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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

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
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The **WEEKLY SUMMARY**, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

WARNING

The **WEEKLY SUMMARY** contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EDT, 7 May 1970)

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
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Western Hemisphere

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

27



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BRAZIL SECURITY FORCES HIT TERRORISTS

29

Military and security forces have carried out major operations against terrorist groups.

CUBA AND SUBVERSION: OLD STRATEGY, NEW TACTICS

Almost every Latin American republic has felt Fidel Castro's interference in the form of subversion and armed struggle at least once. The involvement has ranged from direct participation by Castro himself to the supplying of arms and ammunition. The great majority of Castro's efforts have failed, however. Despite the setbacks, he has adopted revolution as a way of life and there are no signs that he plans to reject it.



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RENEWED VIOLENCE LIKELY IN GUATEMALA

30

President Mendez has allowed the state of siege, imposed following the assassination of German Ambassador von Spreti, to lapse despite an increase in terrorist violence.

TRINIDAD FACES A NEW POLITICAL CLIMATE

31

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EL SALVADOR ADOPTS A TOUGH LINE

32

The Sanchez government is adopting a new and tougher approach to domestic and foreign politics.

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FAR EAST

The Thieu government in Saigon finds itself so overloaded with problems of political discontent that it is unable to deal effectively with all of them at once. Various opposition leaders and groups are acting boldly in the face of the government's hesitancy to take more repressive measures. A number of top officials are weighing in with gloomy prognostications, the police forces have been unable to cope with the daily pace of demonstrations, some violent, and the government has had to return several battalions of regular troops to Saigon, both because of the political turmoil and because of an increasing threat of Viet Cong terrorism in the capital. Off-balance because key lines of authority are not working, the Thieu government may be facing a real crisis.

On the military front, activity reached substantially higher levels last week in I and IV Corps, perhaps indicating the beginning of the second phase of the Communists' spring offensive, but also possibly representing a Communist effort to divert allied attention away from sweep operations inside Cambodia.

The allied operations aimed at Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia have so far not encountered sizable numbers of enemy forces, but have uncovered large quantities of supplies. Communist military headquarters elements have apparently been able to relocate fairly rapidly to avoid the allied sweeps.

Deeper inside Cambodia, the Communists continue to press hard on the Cambodian Army. Two provincial capitals were reportedly captured late in the week, and the Communists are still blocking several major transportation routes between Phnom Penh and the eastern and southern borders of the country.

On the international scene, Hanoi reacted to US military thrusts into Cambodia and bombing of certain targets in North Vietnam by boycotting the session of the Paris talks scheduled for 6 May. Peking's denunciation of the US moves did not imply any larger role for China in Indochina, but did contain a sharp personal attack on President Nixon. Communist China also announced the formal severance of relations with Cambodia and in the same breath recognized the newly formed Cambodian government in exile, Sihanouk's first major step toward an attempt to re-establish himself in Cambodia.

The Indonesian-initiated Asian conference on Cambodia now is scheduled for 16-17 May in Djakarta; 12 nations (all non-Communist) of the 21 invited have agreed to attend. Although there is little prospect that the conference will have any practical effect on the over-all Cambodian situation, it probably will generate a degree of international political support to Phnom Penh and some bilateral aid.

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VIETNAM: TEMPORIZING IN HANOI

Hanoi has temporized so far in its public reaction to the allied ground operations into Cambodia and the US air strikes against targets in North Vietnam. The Communists boycotted the plenary session of the Paris talks on 6 May, but said that they would return to the table next week unless the bombing continued. Their failure to rupture the conference completely after threatening for months to do so shows Hanoi's reluctance to close off any political options.

The Communists' propaganda reaction to the new allied moves is in the same cautious vein. They lashed out at Washington for the ground and air attacks, but carefully avoided committing themselves to forceful retaliation. They also have made some general threats, but concrete decisions on their future course are yet to be made. Hanoi has contended that the air strikes violate Washington's "pledge" in November 1968 to halt all bombing of the North. This could mean that the Communists, in turn, no longer feel constrained about large-scale use of the Demilitarized Zone or attacks on major South Vietnamese cities.

Hanoi's slight delay in recognizing Sihanouk's "government in exile" may be caused by the same instinct to temporize. The North Vietnamese extended recognition to the new "government" a day after it was announced, but only after six countries, including China, already had weighed in. Unlike the Chinese, Hanoi has not yet announced withdrawal of its remaining per-

sonnel from Phnom Penh. Thus, even at this late hour, the Vietnamese Communists seem to be reluctant to close off completely the possibility of dealing with Lon Nol and his associates.

One of the reasons for Hanoi's caution may be difficulty in concerting with Peking and Moscow. Party First Secretary Le Duan's prolonged stay abroad suggests that difficulties have cropped up. He has been away for three weeks and the Polish press reports that he took a side trip to Warsaw, leaving there on 6 May. His absence from Hanoi at such a critical time strongly suggests that the Vietnamese are being pulled in different directions by their principal allies, with Peking pressing militancy and Moscow counseling moderation.

It is also possible that Hanoi has been sufficiently surprised by the turn of events in Indochina that it needs some time to sort out all of the implications and to make new decisions. This process, however, probably would not impair the Communists' ability to react rapidly in tactical battle field situations.

Communist Military Reactions

Communist battlefield reactions to the US and South Vietnamese operations against their long-held sanctuaries in Cambodia have varied, but no major efforts to stand and fight or to counterattack have developed.

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Although there was little direct confrontation with Communist combat forces during the opening stages of the allied sweep operations, ground fighting picked up as the week progressed and the operations were enlarged. Cumulative casualties as of 7 May show more than 3,000 Communists killed in contrast to South Vietnamese losses of 162 killed and 840 wounded. American casualties totaled 37 killed and 79 wounded. Additionally, enemy losses included the seizure of more than 4,000 weapons and 1,000 tons of rice.

Inside South Vietnam, increased enemy activity in IV Corps last weekend may have signaled the beginning of the anticipated "second phase" of the Communists spring campaign. The enemy effort gained momentum early in the week with some strong rocket and mortar attacks against US facilities, but they were not as intense as those in the early April upsurge. The pattern of preparations for this phase suggests



Mortars, recoilless rifles, SKS carbines, antiaircraft guns, and light machine guns captured by ARVN units in Parrot's Beak area.

that there will be less coordination than the previous month, with attacks taking place as each unit completes its local preparations. In some areas, moreover, enemy offensive plans may have been thrown off schedule or altered as a result of the allied cross-border operations or other pre-emptive actions.


Higher levels of enemy action will probably continue well into May. Plans for renewed hostilities by enemy forces in the central coastal provinces, to get under way on 7-8 May, were revealed in a recently captured document.

Throughout much of the country the enemy's local force units could step up the tempo of shellings and small-scale attacks on very short notice. In addition, first-line combat units are in a position to threaten certain allied bases and urban centers, especially in northern Quang Tri Province just south of the Demilitarized Zone, in central Thua Thien Province, and in the coastal lowlands of Quang Nam and Quang Tin provinces. In II Corps, Communist forces are mostly concentrated near allied Special Forces camps in the international tri-border area. Although many of the enemy main forces in III Corps are preoccupied with allied operations, they could launch attacks designed to divert attention away from the allied operations in eastern Cambodia. Most of the major enemy units in the delta provinces have avoided contact with South Vietnamese forces and apparently are not ready for large-scale ground operations in the immediate future.

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CAMBODIA - SOUTH VIETNAM: Current Situation



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● VC/NVA base area along Cambodian border

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Violence and Pessimism
Increase in Saigon

The government moved strongly this week to head off renewed disturbances by student and Buddhist groups, and its actions will probably engender new charges of repression. Following an emergency cabinet meeting, at which officials expressed concern that Communist agents might be able to exploit political unrest in Saigon, the government ordered all schools and universities in the Saigon area closed indefinitely. There had been indications that militant student leaders in Saigon were gaining control of the antigovernment protests and were organizing further demonstrations.

Another serious situation may develop out of a clash between two antagonistic Buddhist factions for control of a key pagoda in Saigon. The government is already being accused by the militant An Quang sect of having intervened on behalf of its rival. The possibility of further violence between the Buddhists represents a new and potentially explosive problem for Thieu government, which has indicated that it is prepared to use force if necessary to maintain control.

A mood of discouragement now appears to be developing in some government circles over President Thieu's inability to deal effectively with growing popular discontent. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] Corruption is widespread among high-ranking South Vietnamese military officers, but since Thieu must retain their support to remain in office, his hands are somewhat tied in trying to cope with public dissatisfaction over their activities.

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[redacted]

President Thieu also appears to be somewhat discouraged about the prospects for his regime. He has recently registered strong disappointment in the performance of some key ministries, and there apparently has been a loss of mutual confidence between the President and some of his key lieutenants. [redacted]

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SIHANOUK FORMS HIS GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

"The Royal Government of National Union" organized by Sihanouk in Peking this week is a blend of experienced politicians and energetic leftists. The new government is nominally under the direction of the "National United Front of Cambodia," which is chaired by Sihanouk, and it probably will continue to function for the time being in the Chinese capital.

Penn Nouth, a prominent Cambodian politician who has acted as prime minister in past Sihanouk governments, was picked to head the new government. Nouth's political prestige and his loyalty to Sihanouk made him the logical choice for the position, but because of age and poor health he is likely to be only a figurehead. As expected, a number of well-known Cambodian leftists were given key cabinet portfolios, including national defense, interior, and information. These individuals, three of whom were leading members of the National Assembly until Sihanouk's 1967 purge forced them to flee Phnom Penh, at one time had some following among the youth and intellectuals in Cambodia. The fact that they were not present for the government's unveiling in Peking suggests they may either be in Hanoi or with Communist forces fighting in Cambodia.

The Chinese quickly endorsed the new government and then announced the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Lon Nol regime. Although Hanoi and the Viet Cong

also have recognized Sihanouk's government, they have stopped short of severing their slim diplomatic ties with Phnom Penh. The Soviet Union has not yet taken a position on Sihanouk's government.

In Phnom Penh, meanwhile, the Lon Nol government apparently intends to break diplomatic relations with the Provisional Revolutionary Government and resume relations with Saigon. The Cambodians are also moving to improve relations with Thailand, but at a slower pace.

On the military front, (see map on page 4) government forces continue to fare badly in their engagements with Communist troops. The Communists are still threatening to cut Phnom Penh's overland access to the southern and eastern provinces. Their reported capture of the capitals of Kratie and Mondolkiri provinces were their most significant and bold military moves to date. In addition, they captured the strategic Mekong River ferry crossing at Neak Luong, some 30 miles south of Phnom Penh. Initial efforts by the Cambodian Army to retake Neak Luong were unsuccessful. Government troops regained control of the gulf-port town of Kampot, but Communist elements reportedly still had the southern towns of Takeo and Angtassom surrounded.

