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Dispatch No. EGLA 5203

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per DOI 70-12

To : Chief, EE  
(Attn: C )  
FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach  
SUBJECT: GENERAL- OPERATIONAL/ZIPPER/CART  
SPECIAL- UJDREADFUL

Date \_\_\_\_\_  
INFO: CCM ( Attn: C )

1. [ ] and I discussed this case in May 1953 in Washington and agreed that it should be brought to a conclusion. Further, [ ] gave the opinion that the LCFLUTTER graphs on Subject's interrogation were very convincing...in spite of a lack of any confirmatory evidence. However, the results could not be convicting unless UJDREADFUL could be reinterrogated, confronted with the results of his previous LCFLUTTER rerun and interrogated further.

2. ZIPPER is footdragging. It is perfectly clear that they want us to leave this case in their hands. Perhaps half a dozen conversations between POB and the top-level of ZIPPER (i.e., UTILITY, MERKER and SHACK) have produced nothing. We are now at a definite impasse.

3. In the meantime, UJDREADFUL has attempted to strike an independent personal relationship with his POB case officer, [ ]. UJDREADFUL has offered [ ] material and CE leads that he claims he will not give to ZIPPER; he has indicated an interest in emigrating...to the USA if possible; he has stated that he and ZIPPER have little in common and he cannot see a long-range future with ZIPPER.

4. This is the way the case stands as of today. An independent POB approach to UJDREADFUL would cause a POB/ZIPPER flap, if discovered. POB insistence on an immediate ZIPPER solution is probably going to produce considerable friction, an irritant that would be most unwelcome in current POB/ZIPPER relationships. Are CCM and Washington in agreement that, regardless of the consequences, we must clear up the case? If so, how? ZIPPER is taking the simple position that LCFLUTTER is the sole evidence and LCFLUTTER is not enough. In a memorandum to us last month they glibly wrote off the whole case as settled "now that LCFLUTTER has been found unreliable and ruled out by UTILITY."

5. POB can suggest no decisive course of action at this time. We could, of course, call for a showdown with ZIPPER; demand that POB and ZIPPER sit down

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together with UJDREADFUL and present the evidence. ZIPPER might accept this solution as an effective way to clear UJDREADFUL, however, they will most likely oppose this extent of American intervention in the case and might even be willing to suggest dissolution of CSW as an alternative. More likely, ZIPPER would decline American participation but agree to confront UJDREADFUL and thereby end the matter by the resultant denial on his part. In any event, the case would not be solved, though if CSW were actually liquidated, the immediate security problem of UJDREADFUL's membership in ZIPPER would no longer exist.

6. Realizing its limitations, POB makes the following proposal:

a. We will move gradually towards a showdown with ZIPPER, insisting that ZIPPER take the matter seriously and investigate all possible leads as quickly as possible, in the meantime isolating CSW operations and observing them carefully.

b. At the same time [ ] will draw UJDREADFUL out and appear receptive to discussions on emigration problems. If UJDREADFUL takes the bait and appears really to be serious, [ ] could offer to assist in whatever way possible but at the same time suggest that UJDREADFUL inform ZIPPER of his interest in emigrating. This would increase US equity in a completely above-board manner and eliminate ZIPPER's basis for objecting to direct US participation. We would then be in a strong position, both vis-a-vis ZIPPER and vis-a-vis UJDREADFUL to accomplish direct interrogation and additional LCFLUTTERING. Of course the security ramifications of talks directed towards UJDREADFUL emigration to the USA must be carefully considered; however, we believe that actual emigration could be arbitrarily prevented even at the last minute if necessary.

7. We believe the course of action outlined in para 6 might prevent a POB/ZIPPER clash, and provide the pretext for effective interrogation and LCFLUTTER of UJDREADFUL together with a certain amount of pressure on UJDREADFUL which might contribute to the success of these steps.

8. Please let us have your comments soonest.

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