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30 July 1945.

To: WRC (For Mr. Waldron)  
From: V/4B/F  
Subject: Draft Reports from MFIU No. 3.

1. Enclosed are copies of the following draft reports, received last week from MFIU 3 (Third Army Interrogation Center):

- a. Introduction to Egmont Reports
- b. Annotation to Egmont Reports
- c. Introduction to Egmont Berichte
- d. The World Situation in March 1945
- e. Egmont Berichte
- f. Miscellaneous notes on the activities of the Japanese Intelligence Service in Europe.
- g. A character sketch of SCHELLENBERG.

2. The first five of the reports are concerned with Giselher WIRSING, an important member of Amt VI, and formerly editor of the Muenchener Neueste Nachrichten, who is reported from MFIU No. 3 to have been requested from there for Eagle IC. The "Annotations" (1.b. above) evidently refer to copies of Egmont Reports which were not forwarded.

3. Final versions of the draft reports (the originals of which have now been sent back to MFIU 3) will no doubt be forthcoming in the next few weeks from MFIU 3, but it was felt that the information contained in the drafts should be made available immediately to the War Room.

FOR COORDINATION WITH

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## INTRODUCTION TO ELMONT REPORTS

"Demons and the devil are not one and the same. Where the Gods have been banished also the devil has lost his right to dwell. There we find the grey twilight beyond good and evil. Faust and Mephistopheles are, as we have always known, the same thing seen from different angles. However, they are by no means 'Urbarmensch' and 'Untermensch'. Those terms are born in the demonic twilight, on a plane where the good and the evil are realities no longer, where they have been extinguished by a simple act of volition. In reality this state of affairs engenders an iniquitous promiscuity of passions and with it the corruption, not only of all spiritual but also of all moral fundamentals. This has been the predominant characteristic of all demonic epochs.

The confusion and pollution of man's innate moral sense of discrimination begins in that twilight where demons hold sway. He who appeals to the Gods must also comprehend the devil as a reality and as a power. Exorcism of Mephistopheles as practiced in this epoch of human history is a worse desecration of fundamentals than to sell one's soul to the devil. As historical experience has taught us, by some wondrous means the Evil begets the Good. Only where Good and Evil blend, altars are built for the false Gods, as illustrated in an incident of modern history, when a streetwreath was carried in triumphal pageant through the street of Paris as the Goddess of Reason".

In these words Dr. Gisoler WIRSING, one of Germany's most outstanding publicists and writers, passed judgment on an era in German history that was about to draw to a close. That he launched this invective, couched in allegorical language and ill-concealed in a dissertation on a Dutch 15 Century author, Hieronymus BOSCH, at a time when the Gestapo was still omnipotent (April 1944), must be placed to his credit. WIRSING is undoubtedly a courageous man if compared to the common run of Germany's scribes.

In 1941 WIRSING wrote a book on the United States, 140,000 copies of which sold up to 1943. It was based on material and experiences gathered during a four months stay in the United States in 1938. As title for his book he chose "Der masslose Kontinent", meaning boundless with the connotations of insatiable. In it WIRSING examined the American claim to world domination in its development since the United States was founded (die Entwicklung des Weltherrschaftsanspruches der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika) as opposed to the German principle of the delineation of spheres of influence (Prinzip der Abgrenzung der Machtsphären). In a chapter called the 'Petrification of the American myth', he went to great pains in convincing his readers that Oscar Wilde found the key to the problem of Americanism when he stated that 'America's youth is her oldest tradition'. He came to the conclusion that the terms 'Old World' and 'New World' could no longer be defined geographically. The United States, he argued, does not belong to the nations who fight for a better future of humanity, but is hopelessly shackled to the past. On this the central theme of his book, he rings through 450 pages the

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changes, in never ending variations of truth and half-truth, lies and distortions, in all an exhibition of poverty of thought richly garbed in pseudo-historical objectivity supported amply by quotations and statistics.

Because few men in Germany had WIRSING's factual knowledge and journalistic aptitude, nor the nerve to put across such a smooth concoction of blatant propaganda and insidious distortions, his book was bound to become a fountain head of anti-American propaganda in Germany. The sum-total is a perfect example of Sir Edward Grey's dictum that the Germans have an admirable knowledge of facts but do not understand the meaning of them. That the 'Masslose Kontinent' was written by a man of high intellect, known for his erudition, journalistic skill and independence of thought, a pupil of Professor HAUSHOFER and an apostle of Germany's claim to world hegemony, should be a forceful reminder not to look for the protagonists of the Prussian philosophy of might over right among the Nazi extremists alone, WIRSING came into prominence as co-editor, later publisher of a monthly magazine 'Die Tat', "in which a circle of neo-nationalistic and pro-fascist writers developed a program for a kind of national-socialism before the Nazis came to power" Their program, according to WIRSING, was socialist and aimed at bringing about a synthesis between their group, the left wing of the NSDAP (STRASSER), the democrats and the social democrats. In 1932 'Die Tat' favored HINDENBURG's re-election. 'Die Tat' also identified itself with an attempt at staving off the Nazi rush to power by having General SCHLEICHER appointed Chancellor of the Reich.

Since 1934 WIRSING worked for the 'Munchener Neueste Nachrichten', first as editor of the foreign department, later as publisher, a position he retained after AMMAN, the owner of the 'Volkischer Beobachter', had bought the 'Munchener Neueste Nachrichten' in 1936. In 1934 WIRSING published a book advocating a rapprochement with Russia, a political line he had followed consistently. In the following years he travelled abroad a great deal, visiting the Near East, in 1938 the United States, following the invitation of a friend, the then German Ambassador DIECKHOFF. He was introduced to President ROOSEVELT and found him exceedingly irritated about the annexation of Austria. Upon his return to Germany, in September 1938, WIRSING reported on his impressions to Foreign Minister von RIBBENTROP, the chief of the German press Dr. DIETRICH, the publisher AMMAN and Secretary of State WEIZACKER. The gist of his impressions: Should it come to an open conflict with England, the United States would enter the war little later, an opinion frequently expressed in Ambassador DIECKHOFF's reports to the Foreign Office. Of course little head was paid to these warnings.

During the winter 1938/1939 a group of independent, influential German personalities met in the common endeavor 'to mitigate the inflexibility of the course HITLER-RIBBENTROP in the conduct of Germany's foreign affairs.' Without developing any cooperative aim, WIRSING, WEIZACKER, DIECKHOFF, Rudolf KIRCHER (chief editor of the Frankfurter Zeitung), and Generaloberst BECK met in informal discussions. Their immediate

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concern was to see the Polish question settled with and not against Great Britain.

Shortly before the outbreak of the war WIRSING accepted an offer by von RIBBENTROP to work for the propaganda section of the Kulturpolitische Abteilung of the Foreign Office under Ambassador ALTENLURG. His co-workers were journalists like KIRCHER, SLEBURG (Paris correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung), Graf PUCKLER (London correspondent of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung). When WIRSING found that interoffice rivalry between the Kulturpolitische Abteilung and the Ministry of Propaganda largely nullified their efforts, he retired to MUNICH.

When, in spring 1941, WIRSING expressed the opinion in an article in the 'Munchener Neueste Nachrichten', that Franco-German relations were bound to deteriorate unless a formal peace treaty were concluded. A policy also favored by Ambassador ABETZ, his position became untenable and he joined the Army. He was posted to Kriegsberichter Coy and served in the East until the end of 1942. He did not return to Munich, because he felt that expressing one's views with a modicum of freedom became increasingly difficult in the light of Germany's reverses in North-Africa and Stalingrad. He continued publishing 'Die Tat' in Berlin until the magazine was prohibited by government order. He also wrote a book 'Das Zeitalter des Darges', in which he advocated the creation of a Europe not founded on the principles of force. In 1943 and 1944 he paid short visits to Madrid.

