

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~INFORMATION
September 25, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

SUBJECT: Vietnam Ad Hoc Working Group Meeting, September 22, 1970

Sullivan referred to a Defense press statement on Madame Binh's POW offer, and said that better coordination appeared to be necessary in the Government on this matter. The President had issued orders that there was to be strictly no comment.

Sullivan said he had been on the phone with Bui Diem, and had learned that Foreign Minister Lam was coming down from New York the evening of the 22nd by car. Bui Diem was going on to Paris September 24, hopefully in a quiet and private manner without press attention. Dr. Kissinger was going to Paris on the evening of the 25th and would arrive there the morning of the 26th. He would have a session with Bruce and Habib and go on to meet the President in Rome on the 27th. While in Paris he would need to see Ky, and Sullivan would telephone Dr. Kissinger to this effect. Dr. Kissinger's call on Ky would assume the appearance of a "massive strong arm exercise" to keep Ky away from the U.S. at this time, but was nevertheless required. Sullivan had talked over the Ky issue with the Secretary and had said that all this pressure on Ky might drive him further into a corner and make him more stubborn; our only alternative was to offer him something else, e.g. an official invitation to pay a visit to the U.S. after November 10. Sullivan felt the best people to turn Ky off were Bui Diem and Khoi.

Sullivan referred briefly to "Operation Counterpunch" in Laos, saying that the word had gone out to Godley to undertake this operation. The people in Washington had felt that those in the field were best qualified to pass judgment on the desirability of the attack.


Sullivan remarked that the situation in Con Son was in a mess because the tiger cages had been torn down, and there was no place to put the maximum security prisoners. Evidently there was great confusion there.

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Sullivan turned to the PSYOPS field, noting that two NVA lieutenants had rallied in Cambodia as a result of leaflet drops. The PSYOPS Committee itself had now moved since the previous week with considerable dispatch and had taken action on a number of things. Sullivan was encouraged by the Committee's new energy.



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Sullivan said that the action on the GVN Program Law might be completed by the Lower House as early as the end of next week. The outside limit would be around twelve days, since the new Senate would be coming in.

Sullivan referred to a CINCPAC message to the MACV Provost Marshal on how to organize and handle POW camps. He thought that this was an excellent message. In this respect, there was a simmering mess in the Phu Quoc Prison Camp. For example, there was only a handful of doctors for literally thousands of prisoners. Other facilities were inadequate as well. The ICRC was calling attention to this.

General Smith indicated in response to a question from Sullivan that he did not know the status of Secretary Laird's efforts to go to the Hill for a supplementary. He observed, though, that one plan for dealing with the need for additional funds would be to see if additional funds might now be added to the Senate version of the Appropriation Bill (which had passed the House) with the matter being worked out in conference. Sullivan felt that this was a very dangerous approach, since the conference might end up by taking the increase out of our hides, i. e. by having the Senators shift funds to Vietnam from other areas with no increase.

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General Smith said that he had brought the ROK pay tables with him, and was going out to the field to make a recommendation on what outlay should be made for FY 71 for payment of ROK allowances. He favored cutting out maximum payments for officers, and leaving the internal system for the lower ranks the same.

Nooter mentioned that he had met with Warren Nutter on funding for FY 72, and could say that Nutter had not offered to pick up anything. This came as no great surprise. As a means of generating more funds for the GVN, Nooter suggested that we might wish to untie the AID funds. I noted that there had been some thinking in the NSC directed toward this same point.

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