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SECTION 1 OF 2

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CITE CIA 359057 SERIAL:	(b)(3)
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PASS:	(b)(3)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	·
WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASS S E C R E TNOFORN DIST: 24 JANUARY 2001 COUNTRY: ZIMBABWE/CONGO(K) SUBJ: BELIEF BY DROC AND ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENTS THAT THE UNITED STATES MAY HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN KABILA'S ASSASSINATION; ZIMBABWEAN PLANS FOR PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN THE DROC	
DOI:	(b)(1)
SOURCE:	(b)(3) (b)(1)
	(b)(1) (b)(3)
SUMMARY: NONE	
IN MEETINGS HELD IN HARARE, ZIMBABWE, BETWEEN	(b)(1) (b)(3)
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DROC) AND ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS FOLLOWING THE MID-JANUARY ASSASSINATION OF DROC PRESIDENT LAURENT ((KABILA)), DROC OFFICIALS PUT FORTH THE THEORY THAT THE UNITED STATES (U.S.), SPECIFICALLY U.S. INTELLIGENCE, WAS INVOLVED IN KABILA'S ASSASSINATION. THE DROC OFFICIALS TOLD ZIMBABWEAN OFFICIALS THEY BELIEVED KABILA'S ASSASSINATION WAS DELIBERATELY TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE ASSASSINATION OF CONGOLESE PRIN MINISTER PATRICE ((LUMUMBA)) IN 1961, WHICH THEY ALSO BELIEVE WAS CARRIED OUT BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THIS ASSERTION, COMBINED WITH KABILA'S MARXIST POLITICAL BACKGROUND AND THE PERSISTENT PERCEPTION BY THE DROC AND ZIMBABWE OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR RWANDA AND UGANDA IN THE DROC WAR, HAS LED ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO U.S. INVOLVEMENT, EITHER UNILATERALLY OR THROUGH ITS SUPPORT TO THE OPPOSING FORCES IN THE REGION.  ZIMBABWEAN OFFICIALS CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF U.S.  INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASSASSINATION AS NO MORE OR LESS LIKELY THAN THE OTHER THEORIES DISCUSSED WITH DROC OFFICIALS, INCLUDING COUP ATTEMPT	/IE  (b)(1) (b)(3)
BY DROC GENERALS AND/OR DROC'S ALLIES.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
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	(b)(1)
	(b)(3)
2. REGARDING THE DROC PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION,	(b)(1) (b)(3)
ZIMBABWE HAD THE UPPER HAND IN ANY DECISION AS TO WHO WOULD	(0)(0)
SUCCEED THE ELDER KABILA, AND THAT INTERIM PRESIDENT JOSEPH	
((KABILA)) WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE REAL POWER BEHIND ANY NEW PRESIDENT. TO THIS END, ZIMBABWE WOULD ENSURE THAT, IF A NEW	
PRESIDENT WERE SELECTED TO REPLACE JOSEPH KABILA, THE LATTER WOULD B	E
NAMED VICE PRESIDENT OR MINISTER OF DEFENSE. THE CURRENT PLAN OF	_
SENIOR ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IS TO REACH A CONSENSUS BY THE	-IF
ALLIED POWERS, WITH THE DROC HAVING THE FINAL SAY. ZIMBABWE IS	-
CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT DROC OFFICIALS WILL ACQUIESCE TO ZIMBABWE'S	
PREFERENCE, GIVEN THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES	
AND ZIMBABWE'S ROLE AS THE DROC'S MAIN SOURCE OF MILITARY SUPPORT.	
THE ZIMBABWEAN GOVERNMENT DID NOT ANTICIPATE	(b)(1)
ANY MAJOR DISAGREEMENTS WITH ANGOLA OR NAMIBIA ON THE SUCCESSION	(b)(3)
ISSUE. THE ZIMBABWEANS BELIEVE THEIR ROLE AS THE MAIN	(b)(1)
PLAYER IN THIS ISSUE WAS EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT NEARLY HALF THE	(b)(3)
DROC CABINET CAME TO HARARE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ASSASSINATION, FOR	
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ZIMBABWEAN LEADERSHIP ON DEALING WITH THE	
ASSASSINATION AND ESTABLISHING AN INTERIM DROC GOVERNMENT.	(b)(1)
3. PRESIDENT ROBERT ((MUGABE)) HAD ENSURED THE WORD WAS OUT TO DROC PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRANTS TO COME TO	(b)(1)
HARARE FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THEIR PLANS FOR THE DROC, TO INCLUDE	(2)(0)
RAPHAEL KATEBE ((KATOTO)), A CONGOLESE BUSINESSMAN RESIDING IN	
BELGIUM, AND A NATIVE OF KATANGA, DROC	(b)(1)
KATOTO HAD APPROACHED THE ZIMBABWEANS THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES (NFI)	(b)(3)
ABOUT ZIMBABWEAN SUPPORT FOR HIS CANDIDACY.	
4.	
	(b)(1)
	(b)(3)
POC:	(b)(1)
COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS WELCOME.	(b)(1)
ADMIN	(~/(~)
ACQ:	(b)(1)
DISSEM:	(b)(3)
	(b)(1)
	(b)(3)

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END OF MESSAGE SECRET.  CABLETYPE:  BT  #1348	(b)(3

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