The Cambodian Army commander of the southern border provinces recently told a South Vietnamese general that morale was low in the Cambodian Army and that he

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was pessimistic about the overall situation. He claimed that the Communists were succeeding in isolating towns and securing a firm hold in rural areas. He asserted that many village and hamlet chiefs in Svay Rieng Province were Communists, and others in Kompong Cham Province who remained loyal to the government were being killed by the Communists.

In an effort to boost morale, the government recently issued a communiqué asking its troops to hold on for another ten days, after which time the Communists, according to the communiqué, will be unable to keep fighting. The message also noted that

aid for Cambodia is coming from everywhere, particularly from ethnic Cambodian troops recently flown into Phnom Penh from South Vietnam.

US military operations in Cambodia will almost certainly improve the spirits of the leaders in Phnom Penh and help convince hard-pressed Cambodian Army units that their situation is far from hopeless. Additionally, in the international sphere, the forthcoming mid-May Asian conference of non-Communist nations on Cambodia should help generate more political support, and possibly some materiel aid, for the Lon Nol government.

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CHINA FOCUSES ATTENTION ON CAMBODIAN DEVELOPMENTS

This year's May Day celebrations in Peking were held amidst heightened national attention to the latest developments in Cambodia. Party chairman Mao Tse-tung and his designated-heir Lin Piao made public appearances for the first time in over six months, while the featured foreign guest was Norodom Sihanouk.

On the domestic side, the celebrations revealed no major changes in China's ruling line-up, but several important leaders failed to show and Peking has offered no explanation for their absence. The most notable absentee among the politburo members was Peking boss Hsieh Fu-chih, who may be ill or out of the cap-

ital on some assignment related to his additional duties as minister of public security. Aside from the few puzzling absentees from the top leadership ranks, the most interesting feature of the turnout was the unusually large number of officials in attendance who were identified as members of the Peking-based military, party, and government machinery. Their presence suggests that some of the positions in the central departments and ministries that were decimated during the Cultural Revolution are now being filled.

For Sihanouk, Peking's May Day festivities were sandwiched between the conclusion of the

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Indochinese summit conference and his announcement on 5 May of the official formation of his government-in-exile. Predictably, the Chinese loudly acclaimed the conference, declaring at the same time that the Chinese "resolutely oppose" efforts to utilize the UN or "any other international organization or conference" to settle the Cambodian problem. The Chinese also blasted the Soviets for UN Ambassador Malik's encouragement of new Geneva-type consultations on Indochina and wrote off Indonesia's planned Asian conference on Indochina.

The Chinese role in the Indochina summit conference was almost certainly far larger than public disclosures suggest. Premier Chou En-lai himself was probably in attendance, and may have urged a more militant line than that finally adopted by the publicly identified conferees. Peking obviously is attempting to play the "people's war" card with respect to the Indochinese situation; its negative attitude toward any sort of negotiations on the issue may have made it more difficult for Hanoi to consider such a ploy. The Chinese have probably pledged increased materiel support to the actual combatants in Indochina, but there is no indication that Peking plans to intervene in the conflict itself.

Peking wasted little time in formally recognizing Sihanouk's newly formed Royal Government of National Union. In making the announcement, Premier Chou En-lai declared that Peking had officially severed diplomatic relations with Phnom Penh and was withdrawing "all staff of the Chinese Embassy

and Chinese experts." The Chinese ambassador in Phnom Penh subsequently met with Cambodian leaders and an arrangement was apparently worked out for reciprocal withdrawal of Cambodian diplomatic personnel from Peking. This is the first time Peking has taken the initiative in breaking relations with another state. The move probably was in train for some time and flows logically from previous Communist actions and pronouncements.

Peking's initial reaction to President Nixon's speech on 30 April and to US bombing raids in North Vietnam on 1 and 2 May has been relatively restrained. The official government statement contained a "stern warning" against US provocations and reiterated China's amorphous pledge to provide "powerful backing" for the Indochinese people in their war against the US. Peking, however, did not commit itself to a direct role in Indochina, but instead it seemed to imply that the Indochinese could handle the situation by themselves.

Peking saved its best punches for personal assaults on President Nixon. The Chinese described him as a "god of plague and war" and an "executioner whose hands are dripping with the blood of the Indochinese people." The President was also described as a "malicious war criminal" and the US as being "unscrupulous, truculent, and treacherous." These attacks represent China's most virulent commentary against the US in several months, and suggest that Peking may use the forum of the Sino-US Warsaw talks later this month to further castigate US policy in Indochina.

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USSR REMAINS NONCOMMITTAL ON INDOCHINA

Authoritative Soviet statements early this week made clear Moscow's concern over the trend of events in Indochina. On 4 May, the Soviets took the unusual step of calling a press conference to dramatize their opposition to President Nixon's announcement of 30 April.

Premier Kosygin personally read the text of a government statement denouncing US air raids on North Vietnam and "intervention" in Cambodia. The statement contained Moscow's strongest personal attack on the President to date. The Soviet Premier took pains to stress that US activity in Indochina is contributing to a worsening in US-Soviet relations, but he did not go beyond previous pledges of support for Hanoi.

Kosygin refused to be drawn out on the question of the legitimacy of the present government in Phnom Penh. Now that Sihanouk has formed his "government-in-exile" and Hanoi and Peking have recognized it, however, Moscow may soon feel compelled to follow suit. Kosygin also spoke negatively on immediate prospects for a diplomatic solution in Indochina, saying that "this is not the time for meetings, but for actions." He also promised that Moscow's "comprehensive aid" to Vietnam would be reviewed in the light of the current situation.

The press conference and the fact that the Soviet Premier personally delivered the attack on the President's policies were undoubtedly meant to underline the seriousness with which current US actions are viewed. There is little indication, however, that Moscow feels a need at present to commit itself to any dramatically new course of action.

Moscow's attitude seems guided by the notion that only China or the US can hope to profit from a widening of hostilities in Indochina. The Soviets may now be counseling Hanoi to avoid premature overreaction to Washington's latest moves, but the USSR will not fall far out of step with North Vietnam's ultimate reaction.

The Soviets seem also to be resurrecting various proposals for united Communist action in aiding Vietnam. There have been a few recent propaganda broadcasts which suggest that the Soviets have revived this line. These proposals, like those following the intensification of the conflict in 1965, have probably been raised primarily for the purpose of blackening China. The broadcasts themselves are cast in such a way as to betray Moscow's probable view that Peking is likely to be no more receptive than it was in 1965.

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COMMUNISTS CONTINUE PRESSURE IN SOUTH LAOS


The Communists followed up the capture of Attopeu town in south Laos with a number of attacks against government bases and outposts on the Bolovens Plateau. By 6 May, however, all of these positions were back in government hands, including the principal fire base overlooking Attopeu town. The provincial capital itself remains under Communist control.

Enemy forces also launched a rocket attack against Pakse, the site of the southern military region headquarters. No physical damage resulted, but the raid in-

creased apprehensions about Communist intentions in the panhandle. Local Laotian commanders claim to have evidence of substantial enemy troop movements into the Toumlane Valley and the Bolovens Plateau.

There is some evidence that the Communists may increase the threat to the provincial capital of Saravane. Some unusual enemy troop movements, have been reported in areas north and west of the town, and handbills were distributed in Saravane announcing that it will be seized by the Communists on 20 May. Similar warnings appeared in Attopeu before it was attacked.

In the north, the Communists confined their activity to increasing pressure on the Bouam Long outpost north of the Plaine des Jarres and launching an ineffective rocket attack against Long Tieng. Government forces have regained some high ground within rocket range of Long Tieng and Sam Thong. They believe the enemy is having increasing difficulty getting enough food and ammunition. An assault on the Meo strongholds remains as a real possibility, but the Communists could have elected to postpone this undertaking in favor of consolidating their hold on the Plaine.



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MALAYSIA WORRIED ON ANNIVERSARY OF 1969 RIOTS

The Malaysian Government is displaying considerable nervousness as the anniversary of last year's postelection communal riots approaches on 13 May. Although there is no evidence that any group is planning disturbances to mark the occasion, government officials are trying to damp down rumors that trouble will break out.

Last week Prime Minister Rahman announced that the government is "ready and capable" of tackling any incident that might occur "before, on, or after 13 May." Another official has denied stories that government officials have been refused leave during the first part of May. The government has issued curfew passes and other contingency precautions appear to be under way. At least seven persons have been arrested recently on charges of rumormongering, and shopkeepers, most of whom are Chinese and Indian, have been officially warned not to heighten Malay resentment by raising prices if people start to stockpile food in anticipation of trouble.

Last year, when political campaigning was in full swing, the atmosphere was more highly charged than it is at present. The 1969 riots resulted in the killing of over 150 people, mostly Chinese, and a state of emergency was imposed on the country. The government's efforts over the past year to assuage racial tensions and return the nation to a condition in which parliamentary elections could be resumed have been

low key and unimpressive. If anything, the country has become more polarized, with the Chinese lying low, the radical Malays unhappy, and the government only marking time.

As was the case last year, the Communists, and by association the Chinese population in general, are being billed as the potential source of trouble. The setting of booby traps attached to Communist flags and the distribution of Communist pamphlets that took place in late April throughout West Malaysia were designed to mark the 40th anniversary of the Malayan Communist Party. But more important, the organizational ability demonstrated by these actions has added to the government's worries at this time. Even the prime minister, in the past more fair-minded toward the Chinese community than many of his Malay colleagues, has been making anti-Chinese statements.

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The government appears fully ready to handle most incidents that might occur, but widespread disturbances would sorely tax the security forces. In the event of trouble, the predominantly Malay forces would be tempted to delay intervention in situations where their Malay compatriots are getting the best of it. Whether or not the Communists become involved in any outbreaks this year, the Chinese would again be the losers.

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SLOW ECONOMIC GROWTH FRUSTRATES NORTH KOREANS

Despite intense pressures from Premier Kim Il-song, the North Korean economy is not growing fast enough to allow an increase in already high defense expenditures, nor is it increasing the chances of successfully winding up a plan that has dragged on embarrassingly into its tenth year.

Finance Minister Choe Yunsu, in his budget message to the Supreme People's Assembly on 20 April, avoided output claims for 1969. His figures indicate that revenue and expenditures fell even further behind plans than is usual for North Korea. Revenue increased six percent instead of the 19 percent planned, and expenditures grew by five percent instead of 24. The disappointing performance of the economy was attributed to unfavorable weather conditions and a cut in consumer-goods prices.

Defense expenditures have been the subject of intense propaganda since 1966, particularly so after the Pueblo and EC-121 incidents. Last year, Pyongyang called for another step-up in absolute defense spending, although as a percentage of total state revenues it was to remain at the 30-31 percent in force since 1966. Pyongyang did not meet the 14-percent increase planned for 1969, apparently because the share of funds devoted to defense had already been near the maximum supportable by the economy. Defense spending is planned to remain at 31 percent of total expenditures in 1970,

but, on the basis of the planned rate of budget growth, absolute defense spending is expected to rise by 23 percent.

