

FEB 1980

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DCI EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

19 February 1980

SUBJECT: Weekly Activity Reports; Weeks of 28 January and 4 February 1980

1. On Sunday the 27th we pulled off the exfiltration of the "Canadian Six." This was a real coup in which the two people we sent in to bring the other six out just performed splendidly. The whole plan developed by NE and DDO showed real professionalism. ✓

a. We started around the Hill to let people know that, for the first time, we had not notified the congressional committees about a finding in advance. There was some concern with this but all except Les Aspin seemed to take it pretty well. ✓

2. As far as Iran was concerned the rest of the week of the 28th was rather uneventful. Discussions were generally focused on details like export controls on the Soviet Union.

3. In the week of 4 February I really wasn't around very much.  ✓

*Mother died*

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
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DCI EYES ONLY




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7. Another big event these past two weeks has been the charters. I'm frankly somewhat worried about them. We had a meeting on the 30th of January with the President, Huddleston, and Bayh. We did not resolve it. On Friday the 8th of February, Huddleston tabled his bill in which there are still two substantial disagreements -- whether we give prior notification and whether the committee has access to any of our documents. We worked on various ways to respond to the tabling of this charter and to the legislation that Moynihan tabled in the Senate and McClory in the House that would give us relief from the Freedom of Information Act, Hughes-Ryan, and identities legislation. We had talked about his scheme with the Vice President, I had written a paper which, in my absence, was sent to the NSC outlining several plans. In the long run, during my absence, Aaron and the Vice President simply took it to the President with their recommendations and without any consultation with any of us in the Intelligence Community. They had worked up a plan simply to let the Senate table its bill and us not table even the charters, let alone a relief bill. I think we should have tabled the relief bill for all except Hughes-Ryan and withdrawn the Freedom of Information Act and identities legislation from the charters; have urged the congressional leadership to cut back on Hughes-Ryan notification on their own immediately; and have taken Hughes-Ryan back to only two committees by the charters process. I now think we're in a difficult spot where it will be hard to get a charter through in which there isn't prior notification or some other reporting requirement to the Congress which will be unacceptable to the President. We may be able to get enough right-wingers to block this but the issue is down to congressional prerogatives now and that may be more difficult. On top of that, since the charters really won't fly, the question is what will be tacked onto the Moynihan bill in terms of oversight and reporting requirements. There are two dangers here: one is that those requirements will be too onerous to be acceptable; the other is that whatever they tack on there from the charters to describe oversight that accompanies these Moynihan relaxations may end up being the only charters we ever get. I'm concerned about the way this is going.

8. I went to Principia and really enjoyed my visit as well as the talk I gave to the students. They were very receptive. I also went to Minneapolis and had a first class luncheon that Ed Spencer set up with a group of 30 businessmen. Their questions were great and I think the exchange was very stimulating. X

9. I spent most of Friday afternoon, the 8th, talking with analysts in relays on the overall Middle East-South Asian problem, trying to take a perspective on it. We hope to use that with the President next week. X

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DCI EYES ONLY



MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

19 February 1980

SUBJECT: Weekly Activity Report; Week of 11 February 1980

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a.

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b. [Redacted]

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4. [Redacted]

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5. [Redacted]

6. [Redacted]

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7. [Redacted] I pointed out that the hostages could be in trouble at the last minute of the negotiations (e.g., the militants won't let them go and start killing them) and that the negotiations might well fail. The President, without being specific, gave me assurance that the negotiations were going along very well but that they certainly could fail. [Redacted]

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8. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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9. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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10. Vance asked me to come over that afternoon to explain to me the full details of the rescue operation. I'm not quite sure what prompted him to do this. He mentioned before everyone at the end of the meeting with the President that he ought to get together with me that afternoon and fill me in. I don't know whether this is because I, in effect, filled him in a week and-a-half or so before about the details of the rescue operation or whether it's just because he's such a decent fellow and realized I was out in the cold on the facts of the rescue operation.

