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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Use of Homosexuals by Intelligence Services

1. Reference is made to the memorandum dated 27 June addressed to you by the Assistant General Counsel, subject generally as above, wherein background material and case examples on this subject were requested from this Office to be used in testimony before the Investigation Subcommittee of the Senate Expenditures Committee which is presently interested in investigating homosexuals in the Government service.

2. In general, while there is considerable available information and while there has been a great deal of general discussion of the use of homosexuals by foreign intelligence services and particularly of the use of homosexuality as a control mechanism, our files at the present time do not contain a large number of documented cases suitable for citing. It can be accurately stated, however, that the use of homosexuals as a control over individuals recruited for espionage is a generally accepted technique which has been used at least on a limited basis for many years.

3. With reference to the operational policies of this Office, it can be stated that homosexuals are considered as security risks and every effort is made to screen thoroughly all applicants for positions with OSO to this end.

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4. With regard to the Subcommittee's request for specific case examples that have come to the attention of CIA abroad wherein foreign governments have made use of homosexuals for intelligence or espionage purposes, the following cases are submitted:

a. British Intelligence

(1) A number of staff officers who have been employed by the British services are considered by their colleagues as homosexuals. The British, however, appear to consider each

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case individually.

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(2) During World War II, a German Abwehr Agent, a former Olympic swimmer, was successful in obtaining the notebook of the British Ambassador to Portugal. The notebook was of such importance that the British considered it vital to recover it. Through their intelligence service they were able to discover that the German agent was a homosexual and through exploiting this factor were able to retrieve the notebook. (Further details as to the exact approach made are unavailable.)

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(4) During World War II three individuals were tried by the Italian Special Tribunal for the Defense of the State charged with military and political espionage on behalf of

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England. All three individuals were confirmed homosexuals as was their cut-out, an important Swiss official stationed in Rome. The principal agent was recruited for intelligence work by the Swiss, who was a friend of long standing. He, in turn, entered into intimate relations with the two other individuals, one a German, and one an Italian. Controlling them emotionally, he was soon able to obtain from them information of espionage value. Although the sub-agents in their testimony denied any knowledge that their information was being transmitted to a foreign power, the principal agent testified that they were both aware of the purpose of their espionage activities.

b. German Intelligence

(1) Even prior to the war, the Nazis made extended use of homosexual inclinations in order to eliminate domestic opposition and strengthen the Party. In the well-known case of Colonel General Fritsch which is presented in detail in Gisevius' book "To the Bitter End", an attempt was made to eliminate him through such measures. FRITSCH, who was an active anti-Nazi, was framed by the Nazis in a washroom incident and brought to court martial. Fortunately the Nazis were unable to secure a conviction. FRITSCH was in fact not a homosexual and was able to prove that he had been mistakenly identified with a homosexual of the same name despite the framed incident.

(2) During the War, an Ambassador of an allied nation stationed in Ankara was discovered by the Germans to be a homosexual. They were successful in planting as his butler and handyman an Albanian homosexual who managed to gain the Ambassador's confidence and affection. As a result of his trusted position the butler was able to obtain a key to the Ambassador's safe on behalf of the Germans who then photographed all documents placed in the safe.

(3) Although the list is not currently available in OSO, it has been reported that German Intelligence had compiled an extensive list, by country, of homosexuals holding important governmental positions. This information allegedly was intended to be used for blackmail and subversion purposes.

c. Russian Intelligence

(1) The following case, although historic, may be taken as a classic example of the vulnerability of homosexuals

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holding strategic positions:

(a) In 1900, a young captain in the Austrian service named Raedl, after finishing the General Staff Academy was assigned to the Counter-Intelligence Division of the Austrian G-2. He was intelligent, energetic, and above all honest. At that time in Austria, it was the custom that half the government money in the CI service reached the pocket of the officers themselves, so the service was very poor for lack of funds. Raedl directed all his funds against penetrating the Russians and during his first two years inflicted great damage on Russian networks in Austria. Through numerous court trials, the Russian Intelligence Service managed to identify Raedl who by that time had become chief of the Austrian CI service.

The Russians now made an all-out effort to learn the details of Raedl's personal life. They soon were able to observe that he was never seen in the company of women. Through a young newspaper boy they were able to discover that Raedl was a homosexual and had made improper advances to the boy.

This was the turning point of the case. Under Austrian law no officer could be tolerated in the army with such inclinations and if Raedl were denounced he would undoubtedly be dismissed. The Russians decided to get definite proof and to this purpose were able to substitute another newspaper boy in their employ. This boy was soon able to confirm Raedl's tendencies.

At first the Russians considered denouncing Raedl at once, but then decided to attempt to make better use of the knowledge they had gained. During the summer the boy, who had become very close to Raedl, suggested that they take a vacation someplace other than Vienna. They travelled to a hotel in the Tyrol where a Russian official also took a room. Through the boy, a copy was made of the key to Raedl's room and then, in accordance with a detailed plan arranged with the boy, Raedl was caught in flagrante delictu. He was immediately threatened with official exposure and, through fear, agreed to furnish the Russians with valuable intelligence which he had access to by virtue of his position. A suitable cut-out was arranged, a woman, so that Raedl would not learn too much concerning Russian intelligence officials in the event that he should change his mind.

As his first assignment Raedl furnished the Russians with Austrian mobilization plans to be used in the event

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of a war with Russia. He also doctored or destroyed, over a period of years, information reports received from Austrian networks within Russia. The results of his treachery were so extensive that at the outbreak of war in 1914, the Austrian and German staffs were completely misinformed on the number of existing Russian divisions.