Kim Il-song has insisted that economic growth under a socialist system can reach 15-20 percent annually, but the North Korean economy in recent years has been growing only at an estimated four to five percent a year. This rate is less than half South Korea's growth rate, a comparison that North Korea finds extremely disconcerting.

Economic development in North Korea slowed considerably in the middle 1960s following Soviet cessation of economic aid because of Pyongyang's alignment with China in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The aid cut-off was one of the primary reasons for failure of the original 1961-67 plan. An extension of the plan to 1970 was adopted in order to gain more time to achieve the more important goals.

The Soviet Union resumed economic aid during 1968. About 30 million dollars was probably drawn on credit that year and another 30-40 million dollars is estimated to have been provided in 1969. Nevertheless, prospects for achieving the major goals of the current plan remain uncertain. Pyongyang, however, no doubt will proclaim success when the plan nominally ends in September and a new five year plan is promulgated.

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EUROPE

Soviet propaganda shifted into high gear this week following President Nixon's announcement that US troops had moved into Cambodia. A series of strident press and radio commentaries directed at the President personally and at Washington in general was capped on 4 May with nationwide mass meetings and an unusual press conference by Premier Kosygin. Moscow's concern about the situation in Indochina prompted Kosygin's appearance. He bitterly asserted that US activity there has contributed to a worsening of Soviet-US relations.

In answer to a direct question on the future of SALT, Kosygin charged that the recent US actions "do not strengthen mutual trust, without which it is very difficult to hold the talks." (In Vienna, Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov echoed Kosygin's remark, but did not let the issue interfere with the conduct of the talks themselves.) Another sensitive area in US-Soviet relations, the Middle East, was mentioned. Kosygin virtually admitted that Soviet pilots were in Egypt, but did not specify their role. Judging by Kosygin's remarks on China, Moscow believes the occasion called for down-playing its problems with Peking. Kosygin said nothing critical and signaled a Soviet desire to continue the Peking talks.

Kosygin's criticism of the President by name was something of a turning point in itself and suggested that Moscow's opposition to the policies of the Nixon administration will now be voiced more stridently. That this new hostility coincided with the signs of Brezhnev's strengthened position in the leadership suggests that the forces at play in Moscow might now favor some hardening of their line in dealing with Washington. It is unlikely, however, that such an approach will lead soon to any drastic changes in Soviet policy toward SALT, the Middle East, or China. In each of these areas, Moscow's policy has all along been based on fundamental calculations of risk and opportunity.

East and West German officials met in Bonn this week to prepare for the summit meeting in Kassel. One day prior to the meeting, East German Premier Stoph wrote to Chancellor Brandt criticizing Bonn for claiming that East German citizens are subject to West German law and for opposing East German attempts to join international organizations. Stoph's language and that used in describing the letter in the press, however, implies that Stoph still intends to meet Brandt on 21 May.

Ireland's Prime Minister Lynch unexpectedly cracked down this week on hard liners in the cabinet who have opposed Dublin's dovish policy on Ulster. He expelled the agriculture and finance ministers and willingly accepted the resignation of a third. Lynch obviously had advance support of most members of his party in parliament and they gave full backing to his actions.

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USSR RESUMES NORMAL MILITARY AID DELIVERIES

Soviet seaborne military deliveries to Communist and non-Communist arms clients have resumed following an unprecedented month-long interruption while attention was riveted on the introduction of SA-3 surface-to-air missile equipment into Egypt. Negotiations for military assistance, however, continued throughout that period and resulted in another deal with Iran. Talks also were held with Cuba, Pakistan, and Nigeria.

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(b)(3) During the halt in military shipments to other arms clients [redacted] military equipment, including SA-3s, arrived in Egypt. The shipments included ZSU-23-4 self-propelled antiaircraft guns and a new radar designed to provide early warning against low-flying aircraft that recently appeared in Egypt. Neither type of equipment had been observed before outside the USSR or East Europe.

During the past month Soviet deliveries to Egypt have returned to a normal pace and have included 15 SU-7 fighter bombers, 15 MI-8 helicopters, and a large number of assorted trucks. Routine military deliveries also have been resumed to other Middle East and third world clients.

The intensive effort to augment Cairo's defensive capabilities did not preclude talks with other arms aid partners. The Soviets concluded an agreement with Iran in March for a substantial

number of 130-mm. artillery pieces, together with the related prime movers and ammunition. These and antitank rockets and miscellaneous ground forces equipment are valued at some \$30 million.

[redacted] (b)(1)
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In early April, Soviet Defense Minister Grechko received a large military delegation from Cuba headed by Minister of the Armed Forces Raul Castro. The composition of the delegation suggests that talks may have covered arrangements to provide updated military equipment for air defense. Last year, after almost a year's hiatus in military deliveries to Havana the USSR introduced 170 new 130-mm. artillery pieces and replaced some SA-2 equipment.

Recently, Moscow announced a scheduled visit in June of Pakistan's president. High on that agenda will be discussions on whether military equipment remaining to be shipped under a 1968 agreement, including tanks and guided missile patrol boats, will be shipped. Pakistan also may seek expanded arms deliveries.

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BREZHNEV ENHANCES ROLE AS "PRIMUS INTER PARES"

General Secretary Brezhnev continues to press his advantage on the Soviet domestic political front. There are signs, however, that at least some of his colleagues are attempting to ensure that this not undermine the principle of collective leadership.

Brezhnev was again the regime spokesman at the May Day celebration and his "collected works"--1964 to 1970--are due to be published later this year. His growing public pre-eminence was also underscored by the preliminary Pravda report on nominations of members of the politburo to the new Supreme Soviet to be elected on 14 June. Although each member stands for election in only one district, he traditionally receives additional honorary nominations. The number he receives provides a good reading of his relative political standing in the hierarchy.

1970 (25 April, Pravda)		1966 (24 April, Pravda)	
Brezhnev	17	Brezhnev	19
Kosygin	8	Kosygin	13
Podgorny	6	Podgorny	8
Suslov	4	Suslov	4
Kirilenko	4	Shelepin	2
Pelshe	2	Kirilenko	1
Polyansky	2	Mazurov	1
Shelepin	2	Pelshe	1
Shelest	2	Polyansky	1
Voronov	2	Shelest	1
Mazurov	1	Voronov	1

Brezhnev, when compared to the last election in 1966, is set off more distinctly from Premier Kosygin and President Podgorny, and the latter two are now close to equality. Consistent with other signs over the past year, party secretary Kirilenko

has risen in the listing and now rivals Suslov. Shelepin, predictably, has dropped back.

The one surprise is the blatant slighting of Mazurov, a first deputy premier and former Belorussian party boss. His poor showing supports earlier evidence that Brezhnev may have been playing politics with the Belorussian party organization. Brezhnev's four-day visit to Minsk in March and the inclusion of the present Belorussian party chief, Masherov, on the Brezhnev-led delegation to the treaty signing in Czechoslovakia, may be an attempt to wean away Mazurov's provincial support. Mazurov has been [redacted] (b)(1) critical of Brezhnev's leadership and has been rumored as a likely (b)(3) successor to Kosygin.

Rumors that Kosygin will step down due to poor health continue to circulate [redacted]

[redacted] his unprecedented (b)(1) televised press conference this (b)(3) week on Southeast Asia and his participation in the delegation to Prague has helped to restore a semblance of collective leadership.

There is some evidence that Brezhnev's dominance has been a source of controversy and concern within the politburo. In his Lenin anniversary speech on 21 April, Brezhnev defined collective leadership in a self-serving manner. When the speech appeared in the press the following day, however, a sentence had been added which brought his remarks into line with standard formulations on the subject. [redacted] (b)(3)

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SOVIETS SEE CZECH FRIENDSHIP TREATY AS TRIUMPH

The principle of "socialist internationalism," which Moscow used to justify its intervention in Czechoslovakia, has received its most impressive endorsement to date in the new Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship treaty.

The treaty formally requires the two signatories to take action in defense of socialist institutions wherever they may be threatened--the chief tenet of the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine"--and implicitly commits the Czechoslovaks to fight with the USSR in a war against China. It also commits Prague and Moscow to act to strengthen mutual cooperation in all spheres of relations. The language is forceful enough to reinforce the fears some Eastern Europeans have had about the treaty.

The importance that the Soviets ascribed to the treaty is indicated by the composition of the delegation sent to Prague for the signing on 6 May. It was headed by party General Secretary Brezhnev and also included Premier Kosygin, politburo member Shelest, candidate politburo member Mash-erov, central committee secretary Katushev, and Foreign Minister Gromyko. In addition, Soviet chief of staff General Zakharov was on hand at the head of a large military delegation.

Almost every member of this assemblage played a key role in the events of 1968-69 that put

an end to the liberal reform movement in Czechoslovakia. Both Kosygin--who reportedly had been cool to the intervention--and Katushev conducted crucial negotiations at that time with the Czechoslovaks. Shelest, the Ukrainian party chief, who reputedly was one of the loudest advocates of the intervention, took part in the crucial Dresden, Warsaw, and Bratislava meetings that preceded the invasion. General Zakharov was vital in the planning and execution of the invasion itself.

For these Soviet leaders, the treaty serves to vindicate the intervention and to undercut critics within the Communist movement and even within the Soviet party. As politburo member Kirilenko noted last month, "everyone can now see" that Soviet policies were "fully justified." Brezhnev himself is probably the chief beneficiary of the treaty. He reportedly had been a target for criticism because of his handling of the Czechoslovak crisis, and he is likely to use this belated justification of his policies to advantage.

Czechoslovak leader Husak has also gained. The Soviets are obviously content with his performance as the chief architect of the "normalization." The Soviet delegation treated Husak with conspicuous warmth during its stay, in effect giving him another strong endorsement. Husak will undoubtedly use it to strengthen his position against his domestic critics.

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ARMS CONTROL TALKS RECESS

The US-USSR draft treaty to limit the use of seabeds for military purposes remains the best hope for substantive progress at the 1970 Geneva disarmament talks, which recessed last week after more than two months of frustrating discussion of the key issues. Following several weeks of intensive review in the capitals, the 25 conferees will resume their talks on 16 June in an effort to show some success before the fall session of the UN General Assembly.

In their revised version of the treaty, the superpowers took into account most of the criticisms raised during the past year. Dissatisfaction with the Moscow-Washington positions on some maritime issues could, however, become so strong as to prevent a Geneva endorsement of the treaty. Sweden heads a lengthy list of nations that want the text to include a reference to "appropriate international procedures" as one method of verifying compliance with the treaty prohibitions. Moscow opposes such an addition, regarding it as an opening that could result in an international regime that would also govern peaceful uses of the ocean floor. A meeting this week at Montevideo of nine Latin American states that claim a 200-mile limit of their territorial waters could determine the extent to which that subject will further muddy the treaty's prospects.