*negotiation*

[Redacted] I don't know. When I saw him he took an extraordinary amount of time to go through the thing in detail, though there wasn't too much that was not already in the press. In essence the Iranians have lived up to the steps that we have agreed to thus far but there are more to go. The actual text of our mea culpa that we will have to issue has not been cleared with them and there is no intent to clear it with them. There is going to be an agreement on the principles that will be covered in the corresponding statements and ours will be deftly worded so as not to be too self condemnatory. He read me the wording they had planned. It didn't sound too bad if that's all they have to give.

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a. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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b. After the morning meeting with the President and before my meeting with Vance, we had received two messages indicating that there might be danger to the lives of the hostages if the Ayatollah ordered them to be released from the compound. [Redacted]

[Redacted] He said he'd think it over overnight and let me know on Saturday if he wanted to change his mind. I told him I would be out in Indiana on Saturday but he could get me at my mother's house in the evening. He did not call.

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11. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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12. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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13. I guess my thinking is that if I went ahead on my own and it did turn sour we'd be back in the accusation that here was the Agency running off like a rogue elephant. It was also my theory that if we're going to be continually pushed into the forefront for covert actions like this (Brzezinski and Aaron, but not Vance are doing that), everyone ought to understand the limitations, problems, and risks -- especially the problem of getting started well ahead of time. I don't think Brzezinski understood that. I think he and Aaron feel you can turn on the covert action switch and it ignites. Perhaps we made something in that respect, a lot will depend if anyone picks up the ball now and continues any discussion on this. In short we have been moving into an important new phase in the Agency's activities here in undertaking new and revitalized covert actions, but we're not really prepared for it.

a. On the one hand, despite the President's repeated statements that he isn't going to back off the grain embargo or other moves against the Soviets in the near term, I'm worried that we're going to give some signal soon that we're not too serious about all this. Vance this week sent a memo to the President recommending we join in an early gathering of the UN Commission on the Zone of Peace for the Indian Ocean. When asked to comment on it by Brzezinski's office I said that we certainly shouldn't do that for two reasons: the first is that it would give

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exactly the wrong signal about our establishing new bases in the Indian Ocean area. It would clearly tell people that we had no plan on hanging around. The second was that we shouldn't even consider negotiating ourselves out of a military presence in an area of the world in which we had vital national interests.

b. I'm also worried about being squeezed between the Brzezinski pressure for political actions and the Vance and Carter resistance to them or disinterest in these "dirty tricks" areas. We can get caught in the vise here. It's also a tough one for me politically. It is clear from a number of indicators that Brzezinski and Aaron think Carlucci would be great for promoting the covert actions they want, [redacted] and a question from the President to me during my meeting with him as to whom I leaned on for covert action support. But what they would want to do is use Carlucci to get the Agency out in front of Vance and the President on covert political actions -- tough decisions and I'm in the middle again.

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14. [redacted] leaked to the Washington Post this week. The President put a lot of pressure on to tone it down and was successful in doing that, but here we are again. On Saturday Birch Bayh asked me with all innocence where I thought the leak came from even though one of the newspapers suggested that a television comment of his may have been the original genesis of it.

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15. I made a run on Representatives Dante Fascell and Ed Derwinski about [redacted] They are unwilling to do too much but would help us put some pressure on State by delaying the State Foreign Service Reform Act somewhat. I talked to Vance about it on Friday. He claims he would have a rebellion if the foreign service got nicked again, as their morale is very low from what they think have been a number of other setbacks. This is going to be a tough one.

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16. [redacted]

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17. On Wednesday Brzezinski had a meeting on the overall security problems in the Mid-East, Southwest Asian area. As usual he had a set agenda, stuck to it, and permitted no time for anything else. Most of the agenda items were mechanics and dull. He has now run the daily SCC meetings down to twice a week on Tuesdays and Thursdays, though the one for next Tuesday, the 19th, has been cancelled already. Clearly everything of significance is being done upstairs by the inner foreign policy group.

18. I hosted a luncheon on Wednesday for a lot of Canadians who had helped with the release of the "Canadian Six," just a goodwill gesture.

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Capt Thibault,

DCI said there would be no reflections memo for the week of 18 February - he couldn't remember enough.

Gary

The Director Central Intelligence

Washington, D. C. 20505

Week of ~~18 FEB~~

No reflections  
memo - can't  
recall much