In June 1944 WIRSING had to attend a one month refresher course for officers in POTSDAM, a fortuitous circumstance, to which he owed his not being victimized after the 29 July, although he was a close friend of one of the chief conspirators, Legationsrat Dr. Adam von TROTT of the Foreign Office. In August 1944 WIRSING witnessed the collapse of Germany's Western armies in Paris and became convinced that a continuation of the war would be senseless and that further sufferings should be spared "the tortured German people and the other peoples". From the foregoing can be gathered that WIRSING has never identified himself to the fullest extent with extremist Nazi policies. On the other hand, he carries on inordinately large share in laying the ideological foundations upon which the conservative elements of Germany could submerge their dislike of the many repugnant aspects of the Nazi regime, on the supposition that they were dealing with passing phenomena indispensable in Germany's struggle for power, but to be shed once the goal had been reached. As seen from that point of view WIRSING must be considered an intellectual war criminal of the highest order. His contribution to the havoc wrought by the Nazis and the ensuing chaos, is a matter of historical record. No doubt, the exigencies of Germany's military defeat have forced him to jettison some of the ideological ballast that carried him safely across the rough seas of the Third Reich. A start has been made already; no mention appears in his written curriculum vitae of the 'Masslose Kontinent'. More ballast is bound to follow. Nothing must stand in the way now of closest collaboration with the Western Powers, "so woefully unaware of the Bolshevist danger". No doubt, WIRSING will, if given the opportunity, throw the full weight of his journalistic skill and political determination behind an effort to cause a cleavage between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Allies.

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## ANNOTATIONS:

1. Typical examples of Egmont reportage style. Unpleasant truths had to be represented as coming from impeccable sources abroad. Conversely, misconceptions prevailing in highest German circles as to the imminence of a split among the Allies had to be debunked in form of a rebuttal of opinions lending support to that misconception expressed in certain sections of the Allied press.
2. A warning that could be openly expressed provided it had factual support.
3. Based on reports that came to hand in January, February 1945, predicting that CHURCHILL would chose the earliest possible moment after Germany's defeat to break up the coalition and to hold elections.
4. A straw in the wind was an appeal by American authors addressed to STALIN in the autumn of 1944, on behalf of Poland.
5. Amt VI never lost sight of the possibility that secret arrangements might have been made between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. providing for the use of air bases on the Siberian littoral by the United States. Reports from the K.O. in China passed on rumors of dubious validity claiming that in certain localities preparations were being made suggesting that some kind of understanding along these lines had been reached. This sentence was written in March 1945, before air attacks on the Japanese mainland were launched in force. WIRSING believes that they have changed the picture fundamentally.
6. Mostly based on 'Frontaufklarungs' material; The last Egmont report devoted a whole page to a detailed analysis of those reports.
7. Direct appeals to the Communists in Berlin.
8. Phrased more cautiously in the original.
9. Swiss reports on negotiations with the former German Reichschancellor WIRTH.
10. Very detailed reports from sources within the Austrian Freedom movement.
11. Routine reports from Madrid.  
Another source which concerned itself specifically with church matters reported in details on a very interesting conversation with the Bishop of Laibach (Slovenia), touching on Tito's aspirations in Carinthia and Trieste.  
  
K CHI-Bericht related (January 1945) certain statements made by MOLOTOV at a reception of a Bulgarian delegation, shortly after the armistice with Bulgaria had been concluded. In an informal address MOLOTOV outlined with greatest candor his conceptions of the exclusiveness of the Slav sphere of interest vis a vis any combinations of powers likely to impinge upon it. In MOLOTOV's also the word 'Adria' fell, which lends confirmation to WIRSING's belief that a critical situation was bound to develop in the Trieste sector.

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12. The inner circle.

13. This information may have been gleaned from letters written by the Spanish Ambassador in Britain, the Duke of ALVA, to the director of the Spanish Foreign Office. Copies of that correspondence had been obtained by Amt VI.

14. Counter-stroke against Turkey's declaration of war, according to WIRSING.

16. Information had been received to the effect that a modus vivendi had been agreed upon by BIDAULT and SANGRONIZ, when the Russians intervened.

17. WIRSING wrote several reports in which he pointed out the folly of recalling Ambassador DIECKHOFF from Madrid at that juncture (September 1944).

The Allied press has consistently erred in its interpretation of those relations. A rift already began to develop after the Hondaya meeting between Franco and HITLER in 1940. At that occasion HITLER's request of a right of a free passage for German troops who were to invest Gibraltar from the rear, was turned down by FRANCO who considered the war 'as by no means ended'. In so acting FRANCO foiled Germany's designs which, if attained, might have spelled the end of the British Empire. CHURCHILL, in WIRSING's opinion, was the only responsible statesman who saw things in their true perspective. The Germans, in particular, HITLER, underrated FRANCO, whose military acumen is a matter of historical record. Already in 1944 relations between Spain and Germany had reached their nadir. When Spain concluded a treaty with Great Britain on 2 May 1944, the Germans sent a very sharply worded note which KIECKHOFF delivered after some hesitation. The Spanish Government on its part concealed from Germany a secret clause in that treaty, promising the expulsion of Germany's consular staff from Tangier. In its purely emotional reaction Germany merely proved that the bark was still there, but that the bite had gone.

19. Cf. negotiations with the U.S.S.R. on Britain's interests in the Ploesti Oil Fields. The Russians removed machinery from certain oil fields over the protests of the British Government. Very detailed reports came to hand.

20. This contention was born out by reports from Stockholm on the visit of the Norwegian Foreign Minister to Moscow in early 1945. Even prior to this visit the North-Norwegian question had been under discussion and in Swedish circles apprehensions were entertained that the Russians had come to Northern Norway to stay. From a German Foreign Office source WIRSING learned that Sweden had intimated, quite unofficially, that the deprivations of the retreating Army Group RENDULIC in Northern Norway would merely play into the hands of the Russians who would move into territory despoiled of its inhabitants.

Fears were also expressed by serious Swedish sources regarding Russian designs in the Kattegat and in this connection the pivotal importance of the Kiel Kanal stressed.

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21. Bornholm was dealt with in one of the last Egnott reports, its potential value as a spring-board being stressed. Here again Swedish sources had expressed concern. Also the Germany visits of Count BERNADOTTE should be seen in this light. WIRSING believes that the omission of not taking BORNHOLM in time must be considered a geographical oversight on the part of the British.

22. Her return to Russia coincided with increasing friction inside the Embassy. Mrs. KOLLONDI, according to Swedish sources, had antagonized a Secretary of the Embassy who happened to be the representative of the GPU.

23. The Russian invitation is supposed to have reached de GAULLE at the very moment CHURCHILL arrived in Paris.

24. Ex post observation, not in Egnott style.

25. According to Cardinal SCHUSTER, Milan.

26. The REBENTROP wing has always tended to overrate the importance of the inner circle and underrated that of the men around Eden.

27. Especially in the periodical 'Der Krieg und die Arbeiterklasse'.

28. When in September 1944 SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING compared notes on the international situation for the first time, WIRSING pointed out that world affairs were gravitating away from Europe in the direction of Russo-Japanese relations. At that time WIRSING expected that Russia would fall in line with the United States (junior lend-lease and Russian Far-East policy.) SCHELLENBERG did not share this opinion, but promised WIRSING that all resources of Amt VI would be thrown behind an effort to clarify Russian policy vis a vis Japan. When STALIN delivered his famous address on 7 November 1944, singling Japan out as an aggressor nation, WIRSING in a special report written at the request of SCHELLENBERG, read into this sentence the accomplished fact of a fundamental change of Russian policy towards Japan. Again SCHELLENBERG demurred. Then, approximately three weeks later, a report by Ambassador SATO to his government was intercepted in which, very cautiously worded, he related a conversation he had had with MOLOTOV in connection with a Japanese demarche expressing concern at anti-Japanese utterances by a Russian Colonel in a public address. MOLOTOV, according to SATO, availed himself of this opportunity to convey to the Japanese Government not to mistake rhetorical exuberance for an expression of the considered policy of the Kremlin. However, MOLOTOV added, the time would come when certain outstanding questions of a more fundamental nature would have to be thrashed out between the two nations. This report was interpreted by both SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING as indicating that the U.S.S.R. was not prepared to join forces with the United States in the Far East at this stage. All along the members of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin had been displaying a great deal of confidence regarding the prospects of an early Russian intervention on the side of the United States. WIRSING kept following up developments very closely. He believed to discern indications of a desire on the part of Russia, not to see Japan go down in total defeat, although the Russian press seemed to lean in the opposite direction.