At one point during Raedl's activity, an Austrian agent in Warsaw reported that there were indications that Russia was in possession of Austria's mobilization plans. In order to save his own skin, Raedl decided to place the blame on some other Austrian agent who was in fact working for Russia. As Chief of the CI service he knew which agents were suspected as doubles. He asked permission from Russia for this step but before receiving a reply he proceeded to turn over three suspects for investigation. The men could not be convicted, however, through lack of definite proof. Russia ultimately decided that Raedl was of more importance to them than the three agents and furnished the necessary proof to Raedl in the form of photostats of messages received from the suspects. Raedl produced the document in court as a result of which the men were found guilty and hanged. In return for this service, however, the Russians demanded from Raedl a complete list of Austrian agents in Russia.

Raedl also managed to report to the Russians the name of a Russian Colonel who had offered to furnish the Austrians with Russian mobilization plans. Consequently the Austrians paid a large sum of money for a batch of worthless papers and the Colonel in question was liquidated.

Raedl was finally exposed quite incidentally in 1913 through censorship measures which were then put into effect by the Austrian Government. Because of the tenseness of the international situation, most Russian nationals were forced by Austria to leave the country, thus presenting operational difficulties to the Russian intelligence service. The Russians attempted to send money to Raedl through a post office box not realizing that Austrian censorship controls were in effect. Because of the size of the sum, it attracted Austrian attention. A watch was kept on the post office box and Raedl was identified after picking up the money. He was put under house arrest and shortly thereafter committed suicide.

In conclusion it may be said that the Russians, controlling Raedl through fear of exposure of his homosexuality,

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almost completely neutralized the efforts of the Austrian service in their direction over a period of years. Not only did they have the identities of all Austrian agents in Russia, but in gaining valuable military intelligence and feeding back deception material through Raedl they put both Austria and Germany at a definite disadvantage at the opening of World War I. When the Germans learned of Raedl's case the Chief of the Austrian General Staff himself was ordered to make an investigation with the result that the entire General Staff was changed. This also, of course, was a distinct disadvantage to a country entering upon a war.

(2) During 1948, reports were received from a source of doubtful reliability indicating that an American lawyer was active as an agent for foreign Communist groups and specialized in rapidly obtaining for foreign agents United States Immigration visas through his excellent contacts within the State Department. Source claimed that the lawyer was a homosexual and maintained his strangely excellent contacts within the Department through homosexual friends who assisted him through their ability and influence. Source further claimed that as a result, a complete network of homosexuals employed in responsible positions was being utilized by Soviet agents and that part of the network penetrated deeply into the State Department. The lawyer was further said to be in law partnership with the brother of a United States Senator. This report was made available to an Embassy official in the country where it originated. Because of the general unreliability of the source and the sensational and serious allegations in his report, it was not formally disseminated to the State Department in Washington pending clarification. A thorough investigation failed to substantiate or confirm source's claims.

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(4) The use of homosexuality for purposes of recruitment, blackmail and control has been a frequent technique of the Soviet Intelligence Services. This has been particularly true of the organs of State Security. It is known that for many years the MGB and its predecessor organizations in Moscow have directed intensive recruitment efforts against foreign diplomats who have homosexual tendencies. Standard operating procedures

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in these cases has been for Soviet Intelligence to confront these individuals at the appropriate time with photographic and other evidence of homosexual acts endeavoring to recruit them in this way by blackmail. It is known that a number of such approaches to foreign diplomats in Moscow were successful in past years. Unfortunately, the files of OSO do not contain documentation for these cases.

5. A review of the above espionage and subversion cases in which homosexuality figures, reflects the following points of major interest which should be considered in any investigation of the general security of homosexuals:

a. Coercion and blackmail of homosexuals is particularly effective when: (1) homosexuality is universally condemned and actively attacked by the society in which the subject lives as illustrated by the Raedl case; (2) laws against homosexuality are promulgated and enforced. The Nazis in particular endeavored to coerce members of the German General Staff, the church, or any opponents of their system by the creation of strict laws the enforcement of which provided a powerful pressure weapon. Colonel General Fritsch is only one example of their attempts to remove opposition through this device.

b. Under other conditions, a real security hazard lies in the susceptibility of homosexuals to inducement to cooperation in espionage on the basis of the following factors:

(1) An established homosexual relationship involving emotions as strong or stronger than a normal love-relationship.

(2) The fact that homosexuality frequently is accompanied by other exploitable weaknesses, such as excessive use of alcohol, use of narcotics, physical cowardice, susceptibility to pressure and general instability thus making the individual doubly vulnerable.

(3) The known psychological susceptibility of the passive homosexual particularly to domination by aggressive personalities in any number or in any situation. This may have been the moving factor in the case of the Ambassador in Ankara.

(4) The comparative ease with which places where homosexuals congregate, i.e. bars, restaurants, night clubs, can be identified in any reasonably large community makes it possible for a recruiting agent to use homosexuality as an excuse for the development of a clandestine relationship, which can later be directed to espionage purposes with or without the knowledge of the subject. In this regard homosexuals have a definite


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similarity to other illegal groups such as criminals, smugglers, black marketeers, dope addicts, etc.

(5) The strong bonds and loyalties existing between homosexuals which makes them seek out, congregate with and support others of their nature. This factor would account for the association of the four men in Italy cited above, and the possible homosexual network within the State Department.

6. It would be appreciated if you would advise this Office of any further assistance which we can furnish in this regard.


ROBERT A. SEYOW
Assistant Director
Special Operations

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS: Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:		NO.
		DATE <i>5 July 1950</i>

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TO	ROOM NO.	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS
		REC'D	FWD'D		
1. ADSO			<i>5 July</i>		<i>By Hand</i>
2. DCI					
3. Gen. Counsel					
4. ADSO					
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