There has been no movement toward agreement on either of the principal options for controls

on chemical and biological weapons (CBW): the Soviet draft CBW convention and the British draft BW treaty. Most of the Geneva conferees continue to favor action that would deal with both CW and BW, but they do not regard the Soviets' verification mechanism--appeal to the UN Security Council to investigate suspected violations--as an adequate response to their concern.

The Italians have secured the creation at Geneva of an informal nine-nation working group on general and complete disarmament (GCD), whose members include NATO, Warsaw Pact, and nonaligned nations, but exclude the three nuclear powers represented at the talks. The working group is unlikely to offer a substantive GCD proposal soon. Moscow recently indicated a revived interest in GCD, but it is believed that the Soviets would not want such activity to divert attention from the primary issues before the conferees--CBW and the seabeds treaty.

Another disarmament subject, a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests, probably will not be accorded much time until the direction of the SALT talks becomes clearer. Should the Geneva conferees be unable to show substantial progress in any arms control area, there may be demands for a convening of the UN Disarmament Commission, an unwieldy entity certain to serve as a focal point for grievances against the superpowers.

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SINO-SOVIET TALKS REMAIN ON DEAD CENTER

Top Chinese and Soviet leaders have again expressed their intention to continue the Peking talks despite the lack of significant progress during the past six months. The talks have apparently been in recess since the departure of chief Soviet negotiator Kuznetsov for the Lenin centenary celebrations in Moscow, but he probably will return to Peking shortly to resume the discussions.

Chairman Mao, in an apparently cordial conversation at the Peking May Day ceremonies, told the deputy head of the Soviet delegation that China wished the talks to resume "as soon as possible" and gently prodded the Soviets as to when Kuznetsov would return. Soviet Premier Kosygin, in his surprise news conference on 4 May, indicated that the Soviets plan to continue the talks, and voiced the opinion that both sides were interested in reaching a settlement.

Despite these relatively conciliatory comments, however, officials on both sides have flatly stated that no significant progress has yet been made. Kuznetsov himself told a Western diplomat that stories of Soviet troop withdrawal from the border were without foundation and that Moscow would not consider making such a move unilaterally.

In addition, the Chinese chargé in Moscow said in late April that Peking has not given agreement to Soviet Ambassador-designate Stepakov and has no present intention of appointing its own ambassador to Moscow. Another Chinese official has confirmed that Peking views the Stepakov appointment as a possible Soviet attempt to downgrade the negotiations. The Soviets, in turn, have indicated they may seek Chinese approval for shifting the talks to Moscow. Peking, however, will probably be reluctant to accede to such a move.

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SOVIETS SQUANDER NATURAL GAS AND CRUDE OIL


Continuing Soviet efforts to boost current petroleum output have resulted in serious losses of natural gas and crude oil. Failure to realize the full potential of older producing fields is beginning to impinge on export capability and makes the Soviet need to develop new fields more imperative.

In the Mangyshlak Peninsula, natural gas that was obtained as a by-product of crude oil was flared off as waste instead of being utilized or recycled into deposits to maintain pressure. As pressure declined, numerous wells ceased producing. The Soviets finally in-

jected seawater into the deposits in an attempt to increase pressure and avoid costly pumping. The Mangyshlak oil, however, is highly viscous, and the seawater cooled the oil until it solidified and became unrecoverable. As a result, a large portion of the Mangyshlak oil reserves, which approximated the reserves on Alaska's North Slope, was lost, as were the great quantities of gas that were wantonly burned.

Similar mistakes have been made in Belorussia, where a newspaper recently scored petroleum producers for flaring 350 million cubic meters of natural gas during the last five

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years. Crude oil has had to be pumped prematurely at a number of wells because of declining pressure, and pumping will be required at still more wells in the near future.

At one Belorussian deposit, many wells are idle because of mechanical problems, and production from active wells has been increased. This approach will result in fulfillment of the current production plan but will reduce ultimate recovery of oil from this deposit alone by some 100,000 metric tons.

Tremendous waste of crude oil and natural gas also has occurred in the immense Urals-Volga and West Siberian fields and elsewhere. Many unrecoverable pockets of oil have been formed by improper water injection. Last year some 10 billion cubic meters of gas, about one fourth of

all the gas produced in conjunction with oil in the USSR, was flared. Moreover, such waste is continuing. In many cases, the exposure of scandalous waste reportedly has led only to unfulfilled promises that shortcomings will be corrected.

A number of factors contribute to the Soviets' profligate treatment of their petroleum resources. The incentive system induces maximum production in the short-run regardless of technical requirements and long-run consequences. Soviet petroleum technology and equipment are not up to Western standards. Moreover, responsibility for oil and gas extraction is divided between two ministries, resulting in frequent failure to apply the best techniques available for exploiting associated deposits of oil and gas.

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ROMANIA COURTS THE ARABS

Romania has made a strong bid in recent months to improve its relations with the Arab world, particularly with Egypt.

The Romanian Government has never fully recovered its political standing in the Arab world since it refused to join the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries in breaking relations with Israel after the June 1967 war. Romanian-Arab relations fell to a new low last August when Bucharest raised its diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv to embassy level. Widely considered a coup for Israel, the move was denounced by Arabs and Communists alike. Iraq recalled its chargé and Egypt recalled its ambassador, while the Sudan and Syria broke relations entirely.

The Romanians still insist on implementation of the 1967 UN resolution as a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, but since early this year they have been at pains to demonstrate limited support for the Arab cause in other ways. Bucharest staged an international day of solidarity with the Arab people on 25 January. In February the authoritative party daily Scinteia condemned the Israeli bombing of the Egyptian civilian factory at Abu Zabal. Visits to Cairo by a Romanian trade union delegation in February and by Foreign Trade Minister Burtica in March were empha-

sized in the Romanian press as evidence of Bucharest's friendly intentions. Finally, in a speech to the Romanian parliament later that month, Foreign Minister Manescu appealed for a "full normalization" of relations with all Arab countries, and significantly, did not mention Israel.

Nevertheless, the problem that probably touches the most sensitive Arab nerve has been the emigration of Romanian Jews to Israel. This emigration had totaled several thousand yearly, but was abruptly cut off following the June 1967 war. In October 1968 it was reportedly allowed to resume in trickling numbers. Reports conflict on whether such emigration is still under way, but in view of Romania's other moves toward reconciliation with the Arabs, it is doubtful.

The Romanians probably feel that their policy of neutrality and friendship with all has become somewhat lopsided in the Middle East in favor of Israel. Moreover, while they are apprehensive about the consequences of deeper Soviet involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, they do not want to be isolated as anti-Arab. By extending a friendly hand to Cairo now they hope to re-establish their credentials in the Arab world without seriously endangering their good relations with Israel.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

Israeli claims and Egyptian reports since mid-April have pointed to a larger and more autonomous role by Soviet military personnel in Egypt, but to date there has been no evidence of an aerial engagement between Soviet and Israeli pilots. Israeli officials this week reiterated their concern over the Soviet presence, but indicated they would proceed cautiously in an apparent hope that direct Israeli clashes with Soviet forces could be avoided. Tel Aviv's concern over the increasing casualties being inflicted by Egyptian raids has so far been manifested only in a higher level of air attacks in the immediate area of the Egyptian cease-fire lines.

Egyptian President Nasir's May Day speech included an appeal to the US to force Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories or at least to refrain from providing additional support to Israel. Nasir termed this a "final appeal for the sake of peace in the Middle East," and warned that further US augmentation of Israel's military superiority would affect US-Arab relations for decades to come.

Political violence in the Indian state of West Bengal has gained nationwide publicity as Naxalites—pro-Peking Communist extremists—have been staging hit-and-run demonstrations in the Calcutta area. "President's Rule" (control from New Delhi) was imposed on the state last March, and although the security situation is not likely to get out of hand, the stepped-up violence is a cause for concern.

The launching of the Chinese space satellite has intensified the debate in India on acquiring nuclear weapons, but the government still denies it has any intention of going nuclear.

Celebrations for the third anniversary of the Greek military coup of 21 April 1967 began Sunday following the Greek Orthodox Easter week. Premier Papadopoulos reaffirmed more confidently than ever the regime's policy of returning to constitutional rule only when the country is ready. Security for the celebrations was very tight, and no incidents have yet been reported.

Zanzibar and East Germany have apparently reached an impasse over new trade and aid agreements after more than a month of negotiations,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Zanzibaris have long been dissatisfied with the poor quality of East German goods and services.

President Milton Obote of Uganda announced that his government would purchase a majority interest in nearly all of the country's industries. This nationalization will affect several US companies that have small investments in oil distribution, banking, and insurance. [REDACTED]

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ISRAEL PROCEEDS CAUTIOUSLY WITH SOVIETS IN EGYPT

The Israeli Government has continued to express its concern over what it claims to be growing Soviet involvement in Egypt and has sought to raise international alarm, particularly in the US. At the same time, Tel Aviv, while avoiding attacks deeper into Egypt and possible contact with Soviet pilots, continued to mount heavy air attacks along the canal and the Gulf of Suez. The Israelis have restated their willingness for a cease-fire and peace talks, but have shown growing irritation with the increasing number of Israeli casualties along the canal. These have been approaching the levels of the summer of 1969, which at that time obliged Israel to step up its attacks on Egypt.

Prime Minister Golda Meir and two top Israeli military officials, Minister of Defense Dayan and chief of staff General Bar-Lev, have all manifested Israeli reluctance to get involved with the Soviets in Egypt, but have emphasized Israel's determination to fight to defend itself and to resist any attempts to force them from the present cease-fire lines. Mrs. Meir said that Israel was not at war with the Soviet Union and had no plans to fight one "but we will not run away if it (war) becomes necessary for self-defense." Dayan, in a speech to students in Haifa, said that Israeli armed forces had had no air clashes with the Soviets and hoped they would not. He claimed that Israel halted its deep penetration raids around Cairo because "they had served their purpose," but added--perhaps more significantly--"now that the Russians have entered the

area, we prefer to wait and see what we shall be able to do." Reflecting the Israeli desire for a solid show of US support in the new situation, Dayan said he would like to see the US "as a real tiger with teeth... stand up to the Russians." Dayan also sounded what might be a warning when he charged that Soviet air defense support was enabling Nasir to seize the initiative along the canal; he noted that the Israeli casualty rate had jumped from 9 killed and 47 wounded in March to 27 killed and 62 wounded in April.

Bar-Lev, in a briefing given to visiting US National War College students, also stressed Israel's current cautious posture. Asked what Israel was going to do about the Soviet pilots, Bar-Lev was non-committal and said only that the Israeli armed forces were gathering all the information they could on the Russians. He claimed that the Soviet and Arab aim was to force a peace settlement on Israel that would put it back to the pre-June 1967 borders. The chief of staff insisted that Israel would maintain the status quo until there was a chance for "real peace." Also present was the Israeli director of military intelligence, General Yariv, who said that Israel did not take lightly the international complications involved in the presence of Soviet pilots and would exercise caution. But he averred that Israel would act to defend its existence and said what Israel needed now was hardware, especially aircraft, and a US "deterrent posture" toward the USSR.