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28. Later SATO reports, although full of cryptic allusions and therefore rather difficult to evaluate, seemed to bear out this thesis. No evidence came forth at any time to the effect that the Russians used their abstinence as leverage to gain advantages of undue proportions from Japan. Early in 1945 agents in Manchuria (conveyed through BORODIN) reported that a Japanese delegation, whose composition appeared indicative of its having been given a mission beyond the discussion of border questions and fishery rights, passed through Harbin en route to TISCHITZ East of Lake Baikal, evidently bound for a meeting with a Russian delegation.

29. OSHIMA had been kept in the open for a long time. His consistently erroneous judgments on German affairs and the facts that to all intents and purposes he was merely echoing the celebrations of RIBBENTROP had not escaped the notice of his superiors in Tokio. In 1944 Admiral ABE reached Germany in a submarine, charged with a special mission. All efforts to have him and Admiral KOSHIMA received by HITLER were unavailing. RIBBENTROP was afraid that such a meeting might lead to a denouement of the combination RIBBENTROP-OSHIMA and effectively countered any such move. According to information received from Legations-rat BRAUN, the East Asia referent of the German Foreign Office, Admiral ABE represented the Japanese Navy and had been sent to bring about a conciliation between Germany and the Soviet Union. He was also to impress upon HITLER the necessity of setting up a Joint German-Japanese General Staff. The only German official he ever had contact with was Admiral DONITZ.

30. And Korea.

31. The Japanese in Berlin evinced great interest in the person of GREW. In an Egnont report of December 1944, WIRSING had expounded his views on GREW's role in the State Department. He had pointed out that in 1941 GREW was probably the only American statesman of consequence who correctly gauged JAPAN's drift towards war. WIRSING quoted American sources to the effect that GREW had cautioned the State Department against a policy of bluff (as represented by HORNBECK), exerting increasing pressure on Japan on the one side, and not taking the possibility of an explosion into account on the other. WIRSING stated that, although GREW had expressed himself publicly in a strongly Anti-Japanese vein, it should not be ruled out that GREW in view of his intimate knowledge of the Japanese question and his reserved attitude towards the U.S.S.R. might actually not have been fully sold on the idea of total destruction of Japan.

32. Source: BORODIN

UGAKI reputedly belongs to an appeaser group in the Japanese General Staff. Beginning 1945 he went to Shanghai to establish contact with representatives of the Generalissimo. This attempt never grew beyond the stage of exploration.

33. The source of this information is Secretary USHIDA of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. He is an outstanding specialist on Chinese affairs and belongs to a political school of thought represented by the Japanese Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU.



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33. (cont) Its basic tenet is to bring about termination of hostilities between Russia and Germany, followed by a Russo-Japanese alliance and an offer of negotiated peace to the United States, backed by Russia. USHIDA outlined these thoughts in conversation with WIRSING, expressing the belief that, on the basis of parcelling out spheres of interest an understanding between Japan and Russia could be reached. In the Egmont report of December WIRSING passed upon the likelihood of such development, pointing out that everything hinges on the outcome of the Philippines battle. Provided Japan can retain a foothold on the Philippines, her chances vis a vis China and Russia should not be underrated.

34. Viz on the basis of a Japanese, Russian, Chinese combination.

35. This represents the opinion expressed by WIRSING's informants who adhere to the 'Navy Doctrine' in Japan's foreign policy: disinterestedness in Army exploits on the Asiatic mainland at the expense of southward expansion and creation of a Pacific island empire. From their point of view RUSSIAN preponderance on the Asiatic mainland would be preferable to American ascendancy in China jeopardizing the Japanese lifeline to its projected Empire in the South Pacific.

36. Not the Brothers SOONG, but another pair whose name has escaped WIRSING. They are supposed to wield influence in Chungking comparable to that of the brothers BORMANN in Berlin. CORRECTION: The Minister of War remained in office as Chief of Staff.

37. Based primarily upon reports from K.O. China and American sources VI c 4 put out a special report, 30 pages long, on the Yen-an complex.

38. STILLWELL crisis. WEDEMAYER, according to reports received in Amt VI, has been handling matters very skillfully, stressing the military angle of his mission.

39. WIRSING's deductions.

40. A great deal of material has been gathered by means of PW interrogation. The economic section of Amt VI has done extensive research in this direction.

42. Followed by capitalistic penetration of Manchuria (HARRIMAN interests).

43. Not an ex post conclusion.

44. Ex post.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION TO EGMONT GERIOHTE:

About the middle of September 1944, SS-Brigadefuehrer SCHELLENBERG, Amtschef VI, RSHA, and WIRSING met at the former's office to compare notes on the international situation. SCHELLENBERG, whom WIRSING had never met before, explained that he had followed WIRSING's political line closely, reading his analyses on foreign affairs in the Munchener Neueste Nachrichten, 'Die Tat' and its successor, 'Das XX Jahrhundert'. In ranging over the whole complex of questions raised by Germany's political and military situation at that time, SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING substantially agreed on the following issues:

- a. That Germany's position was hopeless, both militarily and politically. Just about that time a last chance to come to a negotiated peace with Russia - Japan with the acquiescence of the USSR had offered to mediate - had been passed up.
- b. That it was imperative to terminate the war at the earliest possible moment.
- c. That peace negotiated on an equal footing with Germany's opponents was out of the question.
- d. That it might be worth while to try to ascertain whether 'unconditional surrender' as conceived by the Allies left room for a change in the government, acceptable to the Allies as partners across the peace table.
- e. That the formation of a 'verhandlungsfahige' Regierung would entail the shelving of HITLER. This matter was not touched upon expressis verbis, but rather by implication inasmuch as the whole discussion of what Germany would be able to offer in peace negotiations was premised on the removal of the prime stumbling block.

2. On the basis of the above understanding SCHELLENBERG proposed to WIRSING that he should write reports on the foreign political situation of Germany, giving an unvarnished picture of the hopelessness of that situation and proposing specific measures designed to save Germany from total collapse. SCHELLENBERG offered to put all the material reaching Amt VI through its intelligence agencies at WIRSING's disposal, withholding none. The reports would come out in intervals from between two and three weeks and would be distributed between a very small and select circle only. WIRSING accepted and thereby became as of September 1944 'Ehrenamtlicher Mitarbeiter' of the RSHA. The reports he wrote at his private residence where also the material of Amt VI was sent, usually by messenger. The only person in Amt VI WIRSING had contact with was SCHELLENBERG, an exchange of ideas and occasionally the passing on of top secret material which SCHELLENBERG did not wish to commit to paper, contributing materially to the reports in their final form. So as not to detract from the intrinsic value of the reports, the identity of their author was supposed to be kept a secret known only to the inner circle of the RSHA, the reason being that WIRSING's background as prominent member of the 'Tat Kreis' would hardly commend itself to the diaphans of the Nazi Party.

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DISTRIBUTION  
KEY.

