

AIRGRAM

10 15-1-WE
FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

1	1	1
2	1	1
3	1	1
4	1	1
5	1	1
6	1	1
7	1	1
8	1	1
9	1	1
10	1	1
11	1	1
12	1	1
13	1	1
14	1	1
15	1	1
16	1	1
17	1	1
18	1	1
19	1	1
20	1	1

A-210

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

10 500 0547
HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

TO : Department of State 1965 SEP 23 AM 9 57
 INFO : GÖTEBORG, REYKJAVIK, OSLO, HELSINKI, COPENHAGEN, MOSCOW.
 ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION BRANCH
 4 0216210 03
 FROM : Embassy STOCKHOLM DATE: September 24, 1965.
 SUBJECT : Statement by Prime Minister on WALLENBERG Affair

SUMMARY

The recently released Swedish White Paper on the case of Raoul WALLENBERG is a surprisingly strong effort to put pressure on the Soviets to be more cooperative in the matter. The White Paper also needs to be seen in the domestic political context as an attempt by the Government to reply to opposition criticism that it has not been active enough in pursuing the question with the USSR. While the Wallenberg affair will continue to be a definite irritant in Swedish-Soviet relations, it will not affect the operation of Swedish neutrality policy.

There is enclosed an Embassy translation of a statement made by Prime Minister Tage ERLANDER on September 16 on the occasion of the release of the Swedish Government's White Paper on the case of Paoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who disappeared in Hungary in 1944 during the Soviet advance into that country. The White Paper released to the press comprises three sections: the Prime Minister's statement enclosed with this airgram, a chronological recitation of the history of the Wallenberg affair, and a series of documents bearing upon the subject, such as letters from Erlander to KHRUSHCHEV and KOSYGIN. The chronological account, together with the documentation (both of which are rather long), will be submitted separately as soon as the Embassy has been able to complete the translations.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY

FORM 8-62 DS-323

In Out

1965 SEP 28 PM 4 59

COPYFLO-PBR

Drafted by: JGL: JF Andrews; 11/10/65
 Contents and Classification Approved by: Charge T. Chameton, Jr.
 C. references: JGL: JF Andrews, Jr.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2008

FOR COORDINATION WITH State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 2 of A-210
from Stockholm 9/24/65

The Wallenberg case has been the most persistent issue of contention between Sweden and the USSR since the war. In addition, it has been a domestic political issue in Sweden. The bourgeois opposition has criticized the Social Democratic Government for not doing enough to clear up the mystery, and has urged the Government to make public the evidence available to it showing that Wallenberg was alive after August 1947, the date on which he is alleged by the Soviets to have died in Ljubljanka prison. The Government resisted these pressures on the grounds that to release the information would antagonize the Soviets and thereby reduce the chances of obtaining Wallenberg's release if he were actually still alive.

After the visit of KHRUSHCHEV to Sweden in June 1964, and during the campaign before the elections in September of that year, there was continued agitation by the bourgeois opposition for the Government to issue a White Paper which would put public pressure on the Soviets to be more cooperative and forthcoming in their investigations in the Wallenberg case. The Embassy was informed confidentially at the time that Khrushchev in his talks with Erlander last June was extremely unreasonable and obdurate, and was very annoyed at Erlander's persistence in the matter. However, the Government still refused to agree to opposition demands for the release of its confidential documents, feeling that the time was not yet ripe, and that further efforts should be made with the Soviets behind the scenes. Subsequently, (which has only just been revealed through the publication of the White Paper), Prime Minister Erlander wrote to Premier Kosygin on the subject on February 11, 1965 (receiving a negative reply from the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm). During Erlander's visit to the Soviet Union in June of this year, he again took up the Wallenberg case with Kosygin but without any result. It was at the conclusion of this trip apparently that Erlander decided to accede to the proposal of a White Paper, and rumors to this effect appeared in the press in July.

When the Government actually did issue its White Paper, three months later, the leaders of the opposition were not given an opportunity to study it ahead of time, but were presented with copies of it in a meeting of the Foreign Relations Council just a couple of hours before its release to the press. By releasing the White Paper in this fashion without prior consultation with the opposition, Erlander presumably intended to forestall any future opposition claim that the Government had acted upon the advice of the opposition,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

as well as to stress to the Soviet Union that the White Paper represents a considered step by the Government, acting upon its own initiative. The opposition leaders on the Council protested this mode of operation and refused to give their assent to the White Paper (on the theory that there might be additional documentation which should have been included in it), and requested that the Government make available to them the entire file on Wallenberg. Prime Minister Erlander has replied that the opposition is welcome to examine the Government's voluminous dossier on the case. There is another meeting of the Foreign Relations Council scheduled for October 1, at which time the opposition will probably express its satisfaction with the White Paper. In fact, the opposition press has been practically unanimous in commending Erlander for having pursued the case with such tenacity through the years, despite Soviet denials. However, the opposition will presumably insist that the Wallenberg affair not be shelved and that Sweden continue to make strenuous efforts to clarify the matter.

