9th Division were involved. [redacted] these units only recently completed a reorganization in preparation for new activity. (b)(3)

Despite the high Communist losses in these attacks, the Communists may believe that they were worthwhile since they forced the commitment of a major portion of allied mobile reserve forces to the area, thus limiting the allies' ability to reinforce other installations in III Corps. [redacted] (Map) (b)(3)

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USSR: The link-up and separation of two un-
manned Soviet spacecraft is probably a forerunner to
a manned event.

[redacted]

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[redacted] The Russians announced that an on-board TV
system transmitted pictures of the joined vehicles [redacted]

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The use of this highly sophisticated technique of
automated rendezvous and docking marks a significant
advance in Soviet space technology. It enabled the So-
viets to perform a critical test in their manned program
without risking the life of a cosmonaut. [redacted]

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NOTES

Communist China - Indonesia: Communist China's decision to allow Indonesia to remove its diplomatic personnel from Peking reflects a desire to close out an increasingly unfavorable situation.

[Redacted]

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Once diplomatic personnel have departed, both China and Indonesia will regard relations as "suspended" but not broken.

[Redacted]

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Czechoslovakia-Iraq: Czechoslovakia has recently sold at least twenty L-29 jet trainers to Iraq.

[Redacted]

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USSR: The Soviets conducted their second extended-range test of a solid propellant ICBM to the mid-Pacific on 29 October. Like the first extended-range launch of the missile on 23 October, the shot flew 4,700 miles from Plesetsk. The firing completed the current test series, and the Soviets reopened the impact area to navigation on 30 October. The three Soviet range-instrumentation ships monitoring the tests probably will now move to stations from which they can support a space shot.

[Redacted]

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
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[Redacted]

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
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UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS DETECTED IN THE USSR

DATE — YIELD — PLAC (b)(1)
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Dates are Washington local time

YIELD RANGES: Low -- less than 20 kilotons
 Low-Intermediate -- 20 to 200 kilotons
 Intermediate -- 200 kilotons to 1 megaton
 High -- more than 1 megaton

* The test on 6 May 1966 was a double event consisting of 2 low-yield explosions detonated nearly simultaneously.

There were two underground nuclear explosions (11 October 1961 and 2 February 1962) prior to the signing of the partial test ban treaty in August 1963.

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USSR: An underground nuclear test in the low-intermediate range was conducted at Semipalatinsk on 30 October. This is the fourteenth Soviet test detected this year. Forty-nine underground tests have been detected in the USSR since the signing of the limited test ban treaty in 1963. [REDACTED]

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Peru: Labor unrest in southern Peru has eased with the acceptance by striking workers of the government's offer of a sliding scale of wage increases up to 23 percent to compensate for the rise in prices since devaluation. The settlement was expedited by firm police control and by recognition that a prolonged strike could provoke military intervention. Further labor unrest is likely, however, when present contracts expire--many of them on 1 December--and the unions press for future wage adjustments. [REDACTED]

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*Congo (Kinshasa): The prolonged Congolese army offensive against the mercenaries in Bukavu has probably killed any last remaining hopes for a peaceful evacuation of the mercenaries under International Red Cross auspices. A Red Cross demand that Mobutu call an immediate cease-fire will doubtless fall on officials who are both unable and unwilling to do anything about it. In any case, mercenary leader Schramme now has a perfect excuse to back out of the September evacuation agreement--which called for a cease-fire during negotiations--if he so desires. [REDACTED]

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