3. At his first meeting with SCHELLENBERG, WIRSING emphasized that it was absolutely essential to keep the distribution confined to very few people, in particular not to include RIBBENTROP and Dr. GOEBBELS. ("let Dr. GOEBBELS write his own editorials"). The actual distribution as ordered by KALTENBRUNNER was as follows:

- a. SS-Gruppenfuehrer: FEGELEIN, HIMMLER's liaison officer at HITLER's headquarters, who would submit it to the Fuehrer.
- b. HIMMLER.
- c. SEYSS-INQUART (see KALTENBRUNNER report)
- d. Dotachafter HEWEL, who was made to sign a declaration promising not to give copies of the report to RIBBENTROP or to mention their existence to him. HEWEL represented RIBBENTROP at the Fuehrerhauptquartier.
- e. Probably GOEBBELS, because WIRSING learned that the pessimistic vein of the reports was criticized in circles close to GOEBBELS.

4. Over and beyond their immediate, didactic purpose, of enlightening SCHELLENBERG's their readers on the true state of affairs, the EGMONT reports were a means towards an end. Both SCHELLENBERG and WIRSING were agreed on the desirability of seeing HITLER hors de combat. WIRSING accepted the commission to write the EGMONT reports with the expectation in view, that HITLER appraised of all the pertinent facts that summed up Germany's impending doom would, if he had a spark of responsibility left, withdraw from the political scene of his own accord. At any rate, WIRSING figured, that the reports might be instrumental in maneuvering HITLER into a political stalemate where no alternative was left him but to resign. End of November 1944 when it became evident that HITLER reacted unfavorably to the political line of the EGMONT reports, SCHELLENBERG told WIRSING literally the following:

"It is thus an established fact that HITLER is incapable of accepting any view on the international situation that does not jibe with his preconceived ideas. We have therefore got to reconcile ourselves to the fact that we are dealing with a pathological case (medizinischer Fall)."

Both SCHELLENDURG and WIRSING realized that after the abortive attempt of 20 July, the only group capable of bringing about the required changes were HIMMLER and his SS. But whereas WIRSING was convinced that once HITLER was out of the way, HIMMLER would in short order, be swept away by the inexorable logic of historical development and a 'verhandlungsfähige Regierung' emerge eventually SCHELLENDURG never committed himself to that length and most likely envisaged HIMMLER's ascendancy as a more lasting solution.

When WIRSING suggested to SCHELLENDURG that, once things began to move, BRUNING's aid should be enlisted, SCHELLENDURG's answer was: "We cannot tell that to HIMMLER at the present stage. However, BRUNING is one of our assets (Bruning ist ein Kapital für uns). In this connection also the advisability of going back to a two-party system came to be mentioned, SCHELLENDURG suggesting BRUNING as leader of the opposition. This, to WIRSING's mind, proves that SCHELLENDURG was not prepared to go the whole hog.

SCHELLENBERG  
vs.  
HITLER.

5. HIMMLER, according to SCHELLENBERG, was in far-reaching accord with the findings of the EGMONT reports and endorsed their recommendations. This to SCHELLENBERG was of pivotal importance, inasmuch as HIMMLER's adherence to the Egmont line was an indispensable prerequisite of success. It would be an over-simplification to say that the reports were conceived as mere aide-memoires for HIMMLER. However, in the actual course of events it was to be HIMMLER who, according to SCHELLENBERG, carried the ball and who repeatedly put the full weight of his position behind the cogency of the argumentation in the Egmont reports. In two instances at least he used the reports as vehicle for a demarche with HITLER. The first time, in November 1944, he was, SCHELLENBERG claimed, rewarded with the invidious task of disentangling Army Group G in the Upper Rhine sector (as BALCK's successor). According to SCHELLENBERG this was conceived by HITLER as a means of taking HIMMLER, whose opinions on Germany's foreign policy were obnoxious to him, out of circulation. After the abortive Ardennes offensive, SCHELLENBERG's influence with HIMMLER increased to the extent that the latter made another attempt to induce HITLER to conform to the Egmont line. This time the reward was the command of the Army Group Weichsel, conferred upon him as HITLER's orders by BORMANN. A last attempt to reduce HIMMLER to political impotence was undertaken after the Platten-See disaster when Russian troops pierced the German lines and routed the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler. This happened around 12 March when HIMMLER was told by the Fuehrer that he should take over the command in HUNGARY. Somehow HIMMLER managed to dodge this assignment.

6. Each Egmont report carried certain recommendations designed to create a sound basis on which negotiations with the Allies could be launched, foremost among which were a solution of the Jewish question and the Church question. Both WIRSING and SCHELLENBERG feared that in the final phase of the war all Jews still in German concentration camps would be liquidated. A report by the American reporter Edgar SNOW on conditions in the Maidanek camp near LUBLIN had painted a picture too realistic and too substantiated to be passed off as mere enemy propaganda. In line with the Egmont recommendation SCHELLENBERG induced HIMMLER to give his consent to the release of approximately 60,000 Jews among 300,000 still in German concentration camps, into the care of the Swiss, whose representative, Bundesrat MUSSI, was given assurances to this effect by SCHELLENBERG on behalf of HIMMLER. No sooner had one started to release Jews when HITLER's veto brought the whole scheme to an abrupt end. This was a striking instance of HIMMLER's making promises to SCHELLENBERG which, later on, he failed to live up to either because he met resistance on the part of HITLER or because the extreme wing of the SS failed to back him. Another instance was the release of certain prominent French personalities, associated with the de GAULLE movement, as e.g. the family of General GIRAUD, whose release had actually been ordered by HIMMLER and which MULLER of Amt IV, RSH., failed to carry out.

7. The Egmont reports represent the culmination of plans on which SCHELLENBERG had worked ever since he was put in charge of Amt VI, viz to organise a central evaluation Agency superseding the numerous evaluation branches of the various referate of Amt VI. The idea was that only the 'Zentralauswertungstelle' would impart the intelligence

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collected by the agencies of Amt VI to the policy making organs of the German State. In its final form the 'Zentralauswertungsstelle' turned out a compromise; the referate retained their evaluation sections and the so-called Lageberichte which, up to 1942, Amt VI had put out at regular intervals, were resuscitated only on a much higher plane than their forerunners which, due to their large circulation, could use only part of the available material and had to be written in a journalistic vein. In pursuance of his plans SCHELLENBERG activated a new referat with group VI A, the 'Zentralauswertungsstelle', putting in charge SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr. SCHINDOWSKY, formerly with VI C. The new referate put out periodical reports, written by Dr. WIRSING, all told thirteen extending over October, November, December 1944, January, February, March 1945. The name 'Egmont' was chosen in order to camouflage the true character of the reports, obviating the use of the designation 'Auslandslagebericht' on receipts etc.

NOTE: The information contained in this paragraph is supplied by SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr. HOTTL, deputy chief of VI-E (South-East), RSHA.

8. In the course of his short-term association with the intelligence service (RSHA), WIRSING acquired little actual knowledge of its information collecting processes (Erfassung). Being exclusively concerned with the evaluation (Verwertung) of the material made available to him and in the light of the common usage to withhold the origin of information procured by extraordinary means, WIRSING's inability to identify any of those sources appears creditable. He claims having studiously avoided asking SCHELLENBERG questions as to where certain information originated from. When this question was broached at all, the purpose was to bring out certain characteristics which could possibly have a bearing on authenticity and /or degree of accuracy of a report. In a case of that kind, especially when SCHELLENBERG's own personal contacts were involved, he would give WIRSING his own evaluation without, however, disclosing the identity of the source. After certain material had established its reputation as being generally reliable, WIRSING would be able to rate the source without knowing who exactly supplied the information and by what means it was obtained. Below it has been tried to reconstruct by way of induction some of SCHELLENBERG's and some of Amt VI's most outstanding channels of information.

9. WIRSING got copies of all 'Lagerberichte' as published by the various referate of Amt VI. In recognition of the fact that those 'Lagerberichte' did not always contain a factual compilation of the information received but by their very nature were the result of a process of evaluation by the resp referent, WIRSING insisted on getting the 'raw material' i.e. the reports as they reached Amt VI. For technical reason he did not adhere to this practice in the case of the Russian referat where he relied upon the compilation made in its evaluation section.

