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REPORT CLASS S E C R E T--NOFORN

DIST:

7 MARCH 2001

COUNTRY: CONGO(K)/ZIMBABWE

SECH

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SUBJ:	ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION INVESTIGATING THE ASSASSINATION OF DROC PRESIDENT LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA	
DOI:		(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)
SUMMARY:	NONE	
JOSEPH (THE COMMISSION WOULD NOT FINISH UNTIL MID- TO LATE MARCH, I.E. SOMETIME AFTER PRESIDENT (KABILA))'S TRIP TO EUROPE. IN ADDITION TO THE FACT THAT ESSION HAD STARTED ITS WORK 10 DAYS LATE, THERE WERE STILL SOLESE OFFICIALS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL TO BE QUESTIONED.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
DIFFERENT IF THERE BELIEVED, CLOSE PRO	IT HAD BEEN IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE ON TO DRAW ANY CONCLUSIONS BECAUSE THERE WERE SO MANY T VERSIONS OF WHAT OCCURRED, AND IT MIGHT NEVER BE CLEAR WAS ACTUALLY A PLOT OR NOT. THE COMMISSION CURRENTLY HOWEVER, THAT ALL OF THE MEMBERS OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S OTECTION UNIT WERE AWARE OF THE PLAN TO KILL THE T; MOST WERE FROM SOUTH KIVU PROVINCE, AND THEY HAD SENT	(b)(1) (b)(3)
	TES TO CONGO/BRAZZAVILLE IN ADVANCE OF THE ASSASSINATION. COMMENT: THE COMMISSION LEARNED OF THIS BECAUSE SOME OF S WERE ARRESTED IN THE DROC BEFORE THEY WERE ABLE TO GO TO LLE.)	(b)(1) (b)(3)
ANSELME N FROM SOUT CONGO/BRA LINK BETW KABILA'S PRESIDENT ESCAPE FR	MANY OF THOSE WHO WERE WITH THE ABORTIVE COUP PLOT DIRECTED BY COMMANDANT WINDAGA ((MASASU)) IN OCTOBER 2000 WERE ALSO ORIGINALLY TH KIVU, AND THOSE WHO WERE NOT ARRESTED HAD FLED TO AZZAVILLE AFTER MASASU'S ARREST; THERE APPEARED TO BE A WEEN THE TWO EVENTS. IN ADDITION, AFTER LAURENT-DESIRE ASSASSINATION, TWO OF THE KEY WITNESSES, ONE OF WHOM WAS WIAL BODYGUARD GEORGES ((MIRINDI)), HAD BEEN HELPED TO SECOND THE DROC MILITARY INTELLIGENCE "GLM" PRISON, BEING LED WIFFED BY A CONGOLESE ARMED FORCES (FAC) OFFICER, ALSO	(b)(1) (b)(3)
ESCAPE WA ((SASSOU- CLAIMING A NUMBER		(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)
SETTLING ADMINISTR NON-CONGO ATTEMPT T THE COMMI COULD NOT COMMISSIO	THE COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION APPARENTLY INVOLVED SOME OF SCORES AND RIVALRIES FROM WITHIN THE FORMER DROC CATIONEVEN THOUGH THE COMMISSION'S MEMBERS INCLUDED DESE PARTICIPANTS (ZIMBABWEAN, ANGOLAN, NAMIBIAN) IN AN O GUARANTEE AGAINST CHARGES OF POLITICIZING THE FINDINGS. SSION WANTED TO BE SURE THAT WHATEVER FINDINGS IT MADE BE TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF FOR POLITICAL REASONS. THE N DID NOT HAVE ANY EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE TION. DESPITE PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY DROC SPECIAL.	

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PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY ADVISOR NONO ((LUTULA)) OF "A FOREIGN HAND" IN THE ASSASSINATION. LUTULA HAD BEEN ASKED BY THE COMMISSION TO STAY HOME A COUPLE OF DAYS DURING THE LAST WEEK OF FEBRUARY (I.E. HOUSE ARREST), BUT LATER THE COMMISSION DECIDED TO BEGIN BY QUESTIONING HIS STAFF ON THE EVENTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE ASSASSINATION, SO	(b)(1) (b)(3)
LUTULA WAS ALLOWED TO RETURN TO WORK. LUTULA WAS GOING TO BE DETAINED THE FOLLOWING DAY FOR QUESTIONING, HOWEVER, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS HANDLING OF THE "SECURITY FILE" BEFORE AND AFTER THE ASSASSINATION; LUTULA COULD TELL THE COMMISSION AT THAT TIME IF HE HAD ANY CONCRETE SUSPICIONS ABOUT FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT. THERE WERE ALSO QUESTIONS ABOUT LUTULA'S TIES TO CONGO/B INTELLIGENCE AND WHETHER HE WAS RECEIVING MONEY FROM SASSOU-NGUESSO.	
5. IF THERE WAS EVIDENCE THAT ANY OF THE INDIVIDUALS NOW DETAINED WERE IMPLICATED IN THE ASSASSINATION, THESE PEOPLE WOULD BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE. COMMENT: THIS MAY MEAN THAT SOMEONE LIKE FORMER PRESIDENTIAL MILITARY AIDE-CAMP EDDY ((KAPEND)) COULD BE CHARGED AND PUT BEFORE A DROC COURT.) KAPEND WAS UNDER ARREST AND WOULD REMAIN	(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)
THERE UNTIL HIS GUILT OR INNOCENCE COULD BE DETERMINED. HE WAS TOO DANGEROUS TO ALLOW TO GO FREE AND PERHAPS BEGIN PLOTTING AGAINST JOSEPH KABILA. EVEN IF KAPEND WAS NOT INVOLVED IN A PLOT TO KILL LAURENT-DESIRE KABILA, KAPEND HAD GIVEN THE ORDERS TO EXECUTE 11 LOCAL LEBANESE BUSINESSMEN AFTER THE ASSASSINATION.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
KAPEND COULD CERTAINLY FACE CHARGES ON THESE GROUNDS.	(b)(1) (b)(3)
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	(b)(1) (b)(3)
POC: COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND REQUIREMENTS WELCOME. ACQ:	(b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)
DISSEM:	(b)(1) (b)(3)
USUN, USCINCEUR, EUCOM JAC, US SURVEY DIVISION SHAPE, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSAFE, CINCUSAVEUR, COMSIXTHFLT,	(b)(1) (b)(3)

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