The White Paper contained one sensational new piece of evidence in the form of a statement by a respected and internationally known Swedish doctor, Professor Nanna SVARTZ, who said that while on a visit to Moscow in January 1961 she had learned from a Soviet professor that Wallenberg was then still alive but confined to a mental institution. This information was immediately communicated by Professor Svartz to Prime Minister Erlander and it has formed the basis for a series of Swedish representations to the Soviets ever since, although the information was subsequently retracted by Professor Svartz's informant under what appeared to be pressure from Soviet officials.

As for Erlander's statement itself, it is a surprisingly strong condemnation of Soviet behaviour, as can be seen from the following excerpts:

"The fate of Raoul Wallenberg has deeply engaged Swedish opinion...We have sought to convince the Soviet leadership of the extraordinary seriousness with which Swedish quarters look upon this question. An essential part of our negotiations with the Soviet leaders during this time has come to concern the Wallenberg case. Unfortunately, the result has been negative. The Soviet leaders firmly assert that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union -- either in prison, in hospital, or somewhere else....We have not achieved the result we have sought. Today, we make public our account....In a democratic country, the individual citizen should be able to rest assured that the community will spare no

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page 4 of A-210
from Stockholm 9/24/65

efforts for his protection. As long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued. In its effort to find a solution to the Wallenberg case, the Government has felt the support of a unanimous Swedish opinion."

Conclusion:

The Government's White Paper, including Erlander's statement, represents an effort to put public pressure on the Soviets, while at the same time seeking to avoid giving undue offense. However, it is in effect also an admission of despair on the part of the Government that there can be a successful resolution of the Wallenberg case. In a sense, it is more of a gesture towards Swedish public opinion. However, Erlander specifically stated that "as long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued", so the case is not considered to be publicly closed, and will continue to be an irritant between Sweden and the USSR. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that whatever the frictions in Swedish-Soviet relations engendered by the Wallenberg affair, the Social Democratic Government is highly unlikely to let them affect its concept of Sweden's neutral and non-aligned role in the East-West conflict.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim


George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNCLASSIFIED

3 of Encl. to A-210
from Stockholm 9/24/65

PRIME MINISTER ERLANDER'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1965.

(In connection with release of the Government's White Paper)

The fate of Raoul WALLENBERG has deeply engaged Swedish opinion. He was arrested and carried away by a foreign Power while in diplomatic service for Sweden. His heroic achievements to save Hungarian Jews from brutal persecutions by German and Hungarian Nazis have aroused deep admiration and affection. We have had proof that he was in prison in the Soviet Union. This is the background for the intensive Swedish efforts to find out his whereabouts and have him sent home.

In 1957, the Foreign Ministry made public an exhaustive collection of documents concerning Raoul Wallenberg, together with commentaries concerning his captivity in the Soviet Union. Allow me to make a short recapitulation.

In March 1944, after the German troops had marched into Hungary, a Swedish relief action was started for the Hungarian Jews. Raoul Wallenberg was assigned to the Legation in Budapest in July 1944 to lead the relief action under the direct supervision of the Chief of Mission, Minister DANIELSSON. He carried a Swedish diplomatic passport and enjoyed diplomatic immunity. He worked untiringly, with his own life at stake, to save Jews from Nazi persecution. He saved human lives by the thousands.

By the middle of January 1945, that part of Budapest where the Jews protected through the Swedish relief action were living fell in the hands of the Soviet troops. On January 16, the Soviet Foreign Ministry advised that Wallenberg was under the protection of the Russian troops.

The earlier White Paper [1957] contains detailed material on all the Swedish démarches which were made at that time and during the years to follow, to clarify Wallenberg's whereabouts and to have him transferred to Sweden. They were all fruitless. I wish to recall in particular that the Soviet Government in August 1947 informed us that as a result of a careful investigation it had been established that Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union and that he was unknown to the Soviet authorities.

Between 1947 and 1951 no essentially new facts in the

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 2 of Encl. to A-210
1. JM Stockholm 9/24/65

Wallenberg affair reached the Swedish Foreign Ministry. But in so far as foreign prisoners began to be sent home from the Soviet Union there appeared definite reports about Wallenberg being held in prison in Moscow. This prompted a new long series of Swedish démarches, similarly without result. In April 1956, Minister of the Interior Gunnar HEDLUND and I visited the Soviet Union. We had then the opportunity to present directly to the Soviet Union's Government an exhaustive account of the Swedish views. As a matter of fact, the talks primarily centered on the Wallenberg case. At the end of our talks, the representatives of the Soviet Government -- including BULGANIN, KHRUSHCHEV and MOLOTOV -- promised that a new extensive investigation concerning Wallenberg's fate would be made because of the evidence which had been collected and presented by Sweden.

