

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

11

TO : Chief, EE
Attn:

FROM : Chief of Base, Vienna

DATE: 11 Feb 54
EAVA-5891

SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational/CROOSE
SPEC- Interrogation of Herbert BAUMANN

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1965
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Attached herewith in two copies for EE is a report of interrogation of Herbert BAUMANN. It will be noted that the report was written in sterilized fashion so that it could be passed to CIC. Not passed to CIC, but included for your information, are the results of our traces in CIC files. Cryptonyms of agents mentioned in the report by true name, and sensitive comments and additions which could not be passed to CIC, are being forwarded to Headquarters under separate cover. Our comments on the interrogation as a whole will be included at that time.

2. For Salz: One of the two attachments designated for SOB is a sterilized copy which should be passed to G-2.

Attachments: h/w
Rpt. of Interrogation *here for H/W files*
9 February 1954

Distributions:
3 EE, w/2 attachs.
1 Grover
1 Gratlas
1 CS, w/lattach.
2 Salz, w/attachs. (2) (1 to be passed to G-2)

MICROFILMED
JUL 22 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

RECLASSIFIED	
RI/AN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
RI/MS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

27 atts H/W

INDEX

CS COPY

29 Encls

CLASSIFICATION

11 Feb 54

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

TO: Chief, EE
 FROM: Chief of Base, Vienna
 SUBJECT: GENERAL- Operational/CROOVE
 SPEC- Interrogation of Herbert SAURMAN

DATE: 11. Feb. 54
EAVA-5891

MICROFILMED
~~JUL 8 1965~~
 DOG. MICRO. SER.

Attached herewith in two copies for EE is a report of interrogation of Herbert SAURMAN. It will be noted that the report was written in sterilized fashion so that it could be passed to CIC. Not passed to CIC, but included for your information, are the results of our traces in CIC files. Cryptonyms of agents mentioned in the report by true name, and sensitive comments and additions which could not be passed to CIC, are being forwarded to Headquarters under separate cover. Our comments on the interrogation as a whole will be included at that time.

2. For Salz; one of the two attachments designated for SOB is a sterilized copy which should be passed to

Attachments: h/w
 Dept. of Interrogation *Real for CIA files*

9 February 1954

- Distribution:
 3 EE, w/2 attachs.
 1
 1
 1 CS, w/lattach.
 2 Salz, w/attachs. (2) (1 to be passed to)

MICROFILMED
 JUL 22 1967
 DOG. MICRO. SER.

RECLASSIFIED

RI/AN	
RI/INT	

11 Feb 54

27. atts H/w

INDEX

CS COPY

24 Encls

CLASSIFICATION



EAVA-5891

MICROFILMED
JUL 22 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REPORT ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE BUREAU

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

TOP
109

Subject: Operational Report #1, 21 December 1953

1. CIC, Vienna, arranged a meeting between a PCI agent, using the cover name of Dr. PANTZ, and Herbert W. [redacted] at 1400, 21 December, in the CIC offices at Vienna VII, "Landsstrasse". A chronological account of the meeting will be given, as the chronology is useful in assessing the extent of PANTZ's reluctance to talk. Agent opened the discussion by querying PANTZ on the amount of time he has available. In reply to agent's questions, he said he is not working, so he has all the time which agent might desire to spend with him. He is still recuperating from his experience in Soviet prison and is suffering from an abscess, which he will probably have operated on in the spring. He plans eventually to get some sort of business job, but he has no particular prospects in mind at the present time. His present source of income is 40 60 per month pension as a wounded resistance fighter, plus a sum of money which he inherited from his parents.

2. Agent asked if he didn't still receive money from the Russians. After replying with a question as to why he, who was just recently arrested and interrogated should be receiving money from the Russians, agent commented that it must not then be true, as some of his former friends are reporting, that he is now working for the Soviets. PANTZ inferred he had heard that such rumors were being spread and said they were doubtless due to petty jealousies and the fact that he had been released from jail by the Soviets, which is a somewhat unusual occurrence. Agent agreed that it was unusual and told him that since he was not listed in our files and in the Austrian police files as a Soviet agent, it would be best for him to relate the full story of his intelligence activities, his arrest and his interrogation by the Soviets, so that we would be able to prove to our own satisfaction that he actually is not a Soviet agent. He said he would be happy to tell everything he knows.

3. To start sounding out PANTZ's actual willingness to talk, agent took as a starting point several questions arising from CIC's earlier interrogation. According to that report, he claimed his former wife, Policista PANTZ nee WOLFGANG, was in contact with the IS through one (name) HIL L. PANTZ. PANTZ now states that he believes the full name is HIL L. PANTZ, and that he works under Dr. [redacted] in the Kader Abteilung of the KPÖ Central Committee. WOLFGANG met him in 1951 when she was a student at the KPÖ two week school for bookshafter in Dörfelbachgasse in Vienna V, "Landsstrasse", number unknown. He was head of the school at that time. Her assignment for HIL L. was reporting on PANTZ. He also believes she has been in contact with a Soviet officer of the IS. It was either HIL L. or the Soviet to whom she gave the information leading to his arrest. The CIC report also says his wife is in contact with one Lutz WOLFGANG (often referred to erroneously as Wolfgang WITZ), who allegedly works for the Soviets. PANTZ claims he did not say that WOLFGANG works for the Soviets, although it is possible that this is the case. He is an

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

SECRET
EAVA-5891

CS 5071

11 Feb 54

[redacted]

[redacted]


Austrian who was formerly in the French Western Legion. He was arrested and interrogated by CIC in 1949 or 1950 and was then picked up by the Soviets and interrogated on his CIC interrogation. He was dismissed from the 1949 Geneva Conference. RAUWANN appeared to talk freely on both these topics and to be willing to tell any details known to him.

4. Agent next turned to Soviet interrogation techniques during his arrest, as Austrian resistance was immediately encountered. He said only three persons took part, a Captain, who was his interrogator, a Major, who was the prosecutor (Staatsanwalt), and a civilian interpreter. He knew no names. Personal description was not asked for. He was arrested 31 January and released 16 June 1953. He was interrogated constantly during the first weeks, then less during the middle part of his arrest period, and then not at all toward the end. Concerning details, he volunteered nothing and avoided most direct questions. That he meant by the "first weeks" he was reluctant to pin down. First he gave the impression it might be two weeks, then ten, and finally settled for six to eight weeks. That he meant by "constant" could also not be determined. In desperation he finally said it was eight to sixteen hours, but agent had the impression he just pulled these figures out of the air. For this time was divided into interrogation sessions and breaks for rest, sleep, or eating he would not say. He claimed he did not have to write anything for the Soviets. The interrogator took notes, and on the basis of these drew up "protocols" which were shown to him for his approval and then signed by him. The subject of the interrogations was predominately the personalities and activities of the Bund Akademischer Freiheitskämpfer Oosterrichts, of which RAUWANN is the head, but they also concerned a few of his personal friends and political personalities with whom he has had contact. When asked by agent how many names he gave the Soviets on which they quizzed him, he replied that there were twenty or at most thirty. (Comment: These names are listed in a later paragraph.) After a sceptical look, agent passed on to another topic.

5. Agent next asked RAUWANN how many people with whom he has had intelligence contact are now in Soviet custody. This was immediately limited to persons arrested by the Soviets in 1950 or later. RAUWANN claimed that Gustav WEISS is the only one. After "thinking" a bit, he added Alfred MACHNER, but denied any others. Agent brought up the name of Josef (Sepp) MASCHER. RAUWANN denied ever having looked with or even having ever met MASCHER socially. His only knowledge of the name MASCHER is that he remembers reading in the papers in the summer of 1952 that MASCHER was arrested by the Soviets. Agent commented that it was quite unusual for RAUWANN to remember the name if his only knowledge of it was his reading the one article in the newspaper. RAUWANN answered that he has a good memory for names. (Comment: It is unlikely that RAUWANN has never met or seen MASCHER. Agent returned to the MASCHER theme frequently during the remainder of the meeting.)

6. Agent requested WEISS to give a summary of all his intelligence activity since 1943. He started by giving briefly his contacts in the Austrian resistance movement in 1943 and 1944. He worked in the group under Major Karl ... and others from ... 17 of the German Wehrmacht. He was twice arrested by the Gestapo. WEISS's group had contact with SS through Weitz ...

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



and Karl FUCHS, and with the British through Johannes ITLITZ and rich/ROSENBERG. In January or February 1945, RAUBMAN took up radio contact with Marshall TALBOTT of the Russian General Staff. Agent did not take RAUBMAN elaborate in detail, as it is presumed the entire history is well known. From April 1945 to 19 July 1945 he worked under Dr. Heinrich GOETTY in the Staatspolizei. On 19 July he was arrested, allegedly as a former Nazi, but actually because he opposed the Communist infiltration into the police. He was released on 8 March 1946.

7. RAUBMAN alleged to have had no further intelligence contacts until early 1946, when he met Brita N. at a conference of Bezirks Oberammer of the GOETP (up and down). When asked who else worked for N. B., he at first denied knowing any others. When agent expressed surprise and repeated the question, RAUBMAN said that Otto WESSLY, now under Soviet arrest, was N. B.'s contact man to the Staatspolizei, but that RAUBMAN did not know him personally. He then stated that Alfred MLOKOVSKY was also in N. B.'s group. MLOKOVSKY was working for Josef Adolf UFFAN, who in turn was working for the Americans, but then UFFAN lost his American contact, so RAUBMAN brought MLOKOVSKY into contact with HER. Theodore RAUBMAN, from Graz, worked with UFFAN and MLOKOVSKY, but not directly for N. B. Theo ALBERT worked for WENTL and MLOKOVSKY, but also for N. B., and later for Herbert K. WITL. WITL is now in Graz working for Hueter u. Schranz. Contact with N. B. stopped at the end of 1948. Agent asked RAUBMAN if he was certain these were the only people involved, and he replied that there was no one else. Agent asked if he hadn't obtained reports for HER from his wife, but RAUBMAN denied this. When agent expressed scepticism, RAUBMAN claimed that she was untruthful all the time and that he had gotten no reports after they were married, i.e. his wife was not a source. (Comment: RAUBMAN denied by implication any knowledge of Richard WOLF and Walter KOURA, from whom RAUBMAN is known to have received reports which he passed on to N. B. Also, RAUBMAN maintained contact with N. B. until at least the Spring of 1949, and probably until much later.)

8. UFFAN worked for the Americans in Frankfurt am Main and also for Dr. Oswald P. T. BLUMBERG. In 1945 UFFAN denounced RAUBMAN, HERB, Dr. Arthur F. INFELD, Alexander V. SOPIV. C and others to P. T. BLUMBERG. RAUBMAN alleged that he has never met UFFAN personally and that he knows nothing about his activities since 1943. (Comment: This appears unlikely.)

9. Agent asked what intelligence contacts RAUBMAN took up after the demise of the N. B. operation. He stated that since then he has not been active in intelligence work. Agent expressed considerable surprise and disbelief at this assertion, but RAUBMAN stuck to the statement.

10. Agent next asked how many names the Soviets quizzed him on during his interrogation.

Q: Not many.

A: How many?

