

~~SECRET~~

~~Secret~~



(b)(3)



DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

~~Secret~~

16 February 1973  
No. 0357/73

Copy No 42

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents.

**CONTENTS** (16 February 1973)



- 1 The Money Markets
- 3 France: Europe Mulls Election

**FAR EAST**

- 4 The Indochina Story

**EUROPE**

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

- 10 USSR: Breaking the Ice
- 11 Sparring Over Spitzbergen
- 12 Paying the Piper
- 13 Trade Negotiations: Tough Task
- 13 Yugoslavia: Trimming the Top
- 14 European Labor: New Club
- 15 Iceland: Timely Reminder

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

**MIDDLE EAST  
AFRICA**

- 17 Fedayeen: The Unkindest Cuts
- 18 Egypt: Questions, Few Answers
- 20 Gabon: Bongo Comes of Age
- 21 Portuguese Guinea: Rebels
- 22 Pakistan: Pressure on Wali

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)  
(b)(1)  
(b)(3)


**WESTERN  
HEMISPHERE**

- 23 Uruguay: Bordaberry Gives In
- 24 Paraguay: Stroessner Wins
- 25 Dominican Republic: Calmer
- 26 Argentina: Prospects Dimming
- 27 Peru: Mercado Moves In
- 27 Andean Pact: Sixth Member

**SPECIAL  
REPORT**

France: The Race Is On

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)



(b)(3)



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

(b)(3)




(b)(1)

(b)(3)

**PORTUGUESE GUINEA: FIERCER REBELS**

91 A more aggressive insurgent movement may emerge from the assassination of rebel leader Amilcar Cabral. Guinean President Toure, in whose country the Portuguese Guinea rebels are based, is trying to steer the movement in that direction.]



(b)(1)

(b)(3)

96 [Before his assassination, the pragmatic Cabral had devoted much attention to cultivating support among non-Communist states in the hope that his independent government, when formed, would receive broad backing. The effort had met with some success. If the new leadership were to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

**PAKISTAN: PRESSURE ON WALI**

adopt a harsher ideological stance or closer ties to its Communist supporters, it would jeopardize those gains.]

Aristide Pereira, the provisional rebel leader, lacks the prestige and forcefulness to counter Toure's guidance, which may be one reason he was chosen. Pereira, who is a mulatto as was Cabral, cannot be expected to heal the deep racial divisions within the movement. He may be no more than a temporary compromise until a stronger figure with wider support emerges—possibly one of the more successful military commanders. This could take some time.]

One of the first concerns of those now guiding the rebel movement is to demonstrate its continued viability. That was the purpose of a rebel communique issued on 10 February, claiming insurgent forces launched sweeping offensive military operations inside Portuguese Guinea beginning in late January. The rebels, no doubt, would like to mount a more dramatic action, something big enough to capture international attention and reassure foreign supporters of insurgent capabilities and will to persevere. Hence, the more aggressive posture toward which Toure is pushing the rebels may first become evident through military action. On the political side, the communique said that preparations are being made for the first meeting of the national assembly elected late last year. No date was given, however, and the meeting is not expected soon.]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

[REDACTED]

Toure probably would like to see fewer insurgents in Guinea, in part for his own security reasons. Moreover, he probably will allow those who remain less operational freedom than was the case before Cabral's death. [REDACTED]

President Bhutto has used the recent discovery of clandestine arms in the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad as an excuse for his strongest action so far against the opposition National Awami Party of Wali Khan. On 15 February he removed the provincial governors in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier—the two provinces Wali's party controls; Bhutto has imposed direct rule in Baluchistan.

On 10 February [REDACTED]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)

[REDACTED] raided the Iraqi Embassy, seizing several hundred Soviet-made automatic weapons and thousands of rounds of ammunition. Just what the Iraqis intended to do with the arms has not yet become clear, but the most likely of several possibilities is that they were destined for dissident tribes in Iranian Baluchistan. The Shah's recurrent efforts to stimulate trouble among Iraqi Kurdish minority may well have led Baghdad to try to repay the Iranians in kind.

Officials of Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party have charged that the National Awami Party was planning to make the two frontier provinces independent and that it was plotting direct action against the central government. The National Awami Party denied any involvement and charged that Bhutto's party had been fomenting the recent tribal unrest in Baluchistan Province.

The major real issue for the government may be opposition to provisions in the proposed constitution which the National Awami Party claims unduly limit provincial autonomy. The government has the votes to adopt the constitution in the session which begins on 17 February, but may hope to limit the impact of National Awami Party arguments—especially in the frontier provinces—by tying the party to treason and foreign conspirators.

In the past year there have been a number of confrontations between President Bhutto and the National Awami Party. All were resolved at the last minute, but Bhutto is acting with less caution this time. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~