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AIR POUCH

DISPATCH NO. S BA-502
27 OCT 53

TO: Chief, SE

FROM: []

SUBJECT: General - ~~INTEL~~
Specific - Association of Rumanian Emigrants in
Yugoslavia and their Relations with
Emigrants' Groups in the West

1. Edward Kretzmann, our new Political Officer, (at the Embassy), on 24 October 53 handed us a memorandum entitled as above and addressed to Mr. Walworth Berbour, Director, OS, by Joseph T. Kindrick, Jr., AsCenGen, Munich, dated 9 Oct 53, the report having been prepared by the Munich office of the Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz, West German Security Service. Mr. Kretzmann requested the writer's comments and, after the writer had discussed the memorandum with him, Mr. Kretzmann requested that we write the comments up so that he could send them to Mr. Berbour. On the possibility that you might find them of interest, I am enclosing a carbon copy of my comments. (Unfortunately I do not have another copy of the paper for submission to Trieste station).

2. There is one mistake in my notes, apparently. Tuffin, who keeps notes on these matters as a Therapizek Peripheral Reporting Officer, advises that while the escapees receive a differential sufficient to bring their incomes up to 5,000 dinars if they work and earn less than 5,000, their stipend is 3,000 dinars if they do not work at all. (This is in regard to my note 2.1).

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Enclosure: Memo entitled "Comments on Article. . ."

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24 October 53

COMMENTS ON ARTICLE ENTITLED "Association of
Rumanian Emigrants in Yugoslavia" and their
relations with Emigrants' Groups in th. West:

The following comments are keyed to the pages
and paragraphs of reference memorandum:

I-1 - Instead of 1,400 Rumanians having fled to Yugoslavia during the past two years it is estimated that the figure is closer to 100-150, with most of these having escaped during the first of these two years. Since the intensification of border controls which took place on the Rumanian side approximately one year ago, it is estimated that not more than 25 to 50 persons have escaped.

Published Yugoslav figures for Rumanian refugees give a total of 1560 Rumanian escapees into Yugoslavia during the period 1948-1952 (Oct.). However, the figure of 125 is given as the total remaining here (Oct. 1952). An officer of the League of Rumanian Political Refugees in Yugoslavia, Lt. ~~Marshall~~, has estimated the number of Rumanian escapees in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1953 as being approximately 270.

I-2 - The statement that wages paid the Rumanian escapees are "mostly even higher" does not appear supported by the evidence available to us. These escapees who do not appear anti-Yugoslav are paid 5,000 dinars per month. If they secure work they are paid approximately the same wages as a Yugoslav citizen. If they secure work which pays over 5000 dinars monthly, they lose their stipend. If not, they are paid enough to bring their total income up to 5000 dinars monthly. It is understood that those few who become officials of the Association may receive up to 10,000 dinars monthly for their services as officials of the Association.

I-3 - The statement that the majority of the escapees desire to "go West" has been supported by UDBA officials working with Rumanian escapees at Vrsac, although the official statements of the UDBA in Belgrade are to the effect that the escapees prefer to remain in Yugoslavia.

Constantin

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I-3 - It is our understanding that the Association numbers between 150 and 200 more or less inactive members, not the 500 mentioned in reference memorandum.

II - 1 - It is probable that the person in mind is (Lt) Constantin Boreash instead of "Boris Constantin". Boreash has been in contact with the officials of the U. S. Embassy in Belgrade for some months, as has (Capt.) Ion (Theorgiu).

II - 2 - The description of the meeting on 14 July 52 gives the impression that it was a great affair. Our understanding is that approximately forty Rumanians who did not reside in the Svetozarovo camp were brought together and that one or two of the officials of the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian Associations were brought in to add an international character to the meeting. The statements by Ghinea appear to run true to form. It might be mentioned that according to two Rumanian sources (Risurks and Baker), Ghinea was an unwitting member of the escape group with which he came to Yugoslavia and he did not know what the plans of the group were until their plane landed in Yugoslavia.

It is interesting to note that reference memorandum does not mention the presence at the meeting of (General) Dusan Jugose, the UDBA official who controls all refugee organizations for the Yugoslav Government.

III - 3 - The information secured by the "Association" (it is actually secured by UDBA interrogators and the "Association" has nothing to do with it) would appear to be the best, in so far as border control information provided by escaping border guards is concerned, but its other information would appear to be highly unreliable. The escapees color their stories to meet the desires of those who debrief them, those persons in this case being communists. (And the interrogators also color the stories to meet the desires of their communist superiors.)