Q: About twenty.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



- A: No more.
- B: No more.
- A: I don't believe you.
- B: Well, thirty at most.
- A: Write them down on this paper.

BAUMANN wrote down the following names: Franz JUNKO, Gunther JACOBSON, Dr. Julius HERR, Dr. Hans SCHUSTER, Dr. Walter HOFF, Theodor ALPHEUS, Harold FRIEDENBERG, Robert WILLY, Heinrich WITTE, (fnu) SCHERACH, Dr. (fnu) THOMAS, (fnu) BRODSKY, General Emil BERTHOFF, (fnu) BRODT, Lutz WOLFGANG, Foreign Minister Karl BRUNN, State Secretary Ferdinand RAU, former Chancellor Leopold FITZ, Hans ZIMM, Josef HUBER, Anselm TRAND, Gustav WEISS, Maria SCHUBERT, Felicitas BAUMANN nee GULD-SCHMIDT, and Fritz WEBER.

11. Agent picked out the names of the three Americans and queried BAUMANN on what the Soviets already knew about them, what they asked, and what BAUMANN told them. The information has been supplemented by information received during a re-interrogation on the subject at the third meeting and has been written up as Information Report #7.

12. It became apparent at this time that BAUMANN desired to discuss Josef WITTE, whom he branded as a Soviet agent, but agent was more interested in learning what he did not want to talk about rather than letting him rattle on on topics that were not going to prove anything.

13. In answer to a question as to why he was arrested, BAUMANN explained that it was connected with the arrest of Gustav WEISS and Anselm TRAND. WEISS testified that the Bund Akademischer Erziehungskampfer, of which BAUMANN was head, was in contact with the French and American intelligence services. He does not feel that WEISS so testified in a deliberate attempt to incriminate him. BAUMANN maintains the allegation is false. He did admit having received support for his organization from the French General Emil BERTHOFF, but claims it had nothing to do with intelligence activity. The support was in order to further the purposes of the organization and took the form of free quarters, free train rides, and \$2000. Similar support was provided by the educational division of WSAK. (Comment: At the end of the meeting BAUMANN admitted he was not arrested in connection with the WITTE-TRAND affair.)

14. Agent asked about the exact location of the prison, but BAUMANN claimed he did not know. He was taken to the prison at night, with shades drawn in the car, and driven around in circles on the way. He could only say that it was on the edge of the town of Radun, near a railroad line.

15. Asked about the current whereabouts of FLETCHER, he replied that he is still in jail. Asked how he knows this, he said he assumes it because FLETCHER was guilty of intelligence activity against the Soviets and the Soviets do not

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



release such types. As far as BAUMANN members, FLEKOVSKY was arrested in May 1952. The last time BAUMANN saw FLEKOVSKY was in 1948. (Comment: No BAUMANN-FLEKOVSKY contact since 1948 is difficult to believe.)

16. Asked about other persons arrested since 1950 whom he believes are still in jail, BAUMANN gave the names of (fnu) [redacted], resided in Vienna VII; (fnu) SPANGL (this is Heinrich SPANGL; BAUMANN claims he has never met or seen him); (fnu) [redacted] (this is probably Hans [redacted]); Armin [redacted]; and Walter [redacted]. (Comment: In meeting #4, BAUMANN gave the names of many others who were in prison with him, but at this first meeting he denied having met any other prisoners during his arrest.)

17. Asked about his connections to Gustav TRUD and Anselm TRAUD, and the intelligence contacts of these persons, BAUMANN gave the following story. TRUD was national leader of the Bund Demokratischer Freiheitskämpfer; TRAUD was head of the Vienna branch of the organization; and BAUMANN was Youth Referent for the national organization. At the end of 1947 BAUMANN accompanied TRAUD to one meeting with a Mr. "Harry" at the "CIC office" in Persallgasse. TRAUD was apparently in constant contact with "Harry". The meetings lasted five hours and concerned training and planning for using the organization to collect and transmit intelligence reports on the Soviet zone of Austria. BAUMANN allegedly never participated in the activity because he did not like CIC's security - he was introduced by true name and driven home in an Army jeep after the meeting. The Soviets never learned that BAUMANN accompanied TRAUD on this visit. TRAUD confided to BAUMANN in 1947 that he was also in contact with a Mr. Johnson from FSC and with the French Intelligence Service. He believes TRAUD was in touch with TRUD until at least 1952 and that the organization of the Bund Demokratischer Freiheitskämpfer was used for transmitting reports from the Soviet zone of Austria. He believes TRAUD was completely incapable as an intelligence operator.

18. Agent next turned to pressing for information on government personalities to whom BAUMANN has passed reports or with whom he exchanged reports. BAUMANN steadfastly denied ever having participated in such activity, and eventually said that the only possible instance of this might be the fact that he contributed information to the (not-dissolved) back of the Austrian Resistance Movement. For this purpose he met with Legationsrat (fnu) SIFERT and with Dr. (fnu) WILHELM and Dr. (fnu) [redacted], two of SIFERT's secretaries. (Comment: This is Dr. Kurt WILHELM, RUF's secretary from 1946 to 1948, and Dr. Wilhelm [redacted], RUF's secretary after 1948.) These contacts were irregular between 1947 and 1949. BAUMANN finally admitted that he might have given them a few bits of political information and that in return he received preferential treatment in visa affairs for some of his people in the Bund Akademischer Freiheitskämpfer. He denied any other intelligence contacts in the government. (Comment: This conflicts with other information available to this office.)

19. Agent next asked with which Austrian police officials he has had contact. After some hesitation, he listed Insp. Josef HIESCHERER, Insp. Herbert [redacted], Insp. (fnu) PLATEL, and Insp. (fnu) ADAM. He said he appeared to be having difficulty remembering the names, a unit suggested that Insp. (fnu) [redacted] might be one of his contacts, but BAUMANN replied that he had never heard of him. BAUMANN then continued with the names of Insp. (fnu) [redacted], Insp.

Vertical stamp on the left margin, partially illegible. Includes the word "RECEIVED" and some numbers.

Grid of boxes at the bottom of the page, likely a scanning artifact or a form.

(fnu) MURSEVAL K, and Mr. Donald P. WILSON. BAUMANN first referred to the above persons as co-workers who provided police protection for his Bund Akademischer Freiheitkämpfer, then stated that his only contact with them was when they were investigating the Freiheitkämpfer and that he tried to get them to lay off, and then finally admitted that he had exchanged reports with most of them.

20. As to the source and subject of information which he collected and passed to the police, he said most of it was "operational information" needed by the Freiheitkämpfer for their propaganda and raiding activities against the Neo-Nazi and Communist parties. Most of it was on the VDU and Nationale Liga. His steadyest source was Heinrich Robert F.L.L.K., member of the VDU. He frequently received information on the VDU and the Nationale Liga from Landtagsabgeordneter Heinrich FIECHER. He elicited information from Nationalrat (fnu) SLAVIK of the VDU.

21. At this point agent commented that BAUMANN's unwillingness to cooperate allowed only one conclusion to be drawn, that he was now working for the Soviets as alleged. BAUMANN said he doesn't know whether it makes any difference or not, but that he did once work for the Americans, loyally, and that it only got him into trouble. Although he did get some food, he was never paid for his work, not even enough to cover expenses. (Comment: Apparently a reference to his contact with F.L.L.K.) Now, to top it off, he was arrested by the Russians, partially because of his former AIS activity. Agent said that what BAUMANN did in the past is no criterion; he now gives all signs of being a Soviet agent and it is up to him to prove otherwise.


22. Agent asked which of BAUMANN's former contacts had approached him to ask if he had compromised them to the Soviets. He insisted, repeatedly, that no one had.

23. Agent asked if the names ELKS WERTY, UFFMAN, and KLIMOVIC had come up during his interrogation. He denied that any of them had been mentioned and stated that he had never heard of KLIMOVIC at all. (Comment: He admitted at the end of the meeting that ELKS WERTY's testimony had been the prime cause of his arrest.)

24. Agent asked if he knows anyone whom he believes to be an American agent. BAUMANN said he did not, but was eventually forced into a position where he had to admit that there were some people whom he had grounds to suspect might be in contact with the Americans, but he still declined to give names. Finally, agent phrased the question as follows: If you had to name five persons who work for the Americans, whom would you name? BAUMANN gave the following:

- a. State Police employee (fnu) POSKA (phonetic) - He visited BAUMANN briefly at his home and asked him questions about his arrest.
- b. Josef HUSCHKA - only because of his position in the police.
- c. Herbert O. ISHMAELER.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



d. Hans ZORN - A technocrat in the lower Austrian government who collects information and exchange reports.

e. After denying that he could name any others, he included Fritz N. B.

(Comment: This was holding back for no apparent purpose. If he had really wanted to appear to cooperate, he could probably have given 10 names without giving anything away.)

25. Agent asked who had interrogated him on his arrest. He stated that the French had called him in for a two hour interview in mid-July 1953. Questions were mainly on the basis for his arrest, who he saw at the prison, etc. He told them he was arrested in connection with YIP and FRANK and that he saw no one at the prison. A Staatspolizei employee who gave his name as POSKA (phonetic) visited him at home in November 1953 and asked the reason for the arrest and whether or not he had been interrogated by the Americans. This took only about a half an hour. Later, RAUBACH called the Staatspolizei and asked if they had really sent the man. They denied having done so. RAUBACH believes that POSKA came on American orders.

26. In response to a repeated query as to which friends or former contacts had come to ask about his arrest, RAUBACH stated that the following persons had asked him about it:

a. Franz HURKO - He used to work with RAUBACH and NEUB. He now collects information, but RAUBACH doesn't know for whom. He distrusts him because he hasn't been arrested. He asked RAUBACH about Soviet interest in him.

b. Gunther TROCKE - Customs official and personal friend of RAUBACH's who helped his wife while he was in prison. He asked about the arrest.

c. After saying there was no one else, he mentioned he had seen Karl ORTHNER several times since his release and that he had asked if the Russians had mentioned him. RAUBACH said that ORTHNER was a personal friend of N. B.'s who had no part in his intelligence activity. (Comment: ORTHNER was one of N. B.'s penetrations into the FOOL, and RAUBACH probably knows this.)

27. Without being questioned, and for no apparent reason at all, RAUBACH started talking about Walter MATHEIS. He said MATHEIS was arrested by the Soviets in April 1952 and sentenced to eight years for distributing anti-Soviet leaflets. This was the cause of NEUB's flight from Vienna. RAUBACH said he did not know MATHEIS, but that the Soviets had asked him about MATHEIS and that they had read to RAUBACH the testimony given on him by MATHEIS.

RECEIVED
FBI
JUL 15 1953
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION


11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11

28. Agent asked the identity of (Mrs) SCHWACH, whom BAUMANN had listed as one individual on whom he was questioned in detail by the Soviets. He said SCHWACH was a member of the VDU student group and that the Fund (Kadonischer) Freiheitkämpfer had accused him of libel and instituted legal proceedings against him. SCHWACH accused the Freiheitkämpfer of having broken into VDU Headquarters and stealing a list of political opponents of the VDU. This was true, but the Freiheitkämpfer challenged that statement to defend themselves and to publicize the fact that the VDU was keeping a "black list."