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Israeli officials have this week repeated their desire for a cease-fire and a peace settlement. None of these statements indicates any change in Israel's legal requirements for a settlement and may have been designed largely for domestic and international consumption. Noteworthy of Israeli thinking was a re-

cent public opinion poll on the question of the future of the occupied Arab territories. Over 60 percent of the Israeli citizens questioned expressed opposition to the (b)(3) return of any territory whatsoever, and only nine percent were ready to return all the areas. [redacted]

NASIR ISSUES APPEAL AND WARNING TO US

In a lengthy review of the Arab-Israeli confrontation before an assemblage of workers on May Day, Nasir appealed to the US to order Israel to withdraw from the Arab territories it occupies and warned that a harmful united Arab reaction would result from any new US aid commitments to Israel.

Nasir called on President Nixon to order an Israeli withdrawal, and if this were not possible, at least not to give any new political, military, or economic aid to Israel. Nasir characterized his speech as a "final appeal for the sake of peace in the Middle East." Following the speech, Egyptian officials personally conveyed Nasir's "peace appeal" to the French and the British ambassadors.

Nasir has often criticized US support for Israeli "expansionism," and the Egyptians have frequently indicated they believe that the US has the power or influence to force Israel to do its bidding. Nasir's speech thus follows the usual Egyptian line, but goes somewhat further in addressing the plea to President Nixon personally and in conveying the appeal to other interested parties. No new concessions or fresh

approaches to the Arab-Israeli impasse were offered by Nasir, however.

In conjunction with his appeal for peace, Nasir made an apparent bid to head off any further US aid to Israel. He warned that if the US took another step to confirm "Israel's military superiority," it would affect US-Arab relations for years. [redacted]

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In his address, Nasir did not directly mention Israeli and US charges that Soviet pilots flying operational missions have increased the USSR's military commitment to Egypt. He did, however, refer to a recent "political propaganda campaign against the USSR," and charged that it was designed to hide the fact that the Egyptians were now taking the initiative militarily and was meant to open the way for a "new escalation of US assistance to Israel." [redacted] (b)(3)

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ARMY-FEDAYEEN CLASHES IN JORDAN WEAKEN KING'S POSITION

The clash last weekend between Jordanian troops and commando elements, coming on the heels of fedayeen charges that Jordan is plotting to kill commando leaders, has further eroded King Husayn's position.

[redacted] Saturday's incident was touched off when a small Fatah unit began lobbing shells across the Jordan River near the section of the East Ghor Canal that is now under repair. After the Israelis returned fire, Jordanian Army units moved against the fedayeen in an effort to impose a cease-fire. Two Jordanian soldiers and one commando were reported killed. Elements of at least three fedayeen organizations in the area then attacked the Jordanian troops; in the ensuing fighting, the commandos' camps were destroyed and their arms and provisions seized.

The Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC), coordinating body for five of the major fedayeen organizations, immediately cited the army's action as further proof that army leaders are plotting to crush the fedayeen movement. Earlier, one of the

commando groups had announced that it had foiled a plot by Sharif Nasir, the head of the army, to assassinate Fatah's Yasir Arafat and George Habbash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The PASC called on Jordanian soldiers to resist their commanders and prevent the army from being turned into a "force for the protection of enemy settlements and installations." According to press reports, however, commando leaders subsequently held an all-night session with army commanders in an attempt to stave off any new flare-ups.

Nevertheless, the incident seems to have confirmed growing suspicions among the fedayeen and their supporters that the regime has been cooperating with the Israelis to keep the cease-fire lines quiet and to exterminate the commandos. Much caustic criticism of the King and of Sharif Nasir is apparently beginning to circulate throughout the country, and the more radical commando groups are distributing broadsides playing up Sharif Nasir's assassination plot. [redacted]

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CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT INSTALLED IN DAHOMEY

A new civilian government of "national union" in Dahomey, complete with a three-headed presidency, was sworn in this week, but it holds little prospect for bringing long-term stability to this coup-ridden former French colony in West Africa.

The joint presidency is manned by the country's three civilian political kingpins and chief regional spokesmen--Hubert Maga, Justin Ahomadegbe, and Sourou-Migan Apithy. They succeed an inept and divisive military triumvirate that has kept Dahomey in a state of near chaos for the past five months. Maga, a northern leader who was the country's first president, is "first among equals" and premier; that role is supposed to rotate among the three presidents every two years. Cabinet ministries have been apportioned among supporters of the three presidents and of former president Zinsou.



Former President Soglo toasts three other former presidents--Apithy, Maga, Ahomadegbe--who make up new "national union" government.

The final agreement on the new government came only after the army had applied heavy pressure on civilian politicians, including a threat that they might find themselves out of the picture completely if they did not arrange a compromise.

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Given the depth of the mutual hostility among the three presidents as well as their conflicting political ambitions, it is highly unlikely that the compromise will last for long. Moreover, even if the government survives its own built-in divisions, there are a number of unresolved conflicts within the military, and between the military and civilian leaders, which could explode at any moment.

At the center of the most pressing of these disputes is the question of the future status of the army chief of staff, Lt. Colonel Kouandete.

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Meanwhile, the incoming government has already been threatened with a general strike by workers and students demanding immediate and drastic tax reductions. Their challenge could lead to the early crumbling of the fragile new structure

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NEW TENSIONS IN US-SOMALI RELATIONS

New tensions have arisen between the US and the military regime in Somalia, and relations seem likely to worsen. In late April the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) rounded up a collection of civilians and military personnel and charged them with plotting against the government. General Korshel, a vice president of the SRC and a former police commander, was accused of masterminding the plot. Following Korshel's arrest and a propaganda campaign that stressed the involvement of an "imperialist" power, five members of the US Embassy in Mogadiscio were expelled for alleged involvement in the conspiracy.

The expulsion of the Americans suggests that some government officials may have been aiming more at creating new irritants between the US and Somalia than at countering local coup plotting. No information has yet emerged to shed any light on the plot itself or on the few Somalis thus far identified. Reports have long confirmed the existence of disaffection and periodic plotting, but it is unclear if those arrested were part of a conspiracy or were merely known dissidents who were jailed to put them out of circulation.

Even less clear is General Korshel's part in the plot. Despite the regime's contention, Korshel seems ill suited to the role of ringleader. He had few assets to contribute to a serious plot, having little influence outside the council or with his colleagues. He was a reluctant participant in the army

take-over last October and joined only after being threatened with arrest. Since then, his position has been shaky at best, and he apparently was retained on the SRC partly by virtue of his senior rank and partly to give the appearance of army and police cooperation.

On the other hand, during his long tenure as a top police official before the coup, Korshel was closely involved with the US police training and assistance program. Although Korshel may have been in contact with some dissidents, it also seems probable that linking him with the plot may have been prompted by some SRC members as a convenient way of dumping him from the council and implicating the US. At least one source--an article datelined Mogadiscio that appeared in an Italian Communist publication--hinted at such a possibility by stating that US representatives are involved in police training and alleging that the plot was organized by police.

Sentiment favoring a break with the US is known to exist among some of the young nationalist officers on the SRC. Although it is not clear who is behind the current anti-US campaign, US-Somali relations have drifted steadily downhill since the army seized power in October 1969. The army has long been hostile to the US for its role as an arms supplier to Ethiopia and as a close supporter of ousted prime minister Egal. Somali suspicion of the US has already led to the expulsion of the Peace Corps in December 1969, and this latest incident may nudge both countries closer to a break.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

The May Day holiday passed peacefully in most of Latin America, and reaction to President Nixon's speech on Cambodia has been limited. Communists in Venezuela attempted to organize anti-US demonstrations, but there was little trouble.

Fidel Castro's statement on 22 April that Cuba will always be ready to have closer military ties with the USSR and Raul Castro's prolonged visit to the USSR, where he received an unusually warm reception, underline the continuing improvement in Soviet-Cuban relations. In addition, Soviet naval vessels that took part in a recent exercise in the Atlantic may visit Havana over the weekend and then engage in maneuvers in the Caribbean.

Delegations from nine countries that claim maritime jurisdictions to a 200-mile limit are scheduled to finish a week of deliberations in Montevideo today. Among the subjects discussed were denuclearization of the seabeds and a Latin American position on the US-USSR proposals for a Law of the Sea convention. The results of the discussions are likely to be incorporated in a "Declaration of Montevideo," to be issued at the close of the conference.

In the Dominican Republic, President Balaguer still appears to be a strong favorite to win re-election in the contest on 16 May. Election-related violence and last-minute threats by some of the opposition parties to withdraw have dominated the headlines, but opposition efforts do not appear to have eroded Balaguer's strength seriously. The major opposition party, led by Juan Bosch, is still abstaining and refusing to support any candidate. Even Bosch has publicly admitted that his party cannot halt the President's re-election effort. Bosch is likely to continue to cry "fraud" and claim that the election is a farce, a theme other opposition parties can be expected to pick up.

The mutiny by the Haitian Coast Guard last month continues to spark arrests and ousters of middle-level civilian and military personnel, but there has been no widespread purge or bloodbath, as many expected. The government, in fact, has shown some concern for its public image and has officially denied that any executions have taken place. A further shake-up may still occur, but President Duvalier seems satisfied that he can count on the loyalty of the majority of the armed forces.

Colombia remains calm, and the curfew restrictions have been further modified in Bogota and removed entirely in other areas. Preliminary returns in the congressional contests suggest that National Front candidate Pastrana will lack a majority and will have to form a coalition if he is to govern effectively. The final recount of the presidential vote may take as long as another month.

Presidential inauguration ceremonies will be held today in Costa Rica for Jose Figueres, who previously held office from 1953 to 1958. Many foreign delegations are expected to attend, and the possibility of embarrassing demonstrations cannot be ruled out.

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
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BRAZIL SECURITY FORCES HIT TERRORISTS

Military forces and security units have dealt severe blows to terrorists in southern Brazil. The principal target was the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR), which has been responsible for many major terrorist operations during the past two years.

The security forces' current campaign was largely made possible by leads obtained from suspects in the attempted kidnaping of US Consul Curtis Cutter in Porto Alegre on 4 April. The abduction was planned by the VPR and coordinated with other terrorist groups. When this attempt failed, they selected other targets, including the West German ambassador, another US consul, and several Brazilian military officers and government officials. These plans were frustrated by the arrests of several important terrorists in Porto



Alegre, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. Two of the four members of the national command of the VPR were captured, another committed suicide, and only the organization's leader, renegade army Captain Carlos Lamarca, remains at large. In addition to many bank robberies and thefts of arms, the VPR was responsible for the assassination of a US Army Captain in Sao Paulo in October 1968 and the kidnaping of the Japanese consul general in that city last March.

