

370 3-47  
22 pages  
115 numbers

~~Secret~~



(b)(3)



*Weekly Situation Report  
on  
International Terrorism*



(b)(3)

7 December 1977

~~Secret~~

**SECRET**

(b)(3)

7 December 1977

**BACKGROUND ARTICLE****Guatemalan Guerrilla Army of the Poor**

The Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) as it exists today is the result of the assimilation of splinter groups of terrorists and radical leftists into a unified guerrilla/terrorist movement. In 1968 the Edgar Iburra Guerrilla Front (FGHI), a predecessor to the EGP, assassinated two U.S. military officers and U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein. The leader of FGHI, Julio Cesar Macias Mayora, alias Cesar Montes, remains the primary leader in the EGP. As of August 1977 the strength of the EGP was broken down as follows: guerrillas 225, hardcore militants 320, and support personnel 1800 to 1900.

EGP strategy, as outlined in an internal document of the organization dated December 1975, is to promote a guerrilla war for the overthrow of the current government. To this end, the document revealed that the EGP proposes several types of military action including assassinations, kidnappings economic sabotage, and armed propaganda actions, both in urban and rural areas. According to Guatemalan government reports, the EGP also plans to aggravate tensions along the Guatemalan/Belize border to force Guatemalan action, thus weakening and dispersing government military strength.

In November 1975 the EGP issued a declaration of war aims in a two-page pamphlet entitled "Popular Warfare". The pamphlet said that a "people's war" led by the EGP was being waged in Guatemala and blamed previous revolutionary failures on the lack of a unified political and military organization which was both revolutionary and clandestine. The pamphlet concluded by saying that the EGP had corrected these errors and would continue the revolutionary struggle until the poor people of Guatemala had been liberated from all forms of oppression. Since early 1976 the EGP has increasingly promoted terrorism as a means to its political ends as evidenced by increasing numbers of violent acts. Although the majority of these terrorist acts have been calculated to attain political goals and primarily affect the native population, some have threatened U.S. persons or U.S. interests.

7

**SECRET**

(b)(3)

**SECRET**

(b)(3)

7 December 1977

Noteworthy were the 26 November 1976 raid on the Shenandoah Oil Properties and the February 1977 kidnaping of a local businessman with a dual U.S./Guatemalan citizenship. (See the issues of 30 November 1976 and 8 February 1977.) The businessman was subsequently ransomed. While there is a dearth of information regarding EGP plans and intentions, the leadership of the EGP remains in the hands of the same individuals who planned and conducted the 1968 assassination of Ambassador Mein and the killing and kidnaping of other foreign and U.S. officials during that same period. The momentum built up by the EGP from late 1975 to the present has continued without serious disruption to either its organization or the recruitment and training of support personnel.

Since 1975 the EGP has attempted to develop clandestine support mechanisms in foreign countries. It established a secret base in Mexico to promote its "international relations" through a network of collaborators and contacts in Central and South America, Europe, the United States and Canada. Captured EGP documents show the Mexican base as a primary channel for smuggling arms and other military equipment across the border into Guatemala. Documents also support EGP claims of "auxiliary" support structures in the United States and Europe.

Principally through Cuban channels the EGP maintains contacts with pro-Cuban leftist revolutionary parties in Latin America, some of which are associated with or are charter members of the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). The JCR is the umbrella organization in Latin America for radical extremist urban and rural guerrilla terrorist movements. Documents disclose that the JCR has helped the EGP establish contact with the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) and the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) in El Salvador; the Authentic Revolutionary Movement (MRA) in Costa Rica; the National Liberation Army (ELN) of Bolivia; and the Revolutionary Worker's Party (PRT) in Argentina. While the scope of Cuban support to the EGP since August 1976 is not known, Cuban support prior to that date was limited to financial and material support, training, and equipment and materials for forging and fabricating travel and identity documents.

As its strength and successes increase, the EGP could

8

**SECRET**

(b)(3)

**SECRET**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)

7 December 1977

serve as a magnet drawing together the radical and leftist groups in the region, posing a threat to area-wide political stability. (SECRET)

**SECRET**

[Redacted]

(b)(3)