29. Agent, honestly feeling that further discussion was pointless, started to pull together his various papers and told BAUMANN that if he doesn't care to cooperate, there is not much point in agent's wasting his time with further discussion; I guess you'll just have to remain in our files as a Soviet agent. BAUMANN shrugged his shoulders. Agent asked him for his address and phone number so that he could be contacted just in case the boss had any more questions he wants asked. BAUMANN asked what name the caller would give, so that he will recognize who it is. (It doesn't make any difference if the name isn't a true one.) Agent told him Baxter, and spelled it out assuring him that he need not fear agent would give him his true name. Just as agent started to stand up signifying the end of the meeting, BAUMANN asked, "And shouldn't I have some means of contacting you in case something comes up?" Agent asked what he could possibly ever have to say that he hadn't had ample opportunity to say during this meeting, to which BAUMANN replied that perhaps the Soviets might be after him again. Agent told him that after today's performance we wouldn't bother to lift a finger to help him, no matter who was after him.

30. At this point BAUMANN suddenly dropped the facade and in a rapid exchange he said he could give important information on Soviet agents; that the fact that he was arrested shortly after REIN and TRAD was sheer accident and the real reason for his arrest was HILKOVSKI; that the Soviets had a copy of a report he gave H.F. on the personnel of the Soviet Censorship Office; and that he had also been in contact with other persons, including Richard WOLF. Agent asked how many Soviet agents he knows and what their names are. BAUMANN said he knows several, and agent replied that he knows the names of any Soviet agents, including probably all those whom BAUMANN knows. There followed a rapid, at times heated, seven or eight minute discussion of security, in which BAUMANN admitted he had been lying but claimed he would only get himself in trouble if he told any more; complained that TIC is insecure because it has too many fools; that it was plain to see that agent (who said he was from "Headquarters" in Salzburg) was a specialist in intelligence matters and not one of the fools, but that nevertheless the organization as a whole was bad; repeated again that if he talked he was certain he would be arrested again by the Soviets; and that nothing in well known TIC offices is bad security and dangerous to him. This was interspersed on agent's side with frequent statements to the effect that as far as agent is concerned, the day's meeting has convinced him that BAUMANN is indeed a Soviet agent, and that agent is not going to change the meeting place, not going to take anything but routine security procedures, not going to make any commitments and not going to change his mind until BAUMANN has proven his willingness and ability to answer truthfully and completely questions which are asked of him. As an apparent impasse was reached at the end of this exchange,

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



BAUMAN commented, almost completely out of context, "There are a number of different American intelligence services." Then agent threw the initiative back to BAUMAN with a noncommittal affirmative, there was first a moment of silence and then BAUMAN said, somewhat at a loss for words, "I believe the British and French have several different intelligence services too." Both agent and BAUMAN were standing throughout the above exchange. At this point there was nothing more to be said, so BAUMAN put on his coat and started toward the door.

31. After BAUMAN started to leave, he stopped, apparently reluctant to go, and asked what he would have to gain if he did cooperate.

A: You can judge that yourself better than I.

B: No I can't.

A: First, you would no longer be listed in our files as a Soviet agent.

B: That couldn't make less difference to me.

A: Not right now, but it might later.

B: I don't intend to emigrate or anything.

A: True, but the Soviets won't always be here to protect you.

BAUMAN shrugged his shoulders; agent did likewise.

A: What do you want me to offer you, money?

BAUMAN at first did not react, then said: If I tell you those things I'll have to leave Vienna.

A: Why?

B: Because the Soviets will find it out.

A: I don't believe that.

B: I'd have to find a position in one of the Bundeslaender.

A: We don't run an employment service, and besides, we don't make any commitments until you've produced.

B: I understand that and know your reasons for not doing so, but nevertheless, my experience is that it doesn't pay to go into those things blindly.

A: My experience is that one always takes up a clandestine contact somewhat blindly.

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

D: Yes, but (with conviction) it doesn't pay. Remember I was with the police for a while and I know the technique of using a person and then doing him in.

A: As far as we are concerned, you are a red list agent until you prove otherwise, and we won't show any confidence in you until you prove that you deserve it.

BAUMANN shrugged his shoulders.

A: It's obvious that we aren't going to agree today, but it might be worth further discussion. Think it over and come here at 1400 tomorrow and tell me the conditions under which you will cooperate.

D: Okay.

32. BAUMANN lives with his brother, Wolfgang BAUMANN, at Vienna VI, Pönnigsklostergasse 7/13, and intends to remain there. Telephone number is A-34-3-06-U.

11 Jul 54

[]

3 1 1 1 5 3 1 1 1

DOC. MICRO. SER.

OR

28 Dec 53

atch
EAVA-5891
11 Feb 54

Report of Interrogation of Herbert BAUMANN

Subject: Operational Report #4

1. WTS agent met BAUMANN from 1415 to 1700, 28 December, at the CIC
Eisenstrasse offices, Room No. 33.

2. At this meeting BAUMANN was debriefed for the information contained
in the following reports:

MICROFILMED
JUL 22 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

- a. Information Report #12, Kurt JUFFINGER
- b. Information Report #13, Hans POMTSCH
- c. Information Report #14, Other Prisoners at the Zentral Gehub
Gefangnis.

3. Agent opened the meeting by commenting that BAUMANN had now had five
days in which to consider the developments to date and asking if any decisions
had been made. BAUMANN replied that no decisions had been made and suggested
that we start in where we had left off at the last meeting.

4. Agent began by asking BAUMANN for information on a number of
individuals:

a. Who is Edward PUMPERNIK? (Comment: PUMPERNIK is reportedly
a friend and intelligence contact of BAUMANN's.)

BAUMANN said he has heard of the name but he can't recall in
what connection; he has never met him personally.

b. Who is Karl KRAUTZBERGER? (Comment: KRAUTZBERGER was a close
contact of Fritz NEFF, possibly known to BAUMANN.)

BAUMANN denied ever having heard of KRAUTZBERGER.

c. Who is Hans ZOEHR? (Comment: This name was mentioned by
BAUMANN as one the Soviets quizzed him on.)

BAUMANN gave information which has been reported separately.

d. Who is Dr. Julius HERZ? (Comment: Another name first brought
up by BAUMANN.)

HERZ replaced BAUMANN as head of the Bund Akademischer
Freiheitskämpfer in May 1952. He has had no intelligence contacts

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

CS COPY

Handwritten: EAVA-5891

11 Feb 54

Handwritten boxes

Grid of boxes at the bottom of the page

other person he saw in the jail was a Soviet soldier who shared a cell with him briefly. (Comment: This came right at the end of the meeting and agent did not have time to go into it in detail. The above story is what BAUMANN told CIC in their preliminary interrogation. [See V-34599, 1 December 1953] He maintained the part about GRIGOR throughout his first session with agent and claimed until this meeting that except for one Soviet he saw no other prisoners during his incarceration.)

13. In the course of some social chatter just prior to breaking up the meeting, BAUMANN commented without any logical buildup to it that another difficulty is the fact that if he got in trouble the Soviets would take it out on his relatives. He said he could "bring proof" that they do that type of thing, and that if he ever had to flee Vienna his brother would probably have to go too. (Comment: This is possibly an indication of the control the Soviets have over BAUMANN.)

14. For the next meeting, agent instructed BAUMANN to bring a Lebenslauf and, "as evidence of how well he can make written reports," to start working on a report giving the names of all persons with whom he has ever had intelligence contact. For each individual, this report should include full name, whether reports were received from him, given to him, or exchanged with him, how often, subject of reports, and through whom and when contact was initiated, and when and why contact was stopped. BAUMANN said that he understood - the same information he had already given agent all over again. Agent replied, yes, but this time it must be complete.

15. Before leaving, BAUMANN said that he hoped agent would have an answer for him at the next meeting. Agent said, "Answer to what?" BAUMANN replied that he hoped agent would tell him at the next meeting the conditions under which he might want him to go through with his plan to help us. Agent replied that, first, he would never give him any conditions under which he could work for us. He will let him make all proposals and then simply say yes or no. Secondly, there is no chance that he will hear anything next time; there is still a lot more to discuss. BAUMANN answered that he couldn't imagine what more there could be to talk about. Agent told him not to worry as he, agent, would ask the questions.

16. Agent suggested that the next meeting be held at 1400, 30 December. BAUMANN requested that it be held later, as he must undergo medical treatment and spend some time in bed, although if there is no other alternative he could arrange to come. After getting the names of BAUMANN's doctors, agent set the meeting for 0900, 31 December. His doctors are Dr. Hans SCHNEIDER, general practitioner; Medizinalrat Dr. HENNING, a specialist with offices at Mariahilferstrasse 31; Dr. Dr. LEITNER, dentist; and various doctors at the Poliklinik, Vienna IX, Mariahilfstrasse.

11 Feb 54

[] []

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

to BAUMANN's knowledge. He now works as an interpreter for American forces in Vienna. BAUMANN denies knowing in what office HERRZ is employed. (Comment: Due to HERRZ's American employment, it would be logical for BAUMANN to conceal any derogatory information which might be known to him.)

e. Who is Ing. Franz FRICHLER - BECK?

BAUMANN claimed not to know FRICHLER, but there is a Beck who is an acquaintance of Franz MURKO. He lives on Mariahilferstrasse, approximately 165 cm. tall, slim, black hair, small face, about 30 years old. (Comment: This description does not fit FRICHLER & BECK & GONCZE & SZANDROI, the man whom agent had in mind.)

f. Who is alias NEUNTEUFEL?

BAUMANN said NEUNTEUFEL worked as a propaganda referent for Ferdinand GAAr in 1950, that he now works for the Bundeskanzleramt press service. He has seen BECK in the company of NEUNTEUFEL, and it was through NEUNTEUFEL that MURKO met BECK.

A: Did you ever give reports to NEUNTEUFEL?

B: No.

A: No reports of any kind?

B: My contact with him was on behalf of the Bund 'Akademischer Freiheitkämpfer, and of course I gave him information on the activities of this group.

A: But you never passed him reports on the VdU, Demokratische Union, or such things?

B: Well, maybe a few.

(Comment: BAUMANN reportedly used to pass reports to NEUNTEUFEL on a regular basis.)

g. Who is Dr. Hans SCHUSTER? (Comment: Name originally mentioned by BAUMANN as an individual on whom the Soviets had interrogated him.)

He is (or was?) deputy chairman for Vienna of the Bund Akademischer Freiheitkämpfer. Nothing known of any intelligence connections.

h. Who is Dr. Walter RECHT? (Comment: Name first mentioned by BAUMANN.)

He is a former functionary of the Freiheitskämpfer. He fled to England after BAUMANN's arrest. He was in the British army during the war and maintained contact with officers of FSI ever since. BAUMANN presumes he was working for the SIS, but allegedly knows no details of his contact.

1. Where is Josef Adolf URBAN now and what is his current activity?

BAUMANN alleged that he knows nothing about URBAN since 1948.

2. Who is Gunter TARBACH? (Comment: Name first mentioned by BAUMANN.)

He is secretary of the Vienna organization of the Freiheitskämpfer. BAUMANN alleged that he has no intelligence contacts to his knowledge, but after BAUMANN's arrest he did contact Herbert BRISERHAMMER to ask him to intervene on BAUMANN's behalf.