On February 6, 1957, came the Russian reply. Its implication was as follows: in the course of the extensive Soviet investigations a document had been found according to which Raoul Wallenberg had died in the Ljubljanskaja Prison in Moscow on July 17, 1947. This had been told by the head of the health service in the prison, SMOLTSCOV, to the chief of the Soviet security service, ABAKUMOV. The latter, it was stated in the Russian reply, had previously supplied the Soviet Foreign Ministry with false information. Abakumov was executed in connection with the purge within the Security Police following STALIN's death.

The Swedish Government's reaction to this reply was that it seemed difficult to believe that all documentation concerning Wallenberg's stay in Soviet prisons other than the document mentioned would be extinct. The Swedish Government reserved the right to submit any further material concerning Wallenberg that could be of importance for a continued investigation in the Soviet Union.

During the years which have followed since then, we have pursued our search and our efforts. We have left no trace unexplored, however vague it may have seemed. We have seized upon every opportunity to bring up the question, through diplomatic channels or by personal contacts. Intensive checking of all material and thorough internal considerations have taken place all the time.

The collection of documents now being published aims at providing a comprehensive picture of what has happened since the earlier White Paper was published. Thus, it contains

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 3 - " Encl. to A-210
from Stockholm 9/24/65

the texts of the notes exchanged with the Soviet Union since 1957. It accounts for the various conversations which we have had with members of the Soviet Government during this period, particularly my talks with Khrushchev in the summer of 1964 and with KOSYGIN in June of this year. Furthermore, the White Paper contains material about the testimonies on which we have founded our representations in recent years. These testimonies refer to two different periods of time.

First, it concerns the reports that Wallenberg during the 1950's had been in prison in Vladimir. We have sought to make contact with the prisoners of war returning from the Soviet Union who could be expected to have been in Vladimir during this period. All of the information obtained from them which could be placed in direct or indirect connection with Raoul Wallenberg has been the subject of testing. A collective judgment of the weight of this information was made in 1959 by Justices of the Supreme Court GYLLENSWARD and SANTESSON. Their pronouncement, which is included in the material now presented, is to the effect that in their opinion, and under Swedish law, the investigation at hand, although not containing full evidence in this respect, must be held as making likely that Wallenberg was alive at least during the early 1950's and that he was then in prison in Vladimir.

Second, the White Paper contains new testimony which appeared in January 1961. Professor Nana SVARTZ on a visit to Moscow had a conversation about Raoul Wallenberg with a prominent Soviet scientist. According to her testimony, the latter on her direct question then made a statement to the effect that Wallenberg was still alive. Professor Svartz has written a separate account, which forms part of the White Paper, about this statement and about her subsequent contacts with the Soviet scientist.

These testimonies have formed the basis for our recurring representations to the Soviet Government. We have concentrated our efforts to the opportunities when there have been possibilities for contact on the highest level. For an initiative from the highest quarters in the Soviet Union has seemed to be the absolute prerequisite for achieving clarity about the fate of Wallenberg and for having him returned to Sweden. During these contacts we have accounted for our material and for our views. We have sought to convince the Soviet leadership of the extraordinary seriousness with which Swedish quarters look upon this question.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 4 of Encl. to A-210
from Stockholm 9/24/65

An essential part of our negotiations with the Soviet leaders during this time has come to concern the Wallenberg case.

Unfortunately, the result has been negative. The Soviet leaders firmly assert that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union -- either in prison, in hospital, or somewhere else. They persist that no material whatsoever exists concerning Wallenberg over and beyond the brief notation about his death in 1947 which we were told about in the Soviet reply of 1957. Repeated new investigations are said to have been made because of our representations, but no new material whatsoever has been uncovered. It is being stated that Wallenberg was never in Vladimir and that the statements by the Soviet scientist to Professor Svartz have been misinterpreted. It is being held forth that there is no reason whatsoever why the Soviet Union should detain Wallenberg, in whatever condition he may be, and reference is being made in the connection to all of the prisoners of war and others who have been allowed to return from the Soviet Union in recent years. The Russians express their regret about Raoul Wallenberg's fate, and call to mind in this connection all of the hardships which followed in the wake of the war.

We have not achieved the result we have sought. Today, we make public our account.

All of the efforts made by Sweden in this case have naturally been motivated by Raoul Wallenberg's contribution to relieve suffering people and by consideration for his family. But this engagement and these efforts also have a wider aspect. In a democratic country, the individual citizen should be able to rest assured that the community will spare no efforts for his protection. As long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued. In its effort to find a solution to the Wallenberg case, the Government has felt the support of a unanimous Swedish opinion.

Translation: Nils Moller.

UNCLASSIFIED