A very important source of information embodied in the Egmont reports were the 'Berichte des Amtschefs', reports rendered by SCHELLENBERG on the basis of exchanges he carried on with important personalities both in Germany and abroad, E.g. with Bundesrat MUSSI, members

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of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, in particular with its naval attache, Admiral KOSHIDA, with the Swiss and Swedish Ambassadors. SCHELLENBERG had o.g. a line into France connecting with an important personality close to BIDAULT. He frequently received reports from a Spanish source, either a diplomat or an industrial, who appeared well versed in Vatican affairs. Regarding SCHELLENBERG's Swiss connections, see Special Report.

AMT VI  
SOURCES.

10. OSTRO was the code-name of a source located somewhere on the Iberian peninsula, running at least 12 different lines. The reports were prolific all round, covering both military and political questions, exceptionally well-posted especially on English matters. After the Yalta Conference OSTRO turned in some good reports evidently based on information furnished by somebody who sat in on the conference.

HASSO (or HECTOR) was an exceptionally high quality source in Stockholm, well informed on domestic politics in England. It conveyed detailed and intimate reports on English trends of thought as prevailing in the inner circles of the main British parties. HASSO and OSTRO were the pillars of England information, providing excellent counterchecks on the reliability of either.

COMMENT DR. HOTTL:

1. NERO stands for Hungarian source, located in Madrid and Lisbon. The informants are to be found in circles close to the Hungarian Military Attache in Madrid and his representative in Lisbon. This connection had been developed by Dr. HOTTL and turned over to Amt VI. The group chief of VI.D (Scandinavia, Britain, United States) drew his main subsistence from this source. Its channels ran from Lisbon resp Madrid to the II Department of the Honved General Staff (Oberst NUTHY), from there to either Dr. HOTTL or his representative SS-Hauptsturmführer NEUNFELFEL in Budapest, at first relayed via Group VI E in Vienna, later on specific orders of KALTENBRUNNER, shunted directly to the RSHA.
2. OSTRO may be looked for in circles close to the former Foreign Minister of Franco Spain, SUNER, who, Dr. HOTTL claims, worked for Amt VI.

11. There existed a line to Portugal's SALAZAR via his father confessor, the Archbishop (or Cardinal) in Lisbon. Considered a most important source.

In Spain an informant regularly compared notes with the Japanese Ambassador SUWA, a very good source.

The coverage of Italian affairs was centralised in Madrid and mostly dealt with routine matters.

The Russian sector was exceedingly well covered by sources located in Stockholm. The information obtained was in part 'Spielmaterial' (planted) and had to be carefully sifted in VI C.

An important informant on Russia who called himself DORODIN sat in Shanghai, evidently running his own intelligence net. The Abwehr was represented both in MUKDEN and in SHANGHAI (K.O.)

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Dublin was a very disappointing source, WIRSING cannot recollect ever having seen a report originating there. He once asked SCHELLENBERG who told him that his predecessors had neglected the Irish sector and that it was now too late to start anything.

OHI-  
BERICHTE.

12. The daily bread of all foreign reportage were the so called CHI-BERICHTE i.e. the transcripts of intercepted and decoded wireless messages. They actually were the solid core of information, although there was no continuity of coverage and frequently important gaps, e.g. after the Yalta Conference when almost nothing from American sources could be obtained, marred their value as a whole. WIRSING claims that more or less complete coverage of the traffic listed below was furnished:

- a. The Turkish Ambassador in Moscow to his government (complete).
- b. The Greek Ambassador in Moscow to his government.
- c. Ambassador HARNELMAN in Moscow who reported to the State Department on the Polish deliberations.
- d. Ambassador CAFFERY in Paris who reported to the State Department on de GAULLE's visit to Moscow.
- e. The Bulgarian envoy in Switzerland who reported to his government on Balkan affairs and was particularly well-informed on the Greek insurrection.
- f. The American representative in Bulgaria who had some trouble with the Russians and told his troubles to the State Department.

SUPPLEMENTS:

Add to Paragraph 4 on Page 10:

End of March 1945 WIRSING told SCHELLENBERG that he considered the Egnont reports to have fallen short of their objective, viz to bring about HITLER's resignation and that all was lost now. SCHELLENBERG concurred and the Egnont reports were discontinued.

Add to Paragraph 5, Page 11; after '... out of circulation'.

Beginning December 1944, SCHELLENBERG went to call on HITLER at his headquarters, armed with an eight-page aide-memoire in which at SCHELLENBERG's request, WIRSING had recapitulated all recommendations made in previous Egnont reports and not acted upon as of that date. These recommendations were couched in much stronger language than usual and made no bones about the fact that no negotiated peace could be contemplated unless certain indispensable domestic prerequisites had been fulfilled. SCHELLENBERG came back from his talk with HIMMLER under the impression that he personally stood behind those recommendations, but was powerless to carry them out.

Add to Paragraph 3, Page 10:

The Foreign Office at no time availed itself of the information produced by Amt VI. According to SCHELLENBERG, KALTENBRUNNER at one time tried to bring about some sort of cooperation by impressing upon RILBENTROP that Amt VI is a 'serving institution' (eine dienende organization). RILBENTROP very curtly declined the offer. According to WIRSING, RILBENTROP had a very deep-rooted aversion to intelligence-gathering services (gegen alles nachrichtendienstliche), an aversion he shared with HITLER.

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THE WORLD SITUATION IN MARCH 1945NOTE.

The contents of this report correspond approximately to the last two EGMONT-Reports (Nos 12 and 13), written at a time when collapse had become inevitable and Germany's position had come to be considered hopeless. Events after March 1945 have not been taken into account. No documentary reference material was available for these notes.

POINTS  
OF  
GRAVI-  
TATION.

1. Ever since the Americans crossed the Rhine at REMLINGEN, the ALLIED political leaders have been convinced that Germany would collapse within a very short time. Simultaneously it can be gathered from front line observations in the East that the Army Group ZHUKOV, having reached the lower Oder, has started concentrating large forces E of Kustrin and of Frankfurt a.o. the military situation on both main fronts displays therefore the often discussed features of a race between West and East straight towards the heart of Germany. The alliance of the three principal powers, again reaffirmed at Yalta, has withstood the political strain as predicted in the previous reports. In the face of the newly arisen military situation one can no longer expect the Russo-Anglosaxon coalition to be broken up by political means. From the point of view of the major enemy powers, Germany is no longer in a position to conduct any negotiations.

On the other hand there are numerous indications that the divergences between the Anglosaxons and the Russians will not diminish with the end of the war. On the contrary they are bound to become more numerous. This fits in with the results of the Yalta conference where, according to all sources at our disposal there has been full agreement on only one decisive main topic: to see the war against Germany through together, under all circumstances. Almost all postwar problems were left open at Yalta, or they were settled only in such general terms that the wording agreed on, permitted various interpretations. How great those difficulties are, has been shown most clearly by CHURCHILL's speech before the House of Commons on 28 February 1945, and by the reaction it brought forth among the opposition. From the now available detailed coverage of that debate in the House of Commons on the 1 and 2 March, it can be gathered that it was not so much specifically the Polish question but rather a matter of principal that was under discussion, viz the fundamental ideal on which the future order of Europe should be constituted. Primarily it was therefore the question whether England would actually be made to accept (unquestionably) the methods of brute force used by the Russians vis a vis Poland. It is imperative, however, to refute unequivocally the opinion that the dissensions among the Allies will lead to a new war soon after Germany's defeat. From all our sources it appears rather that in the near future neither the Western powers nor the Soviet Union will be willing to take up arms against each other. It is necessary to sound an insistent warning against any German plans in the present final phase of the conflict, speculating on a new conflict among the Allies immediately after our defeat. The signs of a not considerable war weariness, in England frequently commented upon, have been implemented by further examples. Particularly the Labor Party does not seem willing to extend coalition with the Conservatives beyond the moment of German defeat. Therefore already now a significant portion of British attention is swinging increasingly towards questions, long postponed, of internal politics. In the United States, as far as can be seen from here, there is no psychological preparation for a sudden and abrupt turn against the Soviet Union, even though the enthusiasm for Russia has long since passed its peak because of Moscow's methods displayed in Red Army - occupied territories. President ROOSEVELT's basic policies remain unchanged. As before, the President aims at obtaining at least the indirect support of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan. For that