3. Agent next asked BAUMANN if he had anything to add to the report he gave last time on Margarete DUP, or whether he was prepared to give the source at this time. After some sparring about whether he should or should not give the source, BAUMANN said he could not yet give the source because he was not yet clear in exactly what capacity he was sitting here being interrogated. If the interrogation was a routine interrogation of him as a person who has been released by the Soviets, he does not feel it is necessary for him to give such information. He has already given sufficient information to cause him considerable difficulty if the Soviets find out about it, and he sees no point in risking his neck further for a strictly routine affair. If, on the other hand, the relationship with agent is to continue and be something more than routine, then he recognizes the necessity for giving such information. Thus, BAUMANN summarized, the source cannot be given until I'm certain of just where I stand with you.

4. Agent replied to BAUMANN as follows: The contact started out to be a routine one, but you volunteered the opinion that you could be of further service and, in particular, that you were capable of working on counter-intelligence targets against the Soviets. Whether the contact becomes more than routine depends upon your willingness to cooperate and to present what we consider a workable plan. You have claimed that you have capabilities in the counter-intelligence field, but you haven't yet proven that. The report on DUP was no proof. In the first place, reports without sources are worthless. And until you give the source, we don't know whether that was a one-time affair or whether it indicates a steady source. I won't make this anything more than a routine interrogation until you have proven the capabilities you claim to have and have presented a workable plan. BAUMANN countered that the source of the report was obvious, that it came from another prisoner and that, as agent said, he would not have access to such information on a constant basis. He admitted that he had no sources at the present time, but that such sources weren't necessarily required; there are other ways of getting information.

SECRET

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

In response to an inquiry as to what these other methods are, BAUMANN stated, "according to the theory of the subject," there is the possibility of his playing along with the Soviets, or obtaining another person who would play along. The easiest and best way would be for him to play along himself, and he stated that "under certain circumstances" he would be willing to do so. He immediately stated (but not with conviction) that he wanted to emphasize the "under certain circumstances." Agent asked what these circumstances are, and BAUMANN replied evasively that certain "conditions" would have to be met. Asked what these conditions are, he murmured some vagaries about how, naturally, the possibility for doing so would have to exist and how he would have to know a bit more about whom he was working for. (Comment: BAUMANN appeared poorly prepared in making this suggestion; apparently he had not planned on its coming up at this meeting. The decision to make the suggestion, and to introduce the possibility of his playing along with the Soviets as a theoretical and not necessarily a practical possibility had obviously been planned, but the execution was poor and the details lacking as compared to other stories he has apparently learned well.)

7. In replying to agent's queries on just how such an operation would work, BAUMANN was vague at every turn, but the following story eventually emerged. He stated first that all meetings would have to take place in a western Berlin or none, of course, as meeting the Soviet contact in a Soviet controlled area would be too dangerous. If he told them he has contact with an interesting American office, they would buy this. As to how he would establish the first contact, BAUMANN said he would go to any Soviet installation, tell them that he is a Soviet agent with such and such a cover name, that he desires contact, and either give some sort of a plan using signals on a wall by which the Soviets could contact him or else state that he would return in ten days for a message. The fact that this first meeting would have to be in Soviet controlled territory bothered agent but apparently did not concern BAUMANN. As to how he would win the Soviet's confidence, BAUMANN said this would be difficult now that six months had gone by since his release, but that this difficulty could be overcome because he, BAUMANN, understands the Russian psychology. In any case, he could establish contact, and that in itself is interesting. He said he could not understand why we waited so long to call him in and wondered what sort of accident could have caused us to call him in at this late date. The longer it waits the harder it will be. Naturally, agent would have to give him assignments and information which he could tell the Soviets about. BAUMANN said that due to his poor health he could not start immediately but that he would be back in shape within a month.

8. Agent then asked for the source of the report on Margarete DUF, and BAUMANN recited the story on Kurt SUPFINGER written up in Information Report #12. According to BAUMANN, SUPFINGER had not given him the full name and address of DUF. SUPFINGER had only known her as "Gretl" and that she worked in the Peternell store on Judengasse. Agent asked how BAUMANN had learned her last name, and he replied that he had telephoned the store and asked for Gretl, and that she had answered the phone in the usual Austrian fashion, "hier DUF." Asked how he learned her address, he stated that he had simply looked

it up in the phone book. Agent, having checked the phone book himself in vain, replied that her name is not in the phone book. BAUMANN replied that it is. Agent asked about the spelling of the name, and this time BAUMANN gave the spelling as DUB. (Comment: It is difficult to distinguish between the German sounds "p" and "b", but agent is fairly certain he had BAUMANN spell the name using the phonetic alphabet; i.e., "p" as in Peter, so that the mistake was not agent's. On the other hand, CIC traces do spell the name DUB. In any case, the name Margarete DUB is not in the phone book either, so BAUMANN was obviously lying on his source of the name.)


9. After completing the story in Information Report #12 attributed to JUFFINGER, BAUMANN next gave the information on SCHIESSER, BRUNNER, KOMINEK, FUCHS, and GOSPNER contained in Information Report #14 and attributed this also to JUFFINGER. Later, after revealing the information on Franz POSTSCH contained in Information Report #13, BAUMANN confided to agent that he had told him something that was not true and that this information really came from POSTSCH and not JUFFINGER.

10. Agent next asked BAUMANN for the source of the report on Josef MASCHER, Information Report #2, but BAUMANN said he would not give it at this time. Agent commented that BAUMANN must have a good bit of time at his disposal but that he, agent, had very little time. BAUMANN replied that this was too bad, but that he had once before spoken of the "Koor." Continuing the reference to this quote from the last meeting, agent said that if he, BAUMANN, doesn't do his full duty first, he can expect nothing else but to have to go like the Moor. BAUMANN then said that the report had gone through two intermediaries. MASCHER told the story to Walter STIPEK when STIPEK was in MASCHER's cell acting as a prison spitzel for the Soviets, and STIPEK then told another person who finally told BAUMANN. He at first refused to say who the other person was, but he finally broke down and said, "All right, I guess I'll have to tell you that today, too." BAUMANN then gave the information on Franz POSTSCH contained in Information Report #13.

11. In mentioning STIPEK, BAUMANN said he had been used as a spitzel in the prison by the Soviets and that STIPEK had claimed to NIKOLBERGER, BAUNER and JUFFINGER that he had been checked by a Russian general on his knowledge of Arabic, and that he expected to be sent to the Near East as a Soviet agent. In connection with this, BAUMANN commented that the Soviets always try to find out various skills that one might have. He said they interrogated him on his knowledge of the iron business because in 1952 he was employed by an iron dealer, but that their conclusion was that his only capability is in the intelligence field.

12. Apparently feeling it was necessary to give some excuse why he lied so blandly as related in Paragraph 7 above, BAUMANN explained that prior to his release the Soviets told him that if he were interrogated by any intelligence service he should tell them nothing, if at all possible, but that if he must say something in order to make a good impression, he should say that the interrogation was on his connections with Gustav GRIMM and that the only

SECRET



6. Agent referred to the previous meeting and asked BAUMANN for an explanation of how he had really learned the address of Margarete DUB, commenting that he must have checked the phone book himself and found that it was not there as he claimed. BAUMANN said he had, indeed, checked the phone book as soon as he got home and had then remembered that he had gotten the address by looking up under the name of PETERNEIL, the owner of the store where DUB works and with whom she lives. He reminded agent that he had told him last meeting that SUPPINGER had said DUB lives with the owner of the store. He learned the address and phone number by looking under PETERNEIL, the name of the store. He had forgotten that this was the procedure he used because he had checked it immediately after his release, about six months ago. Agent reminded him that in giving the original report, he had not known that the owner of the store is named PETERNEIL; he knew the store bore this name, but that it is also the owner's name was not mentioned. BAUMANN said he had forgotten this item (in spite of the fact that he alleged the owner is aware of DUB's intelligence activity and that the purpose of the firm is solely for cover) because he had not written it down when he made his notes on the matter six months ago. (Comment: The story appears shaky and BAUMANN showed no surprise when agent did not believe it.) Agent, shaking his head, commented that BAUMANN is too smart to make such a mistake himself, and that it could have been caused only by his "chief" having prepared him badly. BAUMANN appeared to expect the implied accusation, and made no attempt to feign injured innocence. He said the mistake did not stem from any "chief", but that he had made it himself by forgetting his source of the address, and that agent was wrong in interpreting it the way he did. Agent asked why, since he knew the question was bound to come up during the meeting, he had not told agent about his mistake at the very start of the meeting, when agent asked him if he had anything to say. BAUMANN said he had simply not thought of it at that time; he was concerned with giving agent the names of the two prisoners he had been unable to remember at last meeting.


7. BAUMANN next gave agent the information on the prison where he was held, which has been written up in Information Report #15.

8. BAUMANN was told by SUPPINGER and PEITSCH, the latter of whom heard it from Walter STIPKE, that Gustav FINE had died in jail, prior to his trial.

9. After the debriefing on the prison and prison routine, BAUMANN volunteered that Anselm GRAND claims to know the exact location of the prison. He visited GRAND once since his release, several months ago. It was at this time that GRAND made this claim; BAUMANN said he had not wanted to question GRAND about the location, because it might have appeared suspicious. GRAND stated at that time that he had not been interrogated about his arrest.

10. Agent told BAUMANN to bring his Lebenslauf and report on his intelligence contacts to the next meeting. Agent also commented that he would like to have BAUMANN photographed at the next meeting. BAUMANN gave a half-hearted affirmative nod but made no comment. (Comment: Agent will arrange to have CIC photograph BAUMANN at the start of the next meeting.)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



MICROFILMED
JUL 22 1967
DOC. MICROFILM

EAVA-5891

REPORT OF INTERROGATION OF HERBERT BAUMANN

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICROFILM

Subject: Operational Report #6, 7 January 1954

gls

1. PCS agent met BAUMANN in the CIC Blasstrasse office, Room 433, from 1115 to 1655, 7 January 1954.
2. During the course of this meeting BAUMANN gave information contained in the following separate reports:
 - a. Information Report #16, Arrest of Herbert BAUMANN.
 - b. Information Report #17, Alleged Reasons for Arrest of Herbert BAUMANN.
3. BAUMANN was photographed and fingerprinted at the start of the meeting. This was done in a manner designed to strengthen any belief BAUMANN might have that he actually has been in contact with CIC and not with PCS. This may have had some effect, as later in the meeting BAUMANN once referred to agent's organization as the "Abwehrdienst", whereas at previous meetings he had referred to it several times as the "Nachrichtendienst."
4. BAUMANN turned in the Lebenslauf and report on his contacts as requested two meetings previously. The Lebenslauf was short -- one page with large handwriting -- and general, omitting exact dates, and saying nothing which he had not already reported. It was an exceedingly poor job. The report on his intelligence contacts was not as instructed. It was simply a list of 45 names divided into three categories; fellow members of the Akademischer Freiheitskämpfer, persons met in connection with political organizations, and intelligence contacts. He gave nothing regarding the nature and frequency of his contact, when it started, whether he still maintains the contact, etc. Most of the names have already been mentioned in these reports. Those names which have not already been reported as being contacts of BAUMANN's are the following: Dr. Rich MURK, Prof. Josef FISCHER, Mil PRORACEZ, Dr. Anton OETZBERGER, Peter SPITALJEVIC, Kello RIZEL, Docent (fm) ROTHBAUER, Prof. Nedine PAUGWIC, Dr. Rich KORNBERG, Nationalrat a. D. Oscar HUNZLER, Dr. Theo PACHAR, Tyrolean Landtag, President (fm) FOLLING, Editor Ing. Gustav KORNBERG, and Dr. Wilhalm STUBNER of the KPÖ's KZ-Verband.
5. Agent reviewed with BAUMANN the mechanics of his arrest and the reasons for his arrest and for his release. BAUMANN remained unwilling to give a detailed, consistent and logical story. He was still most reluctant to discuss the content of his interrogation.
6. Agent next turned to BAUMANN's plan for establishing contact with the SIS "on our behalf". Agent asked BAUMANN again to explain in detail just how his plan would be carried through. At this meeting he was far less anxious to carry out the plan than he had been before. When agent pressed for details, he replied that he would be working under agent's control and that agent would

