

VIA: Air Pouch
SPECIFIC REF. OR GEN POUCH

DISPATCH NO. 111-110

CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief, [redacted]

DATE: 4 July 1953

FROM: Chief, [redacted]

SUBJECT: GENERAL: Operational [redacted]
SPECIFIC: Attitude of members of the German Advisory Group towards their future in Egypt.

REF: WFAA-67, WFAA-76

1. The following information concerning the German Advisory Group in Egypt was supplied by [redacted] during [redacted] most recent trip to Cairo (week of 20 June 1953). Evaluation to be in conformity with certain remarks made to [redacted] by Joseph Tieschbacher in late May.
2. Ever since the 11 May 1953 speech of British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill in which he attacked the Egyptian Government for hiring "ex-Nazis" as advisors and his later conversations with West German Chancellor Adenauer re: the recall of those German advisors with West German passports, the members of the German Advisory Group in Cairo (see WFAA-76) have had misgivings about the tenor of their employment in Egypt. While they were furious that Churchill would request such action, stated that it infringed upon Egyptian sovereignty, and maintained that they were acting strictly in accordance with West German law (which permits any German to accept foreign employment provided he is not serving as a soldier in a foreign army), they took the fatalistic view that British pressure on West Germany would probably prevail and they would be faced with giving up their Egyptian jobs on losing their German passports. This latter would be of serious consequence to those advisors who are ex-officers of the German Army, since drawing pensions which would be terminated if they elected to remain in Egypt. Also, although they would probably be accepted and documented by the Egyptian Government at the present time, they do not delude themselves that they would continue to be welcome here after their usefulness is terminated (see below).
3. In view of the above, the majority of the advisors are now looking upon their projected stay in Egypt as of considerably shorter duration than previously. Tieschbacher, who left Cairo on 11 June for a vacation in Germany, told [redacted] that he was mainly interested in lining up business contacts which he could fall back on when he was finished in Egypt. Others are attempting to do the same by mail and through contacts with Germans.

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... [redacted] ... which is not yet that very few of the Germans will leave here voluntarily - they are satisfied with their jobs and particularly with their salaries and would prefer to remain here until things in Europe settle down. It is just that most of them are afraid of British influence and do not trust the Egyptians to stand behind them if a real effort is made to get them out.

4. [redacted] states that no additional experts have been hired for the Voss group since the report which was forwarded as WDA-76. The group has, in fact, been reduced by five since that time. They are:

a. Friedrich Goeller of the Military Advisory Group - died in Germany in late 1952 after an operation for lung cancer.

b. Dr. Vachow of the Factory Advisory Group - left Egypt on 16 June 1953 because his two year contract expired and was not renewed. He disagreed with many of the German officers and was considered inefficient.

c. Theodore Terzer of the Factory Advisory Group - expert in bakelite plastics. Although his contract had not expired he was given three months notice and dismissed at the recommendation of Dr. Goeller for whom he worked. With Goeller now dead there is no bakelite plastics expert now in Egypt.

d. Franziska (fm) powder and ammunition expert. Two year contract expired and was not renewed. Reason not known.

e. Herbert Gwert of the Military Advisory Group - administrator of the supply and armaments section of the group. Contract was not renewed after expiration. Reason not known.

X - Dr. Voss did not recommend the dismissal of any of the above and even made an effort to keep them in Egypt but the action was taken and confirmed by the Ministry of War and the German Government to leave. In addition, General Wilhelm Fahrmecher, the Senior Military Advisor, had a serious disagreement with the Egyptian Army General Staff in late May and threatened to resign. Voss intervened and settled the affair to Fahrmecher's satisfaction, and the resignation was withdrawn.

5. This disagreement plus numerous others which have taken place is, according to [redacted] simply an indication of the mutual dissatisfaction which exists both on the part of the Egyptians and the Germans. The Egyptians have expected the Germans to make great changes for the better in Egypt's military position and capabilities and this has not been done. The Germans complain that they have prepared innumerable plans and projects for the Ministry of War which have either been rejected by the Egyptians or not acted upon at all. The Egyptians seldom are willing to listen to the advice given them by the German experts and resent being told the things that are wrong.

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with the Egyptian Armed Forces. Senior German advisors (specifically Voss, General Fahrmbacher, General Oscar Wenzel and Albert Wierlein) have advised against the opening of guerrilla warfare against the British in the Canal Zone on both military and supply grounds. Whether they have had any success in this respect remains to be seen.

6. In general, the Egyptians seem to be slightly disillusioned with the accomplishments to date of the German Advisory Group and perhaps feel they aren't getting their money's worth. This may be only a temporary feeling resulting from the desire of the current regime to accomplish everything (political, military and economic) at once, but the German advisors believe that it points up how really insecure their jobs are. Most of the original two year contracts have expired and have been renewed for one year - further renewals are open to question. [redacted] gives as an example the [redacted] group of rocket projects (see para graph 2 of WMA-76) which is being liquidated as a failure by the Ministry of War. [redacted] himself and most of his engineers have left and the four remaining are being used for other work. While this group was not under the control of Voss, its fate has made a profound impression on the other Germans.

7. [redacted] will be asked to keep us regularly informed on the attitudes of the German advisors and their status with the Egyptian Government. While it is recognized that the above described mutual dissatisfaction may be transitory, any development which would bring about large scale reductions in the number of German (and Czech) advisors at the War Ministry would be highly significant in evaluating the future potential of the Egyptian Armed Forces and Egyptian capabilities for maintaining the Suez Canal Base, if the British should evacuate.

[redacted]

Distribution:

5 - Headquarters

1 - [redacted]

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