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purpose he is ready to relinquish certain positions in Europe that are of minor importance to American interests. In the present phase, too, we maintain the point of view taken in the Egmont reports from the beginning viz that the key to the political situation of the world cannot be looked for in Europe but in the Pacific. Improbable as it may appear that the tension among the Allies will develop into a conflagration immediately upon the termination of the war in Europe, it is certain, that in the long run the contrasts between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians are bound to become ever more marked. Already in the present initial stage results of observation of the occupied German territories show entirely different methods in the West and in the East. Despite acts of violence committed by the Red Army - particularly the mass raping of German women in the occupied Eastern territories - there is evidence that STALIN intends to apply the same policy of "penetration sovietique" for Germany which he has used in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and the Baltic States. Clear evidence of this are the German language broadcasts from Moscow which are aimed at a communist underground movement. To counter this singleminded policy of Soviet penetration in Europe - reaching even as far as France and Spain - there is on the American side only a certain vacuum, thinly disguised by phrases like 'democracy' and 'reeducation' (das nur notduertig durch die Worte Demokratie und reeducation verdeckt wird). There is no clear concept as to the actual meaning of "education towards democracy" of the German people, as can be gathered from the discussion published in English and American periodicals. These contradictions were pointed out most clearly in an article "Germany" by the well-known English writer VOIGHT in the February (1945) issue of "Nineteenth Century". VOIGHT, however, is an outsider and his writings are of sympathetic value only. Disregarding the fact that the key to the political world situation is in the Far East, the imminent German defeat already heralded by the current military events will very soon create most difficult problems for future Allied cooperation. In a new book "U.S. War Aims" - recently received here for evaluation - the American publicist Walter LIPPMAN explains that the Soviet Union would tip the world balance of power by an intolerably large share, should she succeed in bringing Germany into her orbit after the present war. LIPPMAN concludes that all of Germany should remain under the control of the Western powers. This and a series of similar statements indicate that intelligent Americans have realized for some time already what a "penetration sovietique" would imply for the United States as well as for England.

2. Since the report on Yalta Conference there have been no additional EUROPEAN instances of further unified Allied procedure in Europe. On the contrary, PROBLEMS the Soviet Union continues systematically to consolidate her political and territorial positions, regardless of English or American objections. Specifically the following problems have now reached the stage of actuality:

a. The Establishment of Allied Zones in Germany.

It has been confirmed that only an approximate zoning, though not a final one, has been agreed upon at Yalta. Also there appears to be only a negative agreement on methods of administration insofar as STALIN has agreed not to install the communist-infested Free German Committee. Conversely, the Anglo-Americans will refrain, for the time being, from installing a Government composed of emigres.

b. The Austrian Question seems to be just as unsettled. Agent reports indicate that the communist circles in the so-called Austrian Resistance Movement (Osterreichische Widerstandsbewegung) have of late made the assertion that all of Austria would be occupied by the Red Army sooner or later. From the same source we hear that the Soviets are intending to install a communist-influenced Government in Vienna as soon as possible,

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contrary to their procedure in Germany. The master plan is obvious: Communist-controlled Austria would be equivalent to a Russian corridor to Switzerland, thereby leading directly into Western Europe. From MOHAILOVICH's entourage comes the report that TITO has lately intended to claim CARINTHIA. It has not been possible to ascertain unequivocally whether Marshall ALEXANDER's visit to Belgrade during February (1945) had any connection with these unsettled questions, especially since the Serbian sources seem to infer that TITO will not be satisfied with the reconquest of Fiume; rather that he wants to extend the Yugoslav territory beyond Trieste up to the Venetian plain: rumors of such Yugoslav aspirations have also made their appearance in Rome, where they had a disquieting effect.

b. The Settlement of the Polish Question agreed on at Yalta, has failed substantially. In Yalta, England as well as the United States have made concessions to the Soviets that let to the extreme limit of tolerance. In reality the decisions on Poland constitute only a thinly veiled travesty of complete annexation of the Polish territory by the Soviet Union. The remarkable opposition encountered by CHURCHILL after his announcement on Poland before the Commons on 28 February (1945) shows that the policy makers among the British Conservatives are no longer willing to make further concessions. Nevertheless the Soviet Union has made impossible parleys with the former Minister President of Poland, MIKOLAJCZYK, the only personality among the London Poles that could have been used for a compromise. In particular the Soviet Union has refused to palliate the policy of brute force by the NKVD and has refused admission to English and American newspapermen as regularly accredited reporters. A reliable personality who maintains connections to Polish circles in Western Europe, claims that the London Poles do not desire an extension of the Western Border to the Oder as has been offered to them. They fully realize that this claim, advanced by the Lublin Poles, cannot be based on any historical foundation. In the opinion of Polish circles in London are nothing else but the preparation for a camouflaged annexation by the Soviet Union. In the weeks since Yalta it has become apparent that STALIN is not ready to compromise with England on the Polish question. It also seems that no consideration has been given to Moscow to repeated offers of mediation by the United States in the face of MOLOTOV's obdurate demands. Ambassador HARRIMAN has not been able so far to play the part in the Polish question that, as a result of the Yalta decisions, had been envisaged for him. Instead it can be gathered from numerous reports that the unabated use of violence by the NKVD is continuing against those Poles living in the territory of the Lublin puppet regime who still sympathize with London.

d. TURCO-SOVIET Pact.

It is established by now that when the Russians, on 16 March 1945, unexpectedly denounced the Turco-Soviet pact of friendship of 1921, MOLOTOV had not previously notified the English and the Americans. Only shortly before the Turkish Ambassador had been reassured by his English colleague that finally because of her formal declaration of war, Turkey was protected by the Soviet Union. The news took SARKER by surprise when he was about to pay MOLOTOV a parting visit before going to Ankara. The only immediate significance is that the Soviets are intending to obtain a free hand vis a vis of England in the question of the Straits. Of course, the Turks will get a new pact of assistance only when they handed over to all intents and purposes, more or less directly the control of the Straits to the Russians.

e. SPAIN

It could not be ascertained whether any binding agreements

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concerning Spain had been reached at Yalta. Meantime the Moscow radio has started a considerably more virulent polemic against FRANCO in Spanish language broadcasts. No important results have come from the conferences with MAURA in Paris and from the visits in London of Don JUAN's representatives in that city. FRANCO is continuing his efforts to adapt his politics to the wishes and the economic needs of the United States, in spite of the negative attitude public opinion in England and America shows towards him. The new American ambassador has arrived in Madrid at last, whereas the British have made no appointment to fill the vacant post of their ambassador. Apparently it was Soviet influence that wrecked Spain's negotiations with France. From this contradictory situation it can be concluded that the American observers in Spain have clearly recognized the dangers of a change in government without previous thorough preparation; it would forcibly drive Spain into the arms of the communists. Undoubtedly the communist undercurrent in Spain has been essentially reinforced by the successes of the Soviet Union, but as long as there is no foreign intervention, it should be impossible to overthrow FRANCO. The German-Spanish relations have now reached the nadir after the recall of the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin.

f. RUMANIA and BULGARIA

In Rumania and Bulgaria the Soviet policy of planned Communist penetration is continuing. The RADESOU affair has accelerated this process, especially in Rumania. One must suppose that the British Intelligence Services have instigated RADESOU'S action. However, England was not able to protect the former Prime Minister who had fled into the British Embassy at the outbreak of the crisis. In Bulgaria as well as in Rumania the small groups of English and American representatives are able to move about only under certain restrictions. They are able to exert as little influence on the political shaping of these // significant that news stories are hardly ever printed in the Anglo-American press with Rumania or Bulgaria datelines. The show trials in Sofia in which even strongly leftist politicians were sentenced to heavy penalties, were registered only briefly in American weeklies with sarcastic comments.