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

EAVA-5891

INDEX CS COPY

11 Feb 54

[] []

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

EAM - 5891

have to make such decisions. He took the attitude that he didn't care too much about whether or not agent used him on this mission; if agent made a good enough proposition, BAUMANN would feel it his duty to do whatever he could to help the Western powers. He claimed he had previously referred to volunteering to the Soviets here in Vienna only as a theoretical possibility, and that actually he is not ready to do such a thing. However, he would still be willing to do it in Eastern Austria or anywhere in Eastern Europe. He admitted that this would then force him to leave Vienna, and that he would have to have a good cover story as to why he could not return and meet his Soviet contact in a Soviet controlled area. How much money he would require as salary and for subsistence living away from Vienna, he would not say. He spoke in terms of the BAUMANN-Soviet contact being conducted entirely through dead drops, as he now admitted that the Soviets would probably refuse to meet him personally in a non-Soviet-controlled area.

7. Agent concluded the meeting by telling BAUMANN that he needed time to consider the plan and that he would probably telephone BAUMANN on 15 January to arrange for another meeting.

8. Agent Comment - BAUMANN's mixed approach, i.e. his partial backing down on his proposal that he volunteer to the SIS, undermined agent's position and doomed to failure attempts to press BAUMANN for details. The question arises as to whether the change was a tactical one designed to take the initiative away from agent, or whether BAUMANN actually is no longer interested in volunteering to the Soviets. Each of the alternatives appears equally plausible:

a. Tactical Maneuver - For the three previous meetings BAUMANN had made himself doubly suspicious by pushing too hard on the theme that he wants to be recruited by the SIS. It was his only apparent motivation for coming to meetings with agent, and it gave agent a good pressure point to use throughout the interrogation. It is possible that BAUMANN and/or the Soviets realized this and dictated a change in tack in order to regain a better bargaining position. If so, a provocation, backed by an implied threat to break contact if he doesn't follow through as instructed, should reveal it.

b. Actual Lack of Interest - It is equally plausible, however, that BAUMANN's current lack of interest is genuine, in which case our only hold on BAUMANN has been lost and the contact will probably fizzle out. The SIS (or BAUMANN working alone or under some other sponsorship) may have already accomplished their purpose in the contact, or else decided that they have failed to accomplish it and that there is no hope of their doing so, and thus instructed BAUMANN to taper off the contact. In this case, any further attempts at provoking BAUMANN probably will not succeed. Another bare possibility for explaining the lack of interest in volunteering to the Soviets might be that BAUMANN never intended for the agent to take his proposal seriously, that it was just made as a gambit in some other game not understood by agent, and that BAUMANN actually desires to work for the SIS on some other mission which he has hesitated to mention so far.

11 Feb 54

[]

CONFIDENTIAL
 SECURITY INFORMATION
 CONFIDENTIAL

EAVA-9841

6. He claims that he had several teeth knocked out and his upper left jaw bone shattered by the Gestapo during the war. This injury has caused him trouble ever since and is currently abscessed. He was confined to his home, and part of the time to his bed, during the latter half of 1952. It was operated on in January 1953, shortly before his arrest. The injury became worse during his confinement by the Soviets and he has not been well since his release. It may require another operation this Spring.


BEST AVAILABLE COPY

11 Feb 54

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

521 E 52 B 01 E



141A 5871

REPORT FIVE LOCATION OF HERBERT BAUMANN

Information Report #2

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Subject: Arrest of Josef MASCHER

1. Josef MASCHER formerly resided at Vienna VI, Linkertenzelle. In the summer of 1952 he was arrested by Austrian police as he was driving his motorcycle down Muhlgaasse, Vienna IV. He was taken to the Muhlgaasse police post where two officers of the PZB were waiting for him. During a routine search he managed to escape and fled in the direction of Vienna VI. The Austrian policeman chased after him and recaptured him after he had been stopped and held by Austrian civilians on the Raschmarkt, who had heeded instructions from the policemen to stop MASCHER because he had stolen a motorcycle. MASCHER was then taken in handcuffs to the Vienna IV police Kommissariat and then to the STP prison in Baden. The Soviets demanded a confession, but he refused until he was shown photographs of Soviet military installations which he had taken for CIC. MASCHER is convinced that these photos could have come only from a CIC employee.

2. BAUMANN claims that he has never seen MASCHER, does not know his approximate age, knows nothing about his intelligence activity, and knows no friends of MASCHER's. (Comment: The truth of all these statements is very doubtful.)

3. Source - BAUMANN at first refused to tell the source of the above report. Later he claimed that MASCHER had told the story to Walter STIPK, who told it to Franz POLTSCH, who in turn related it to BAUMANN. This appears plausible, but the reference to CIC was probably added in an attempt to support his contention that he was afraid to talk freely because of the poor security of CIC.

MICROFILMED
JUL 22 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INDEX

CS COPY

1172654
141A 5871

1172654

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



1172894

REPORT OF THE LOCATION OF HERBERT BAUMANN

Information Report #2

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Subject: Arrest of Josef MASCHER

1. Josef MASCHER formerly resided at Vienna VI, Linkerdonzeile. In the summer of 1952 he was arrested by Austrian police as he was driving his motorcycle down Mullgasse, Vienna IV. He was taken to the Mullgasse police post where two officers of the NEB were waiting for him. During a routine search he managed to escape and fled in the direction of Vienna VI. The Austrian policeman chased after him and recaptured him after he had been stopped and held by Austrian civilians on the Naschmarkt, who had heeded instructions from the policeman to stop MASCHER because he had stolen a motorcycle. MASCHER was then taken in handcuffs to the Vienna IV police Bezirksariat and then to the ST prison in Baden. The Soviets demanded a confession, but he refused until he was shown photographs of Soviet military installations which he had taken for CIC. MASCHER is convinced that these photos could have come only from a CIC employee.

2. BAUMANN claims that he has never seen MASCHER, does not know his approximate age, knows nothing about his intelligence activity, and knows no friends of MASCHER'S. (Comment: The truth of all these statements is very doubtful.)

3. Source - BAUMANN at first refused to tell the source of the above report. Later he claimed that MASCHER had told the story to Walter STIPKA, who told it to Franz MUTSCH, who in turn related it to BAUMANN. This appears plausible, but the reference to CIC was probably added in an attempt to support his contention that he was afraid to talk freely because of the poor security of CIC.

MICROFILMED
JUL 22 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INDEX

CS COPY

9-...
1172894 to CIAA 5891

1172894
[] []

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

EALR-5891

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF HENRI ET BAUMANN

Information Report #3

IP

ALL
EALR 5891
11 Feb 64

Subject: Alleged Theft of Suitcase Containing Classified Documents

1. In the winter of 1951-52 a brown leather suitcase was stolen from an American officer by a foreign sailor in Vienna. Inside the suitcase were a blue suit and a locked leather briefcase containing reports from TIC to the FBI labeled "Most Secret". These documents are now in the possession of a journalist named Walter, last name unknown, who resides above the American Information Center in the building at Vienna I, corner of Kaerntnerstrasse and Wilhelmstrasse. The Soviets are now trying to obtain these documents.

2. Source - BAUMANN at first refused to give a source for this report, stating only that he had heard the story in prison. Two meetings later he said he was told the story by Kurt SUPPNER, who was one of BAUMANN's cellmates during his imprisonment. SUPPNER was allegedly in the Landesgericht during the winter of 1951-52. He met there a sailor who gave him a receipt with which to claim a suitcase he had checked. The sailor told SUPPNER to get the suitcase, sell the contents, and use the money to send a food package to the sailor in the jail. SUPPNER sold the contents to Walter (LNU).

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

MICROFILMED
JUL 22 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

BAUMANN

CS COPY

10 to EALR-5891

11 Feb 64

[]

RESTRICTED COPY

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

Ed 11-5891

REPORT OF INFORMATION OF SUBJECT RAUBENSH

Information report #1

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Subject Name: RAUBENSH

1. All of RAUBENSH'S information on STERN is dated prior to the Spring of 1950. At that time STERN was working for the Austria Press Syndicate. STERN was in touch with the SIS in Frankfurt, Passaustrasse, with the SIS office in Innsbruck, and with an American Intelligence office which used to be located on Passaustrasse in Vienna. He was about 30 years old, talked a lot, spent a lot of time in bars, and did not go into Soviet quarters of Vienna.

2. Sources with whom STERN had contact are as follows:

a. Dr. (Mrs) SCHNEK. (Comment: This is Dr. Herbert SCHNEK.) In 1941 SCHNEK was secretary to Chancellor Leopold FISCH and supplied STERN with agents with cover positions in the Bundeskanzleramt. Some of these agents, names unknown, thought they were working for an Austrian intelligence service instead of for the occupation powers. In 1942 SCHNEK had himself transferred to Istanbul as Austrian trade attaché, due to fear of the Soviets.

b. (Mrs) VAISEL. No details known. (Comment: RAUBENSH said that VAISEL is an Austrian, but it is nevertheless believed that VAISEL is actually ARNHEIM'S contact.)

c. Paul FILLNER. (Comment: This is probably Armand FILLNER.) FILLNER works for the French political intelligence service and is also in contact with Theo ALPHEI, Theodor HANDEL, Herbert KOLLER, Peter FIEDL, and Alfred PIKOWSKI.

d. Josef Adolf HUPAK. No details known.

3. Source - general gossip in intelligence circles.

MICROFILMED
JUL 22 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INDEX

CS 05.7

11 Le 1A1A-5891

11 Feb 54

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



EMIA-5891

110

REPORT OF INTERVIEW OF HERBERT BARNETT

Information Sheet #6

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Contact: self

1. He was a member of the "League of Youth" in 1933 and later a member of the "Bund" (anti-Nazi group around (real) war time). He was a member of the "Hainwehr" but in 1933 was sent to the "Kriegsgefangenenlager" as a renegade Nazi. He was freed from Dachau in 1935, and after his release worked as a spy for the "Kriegsgefangenen". Because of this he was imprisoned by the Allies for six months at the end of 1945. As a good friend of Julius REAR, he was assigned to found "Organization D", an NSDP supported organization for former Nazis and ex-traits of the "Kriegsgefangenen" who couldn't be brought into the NSDP itself. "Organization D" was dissolved at the end of 1950.

