

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN 45456 ³⁹

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GROUP 1
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CITE [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

DIST 7 FEBRUARY 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 5 FEBRUARY 1968

SUBJECT VIEWS OF SEVERAL SAIGON INTELLECTUALS ON ASPECTS
OF CURRENT CRISIS

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ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (6 FEBRUARY 1968) [REDACTED]

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SOURCE [REDACTED]

3.3(h)(2)

1. SEVERAL SAIGON INTELLECTUALS WERE SURPRISED AND AMAZED AT THE INTENSITY OF THE RECENT VIET CONG (VC) ATTACKS ON SAIGON AND OTHER CITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM. [REDACTED]

3.3(h)(2)

[REDACTED] HIS FAMILY, WAS PINNED DOWN IN HIS HOUSE BY GUNFIRE FOR 24 STRAIGHT HOURS AND THUS GAINED A FIRST-HAND APPRECIATION OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THE VC ATTACK. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] DO NOT 3.3(h)(2)

DISCERN ANY SPECTACULAR CHANGE IN VC POLITICAL TACTICS ATTENDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR MILITARY ATTACKS. THEY AGREE, HOWEVER, THAT THE VC HAVE UP-GRADED THE OBJECTIVE OF SECURING POLITICAL AUTHORITY OVER ANY AND ALL PIECES OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TERRITORY.

2. [REDACTED] THE VC WANT DESPERATELY TO ESTABLISH AN OPERATING GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE IN SOME AREA OF THE COUNTRY WHICH HAS HERETOFORE BEEN CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN). THEY BELIEVE THE VC EITHER ARE NOT CONTENT WITH THEIR OWN PROPAGANDA ABOUT THE NEED FOR A COALITION GOVERNMENT OR ELSE ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE REACTION TO DATE AND WISH TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR CAPABILITY FOR BRINGING A COALITION GOVERNMENT INTO BEING BY ESTABLISHING AT LEAST ONE BASE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN A TOWN OR CITY FORMERLY HELD BY THE GVN. IT IS PROBABLY FOR THIS REASON, THEY BELIEVE, THAT THE VC HAVE PUSHED THE CONCEPT OF THE "ALLIANCE OF NATIONAL AND PEACEFUL FORCES" (IN SAIGON) AND THE "DEMOCRATIC AND PEACEFUL NATIONAL ALLIANCE FRONT" (IN HUE). WHILE THE VC MAY NOT REASONABLY EXPECT TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN THESE TWO CITIES, THEY PROBABLY HOPE TO USE THE TACTIC TO SECURE CONTROL IN OTHER AREAS.

3. [REDACTED] ALL CONSIDER RADIO LIBERATION'S CONSTANT 3.3(h)(2) CALLS FOR A GENERAL UPRISING AS TYPICAL PROPAGANDA THEMES USED BY THE

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[Redacted]

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NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT TO SPUR ITS MILITARY AND POLITICAL CADRES.

[Redacted] THE FRONT IS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT A
GENUINE POSSIBILITY FOR POPULAR UPRISINGS NOW EXISTS IN ANY OF
THE PROVINCIAL CAPITALS AND AUTONOMOUS CITIES.

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[Redacted]

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM~~

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