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[redacted] the government has mounted a joint operation of army, air force, and state police units to locate training bases of the organization in a remote area of southeastern Sao Paulo State close to the border with Parana. Near the town of Jacupiranga, military forces found two sites that the VPR intended to use for guerrilla training. The troops also encountered a band of VPR militants, and among those captured was Darcy Rodrigues, a former army sergeant who deserted with Lamarca and was one of his chief lieutenants.

Military authorities believe that Lamarca himself is in the area along with several of his followers, and the air force has been using napalm bombs in an attempt to drive the terrorists out of hiding in the extremely thick jungle. Security officials believe that if Lamarca and his group can be captured, one of the most important terrorist organizations in Brazil will have been permanently crippled.

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RENEWED VIOLENCE LIKELY IN GUATEMALA

Guatemalan President Mendez has allowed the state of siege, imposed following the assassination of German Ambassador von Spreiti, to lapse despite an increase in terrorist violence. Mendez' action suggests that his government will not undertake large-scale counterterrorist actions in the remaining weeks of his administration.

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[Redacted]

an extreme right-wing group similar to the Army Special Commando Unit, which operated against leftist subversives in 1967 and 1968, had been activated, probably with President-elect Arana's tacit approval.

[Redacted]

Since the commando unit's appearance, several Communists have been killed.

The FAR has decided to continue its terrorist activities both in Guatemala City and in rural areas. On 29 April, leftist terrorists in Guatemala City

tried to kill one of Arana's bodyguards; a policeman was killed in the attempt.

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President Mendez has been reluctant to deal strongly with the leftist threat because of his desire to conclude his term of office on 1 July peacefully. He also apparently wants to place the burden of solving the terrorist problem on the incoming Arana administration. His attitude probably will give the rightist counterterrorists even more reason to act.

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The activities of this clandestine unit may result in the loss of many innocent lives and add to the increasingly tense situation. During the last period when such a unit was active, mutual retaliation was the rule rather than the exception.

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TRINIDAD FACES A NEW POLITICAL CLIMATE

Confidence in the government has been severely shaken by the recent disorders, and cabinet changes will probably soon take place. The government also appears likely to present new legislation in an attempt to dramatize its awareness of the need for social and economic change.

The arrest last weekend of the ringleaders of the army mutiny, which erupted on 21 April, finally ended the drawn-out revolt. The rebellion, coming on the heels of weeks of unrest fomented by black power dissidents, had threatened to topple the administration of Prime Minister Williams. Since the arrests, government spokesmen have refused to divulge any of the details surrounding the mutiny, but it appeared to stem primarily from complaints about internal conditions in the regiment. Some of the officers, who are scheduled to stand trial for treason later this month, may also have been sympathetic to the black power cause.

Prime Minister Williams, who has held power since 1956, has probably now incurred political liabilities that could shake his party's long-time dominance. Williams' personal political stock, upon which the Peoples' National Movement (PNM) has been highly dependent, has undoubtedly dropped as a result of his inability to head off the black power movement or to take early decisive action against the mutineers. The resignation of one

of his chief ministers, a young cabinet official regarded as a spokesman for the black nationalist wing of the PNM, has also tarnished the party's image.

Williams has tried to recoup some of his lost political ground by promising a "drastic reconstruction of government" and vowing "to support unequivocally" the claims of blacks to social justice and economic dignity. Despite the rhetoric, Williams' new programs are thus far vague. Earlier in the year, he tried to counter the demands of black power advocates by prescribing an additional 5 percent tax on corporations and individuals in high tax brackets and by immediately creating 1,600 new jobs. Even these specific efforts had little impact, in part because unemployment, estimated at 15 percent of the work force, appears to affect mainly secondary school dropouts who are unwilling to accept the common laboring jobs offered.

Williams will probably call elections late this year or early in 1971; the current parliamentary term expires next year. The prime ministers' difficulties may be complicated by a political opposition that recently has shown new signs of life. Although his foes are still splintered, Williams will have to present some practical programs in coming months if he is to stave off a serious erosion of his party's strength.

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
EL SALVADOR ADOPTS A TOUGH LINE

The Salvadoran Government appears to be adopting a new and tougher approach to domestic and foreign politics. In an obvious effort to set the political tone for the last two years of the Sanchez administration, the government is taking steps to restrict political opposition. El Salvador continues to take a tough stance against Honduras, as well.

Although the government was careful to avoid incidents before the congressional and municipal elections on 8 March, it made clear that its patience with student dissent was wearing thin. Concerned that terrorist successes in neighboring Guatemala might inspire Salvadoran student or extremist groups to resort to violence, the government served notice after the election that it would deal harshly with any further public disorders.

Despite its landslide victory in the elections, the government has not made any conciliatory gestures to the opposition parties. Ignoring Christian Democratic charges of election fraud and voter coercion, the administration has treated the electorate to a practical demonstration of its new get-tough policy. It annulled the mayoral victory of a candidate from a minor leftist party, which had been used as an electoral vehicle by the Communists, and later used military reservists to break up a peaceful rally of the same party.

Recently, there have been indications that the National Guard com-



General Medrano

mander and intelligence chief, General Medrano, is interested in running for the presidency in 1972 with President Sanchez' support. This suggests that the tough line will continue and even grow in intensity. Medrano, a dedicated anti-Communist, is not above precipitating leftist violence in order to win popular support.

Medrano has also supported a tough policy toward Honduras. He reportedly is responsible for the current disruption of traffic along the Pan American Highway and has been uncompromising in his refusal to remove National Guard troops from the border areas--a major stumbling block in the way of the creation of a demilitarized zone.

The Salvadorans recently became aware of reports that Honduras had acquired jet fighter aircraft and they now fear that a surprise attack is planned. A number of defensive measures have already been taken and restrictions have been placed on the movement of US Military Group personnel. The restrictions may be aimed at masking a repositioning of army units

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Cuba and Subversion: Old Strategy, New Tactics


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No 45

8 May 1970

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
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W A R N I N G

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CUBA AND SUBVERSION: OLD STRATEGY, NEW TACTICS

Fidel Castro has been involved in subversion and armed struggle in varying degrees ever since the Cayo Confites expedition in 1947. Almost every Latin American Republic has felt his interference at least once. His involvement has taken many different forms ranging from direct personal participation, as in the abortive Cayo Confites adventure against dictator Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, to the supplying of tons of arms and ammunition, as in Venezuela in 1963. His efforts have consistently met with failure, with the single exception of his war against former Cuban president Fulgencio Batista. Even then it took two attempts before Batista was ousted. Despite his many setbacks, he has adopted revolution as a way of life, and there are no signs that he plans to reject it as a basic tenet of his personal philosophy. His tactics might change because of the circumstances peculiar to a particular situation, but the fundamental precept seems immutable.

Castro's predilection for armed struggle as the main road to political power has brought him into conflict with many of the Moscow-oriented Communist parties of Latin America and even with some orthodox Communists in Cuba. His domestic critics are too timid and too few to constitute a serious problem; they are handled in typical Castro steamroller fashion through public denunciation followed by various forms of banishment. The foreign parties, however, have the ear of the Soviet Union, Cuba's most important benefactor, and are less easy to silence. Party leaders, many of whom were well-established disciples of Marx and Lenin long before Castro began dabbling in politics, view the Cuban dictator as a latecomer to the Communist movement and as an arrogant, self-appointed oracle of revolutionary doctrine. Castro in turn thinks of them as ossified theoreticians corrupted by the soft life and blind to political reality. On occasion, Castro has been willing to accommodate Soviet reaction to complaints from Latin American party officials by agreeing, as he did in 1963 and 1964, to allow the local Communist party leaders to determine the road—peaceful or nonpeaceful—to power in their respective countries. Such agreements, however, have been honored only for relatively brief periods of time and Castro invariably has returned to cramming his guerrilla tactics down their throats.

When Castro's most carefully conceived guerrilla venture—Che Guevara's operation in Bolivia—met disaster in late 1967, party leaders throughout the hemisphere could scarcely restrain an audible sigh of relief. In their eyes, Castro's theories of violent revolution had at last been proved wrong. A toning-down of propaganda and a hiatus in Havana's support of guerrilla warfare operations suggested that Castro had finally recognized his folly and was adopting a change of strategy. This hope, however, has proved to be false. Evidence of the past two years shows clearly that Castro clings as strongly as ever to his theories of armed struggle and violence. His tactics have changed, but his strategy remains the same. Moreover, armed struggle and violent revolution seem to be such basic elements in Castro's psychological make-up that they will probably remain Cuban policy for as long as he is in power. But whatever Castro's theories, a variety of factors will tend to make him selective in his support of revolutionary groups.

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BACKGROUND: THE ROAD TO REFLECTION

The capture and execution of Che Guevara in October 1967 and the subsequent destruction of his guerrilla group in Bolivia caused Fidel Castro to pause and reflect at length on his policy of exporting revolution. The Bolivian fiasco, which was merely another in a long string of fruitless and costly Cuban adventures in subversion, was a particularly disastrous setback because the nucleus of the guerrilla group consisted of 16 veteran Cuban combatants—three of them members of the Cuban Communist Party's Central Committee—who were hand-picked and led by the man whom Castro considered the most experienced and daring guerrilla warfare tactician in Latin America. The group was theoretically the best team that Havana could field.

The startling lack of success in Bolivia became apparent to Castro when he finally gained access to Guevara's campaign diary in the spring of 1968. Castro found out that, far from establishing a viable guerrilla front, Guevara's band was constantly on the run, was barely able to survive the harsh terrain, and was unable to recruit Bolivians through his highly touted tactic of "armed propaganda." The circumstances of the defeat indicated to Castro that a rethinking of Cuba's strategy was in order.

IMPROVING THE SUBVERSIVE APPARATUS

In addition, a hard look was taken at the Interior Ministry (MININT), which is charged with carrying out foreign intelligence operations such as the Bolivian affair. A reorganization of MININT was initiated in mid or late 1968 at the same time a similar process was set in motion in the Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR), another government branch deeply involved in subversion. That this shake-up was long overdue became even more apparent when a series of defections of key personnel shook MININT in 1968 and 1969.