2. In 1946 or 1948 BARNETT was employed by the firm Fleischwerke A.G., a company which delivered meat to the Soviet occupation forces. The Soviets had accumulated a large debt to the firm, so the company sent BARNETT to the Soviet "Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands" to intervene on their behalf because BARNETT allegedly had a brother who had emigrated to the USSR and was then an NKVD officer at the "Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands". BARNETT was successful in getting the Soviets to pay the debt and allegedly received an AS 30,000 commission from the firm. After this first success, he did the same thing for other firms.

3. BARNETT founded the "Partei der Mitte" in 1951. The party was financed by Martin BREITENBERG, but later BARNETT and BREITENBERG became enemies because of both financial and intelligence matters and denounced each other at CIC. BARNETT also received money from the SPDC to make propaganda for the "Breitner Committee" against the NSDP in the 1951 election.

4. BARNETT collects political intelligence, but it is possible that his political activities are only a cover for the collection of military intelligence as well. His intelligence contacts include Josef SOHN, Franz WURCHER, Herbert GLEISNER, and Prof. (fnu) EDUARD. EDUARD has contact with Fritz BREITENBERG and (fnu) BREITENBERG of the "Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands" central committee.


BEST AVAILABLE COPY

11/20/54

MICROFILMED
JUL 24 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

EMIA-5891

11/20/54



d. Albert LOEY - The Soviets asked BAUMANN, who is (fnu) LOEY. BAUMANN replied that he is former Austrian employee of the Education Division. The Soviets said he was lying again and showed him an extract from the interrogation of grain REINHEISTER. REINHEISTER had testified that he learned from Josef HARTL, his source in Dr. Oswald PETERLUNGER's office, that on 22 February 1953 one (fnu) LOEY and a CIC employee spoke to Dr. PETERLUNGER on behalf of BAUMANN. HARTL heard BAUMANN's name being mentioned as LOEY and the CIC employee left PETERLUNGER's office. BAUMANN said he did not know who this LOEY might be. (Comment: This probably refers to Albert LOEY.)

e. Fritz STINGER - The Soviets questioned BAUMANN on (fnu) STINGER, but BAUMANN denied knowing anything about him. They know he worked in the Political Section of CIC Vienna and that he was later transferred to Lins. They know his personal description and his license number. (Comment: This report probably refers to Fritz STINGER.)

11 21 54
 []

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

EAUA-5891

REPORT OF INTERROGATION OF HERBERT BAUMANN

Information Report #8

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1953
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Subject: Franz MURKO, Alleged Soviet Agent

1. Franz MURKO is approximately 28 or 29 years old and resides at Vienna IV, Schikanedergasse 13/12. He has been in the intelligence collecting business since 1946, and during that time has been in contact with BAUMANN, Fritz WISE, Hans ZOHAR, and Herbert DEISENHAUER, among others. He was allegedly once in contact with an American using the name "BERLIN". He still maintains intelligence contact with Hans ZOHAR and social contact with BAUMANN. He was arrested and interrogated by the FBI in the Summer of 1947. BAUMANN alleges that he is a bit crazy.

2. BAUMANN, Felicitas BAUMANN nee GOLDSCHMIDT, Alfred MUCKOVSKI, and possibly Armin REINHEISTER have all given the Soviets derogatory information on MURKO. Dr. Herbert KOENIG was also aware of MURKO's intelligence activities. MURKO maintains open contact with Vladimir FEDJANIN, Soviet Press reporter. MURKO alleges he is often invited to the IV Bezirk Kommandatura, but he does not state the reasons for these visits. Shortly before BAUMANN left on the trip during which he was arrested at the Suez Demarcation Line, MURKO telephoned BAUMANN. He told BAUMANN he was being visited by two persons wanting information on BAUMANN, and asked him if he was planning a trip. BAUMANN replied that he did not intend to leave. Now, MURKO claims that he did not telephone BAUMANN. For the above reasons, BAUMANN believes MURKO is a Soviet agent.

3. In November 1953, MURKO offered to exchange intelligence reports with BAUMANN. BAUMANN refused.

4. Source - Personal knowledge of MURKO and statements made by him.

X

MICROFILMED
JUL 29 1957
DOC. MICRO. SER.

15 to EAUA-5891

1000 53

11 Feb 54

[]

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

EAVA-5891

-2-

6. Source: Kurt SUPPNER and personal investigation by RAUMAN. For additional information pertinent to evaluating this report, refer to Operational Reports 3, 4 and 5 and Information Report #12 on Kurt SUPPNER.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

11 Feb 54

[]

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

EALIA-5391

REPORT OF INTERVIEW OF HERBERT BAUMANN

Information Report #11

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1962
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Subject: Hans ZOHAR

1. Hans ZOHAR resides at Vienna VIII, Skodajasse. He is employed as a Rechnungsrat (financial advisor) of the Lower Austrian Land government. He collects and exchanges intelligence reports. He formerly had contact with Armin RENTHUISER, Hans DEHL, Herbert KORNIG, and Theo ALBERT. He has claimed an American intelligence connection. At present his intelligence contacts include Franz MEZKO, Herbert DEISENHAUER, and an official of Dr. Maximilian FANTLE's office, possibly (fnu) LEFKER. BAUMANN disclaims knowledge of former intelligence contact between ZOHAR and Dr. Walter RECHT. ZOHAR deals in political, as opposed to military, reports.

2. The Soviets questioned BAUMANN on ZOHAR. The Soviets appeared to already know alot about him from RENTHUISER, DEHL, and KORNIG. The Soviets also summoned for testimony (not arrested) (fnu) SCHRAMK, business manager of the wholesale iron firm ALDOL Gmbh, where BAUMANN was employed from January to July 1952. SCHRAMK was questioned on the contacts of the firm, one of whom is ZOHAR, who is employed as a consultant.

3. Source: Franz MEZKO and knowledge acquired during arrest.

MICROFILMED
JUL 29 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

INDEXED
FILED

CS COPY

LET #
Back 18 to EALIA-5391

11 July 57

[]

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

REPORT OF INTERROGATION OF HERBERT RAUNANN

Information report #12

EALA-5891
2P
a.c.
EAVA 5791
H 54

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
D.C. MICRO. SER.

Subject: Kurt SUPPINGER

1. Kurt SUPPINGER was born 24 October 1923 and resided at Vienna XIII, Martlebergasse 48 until his arrest by the Soviets on 21 October 1953. SUPPINGER was born in Moscow of a Russian mother and speaks fluent Russian. His father was a prominent Austrian Communist killed by the Germans at Stein, Austria in April 1945. SUPPINGER was employed as an interpreter in the USA Frattnerhof offices from approximately 1949 to approximately 1951. During this period and up until the time of his arrest he worked for the SIS. During part of this time he also worked for CIC. Prior to 1951 he travelled frequently to Yugoslavia, and reported on Yugoslav industrial targets to the Soviets and on Yugoslav political targets to an unspecified American intelligence service. SUPPINGER's CIC control officer used the cover name "RIZZI". In 1951 SUPPINGER was arrested by the UDBA, but was later released because they could prove only a small part of his political espionage, and because he had a well documented, although untrue, cover story as a New York Times correspondent. Upon his return to Austria after being released by the UDBA, SUPPINGER was accused of being a Titoist and expelled from the KPÖ, but this was done on SIS orders to cover SUPPINGER's intelligence activity. SUPPINGER reported regularly to the Soviets on his CIC contact, but they learned from the Walter STIPAK interrogation that SUPPINGER had concealed some facets of his CIC contact, and this was the reason for SUPPINGER's arrest.

2. SUPPINGER's IS contact had been run out of the Stadlau Kommandatura, but in the Fall of 1952 he was detailed to work on a mission with a woman controlled by the SIS office in the ellaris, in addition to his work for the Stadlau Kommandatura.

3. SUPPINGER was arrested by the Austrian police on 21 October 1953 on a criminal charge of fraud. The arrest was not made on Soviet orders, but when the Soviets learned that he was already in jail they ordered his transfer first to the X Bezirk, and then on 6 November to the Zentral Strafb Gefaengnis in Baden. Background of the Soviet desire to arrest SUPPINGER was twofold:

a. The Stadlau Kommandatura had summoned SUPPINGER several times because he was late in submitting reports and because they had several questions from previous reports that they wanted to clear up. SUPPINGER had ignored the summons because he knew that he had been lax in his SIS work recently and because he feared for his safety as a result of the arrest of Walter STIPAK. When the Kommandatura heard that he had been arrested anyway, they ordered him held at their disposal just to be on the safe side.


INDEX
CS COPY

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
D.C. MICRO. SER.

11 Feb 54

20 to EAVA-5891

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



EAVA-5891

110

INFORMATION REPORT OF ROBERT B. GUNN

Information Report # 13

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
SOC. MICRO. SER.

Subject: Franz Puetzsch

1. Franz P. I. G. was arrested in Vienna in the fall of 1952. BUECKER was together with P. I. G. for fourteen days during May, 1953, in cell # 23 of the Baden Central Schubhelfengenis. BUECKER alleged that P. I. G. was "the most important Soviet arrestee," and that the Soviets made an error in putting P. I. G. in the same cell with him, because they knew that P. I. G. would be released and able to tell about him. P. I. G., after a long radio training period in Salzburg, has worked for two years as a radio operator for "Operation Intelligence Service," an American organization in Salzburg. He reported Soviet Zone order of Battle. At the time of BUECKER's arrest, the Soviets confiscated the radio and signal plan he had been using. The Soviets tried to double him immediately after the arrest. He agreed, but then gave them false information. The Soviets knew it was false, and hence gave up the double attempt and sent him to the Baden prison.

2. Walter P. I. G. was placed in P. I. G.'s cell to spitsel on him, and later confronted him during his investigation.

3. Source - Statements made by P. I. G. to BUECKER. For material pertinent to evaluation of above report, see Operational Report # 5.

MICROFILMED
JUL 10 1963

CS COPY

21 to EAVA-5891

11 Feb 54

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
SOC. PROG. SER.

MICROFILMED
JUL 22 1967
SOC. PROG. SER.

Information Report 14

1767 5891
a.k.a. EAVA 5891
11F2654

Subject: Other prisoners in Central Detention Camp

1. Otto (2) [Name] - actor, ships stevedore, with Wehr for a short time. He allegedly gave information to CIC in 1945 on Austrians in contact with the Soviets. He was arrested at the Enns Detention Camp in the summer of 1952 and sentenced to 25 years' prison. He did not admit to any intelligence activity since 1945. Source: Kurt [Name], who was in cell 2 in the cellar with [Name], [Name], and [Name] for a short time before he, [Name], was sent back up to the "Untersuchungshaft" as a spitzel.

2. (fnu) [Name] - employed by the Vienna Gemeindevverwaltung, Mag. 1st. [Name] arrested during the war. Arrested in late summer 1952 in Vienna 14, [Name] [Name]. At the time of his arrest he was in the company of two men with whom he had worked for two years, and to whom he had just given several orders. Little report, but these could do nothing to help him. He claims that he does not know what organization he was working for. He went crazy in prison. Source: [Name]. (Comment: possibly Alfred [Name])

3. Ernst [Name] - sentenced to 25 years for distributing in Russian barracks Russian language newspapers printed by the [Name] in Munich. [Name]'s mother was allegedly sentenced to death on the same charge. Source: [Name]. (Comment: possibly Ernst and Isabella [Name], who were arrested on this charge.)