We would appreciate evidence that "the Tito Government . . . places everything that is necessary . . . at the disposal of the group." Actually they are little more than a closely controlled, suspect, sounding board for the Yugoslav propaganda agencies.

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III - 4 - What evidence is there that the population in Rumania is "highly susceptible to the propaganda activities of the Chinese group"? The fact that most of the escapees are pro-Western would make it appear that the Yugoslavs merely succeed in making the Rumanians feel that Yugoslavia is now with the West, but this is not the "Communist message" that Tito wants to get across. That Western propaganda is weak in this field we will all agree.

IV - 1 - What evidence is there that "the Communists in Rumania have strong anti-Russian feelings"? There are disillusioned Communists and there are Titoist factions but the hard core communists hold on to Mother Russia's apron strings. What evidence is there of "new impetus" to the Titoist tendencies of the Rumanian people since the death of Stalin? Specific reference to the "skillful Belgrade propaganda activities" would be of help in evaluating them.

IV - 2 - The statement that the Association "exerts direct and most effective influence on Rumania" would appear to require supporting evidence. That the Western groups lack influence because they have lost contact with their homeland must be admitted.

IV - 3 - "Rumors" of contact between the Yugoslav groups and groups in the West have been current for some time and available evidence seems to indicate that the rumors originate with the Yugoslavs. We would appreciate evidence of "secret trips" into Yugoslavia. There has been one unsubstantiated report that Joachim Wasseresu (who works for Tito/Constantinescu, listed as an unreliable intelligence source in Austria) has been in Yugoslavia to contact refugees. There is no tangible evidence to support the rumors that contacts have been allowed. There is another report that Vanille Distrescu, who is vice-president of a refugee group headed by (General) Vanille Khan in Germany, was in Yugoslavia during the spring of 1953 and met Lt. Boreah. However, the report is open to question and there are no allegations of contact with the Yugoslav sponsored refugee group. Lt. Boreah has stated that he personally desires contact with some Rumanian refugee groups in the west but it is not believed that this has been accomplished.

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IV - 3 - That members of the Association "have given a hint that they would be willing to cooperate with emigrants' organizations in Western countries" appears improbable as no emigrant here has the authority to thus "hint". All control is in the UDBA and anyone giving such a hint (if backed up with any authority at all) can only be an UDBA official. The facts proving that such "hints" have been made would be useful in helping us identify UDBA personnel. That the emigrants "would be willing to cooperate" is admitted; in fact, they would like to "go West" too!

IV - 3 - That "Rumanian Intelligence men in Austria suddenly are in possession of an abundance of material from Rumania which they obviously get from Werschets" is most interesting. May we have copies? Who produced it? Who typed or printed it? Who transported it across the Yugoslav border since the emigrants are not permitted to leave the country? The facts supporting these allegations would be most valuable.

IV - 3 - The speed with which reference paper jumps from unsupported supposition to unsupported conclusion is startling. The "tacit cooperation in the intelligence field" (which is assumed from facts not given) probably followed what is an UDBA political objective, rather than the reverse. What is this distinction between "ideological or programmatic coordination" and "cooperation at the level of the fatherland"?

IV - 3 - It is quite agreed that "by no means all of them (Rumanian escapees) are fanatic communists." As a matter of fact we feel that many of them are anti-communist and that is the reason they fled from Rumania. Rather than "opportunists" they are persons yielding to force which they have no choice other than to yield to. Just what the statement "understandable desire to 'reinsure' themselves in the West" means is not clear.

V - 2 - If the Yugoslavs - that is, the UDBA - are "trying to prevent" relations of the Association with the West from becoming closer, how can these relations "presumably become closer, since the UDBA controls everything about these persons? Since the UDBA controls and finances and exploits to its maximum possibility this particular Association, how can the writer of reference memorandum say "it is conceivable that the Yugoslavs themselves would come to take interest in these relations"?

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V - 2 - It would appear most important to know the identity of the Rumanian in Austria who made a trip to Yugoslavia and talked with an UDBA Major (did he talk with any Rumanian emigrants?). Was it the questionable Joachim Vacarescu? Is there any evidence to support the report? Who was the UDBA Major? Where did the talks take place? How was the system of "false papers" mentioned in reference memorandum ~~xxxxxxxx~~ to work? Why has an effort not been made to exploit this "offer" (when all other efforts by Western authorities to reach the emigrees have failed)? What have Salzburg and Munich done about this matter other than to receive the "offer" with "reserve"?

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
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