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## OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR POUCH TO AMZON  
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. MGH-W-101

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CLASSIFICATION

TO: Munich, Germany

DATE: 23 June 1947

FROM:

SUBJECT: GENERAL-

SPECIFIC: HERRING

REF: MSC/302, MGH-609, HSC/Ops/11, HSC/Ops/34.

1. We are very interested in indications (HSC/Ops/34, Para. 11) that Subject may shortly become available for a penetration project aimed into the higher levels of the KPD.

2. It is urged, because of the potential value of such a project and because of the general dearth of penetration of KPD on any level, that Subject's denazification and recruitment be handled as expeditiously as possible. It is realized that the time required to accomplish the above will be determined by normal administrative delays of denazification procedures and the Case Officer's estimate of Subject's willingness to undergo recruitment as an agent.

3. Certainly MG Denazification officials in OMGB when presented with testimony of Dora THIELE DOHMAN and Walter COHN, in a form which could be passed to the German denazification authorities, should be willing to apply pressure to the Germans in order to speed up Subject's hearing before the Spruchkammer. It should also be possible to have some or all of the TUSA-IPW reports mentioned in MSC-302, downgraded for use in Subject's trial. If, as is indicated by the material available here, Subject is willing to avow his connections with the Communist Party both before and after the war, his clearance by the German authorities should be assured.

4. We should be able to accomplish the above steps in a way that will tend to restore Subject's confidence in us which was undoubtedly impaired by his long imprisonment. Perhaps Bruno GOLDHAMMER can (if he is not doing so already) help Subject. Our

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visible motive in dealing with American and German officials in assisting HERRING can merely be to prevent a further miscarriage of justice in this case.

5. One danger which should not be overlooked is that CIB might become incensed if they find out we are now using HERRING after once having been turned down on the project. This danger is remote since Colonel STEVENS was the only man who knew much about the case and he has since been redeployed. Thus if CIB becomes aware of our project, which should not happen with correct handling, they would have little cause to make an issue of this matter.

6. One additional complex which may warrant exploration is RUBINSTEIN (or SILBERSTEIN or GOLDSTEIN), Par. 16 of SCI Third Army Report on HERRING, dated 6 August 1945. A very vague possibility exists that this man may be connected with the man (BERNSTEIN) "brought" by CIC from Paris in May-June 1946 upon Serge ROUKINE's declaration that BERNSTEIN (?) was an RIS leader in Western Europe. Perhaps we could get a physical description of BERNSTEIN (?) from CIC Maj. LAYTON or, if preferred, from some MISC interrogators who were about at the time, for comparison with HERRING's description of RUBINSTEIN (or SILBERSTEIN or GOLDSTEIN).

cc: [ ]  
Heidelberg

*Handwritten notes:*  
10/16/45  
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