4. Ing. (fnu) [Name] - He was a [Name] member who worked for CIC in Austria. He allegedly reported to CIC on the organization of the oil fields. He was compromised by [Name]. He was called into the local commandatura on the guise of making some repairs, but was arrested as soon as he arrived, date unknown. Source: [Name]. (Comment: one Ing. [Name] is known to have been arrested by the Soviets under these circumstances on 11 April 1952.)

5. (fnu) [Name] - [Name] heard this name being called by the guard.

6. (fnu) [Name] - [Name] heard this name being called by the guard. (Comment: possibly [Name], who disappeared in February 1953.)

7. (fnu) [Name], (fnu) [Name], two brothers named (fnu) [Name] - they came to the prison at the end of January or early February 1953. They were arrested while collecting trash from a Soviet trash dump in [Name] [Name]. They were working for the Americans through a man who resides in [Name], Vienna XIII. Source: Franz [Name] was in a cell with [Name]. (Comment: [Name] and Leopold [Name], [Name] [Name], and [Name] [Name] were arrested in summer 1953 for collecting trash from Soviet trash dumps.)

8. Gustav [Name], [Name], and [Name] were also in this prison. [Name] died in his cell in December 1953. [Name] was in cell 20 with [Name] [Name].

11F2654 EAVA-5891

11 Feb 54

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

5. BAUMANN admitted that he had told agent some "big ones" at the last meeting. One of these was the statement that he was arrested in connection with the GRIMM case. This, he says, is a story that has grown up due to the coincidence that he was arrested shortly after GRIMM and was known to have had casual contact with GRIMM in 1948. He was actually arrested in connection with Alfred MILKOVSKI. MILKOVSKI confirmed to the Soviets that BAUMANN had worked with Fritz REEB in 1948. The Soviets had no information on any later intelligence work, but they did know that he was spending more money than he appeared to earn, so they called him in to check out his current activities. He was released because they could not prove anything on him and due to the change in Soviet policy after the death of Stalin.

6. At the end of the meeting, agent asked BAUMANN if he needed money - not a salary but just a couple hundred Schillings for "expenses" and pocket money. BAUMANN replied that he actually is broke, not well supplied with funds as he had alleged at the previous meeting, and that he would appreciate anything agent cared to give him. Agent gave him AS 200. He accepted the money and asked if a receipt is necessary. Agent replied in the affirmative and passed him paper and pencil. He then asked if he must sign his true name. Agent said yes, and he then did so. (Comment: Receipt was on a blank piece of paper, not the usual CIC form.)

11 Feb. 54

[]

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- A: And for information on the satellites?
- B: That is very difficult. I know that type of thing is much sought after now, but I just don't know anyone in that line. Refugees, perhaps
- A: You could go down to the Nachrichtenbureau in Graz, couldn't you?
- B: Yes, but that's no good.
- A: What can you get, then?
- B: KPDc.
- A: From whom?
- B: That depends on the type of information you want.
- A: What different types can you get from whom?
- B: On the POOL and Reark level of the KPDc from (fnu) LOMHA.
- A: Who's he?
- B: Aaktionsleiter in the PI Reark.
- A: And information on decisions made by the Central Committee Politburo?
- B: That would have to be pieced together from a number of sources. One of them would probably be Kurt BICHL & HARTSCHE, employee of the World Peace Council and a favorite and frequent guest of Ruth FISCHER, Ernst FISCHER's wife.
- A: And a list of members of the Kadroabteilung of the Central Committee?
- B: That I might be able to get from Gunther (?) WEISZ, Director of the Soviet Information Center.
- A: And the Communist trade union factions?
- B: That is easy to get from anyone.
- A: How about the FTU?
- B: That's difficult, because it's compartmented, as you have probably already noticed.
- A: Nodded affirmatively. How would you get the information from these people?

3 0 0 2 5 3 1 0 3

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- B: Elicit it.
- A: You couldn't recruit any of them willingly?
- B: REISS, definitely not, because he is a fanatic communist; DICHTL, perhaps, because he is just an adventurer; LOPATA, I doubt it.
- b.
- B: What I can do best is counter-espionage work.
- A: What are your various capabilities there?
- B: (evasively) There are several things I could do.
- A: You don't want to discuss them now?
- B: No, I'd rather wait a while.
- A: You will suggest them later.
- B: Yes, I will suggest some jobs later.
- A: Counter-espionage is a tough field, do you think you're capable enough?
- MALKIN then briefly related his intelligence experience, commenting that he believes he has a good groundwork.
- A: You do still have ambitions as an intelligence operator, don't you?
- B: I don't want to come right out and say I want to work for you, as that would probably be misinterpreted. You would think I was sent by the Russians. You will probably think that anyway.
- A: Yes, I do.
- B: I understand that, but I will gradually win your confidence, you will see.
- A: You will win it quicker if you admit you told the Soviets everything you know, and that you are now working for them. That's nothing particularly derogatory, you know; it's expected (of people arrested by the Soviets). It is only bad if you don't admit it.
- B: I know, but it is not true.

3 0 8 2 5 3 1 10

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Agent then started telling BAUMANN why his story couldn't possibly be true, but quickly gave up the attempt as it was plain that BAUMANN was not ready to change his story and that accusations at this time would serve no good purpose. To the illegal parts of his story, BAUMANN simply explained that such were the Soviet methods.

c. Recalling BAUMANN's statements at earlier meetings that he has information about Soviet agent(s), agent felt that the time was favorable to ask about them.

A: Who do you know besides Frans NUSKO who is working for the Soviets?

Without the slightest hesitation, BAUMANN gave the name of one Margarete DUB (Comment: Later changed to DUB, apparently the correct spelling.) and pulled from his pocket a torn piece of an envelope on which appeared to be written her home and business address. BAUMANN then gave the information on DUB reported in Information Report 49. He had the story down quite pat, and it was apparent that he had come to the meeting with the pre-meditated intention of giving this information to agent at this time. Agent asked for the names of DUB's sub-agents, but BAUMANN replied that he knows none. Agent then asked if he actually knows none, or whether he just knows none that he cares to mention at this time. BAUMANN said that he actually knows none, but the question appeared to be one which he had not anticipated and the decision to deny knowledge to have been made on the spur of the moment without the consideration he would have preferred to have given it. Agent asked for the source, but BAUMANN refused to give it. Agent explained that such reports are worthless without a source, to which he replied that he understood that and that he would divulge the source later.

A: If you are going to give it later anyway, why not give it now?

B: In Austria we have a proverb which goes, "Der Moor hat seine Schuldigkeit getan; der Moor kann gehen." (The Moor has done his duty; the Moor can go.)

A: And you don't want to be the Moor and have to go, right?

B: Right.

A: Well, your only chance of not having to "go," lies in your willingness to give the source of such reports.

B: I'll give it to you later.

A: When?

*

11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11

SECRET

B: After the holidays.

A: It would be better if you would tell us sooner rather than later, as we would both save a lot of time that way.

B: I'll tell you after the holidays.

Agent then changed the subject. After about ten more minutes of routine debriefing, it was time to close the meeting.

5. BAUMANN alleges that in the course of his wartime resistance activities he had a number of teeth knocked out and his upper left jaw bone was shattered, and that this injury still abscesses occasionally and gives him considerable difficulty. He states that as a result of this injury he was inactive and under medical care during the last half of 1952 and that he underwent an operation in January 1953, shortly before his arrest. He states that this condition became worse during his imprisonment due to the fact that his cell was unheated and the Russians gave him only the most superficial medical treatment. As a result, he is again inactive, spending most of his time at home; he is under medical care, and will probably have to be operated on again in the spring. (Comment: This appears to be one more reason for believing BAUMANN is under Soviet control. Being in ill health, the opportunity to refuse or prefer medical care was one more handle available to the Soviets in breaking BAUMANN.)

6. Comments: The following considerations support the belief that BAUMANN is now acting under Soviet control:

a. At the first meeting BAUMANN was obviously unwilling to give an accurate account of his intelligence background, his former contacts, or of his interrogation by the Soviets. He later admitted this but explained his reticence as being due to poor security at CIC. For the second meeting, BAUMANN changed his story so that his unwillingness to talk was somewhat less obvious, but made himself more suspicious by showing no concern for his own security. Whereas on the first day, fear of another Soviet arrest was allegedly his primary motivation which caused him not to want to cooperate, on the second and third days he at no time mentioned fear of the Soviets; instead, he volunteered to work on counter-intelligence targets against the Soviets. He signed a true name receipt without question. On the second and third days his protests against the poor security of holding the meetings in well-known CIC offices had a strictly formal character, made for the record and not out of conviction. Two assumptions appear possible: (1) That BAUMANN has complete confidence in the security and good intentions of his interrogator, or (2) that he has informed the Soviets about his interrogation and that he has their blessing. The first assumption hardly appears justified.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

EAVA-5891

b. BAUMANN has consistently denied having told the Soviets everything. In fact, he has consistently denied having told them anything about any of his former intelligence activity. He claims that his interrogation was of the nature of a pre-trial investigation and that the purpose of it was almost wholly to collect evidence to bring him to trial. He was released because the Soviets could not prove anything on him. This story appears unlikely. It is very likely that anyone arrested by the Soviets for four and a half months and then released has told them everything he knows and has been recruited by them. All other known information tends to confirm this possibility.

c. BAUMANN's obvious desire to be recruited and his bid for recruitment made with the report on Margaret OUB, whose job for the SIS is allegedly to penetrate and provoke American intelligence, has all the earmarks of provocation.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

11 Jul 54
[]

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

MICROFILMED
JUL 10 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

584A-5841
7P
MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REPORT OF INTERROGATION OF HERBERT BUCHMANN
Information report 15

Subject: Soviet Central Schub Gefaengnis, Baden

1. Herbert Buchmann's detention and interrogation took place in the central schub Gefaengnis in Baden, Lower Austria. The name of the prison is a German translation of the name which appeared written in Russian on the check-out slips signed by prisoners when they checked out clothing to be worn in the prison. The exact location of the prison in the town of Baden is not known, but it is on the outskirts of town in the neighborhood of a railroad line. BUCHMANN heard occasional train whistles and on one occasion glimpsed rolling hills but no identifiable buildings through a crack in the curtain in his interrogation room. He arrived at and departed from the prison at night in an automobile with drawn curtains and was driven around in circles to lose his way before entering the town of Baden. The building is a former villa, gray plaster on the outside, and with cellar and four American style floors. Spotlights are trained on the building at night. The view out of the windows on the first floor is blocked by boards set in on a diagonal, opening up toward the top, so that when looking out it is only possible to look up toward the sky. These boards are probably readily noticeable from outside. The building is approximately 9 meters wide and 30 meters long, although BUCHMANN states that he was never in a position to see the length of the building and that this estimate of the length might be too long. The long axis of the building points in a north-northeasterly direction.

