


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TO: DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA, TREASURY DEPT,
ZEN/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ZEN/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
STAFF, ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS,
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PA.

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DIST: 4 SEPTEMBER 1982 PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC); STATE FOR INR;
USCINCSO FOR J-2.


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
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COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR

SUBJECT: ATTEMPTS BY THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE
(ARENA) TO ENLIST SUPPORT OF MILITARY OFFICERS
AGAINST SALVADORAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE; ATTITUDES
OF DEPARTMENTAL COMMANDERS TOWARD MINISTER OF
DEFENSE.



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SOURCE :

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1. SINCE EARLY AUGUST 1982, MEMBERS AND SYMPATHIZERS
OF THE NATIONALIST REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA) PARTY HAVE
BEEN LOBBYING STRONGLY AMONG MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE
SALVADORAN DEPARTMENTS TO INCREASE OPPOSITION TO MINISTER OF
DEFENSE, GENERAL JOSE GUILLERMO ((GARCIA)). THE ARENA
LOBBYING EFFORT HAS TAKEN THE FORM OF PERSONAL VISITS AND
PHONE CALLS TO SALVADORAN OFFICERS BY ARENA DEPUTIES TO THE
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AS WELL AS A DISTRIBUTION OF ANTI-GARCIA
LITERATURE AMONG OFFICERS. TWO OF THOSE MOST ACTIVE IN THE
EFFORT AGAINST GARCIA ARE ARENA DEPUTY TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
AND FORMER ARMY COLONEL, JORGE ALBERTO ((JARQUIN)), AND
THE CURRENT DIRECTOR OF THE SALVADORAN NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

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ADMINISTRATION (ANTEL), COLONEL NICHOLAS ((CARRANZA)). THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE CRITICIZED GARCIA FOR HIS PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF LAND REFORM, WHICH, ACCORDING TO JARQUIN AND CARRANZA, ALIGNS THE ARMED FORCES WITH PARTISAN POLITICAL PROGRAMS OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC).

2. ADDITIONALLY, THE ARENA LITERATURE WHICH HAS FOUND ITS WAY INTO MILITARY GARRISONS IN THE DEPARTMENTS CASTIGATES GARCIA FOR FAILURE TO VIGOROUSLY PROSECUTE THE WAR AGAINST THE INSURGENCY AND FOR MAINTAINING PERSONAL POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS. MOST OF THE LITERATURE CONSISTS OF PAMPHLETS AND UNSIGNED OPEN LETTERS, SOME OF WHICH HAVE BEEN CONFISCATED BY MILITARY COMMANDERS WHO FORBID THE PRESENCE OF POLITICAL LITERATURE IN THEIR GARRISONS.

3. AS A RESULT OF THE ARENA PROPAGANDA AND CONTACT WITH ARENA ACTIVISTS, MANY JUNIOR OFFICERS HAVE EXPRESSED CONFUSION TO THEIR SENIOR COMMANDERS AS TO THE PROPER ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES. THE MAJORITY OF THESE JUNIOR OFFICERS REGARD THE ARENA LOBBYING EFFORT IN THE ARMED FORCES AS SEDITIONARY, AND BELIEVE THAT THE ARMED FORCES HAS AN INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO DEFEND THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE.

4. THE MAJORITY OF SALVADORAN SENIOR OFFICERS PLAN TO TAKE NO PART IN THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING MINISTER OF DEFENSE GARCIA AND WILL NEITHER PUT PRESSURE ON HIM TO RESIGN NOR VOCALLY INSIST UPON HIS CONTINUED SERVICE. THESE SENIOR OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT GARCIA'S STRONGEST CRITICS IN THE ARMED FORCES INCLUDE COLONEL SIGFRIEDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ OF CABANAS DEPARTMENT; COLONEL JOSE DOMINGO ((MONTERROSA)), COMMANDER OF THE ATACATL BATTALION; COLONEL JAIME ((FLORES)), COMMANDER OF SAN MIGUEL DEPARTMENT, AND POSSIBLY LTC RAMON ANTONIO MORALES ((RUIZ)), DEPARTMENTAL COMMANDER OF LA UNION AND MORAZAN. COLONEL ADOLFO ((BLANDON)), COMMANDER OF SANTA ANA DEPARTMENT, AND COLONEL CARLOS ((LOPEZ)) NUILA, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL POLICE, ARE BELIEVED TO FAVOR GARCIA'S RETENTION AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE.

5. ALTHOUGH COLONELS OCHOA, MONTERROSA AND OTHERS WOULD CLEARLY LIKE TO SEE THE RESIGNATION OF GARCIA, THEIR FELLOW SENIOR OFFICERS DOUBT THAT THESE PRO-ARENA COMMANDERS FAVOR AN ACTUAL MILITARY COUP AGAINST THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT, AS SUCH A MOVE WOULD LIKELY FORCE THE UNITED STATES TO TERMINATE AID TO THE SALVADORAN MILITARY. [REDACTED] COMMENT: A MILITARY COUP AT THIS TIME IS ALMOST AN IMPOSSIBILITY AND HAS NO SUPPORT WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES.)

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6. ACQ: [REDACTED]
FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

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7. [REDACTED]

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REPORT CLASS SECRET - WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

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AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS -



ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.

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