

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

*Review of info on Weber for things Worm
of delegatory - see. By MS
ACR:is:*

Ernst WORN & WEBER & CSW & 3597

30 March 1950
MGLA-1616 WEBER, the leader of District Agency S, was present at a GV E meeting attended by [redacted], at which the organization of Project 150 was discussed. WEBER reported that through FYR, he had discovered that PODLEZL was housed at ECIC and WEBER stated that PODLEZL should be used as an administrative assistant for FYR. WEBER also informed [redacted] that URBAN was scheduled to make one more trip to CSR.

Josef Wilhelm BAYER was recruited in August 1948 by ZIPPER (UV 108 of BV S) and at that time, BAYER informed his recruiter that he was also working for the Russian IS. This situation was not reported to ZIPPER Headquarters until November 1949, and apparently during the intervening fifteen months BAYER worked both for the Germans and the Russians.

Mikko WOLF & Peter NISAR & Welzel NOVAK of UV 108 of BV S was an operational problem to Regensburg and to CIC Amberg in 1949 because of his insecure and unscrupulous method of operating.

Milos SPARNER was dishonorably discharged from UV 106 of BV S after he offered military information to BV O of GV E and to GV G while he was still working for UV 108. This occurred in April 1950.

MGLA-3094 dated 21 August 1950

It is evident that GV E and BV S through UV 108 are swallowing most of the URBAN hooks without comment and are accepting almost all that is pushed down their throats. It must be stated, however, that GV E and BV S appear to be wholly cooperative and it cannot be said that they have deliberately kept us in the dark. It is clearly evident that BV S has not exercised sufficient control over URBAN or their CSR project activities. They neither led nor directed the IS activities involving the CSR, this may be due in part to the fact that BV S handles all of GV E's Sovzone collection.

Project 49 has been dropped as the Project leader is night blind, deaf, and can see little in the daytime. BV S apparently did not know this. BV S will be eliminated, and WEBER will become the senior ZIPPER CSR project leader.

MGXW-6489 dated 9 October 1950

WEBER's complete lack of contact and knowledge of his operations is evidenced in the admission that BV S was not aware that the agent leader of Project 49 was deaf and almost blind. We are still dubious about WEBER's qualifications.

MGLA-268 dated 24 August 1949

WEBER gave a praising description of URBAN who apparently has been working for ZIPPER since June 1947 instead of July 1948 as previously reported.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Worn

Ernst WORN continued.

MGLA-4564 dated 28 December 1950

WEBER works as field project leader for such strategic work in CSR as is directed by ZIPPER Headquarters rather than a general agency.

MGLA-4726 dated 11 January 1951

WEBER, the former leader of BV S was transferred to Strategic Intelligence group 39 as group project leader for CSR.

MGLA-4563 dated 28 December 1950

CSW was advised to wait for the reactivation of Project 48. [] proposed to 39/I that the Waldkapelle take over the investigation of 14186 since CSW does not seem to be making headway. 39/I was unenthusiastic, perhaps because he feared that CSW would consider such a move as a reflection on his own ability. Project 48 has not produced a report for a year. Another reason for skepticism about the future of Project 48 is the past record of CSW. Despite tales of the radical change in the character of 14186, there is probably some truth in the charges which he expressed in the attachment to MGLA-4054. Certainly CSW seems to have failed to provide 14186 with any real leadership or guidance.

A visit to the ZIPPER card files in December 1950 showed that only two names of Project 150 had been carded, despite the fact that the Project was first discussed in March 1950. The unvarying explanation, when CSW is confronted with such sins, is that he is overworked and without adequate secretarial support.

MGLA-4541 dated 26 December 1950

[] asked WEBER, now ZIPPER's field expert on Czechoslovakia, for a study of the PRCHALA Movement, as WEBER, a Sudeten German, claims to know personally the leading figures of the movement in Germany. The enclosed report, prepared by WEBER and BOSSELT, is not a study, but a biased piece of propaganda. The past record of these two men, and of WEBER especially, is undistinguished. Whether the fact that we have had small returns (except for the Bohemia Operation) from our investment in WEBER and company, results from incomplete cooperation or (as is more probable) limited ability, it is none the less true that WEBER's past and current strategic work has been deficient.

MGLA-4651 dated 5 January 1951

WEBER knows the true name of OKAPI and the fact that he works for the AIG. He claims to know a number of OKAPI's Czech sub-sources and to have recruited some of the disgruntled net members. WEBER believed that a Colonel KOENIG was associated with the OKAPI complex and he found out through URRAN that Erich (lm) was also apparently working for OKAPI. Finally, WEBER has close ties with some of the persons mentioned in MGLA-881.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Worm

Ernst WORM continued.

MGLA-5366 dated 26 February 1951

A report made by WEBER on Project 48, objectively viewed, constitutes a more severe indictment of BOSSELT, WEBER and PFEIFER than of 14186. WEBER insists that he was so overworked by BOSSELT that he lacked time in which to do his job properly. Whatever the cause may have been, the fact remains that 14186 lacked control and guidance, ~~xxx~~ as did 14200, 14201, 14206 and 14208. A second sin of BOSSELT, WEBER and PFEIFER is sloppy work. Instead of building a crossing point, then a courier route, and finally an agent net, GV E seems to have reversed the process and made wholesale recruitments in the CSR before ~~it~~ it was able to bring out reports or communicate with the source. Consequently, GV E agents were arrested on this side of the border and blown to CIC and the German police. Also, agents like 14208 and 14186, ordered to cross the border, but deprived of effective aid, perpetrated swindles and remained in Germany.