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From: [] #499 Report No: ~~WSS-733~~ Local File No: _____

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Report Made By: [] Approved By: _____

Distribution:
By copy to: Orally to:

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Source Cryptonym: ~~Tirralirra~~ [] References: _____

Source, Operational Data, and Comments:

The information contained herein was furnished to [] and Tirralirra and their Latvian associate by the officer mentioned in paragraph 1 of WSSA-1634 of 9 May 1950. The occasion was a dinner party, some drinks had been consumed, the discussion was philosophical but was serious and concerned future prospects in the area.

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Classification: ~~SECRET CONTROL~~
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~~67-1-6-33~~ []

Subject: Swedish Foreign Policy

Report No: WSS-733

Date of Information: March 1950

Place Acquired: Stockholm

Date Acquired: 8 May 1950

Evaluation:

Date of Report: 10 May 1950

Source: Two Baltic Leaders in Stockholm

1. The following information is construed by the persons furnishing the report as reflecting the opinion of responsible Baltic leaders in Sweden to the effect that the inevitable Foreign Policy of Sweden is to capitulate to Russia without resistance under the best possible terms in the event of war.
2. They claim numerous confirming incidents but could cite only one specific discussion in which the situation was covered. An informed Swedish officer advised assembled Baltic leaders that Sweden's only interest in the Baltics was to be forewarned of an impending attack. This would allow for a mobilization of Swedish defenses. The Balts had been advised previously that all resources of the Baltic resistance groups should be utilized at once to harass and slow down if possible any Soviet mass invasion effort directed against Sweden (or Norway). This presumably would, at least temporarily, curtail any full-scale assault on Sweden, as many Soviet troops would be tied up elsewhere. Such action would in the opinion of the Swedes allow them to obtain favorable terms for at least a short time.
3. In answer to a question as to what Sweden expected to gain by such actions or what they anticipated in the way of an occupation, the officer replied that time would tell. He said resistance equipment could be hidden and counter-action could take place with resources intact at a propitious moment. This was construed by the listeners to mean at some future date after capitulation and occupation.
4. The Baltic leaders stated that they are convinced of Swedish intentions and have sent instructions at every opportunity to resistance leaders in the Baltics to disregard any Swedish requests for open attack on Soviet troops in the event of war. They are to attempt to preserve their assets until action can be coordinated with a major Western effort.

Comment: The above statements and intentions appear to be too unrealistic even for the Swedes. The instructions to the Baltic groups to attack openly may well be in line with the often-repeated desire of at least some Swedish officers to gain several weeks to effect complete mobilization before a mass attack. This part of the report could as well indicate a desire to strengthen an ability to resist as to gain time for capitulation negotiations. The sources of the above statements are irritated over Swedish attitudes toward refugees but do have the confidence of Swedish officials who believe the sources are completely loyal and under Swedish control.