The revamping of MININT included both personnel and structural changes. In July 1968, the first vice minister of the armed forces, Major Sergio del Valle Jimenez, replaced Major Ramiro Valdes Menendez as interior minister. (Valdes, who had directed the ministry since 1961, was not in disfavor, however; after completing a lengthy high-level course of politico-military studies, he assumed in January 1970 the position that del Valle had previously vacated.) Major Eddy Sunol Ricardo, a member of the party's Central Committee, who had often been used by Raul Castro as a trouble shooter, was named to the newly created post of MININT vice minister for political work. The first vice minister, Major

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Manuel Pineiro Losada, who also functioned as the chief of the foreign intelligence apparatus (DGI), retained the DGI under his general command but turned over direct responsibility for its management to Major Joaquin Mendez Cominches, a former comrade-in-arms of Raul Castro. Pineiro's title is now first vice minister and technical vice minister. Major Jose Abrantes Fernandez, who as chief of the Department of State Security (DSE) was charged with counterintelligence and security responsibilities, apparently was "kicked upstairs" and has been identified since last September as vice minister and chief of the general staff. Like Pineiro, Abrantes presumably still has the DSE under his command but may have turned over direct control to an as yet unidentified individual.

room for doubt concerning Cuba's continued adherence to armed struggle and violent revolution. At the conference of the Economic Commission for Latin America held in Lima in April 1969, Rodriguez answered Venezuelan charges that Cuba was still supporting guerrillas by saying that "Cuba has the conception that for the development of the revolutionary process of most of the countries of Latin America, armed struggle is the fundamental instrument. We continue to hold to that conception." To those delegates who talked of resuming relations with Cuba if the Castro regime would publicly reject export of the revolution, Rodriguez replied: "Cuba is not going to change its position to enter into relations with any Latin American government."



The new MININT hierarchy consists of (from left to right) Majors Pineiro, Abrantes, Mendez Cominches, and Leyva and Captains Pupo, Aguilera, and Franco.

POLICY REAPPRAISED

Both the reorganization of MININT and the reassessment of Cuba's policy of subversion were probably completed by late 1969 or early 1970. There apparently never was any intention of discarding armed struggle; the reappraisal seems to have addressed only the problem of how and when to employ it.

With Fidel Castro's almost total preoccupation with domestic problems, Minister without Portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez emerged as a key spokesman for the regime on foreign policy matters after late 1968. His statements leave no

In an interview published in a leftist Chilean magazine in September 1969, Rodriguez sought to clarify "Cuba's position with respect to the revolutionary struggle in Latin America," which he said had "often been the object of inexact interpretations...." He said: "Cuba conceives of a 'continentalization' of strategy. That strategy is based fundamentally on the use of armed struggle and, in particular, guerrilla warfare in the major part of the countries of Latin America, but it does not exclude other forms of revolutionary violence or even of nonviolent political struggle." He characterized as remote and difficult, however, the possibility of attaining power without violence or previous armed struggle. Regarding

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the situation in Chile, he derided the decision by leftist political parties to attempt to achieve power through democratic elections and said that "Chilean revolutionaries must be prepared for a struggle in which violence will be the decisive element, even in the case of their obtaining power by the nonviolent electoral road."

More recently, the Cuban press agency Prensa Latina reported that, in conversations with newsmen at the United Nations in New York in March, Rodriguez said that "Cuba supports the liberation movements in Latin America...this is not only our right but our duty."

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Finally, on 22 April, on the 100th anniversary of the birth of Lenin, Castro himself staunchly reaffirmed in definitive terms his commitment to support the subversion of other governments by violence: "Cuba has never nor will it ever deny support to the revolutionary movement. This is not to be confused with support of any fake just because he is using the name of revolutionary....That type of pseudorevolutionary can expect no aid from Cuba, of course. But revolutionaries like Che, willing to struggle to the final consequences, willing to fight, willing to die—they will always be able to count on Cuba's help....But one must not worry about our posi-

tion toward the revolutionary movement. So long as there is imperialism, so long as there are people struggling, willing to fight for their people's liberation from that imperialism, the Cuban revolution will support them."

UNSUCCESSFUL REBELS LOSE SUPPORT

It is the Cuban subversive effort in Latin American countries that has been the most affected by Castro's policy reassessment. One result was the reduction or complete withdrawal of support from groups—such as those in Venezuela and Colombia—that have demonstrated incompetence and leadership weaknesses culminating in



Venezuelan guerrilla chieftain Douglas Bravo lost Castro's support.

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a splintering of the local revolutionary movement. By early 1969, for example, all Cuban guerrilla advisers in Venezuela had been recalled to Havana and material support had been reduced so much that several guerrilla leaders complained publicly. In his speech of 22 April, Castro admitted that Cuban support had been withdrawn from groups that had constantly performed poorly, but he made it quite clear that he would back those that produce concrete results.

REVOLUTIONARY THEORY REVISED

Another outcome of the reassessment was a fundamental change in revolutionary theory. Previously, the Cubans had maintained that the guerrilla unit in the rural areas, basing its support on the peasants, was the focal point of the revolutionary movement. Units in urban areas functioned only in support of the rural guerrillas. In revising this concept, Castro seems to have realized—probably as a result of Guevara's experience in Bolivia—that the peasant in the countryside is basically a conservative individual with a relatively low degree of political consciousness and therefore a poor prospect for recruitment. Castro thus has apparently adopted a more flexible doctrine in which the students and workers of the cities—who have a greater political awareness and a more liberal bent—initiate the revolutionary process by means of urban terrorism, later moving to the rural areas to start the second—or guerrilla warfare—stage.

Carlos Fonseca Amador, president of the pro-Cuban Sandino Front of National Liberation (FSLN) in Nicaragua, described the new theory in early 1969 in a critique of previous FSLN operations: “Under conditions in Nicaragua—more or less the same as Latin American countries generally—the center of action of the revolutionary war has to be the countryside. However, the role that the city should play also has particular importance, since in the first stage of the struggle

the city must provide the countryside with the most developed cadres in order to direct the organization of the political and military detachment. Generally, the urban revolutionary cells can be developed more easily in the first stage. Such elements include the revolutionary sector of the workers, the students, and a certain strata of the petit bourgeoisie.” Havana, which described Fonseca Amador as “one of Nicaragua's finest sons,” gave its imprimatur by publishing the critique in *Tricontinental* magazine in late 1969.

MARIGHELLA'S CONTRIBUTION

The same theory appeared again in *Tricontinental* in April 1970 when Carlos Marighella's



Castro looked upon Carlos Marighella as the most promising guerrilla leader in Latin America.

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"Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla" was published. Marighella, the Brazilian terrorist leader who was killed in a police ambush in Sao Paulo on 4 November last year, originally wrote the "minimanual" last June but apparently had formulated his ideas of the revolution in Brazil two years prior when he made his break with the Brazilian Communist Party. Although *Tricontinental* acknowledged that Marighella had written his article with the specific case of Brazil in mind, it claimed that the "minimanual" has a "special importance" and that it "will become one of the principal books of every man who, as a consequence of the inevitable battle against the bourgeoisie and imperialism, takes the road of armed rebellion."*

Marighella himself had explained his thesis in an interview granted last September to a representative of a French publication. "Under the present conditions of dictatorship in this country (i.e., Brazil)," he said, "propaganda and educational work is possible, a priori, only in the cities. A number of mass movements, particularly those organized by students, intellectuals, and certain groups of militant unionists, have established a climate politically favorable for a tougher struggle, by which I mean armed actions. All the antidemocratic measures taken by the government...have created a climate of revolt....The city contains all the objective and subjective conditions necessary for a successful guerrilla war. But out in the countryside the situation is markedly less favorable. This means that the war in the rural districts will have to come after the war in the cities, which will play a distinctly tactical role. Besides, the comrades who go out to fight in the countryside will already have undergone their baptism of fire in the urban struggle. The very bravest of them will be sent out into the country."

CUBA VERSUS THE LOCAL COMMUNISTS

Marighella, Fonseca Amador, and other revolutionaries are unanimous in support of Castro's conviction that the local Communist parties have failed to recognize the validity of armed struggle and have been reluctant to put it into practice. The footdragging and sometimes outright treachery of the local Communist parties on this point have long been a sensitive issue with Castro. He is particularly bitter toward the Venezuelan Communist Party, which he believes sabotaged the guerrilla effort in the mid-1960s, and the Bolivian Communist Party, which he largely blames for Guevara's downfall. Although his last major statement on the subject was made almost two years ago on the occasion of the publication of Guevara's diary in Havana, there is ample evidence that his sentiments have not changed as a result of the policy reappraisal. At the Moscow conference of Communist parties in June 1969, for example, the Cuban observer, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, accurately reflected Fidel's views when he challenged a portion of the proposed conference resolution that stated that "the Communist and Workers Parties head the democratic forces and maintain on high the banners on the anti-imperialist struggle, fight selflessly and courageously for the demands of the masses and for the attainment of revolutionary changes...." Rodriguez acidly charged that "in our opinion, that image does not correspond to reality with regard to certain Communist parties in Latin America" and then chastised parties that "underestimate the dangers of imperialism" and "bourgeois reformism." Although Rodriguez' criticism of the Latin American Communist parties was rather mild when compared to some of Castro's bitter diatribes, the forum in which Rodriguez delivered the rebuke indicates clearly that the so-called "thaw" in relations between the parties and

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Havana is pure fiction. Castro withdrew aid from certain guerrilla groups not to placate the local Communist party chieftains but because the guerrilla groups were so ineffective for so long that Castro lost faith in their ability and desire "to make revolution." To use Castro's own words: "They had the opportunity to start and conduct a revolution; they did indeed have the opportunity and they fumbled it." Furthermore, he has flatly stated that he plans to continue support for "revolutionaries like Che," which is just the type of activity that earned him the condemnation of the parties.

DEBRAY AND THE NEW TACTICS

The new importance given to armed struggle in urban areas as a result of Castro's policy reassessment raised questions in the minds of many revolutionaries because it seemed to conflict with the theories expounded by Jules Regis Debray in *Revolution Within the Revolution?* In this treatise—much publicized by Havana—Debray discussed at length basic guerrilla warfare doctrine as he understood it after a year of study in Cuba. Although Debray wrote the essay, its concepts are generally accepted as being those of Castro and Guevara. Thus, the high value now placed on urban struggle compared to the low value place on it in *Revolution Within the Revolution?* leaves Castro vulnerable to charges of inconsistency in a matter of life-and-death importance to revolutionaries who are putting his theories into practice. Juan Antonio Blanco, an instructor in the Department of Philosophy at Havana University, for example, admits, in the October 1969 issue of the Cuban theoretical journal *Pensamiento Critico*, that "Debray, for reasons very well known, is closely tied to our country and our ideas about the problems of Latin America. A criticism of his essay *Revolution Within the Revolution?* is in part, a criticism of our own ideas."

To absolve Guevara, Castro, and even Debray himself of any inconsistency, however, Blanco explained further: "Despite the fact that Debray tries to summarize the basic ideas of Major Guevara and Fidel Castro, this does not prevent certain personal viewpoints, or a poor or simply brief statement of some aspects, from causing different interpretations which do not always have to coincide with Debray's own thought." When it was first published in 1966 in Havana, Debray's essay was highly touted by the Cubans as an important work "for those who know that 'the duty of every revolutionary is to make the revolution.'" Blanco claimed three years later, however, that "Debray was not trying to write a manual of guerrilla warfare or a sociological treatise on the Latin American revolution."