g. GREECE

In Greece the situation has quieted down further. Various sources, however, indicate that TITO is still supporting the Macedonians movement whose aim it is to separate SALONIKA from Greece. Since in Yalta Greece has been recognized as falling under the British sphere of influence, official Moscow politics are reticent on this question. There is definite proof nevertheless that the above mentioned Macedonian movement (Mazedonische Bewegung) operated under entirely communist leadership.

h. SCANDINAVIA

In Scandinavia indications are on the increase that the Soviets intend to establish strongpoints in Northern Norway and above all in the Kattegat. Since the position of the German troops in Denmark and in Norway is bound to become untenable within a definite period of time, it appears essential to see to it now already that Soviet aspirations extending as far as Bornholm be countered. The military value Denmark and Norway represent to us cannot be gauged in this report. From the political point of view, however, it appears imperative that English resp. American troops arrive in Denmark and in Norway before the Russians are able to make a surprise move. Under any circumstances it must certainly be considered significant that according to Swedish sources Mrs. KOLLONTAI, before leaving for Russia, made it clear to the Swedes that the Soviet Union did not wish any intervention of Swedish troops or volunteer corps in Norway. The warning coupled with this advice has considerably dampened the relief over the coming German defeat in informed Swedish circles. Count BERNADOTTE'S well known conferences in Berlin are not without connection to the above mentioned worries of the Swedish Government.

/countries upon the safeguarding of their own economical interests. It is/

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3. No new points are discernible in the preliminary work for the San Francisco Conference. The different interpretation by Russia and the United States SECURITY of the veto rights of the main powers constitutes only one example of the QUESTION. fact that obviously the Conference cannot produce a more secure peace that each of the major powers is willing to guarantee. It can also be seen unmistakably that the American Foreign minister STETTINIUS IS VERY SERIOUSLY pursuing the idea of creating a genuine World Security Organization and that he is trying to avoid the mistakes of the Geneva institution. However, it is possible to find only a partially fitting formula with which the Anglo-Saxon and the Soviet Russian concepts of the common political shaping of the world can be brought to a common denominator.

CONSER-  
VATIVE  
OPPOSI-  
TION IN  
ENGLAND

4. In the weeks since the Yalta conference the impression has gained ground in the English conservative circles that the continental balance of power as desired by England will not be reconstituted as the final result of the European war. Rather, England is again facing a superior land-power whose unequivocal aim is to control the entire European continent,

The Poland debate in the Commons (1 and 2 March 1945) is not only important for the fact that 25 conservative representatives voted against the Government and that 40 more abstained from voting. Rather more significant is the fact that very influential exponents within the Conservative Party, mostly members of the 1922-Committee subjected EDEN's foreign policy to a criticism on fundamental. Conservative circles view with apprehension how the Soviet Union continues expanding its sphere of influence westward, while at the same time she has disrupted plans prepared last fall for a closer alliance of the Western European states under English leadership (Background to the surprise-invitation of de Gaulle in Moscow in November 1944 and conclusion of the Franco-Soviet pact). These British conservative circles, therefore, are working on bolstering all those forces in Europe that oppose total subjugation of the Continent under a Soviet predominance. The Vatican fills an important function in this question. Without playing a political part of his own, it serves to capitalize all those forces in Europe that do not desire to have the Continent overpowered by Communism.

At present it is hardly possible any more to effect a change in the German policy towards the Church as proposed from the beginning in the Egmont reports. Nevertheless it would have been of importance for the future of the German people if before the final military defeat there would have been at least an attempt towards a settlement with the Church.

From clerical circles in Northern Italy we have been informed reliably that no satisfactory result has come out of the conferences which the democratic politician EDEN conducted, on ROOSEVELT's behalf, in the Vatican as well as in Moscow. The bishops in Northern Italy have been quite explicit about their anti-bolshevist convictions, whereas it took demonstrations of the Catholic bishops of Scotland and, beginning of March, a very noteworthy address of the Archbishop of Westminster (leader of the catholic church of England) to take the Polish question as an issue to reiterate the incompatibility of bolshevist principles and methods on the one side and the doctrines of the Church on the other.

No definite reaction has been noticed in the United States to those discussions in English leading circles and in the European conservative camp. It may be surmised, however, that ROOSEVELT's government, also revamped along conservative lines, will follow this development with a great deal more attention than heretofore. One cannot expect American initiative along those lines as long

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as Far Eastern questions remain unsettled. The above statements must be somewhat tempered by the fact that the conservative forces in England are of an essentially reactionary character. Thus their efforts are restricted by certain limitations since the English people as a whole are undoubtedly longing for a government considerably more progressive on social issues. In fact, a social remodelling during the period after the war has to be expected in England which in the end will create institutions not very dissimilar from those that had been created in Germany up to the outbreak of the war. It may be assumed that the Soviet observers, in their exact analysis, have already recognized this weakness of the conservatives in England and in Western Europe. Therefore it is to be expected that in Germany the Soviets will very soon spread anti-capitalist slogans with veiled anti-British and even anti-American allusions.

EAST. 5. Not, it is also confirmed in Japanese circles in Berlin, that Tokio expects the Soviet-Japanese treaty of 1941 denounced on April 14 1945. The Soviet Union intends no doubt to maintain a free hand towards Japan in the same manner she did with Turkey. Furthermore the denouncing of the treaty is a friendly gesture towards the United States. Thus the policy is continued upon which Stalin embarked with his anti-Japanese references on 7 November 1944. Immediately after Yalta the American press has sought to create the impression that Russian participation in the war against Japan, immediately after the German defeat, were a foregone conclusion. This will not be the case, however, according to Japanese interpretation. There is reason to assume that the Japanese are very informed of the actual intentions of the Russians, despite Stalin's policy of deceit towards Japan. Intely the German Embassy in Tokio has confirmed Japanese efforts to replace the KOISO government, as has already been reported several weeks ago. It can be expected that the next Japanese government will be formed from a circle of friends around the person of Prince KONOYE. Court, nobility and capital are intent on forming a government of transition that would take itself to negotiating a compromise peace with the United States. Because of Japan's internal political groupings it seems that Ambassador OSHIMA has not been kept posted up on these endeavours.

The impression emerges that Japanese court circles are prepared to return all conquests made since 1941. Since, for the time being, those circles are trying to use Russia as intermediary, they may intend to make considerable concessions to the Soviet Union in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. On the other side the appointment of Ambassador GREW as Undersecretary of State has been commented upon in Japan as indicating that even in the most intimate circles of America's political leaders, no final decisions have been taken as yet whether the Pacific war should really be continued until unconditional surrender has been attained. In this connection it is noteworthy that neither Tokio nor in Berlin serious consternation over STALIN's publicized policy of compromise has been displayed. Japanese opinion has, on the other hand, used political significance into temporary stoppages of lend-lease deliveries to the Soviet Union, in connection with the latter's Far Eastern policy. Regardless of the validity of Japanese conjectures, it is fairly well established that the Soviet Union has no interest in a total defeat of Japan. One should rather draw a parallel between the Russo-Japanese conferences in recent weeks in Moscow and General UGAKI's attempts to reach an accord with CHIANG-KAI-SHECK. The Japanese are prepared to make considerable concessions to the Russians in China should they succeed in attaining a compromise between Japan, China and the Soviet Union. The Japanese believe that on that basis peace with the United States could be considered. In that case, however, neither Japan nor the United States would wield decisive influence in China, but Russia. As yet it cannot be

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determined to what extent STALIN has already implemented those lines of thought. The Russian tactics in Far Eastern policy are summed up in an attitude of not letting the parties concerned know in advance what her actual intentions in the Far East actually are. Thus they are able to maintain their key position, a position they have undoubtedly attained in the Far East at present, for as long a period as possible and in all directions.