In a further effort to disabuse the revolutionary faithful of any misconceptions about the theories in Debray's book, Havana published in *Pensamiento Critico* in August 1969 a preface that Debray had written more than two years earlier for the French edition of the book. Debray wrote that the purpose of his book was "to seek a maximum of revolutionary efficiency," and he then warned the reader to avoid "any definitive conflict between theory and practice.... Let the combatants figure out for themselves the theory of their fight..."

An article in the January 1969 issue of *Tri-continental* also tried to disentangle Debray from the results of his writings. The "acritical mechanical application" of Debray's theses by some Latin American revolutionary circles, said the article, was "something Debray himself did not intend to happen." The article then goes on to explain why the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement in Uruguay is so successful in waging armed struggle in spite of the fact that Debray claims in his book that in Uruguay "there are no

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immediate prospects for armed struggle." So, in the fashion of George Orwell, Debray wrote what he didn't mean and his manual on revolution is not a manual after all.


SETBACKS CAUSE PAUSE IN AID

The de-emphasis of Debray's theories means that Havana has become more flexible in its ideas on how the armed struggle should be applied and not that the importance of the basic doctrine has dwindled. The de-emphasis happens to come at the same time that Havana has decided to withhold support from lackluster guerrilla groups and when a series of disasters involving pro-Castro revolutionaries has caused the Cubans to slacken the flow of support until the situations of various leaderless groups clarify. These disasters include: the jailing of Nicaraguan FSLN chief Carlos Fonseca Amador in Costa Rica last September for bank robbery; the killing of Carlos Marighella—a most promising guerrilla prospect—by Sao Paulo police last November; the death in prison last November of the pro-Castro secretary general of Panama's Revolutionary Unity Movement, Floyd Britton; the death last September of Guido "Inti" Perero Leigue, the survivor of the Guevara debacle who succeeded in regrouping Che's National Liberation Army (ELN) in Bolivia; and the killing of Gerald Brisson and many other leaders of the Cuban-supported Unified Party of Haitian Communists.




Although the three Cubans who survived Guevara's defeat in 1967 eventually went back to Havana, and the Cubans serving with guerrillas in Venezuela had returned home by early 1969, Havana is apparently still willing to send Cubans to Latin America for special operations under certain circumstances.

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Evidence of Cuban support in the form of arms or money is extremely difficult to produce, particularly in view of Havana's exhortation to guerrilla groups to demonstrate their independence by robbing banks or other businesses and by buying or stealing arms locally. Marighella found this to be a successful tactic and claimed that he had never received arms or financial aid from the Cubans.

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TYPES OF ASSISTANCE

Assistance to rebel groups continued even during the period of policy reassessment. Several of Marighella's followers had been trained in Cuba,



CUBANS IN AFRICA

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Cuban support of subversion is not confined to Latin America. Although Havana's involvement

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in clandestine activities in Africa has declined considerably since the mid-1960s, Castro has sought to maintain contact with Marxist-oriented guerrilla organizations targeted against white African governments. In a speech at the UN General Assembly on 8 October 1969, Cuban ambassador Ricardo Alarcon said: "Cuba reaffirms her complete support for the struggle of the African peoples for their full national independence and proclaims her militant solidarity with the liberation movements of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique, and with the oppressed African peoples in South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe." What type of support Alarcon referred

to became evident the following month when Portuguese military units in Portuguese Guinea captured a Cuban army officer serving with an African guerrilla band operating out of the neighboring Republic of Guinea.

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Cuban instructors are reportedly helping to train African guerrilla units such as this MPLA detachment pictured in Havana's Party newspaper.

Actions of both the MPLA and the PAIGC receive prominent play in the Cuban press, and red carpet treatment is extended to any leaders of the movements that visit Cuba. For propaganda support, PAIGC war communiqués are regularly forwarded to Havana by the Cuban Embassy in Conakry for publication in the party newspaper.

The MPLA maintains a permanent representative in Havana for close liaison. Cuba also maintains loose contact with the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO), but this tenuous relationship seems to have cooled somewhat since the assassination early last year of FRELIMO President Eduardo Mondlane.

URBAN TERRORISM

The new emphasis on urban terrorism has an important side benefit for Cuba. Bank robberies,

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payroll holdups, raids on gun shops, and attacks on small police or military posts have provided various guerrilla groups with more than enough money and weapons for their operations. Kidnapings for ransom have also proved richly rewarding for guerrilla groups in Guatemala, Colombia, and Uruguay. Demanding the release of political prisoners in exchange for kidnaped diplomats or other high-level political figures is another popular tactic of terrorist organizations.

Although Castro is undoubtedly aware that his own diplomats serving abroad are vulnerable to terrorist attacks, he has made no attempt to renounce publicly the kidnaping or assassination of foreign service officials. In fact, when 13 of the 15 prisoners released by Brazil in exchange for US Ambassador Elbrick chose to travel to Cuba for asylum, Castro was on hand at the airport and saw to it that they got red carpet treatment upon arrival. A warm welcome was also given to four of the five prisoners freed in exchange for the Japanese consul general in Sao Paulo and to 19 of the 20 Dominicans freed in a trade for an attaché of the US Embassy when both groups sought refuge in Cuba.

The Cuban press has been outspoken on the subject. A radio commentator in Havana, for example, called the kidnaping of Ambassador Elbrick "the most brilliant action carried out recently," while *Tricontinental* of December 1968 characterized the assassination by pro-Castro rebels of US Ambassador Mein in Guatemala City as "punishment well deserved." Similarly, *Verde Olivo*, the Cuban military weekly, reported the assassination by the same rebel group of two US military officers in Guatemala in January 1968 as being "the only language that the native oligarchs and their patrons, the Yankee imperialists, understand."

The Cubans until 1969 had always underplayed the importance of urban terrorism in the

revolution of 1957-58. The guerrilla war in the mountains had always dominated accounts of the overthrow of Batista. Last August, however, *Pensamiento Critico* published the text of a talk given in closed session to Latin American journalists in 1967 by Major Faustino Perez, the man who directed Castro's urban apparatus during the war. Perez' remarks were probably released because by 1969 the policy reassessment had indicated that added importance was to be given to urban terrorism in the revised revolutionary theory. Perez' historical review closely paralleled the theses expounded by Fonseca Amador and Marighella. His reason for employing terrorist tactics is simple: urban terrorism creates a "situation of insecurity in the so-called economic classes...who are going to feel that their base is shaky and are themselves going to be thinking of the necessity of change, the necessity that this situation cannot continue.... A state of general opinion in the people favorable to change will be created. In other words, even those who are not revolutionaries realize that this cannot continue and will assume an attitude favorable to change."

RAW MATERIALS FOR REVOLUTION

Perez laid great stress, as did Marighella and Fonseca Amador, on the participation of students in the revolutionary process. Students have a developed political consciousness, a certain lack of caution, and have the fitness of youth. The violence that students have precipitated throughout both North and South America in the past few years has apparently impressed Castro with respect to revolutionary possibilities. In late 1969, he initiated plans to resurrect his old student-front group, the Continental Organization of Latin American Students (OCLAE), which was formed in Havana in 1966 to act as a support apparatus for the Guevara adventure in Bolivia. OCLAE has lain dormant since Guevara's failure, but last December its permanent secretariat invited to Havana a select group of student leaders

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


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in several Latin American countries who favor the Cuban position on armed struggle.

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as Camilo Torres, the Colombian priest who joined the ELN and served under arms with the guerrillas until killed in combat in 1966. Another Colombian and former priest, German Guzman Campos, who maintains that "revolution is the only way," so impressed the Cubans that he was invited to the Havana Cultural Congress held in January 1968. In January 1970, Radio Havana characterized as "one of the most significant phenomena in Latin America in recent times" the "growing participation of some of the progressive Catholic clergy in the struggle of the peoples." A month later, the Cubans, apparently searching for another Camilo Torres, gave considerable press



Camilo Torres is Castro's example of the ideal rebel priest.

The Cubans are also favorably impressed by the growing tide of sentiment within the Catholic Church for revolutionary social and economic changes. Havana's propaganda contains heavy doses of material on members of the clergy such

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play to the reported arrival in the ranks of the Colombian ELN of Father Domingo Lain, a Spanish priest who was expelled from Colombia a year ago for interfering in the country's internal affairs. Castro has commented favorably on the revolutionary clergy several times in his speeches and probably looks on cassocked rebels as having excellent potential for guerrilla support activities such as those carried out by various religious orders in Brazil in conjunction with Marighella's terrorists.

THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

Castro will continue to support subversion abroad but is now being much more cautious as to whom he should support and what type of support is to be supplied. If the situation were particularly promising, he would not hesitate to send money, arms, or even Cuban advisers, but the rewards would have to be commensurate with the risks. He seems to have learned that exporting Cubans to lead a foreign revolutionary movement is counterproductive, and he will probably depend on foreign nationals who have the charisma and aggressiveness of a Carlos Marighella to provide the necessary leadership. He will not insist, as he did with disastrous results in Bolivia in 1967, that he control the revolutionary movement, and he will probably be satisfied to confine Cuban participation to support and advice. He is showing signs of being parsimonious with financial and material assistance, urging revolutionaries to sustain themselves by means of holdups, bank robberies, and similar actions that have become so prevalent in Latin America in the past year.

He will exert special care in situations like that in Peru where military officers seem to be making a genuine effort to institute fundamental economic and social changes by means of nationalization and agrarian reform. In such cases, he will soft-pedal violent revolution to avoid up-

setting the appletart. He considers the case of Bolivia a special one, however, and will oppose the Ovando government no matter what changes are instituted. Castro blames Ovando for the execution of Guevara and seems to be intent on exacting revenge. Honorato Rojas, the Bolivian who led Guevara's rear guard into a fatal ambush in August 1967, has already been liquidated by the ELN, and the same fate has apparently been decreed for Mario Monje, the now-imprisoned Bolivian Communist Party official who refused to aid Guevara, and for Ovando himself.

The bulk of Castro's support for revolutionaries will probably consist of propaganda and the training of recruits in guerrilla warfare and special operations techniques. Candidates for training will probably be screened much more closely than in the past, and this policy may result in a drop in quantity but an improvement in quality.

Castro will establish and maintain liaison with, and support, those groups that are willing to engage in armed struggle for the overthrow of their native governments but will be less dogmatic when it comes to the fine points of revolutionary theory. He now recognizes that each country has its peculiarities and that the Cuban experience cannot be repeated in other countries unless his general theories on revolution undergo considerable revision. He will continue to scorn most of the established Communist parties in Latin America and will seek out those revolutionary leaders who are willing to apply in their respective countries the general guidelines of urban terrorism (to create the proper revolutionary climate), guerrilla warfare (to provide a combat nucleus for confronting the forces of repression), and the people's army (to overthrow the government, seize power, and continue the revolution's economic and social phases). Castro is a compulsive rebel and will probably remain committed to violent revolution.

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