LIANG's parleys with CHIANG bogged down, so did CHIANG's conferences with the Inner-Communists. CHIANG is anxious not to let himself be tied down by agreement to a definite attitude. The reforming of the Cabinet after the Stillwell crisis is of no fundamental importance, since both the Minister of War and the Chief of General Staff have remained in office, and since the brothers SOONG still remain the Generalissimo's closest advisers.

In conclusion, the following picture presents itself:

Soviet and American interests in China were running parallel for a while. Both major powers desired a compromise of CHIANG with Yenai, though prompted by different motives. The Soviets expected from such a solution the founding of a wider basis for the Communist party in China; the Americans hope that with the Yenai compromise the best Chinese divisions will become available for the war against Japan after withdrawal from the Chansi zone. In reality CHIANG has crossed Russian intentions by not embarking upon serious negotiations either with Yenai or with the Japanese. He has therefore taken up closer relations with the Americans in spite of his former restrictions. Moscow has countered by broadcasting intensified attacks against CHIANG in Chinese language, as reported by our monitoring service. The conclusion can be drawn that the Russo-American community of interests is only of a temporary nature. Two possibilities emerge:

1. The Soviet Union is totally defeated. In that case the Soviet Union will undoubtedly claim Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, but she will also retain a certain considerable influence in China. According to Japanese sources the newly built large scale Siberian industries were already planned and equipped in such a way that later they would be able to cater to the export trade in the Chinese, Manchurian and Korean markets. The same sources are in possession of documentary proof that already during the last years of the war the Soviet Union has reconverted a part of its Siberian capacities for similar tasks, because, thanks to American lend-lease aid, they did not have to keep their own war production at a maximum pitch.

2. The Soviet Union will have no interest in the Pacific booty, islands and former Germanland's possessions. The nucleus of the whole problem will therefore be the allocation of future spheres of interest in the Chinese mainland. (popular) anti-communist propaganda the mention that Yenai is better according to all sources appears to be better and more firmly established that in Chungking controlled territory, has been completely eliminated. The towering personality of Generalissimo CHIANG has been so much affected by conditions in Chungking - there is considerably less conviction in Yenai - that, once Japan has collapsed - an internal dispute in itself appears unavoidable. In that event the Soviet Union will try to consolidate her sphere of influence, which will be hers quite automatically, and will find herself confronted by American intentions in China of an entirely different nature. From this point of view, much more than from the European one, one has to consider the tactics and the attitude of the Soviet Union in questions of world security that were posed at the conference in San Francisco.

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2. The second and lesser possibility would be a Soviet sponsored compromise arrangement between the United States and Japan. This would be, in a sense, the inverse of the peace of Portsmouth. And in the same way as the Americans understood to take advantage of their part as honest brokers to consolidate in a most decisive manner their influence in the Far East, the Russians would undoubtedly follow identical intentions in this case.

In both cases it is unavoidable that in years to come the center of gravity of Soviet politics will be shifted in the direction of East Asia. This will happen regardless of developments in Europe, already started and best defined in Lenin's famous saying that "he who owns Berlin owns Europe."

THE  
GERMAN  
POWER  
OF  
WAR.

6. From the German point of view the most immediate concern is that with the impending defeat a cleavage of the German people will become unavoidable. Even if a reasonable conformity of methods in the Eastern and in the Western zone of occupation can be expected, there will in the long run certainly be no compromise on basic fundamentals of government. At the present moment it is too late for a policy of action. It is deemed important that the certainly disastrous Werwolf romanticism be done away with, inasmuch as the position of the German people can only be worsened by such actions, is of further importance to drop any illusions regarding an imminent American-Soviet conflict, for reasons that have been developed above. Even disregarding the fact that similar hypotheses are in contradiction to reality, it is quite clear that such a conflict would not be in the interest of the German people. Should it actually break out, many millions of Germans would soon die of hunger. Furthermore Germany would become a battlefield. If at present moment it is at all possible to consider the future, then everything should be undertaken on the German side that would tend to postpone the outbreak of such a conflict. The dividing up of the German people signifies furthermore that sooner or later every single German will have to take sides either for the principles of the East or of the West. It is already evident now that as a consequence of the many bombing attacks which have rendered many millions of Germans homeless and destitute the ground for a communist undercurrent has been much better prepared, than would appear to the casual observer. The German people have become atomized to an extent that no longer will there be a class of highest social intellectual level, nor a group of men capable of assuming leadership. As far as can be recognized up to the present, the Western powers do not oppose the 'penetration bolshevik' with anything but a reeducation program. It promises to be of little effect if at the same time the vast majority of the German people will gain the conviction that in the end only their bare existence seems to be guaranteed.

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30 June 1945.

HDH

SUBJECT: EGMONT BERICHTE.

SOURCE: SS-Sturmabfuhrer Dr. HOETTL, Group VI E, RSHA.

In order to form a correct estimate of the role assigned to the Egmont reports at a time when Germany's military defeat had become a foregone conclusion, one must abstract their "political intelligence" trappings and the circumstances of their origin with the intelligence service of the RSHA. The Egmont reports were no mere "Lageberichte", but political acts of an order usually prepared at the highest level of policy-making agencies. Had they emanated from the German Foreign Office, they would have passed as routine surveys designed to keep the Foreign Minister posted and to enable him to make up his mind what to do next. What lifts the Egmont reports out of the ordinary is the fact that in publishing them and lining up behind their findings and recommendations the authority of men like SCHELLENBERG, KALTENBRUNNER AND HIMMLER, the RSHA arrogated to itself policy-making functions in the field of foreign policy which by rights belong to the German Foreign Office.

WIRSING instinctively felt that behind the ostensible purpose of the Egmont reports, viz to draw an unvarnished picture of Germany's national predicament, hid a more sinister objective linking their purpose with the person of HIMMLER. Most probably SCHELLENBERG will be able to shed light on the connections between the Egmont reports and HIMMLER's political aspirations. Dr. HOETTL, one of the best informed functionaries of Amt VI, believes that SCHELLENBERG's primary aim in putting out the Egmont reports was to inculcate in HIMMLER the belief that he was the man of the hour and that HITLER had to go.

Paras 3 and 4 omitted, in part.

.....In respect to frequent requests for special treatment of certain French, Dutch and Belgian individuals, HIMMLER showed unwanted solicitude and in a great many instances authorized their repatriation via the Red Cross. In these matters also KALTENBRUNNER took a hand, e.g. in meetings with the President of the International Red Cross, Prof. BURKARDT, in March 1945, with Prince BERNADOTTE whom he introduced to HIMMLER, and in connection with the deliverance of a sizable number of Jews into the hands of the Swiss through Bundesrat MUSI. SCHELLENBERG also took a decisive share in this policy of 'preparing the ground'. It is generally assumed that it was he who induced HIMMLER to launch his offer of surrender through Count BERNADOTTE. Another prominent member of HIMMLER's faction was SS-Obergruppenfuhrer BERGER, who had been slated to conduct the levee en masse in the West and who, during the final stage of the war, was given plenary powers in Southern Germany.

5. In this connection also the military ambitions of HIMMLER should be noted. Dr. HOETTL does not agree with Dr. WIRSING to the extent that HIMMLER's assignment to command the southern sector of Army Group G (Oberrhein) was a mere device on the part of HITLER, who wanted to shelve him because of his strong views on foreign affairs. Quite on the contrary, HIMMLER had been coveting military responsibility all along, because he believed himself to have the makings of a great strategist, especially after his undoubted success in stemming the rout of the beaten German armies across the Rhine in September 1944.

6. The sum total of the above-mentioned indications points to the existence of a very specific program aiming at HITLER's overthrow and HIMMLER'S accession to power. As seen in this context the Egmont reports may be considered a blueprint of Germany's foreign policy in case such a change in government should have taken place. Aside from their properties as an interesting piece of reportage they will find their place in the backstage struggle for power between two of the greatest gangsters the world has ever seen.

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