2. The cellar contains cells where prisoners are kept after sentencing and prior to being transferred to another prison, sometimes to the Soviet Union, where they serve their terms.

3. The first floor (hochparterre) contains cells numbered 14 to 26 for prisoners under pre-trial investigation. A sketch of this floor is attached as Annex 1. The sketch is not drawn to scale and the proportions are not necessarily correct. Some of the dimensions are estimated below; dimensions not specifically estimated below are not known. BUCHMANN spent most of his time in prison in cell 14. This is approximately 6 meters long and 2 meters wide. It is known as the second worst cell on the floor because it is on the north side of the building where it is chilled by the north wind. Cell 15 is the worst because it is on the north side and also the largest and thus hardest to heat. Stoves are set into the rooms in the winter and eight briquets are issued to each cell each day, with the exception of cell 15 which gets ten briquets. Cell 14 is the smallest of all, as it is narrow and cells on this side of the building are only 3 meters deep whereas those on the opposite side are 4 meters deep. It is used only for temporary confinement. If any cell is to be searched thoroughly, the occupants are stripped


INDEX

CS COPY

23 61. AIA - 5841

17 Feb 64

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



and placed in this cell while the search is conducted. If a prisoner has to be brought back to a cell during the course of his trial, he is placed in this cell. Normally trials last only a few hours and once a prisoner leaves for his trial he never returns to this floor. However, if a trial lasts through a meal time or overnight, the prisoner is brought back and placed alone in cell 19; in no case does he return to his former cell, where he could tell his cellmate about the trial. The service room is occupied by an officer and several soldiers. Here weapons are stored, clothing is on hand for issuance to prisoners, and the routine administration for the floor is carried out. Cells 21 and 22 are used only for storage. The exercise ground is reached by going down a half flight of stairs to ground level. It is approximately 5 meters square with a wood fence 3 meters high with barbed wire on top. Off one corner there is a guard post. Prisoners awaiting trial are allowed to exercise for 10 minutes daily except Sunday unless it interferes with the interrogation.

4. There are two sets of stairs in the building. The one leading to the exercise ground is the only one used by prisoners and has two barred gates at each floor. For example, prisoners coming up from the cellar must pass through one locked gate at the top of the steps in order to get out into the corridor of the first floor and then must pass through a second locked gate in order to get back on to the stairs leading up to the second floor. The second set of stairs has no gates and is open for free passage to the Soviet personnel administering the prison.

5. Subject spent approximately three weeks in cell 23. This is described here as being typical of the other cells. The cell is 4 meters square with one window approximately 80 cm by 60 cm starting 2 meters above floor level. It has iron bars and is partially covered on the outside with a wooden shutter in such a manner that it prevents a prisoner from looking straight out but it does allow him to look up at the sky. Prisoners are allowed to open and close the window but they must first call the guard and do it in his presence. The room has two German military-type iron beds with mattresses and one blanket each. The blankets are not military type, but are a miscellaneous collection which varies in each cell. There is a toilet, without plumbing, which the prisoner takes to the latrine to empty twice a day, at 0500 and 1600. In the winter months an oven is set in the cell and they are given 8 briquettes per day as fuel. Each prisoner is issued a hand towel, a small bar of soap, and a small aluminum drinking glass. There is no other furniture or equipment in the cell. The door is made of thick wood and lined with metal on the inside. There is no door handle on the inside. It has a peep hole so that the guard can check the cell at any time. Just above the handle, the door has an opening approximately 20 cm by 10 cm. This opening is covered by another small door and is used to pass small items (the 05.00 water, the 17.00 tea, and occasionally tobacco) into the cell. It is not used for the morning or noon meals.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



6. At 0500 daily each prisoner is given 1/2 liter of water to wash with. At 0600 daily an officer makes the rounds to ask prisoners about their health and whether or not they have any complaints. Breakfast is at 0700 and consists of 600 grams of bread and a cup of thick soup, such as grit or corn soup. Lunch is at 1300 and is made up of a thin soup and occasionally a piece of fish. The evening meal consists of only 1/2 liter of tea with two pieces of sugar. There is no variety; the same soups are served for weeks at a time before they are changed. No reading material is allowed. Shortly after the death of Stalin, prisoners whose investigations had been completed and who were in favor with the guards were granted 2 grams of wood tobacco daily. Prisoners were allowed to wash completely once every 10 to 14 days. For this purpose they were taken to a wash room in the cellar. Whenever anyone entered the cell to make a check or to give food, prisoners were obliged to stand facing the rear wall with hands open behind their back. When the person entered, the prisoners turned around and gave in Russian the cell number and the report that everything was in order. Prisoners can wear the clothes they are arrested in if they so desire, but they can check out from the service room any Russian military clothing which they need. The clothing has no insignia and does not have the standard military buttons. All prisoners have their hair shaved several days after arrival.

7. The corridor down the middle of the building between the two rows of cells is approximately 1 1/2 meters wide and is patrolled by a Soviet soldier at all times. It has a carpet so that the guard can approach any cell at any time without being heard. The guard is on an eight hour shift, with short breaks for meals. Changes occur at 0600, 1400 and 2200. The guard is unarmed; all weapons are kept behind the doors which separate the cell area from the remainder of the floor. Separating the cell area from the remainder of the floor are an unlocked wooden door with glass panes, a sliding iron gate, and then another locked wood and glass door. The iron gate is opened by the guard inside the cell area; he carries the key on a band around his wrist. The outside wooden door can be opened only by a person from outside the cell area.

8. The floor is serviced by a female doctor and a nurse. The woman doctor, NU, is approximately 35 years old, blue eyes, 160 cm tall, heavy set, red finger nails, wears a diamond watch and speaks only Russian. The nurse, NU, is approximately 25 years old, 170 cm tall, black hair, brown eyes, fairly slim for a Russian, and wears dark red finger nail polish. Due to the cold and poor food, most prisoners are in ill health, but medical treatment is of a most cursory nature.

9. The room in which BANNIN was interrogated is on the second floor. Only the one room was used. It is located at the end of the building and

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

3 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11

floor above cells 21 and 22. When walking in the corridor on this floor, prisoners are obliged to look straight down at the floor, but BAUMANN did notice that there is a file room at the opposite end of the building and a typing room somewhere on the East side of the corridor. He believes that other interrogation rooms are located on the West side of the building on this floor. A sketch of BAUMANN's interrogation room is attached as Annex B. The room has an inlaid wood floor, plaster walls with a light blue pattern, and an overhead light. BAUMANN sat in the seat marked A in the diagram, in front of a small metal table. Both table and chair are fixed to the floor. The investigating officer sat in chair B. Location C was used by the investigating officer during delicate questions when it was believed that BAUMANN might not be telling the truth. On these occasions BAUMANN would have to look straight ahead. The investigating officer could then see both sides of BAUMANN's face, one directly and the other in the mirror at the end of the room. The officer apparently liked this mirror technique. Chairs P and F were used interchangeably by the interpreter. Chair F was used by the prosecuting attorney when he was present and occasionally by the investigating officer.


10. BAUMANN saw only one investigating officer. BAUMANN believes that during the early, intensive part of the investigation, this officer had no other assignment except the investigation of him. The officer was an Infantry Captain, NJ, approximately 40 years old, slim, 175 cm tall, dark blond hair parted on the right side, brown eyes, poor teeth, and non-smoker. The same prosecuting attorney was apparently used for a number of cases. He was an Infantry Major, NJ, 170 cm tall, slim, blue eyes, black hair, smoker.

11. In addition to taking down content of a prisoner's testimony, a file is maintained giving a precise description of how the prisoner has conducted himself under interrogation.

12. BAUMANN believes the courtroom is on the third floor. It is a military court composed of three persons. His case did not reach trial, and hence he knows nothing about the courtroom or trial procedure. Once a prisoner is sentenced, he never returns to his cell on the first floor; he is immediately placed in a cell in the cellar.

13. BAUMANN was fingerprinted and photographed on the fourth floor shortly after his arrival. At the same time there was made what is called a psychological description. This is a description of his personal habits, such as the way he sits, holds a cigarette, washes his hands, etc., with a view to making a preliminary psychological assessment. He was not allowed to sit with legs crossed, as this is allegedly a bourgeois habit.

COPIES AVAILABLE FOR
REPRODUCTION



SAVA-5891

14. Prior to his release, BUKHAR signed a statement to the effect that he had been well treated, had no claims against Soviet authorities, and had been returned all his personal belongings confiscated at the time of his arrest. At this time his investigating officer told him that he might be called in by one of the Western powers and interrogated on his arrest. If so, he should say nothing if possible, but that if he must say something in order to make a good impression, he should claim he was arrested in connection with the investigation of Gustav GIBBY and Anselm TRUBL, that he had seen no other Austrian prisoners in the jail, that he had been well treated and not interrogated at night, and that he would just like to be left alone. Just prior to release, he was given a food package including American chocolate and led into a very brightly lighted room. After his eyes had adjusted to the bright light, he was quickly led outside into the darkness and into a waiting car which drove around in circles to make him lose his directions and then to the Baden Kommandatura. At the Kommandatura, he was turned over to an Austrian policeman who was given instructions to accompany BUKHAR to Vienna. The policeman took him to the Baden Police Headquarters, from where, rather than staying overnight, he took a train to Vienna alone and at his own cost.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

11 Feb 54

[]

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] []


E 1 5 2 1 0 1 E

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

HALLS


Cells on the first floor (Kerker) for prisoners awaiting trial (Untersuchungshaft) at the Soviet Central Schutz Gefangnis, Baden, Aust.

INDIA
CS COPY



EAVR-5891

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



Interior of room on the second floor
of the Hotel Schloss Hohenberg, Baden, Austria

11 Feb 54



BAKMAN's release from prison, BAKMAN has denied making this phone call.

4. On the train from Vienna to Salzburg, BAKMAN met a Prof. (fn) JOSEF, who was sitting in the same compartment with him. JOSEF works at Vienna I, Herrergasse, in the Lower Austrian Landeserschulrat. The discussion during the course of the trip turned to Fritz KERN. JOSEF knew of KERN's propaganda distribution activities and the circumstances of KERN's compromise and flight from Vienna. During the discussion JOSEF had wanted to know the name of KERN's deputy in the Jungfer Adler. BAKMAN stated that he did not know. (Comment: It is Karl [redacted]) After BAKMAN's arrest, the Soviets showed considerable interest in this same question. JOSEF left the train in St. Pölten, and thus would have been able to notify the Soviets of KERN's presence on the train in time for the pickup at the Inns checkpoint.

5. BAKMAN believes that any one or all of the above three persons could have been responsible for fudging his trip to the Soviets.

6. BAKMAN was removed from an Austrian train at the Inns checkpoint line the evening of 31 January 1953. After checking BAKMAN's documents once without question, the guard came back several minutes later to make a recheck. After the recheck, the guard posted another guard at the door of his compartment and went to get a Soviet officer. The officer checked his documents a third time, said his suitcase was not in order, and told him he must travel back to Vienna.

7. After waiting outside the checkpoint for approximately 30 minutes, guarded by two soldiers, an automobile arrived, license number unknown, with a major, soldier, and a civilian who spoke poor German. BAKMAN was driven to the St. Valentin Kommandatura, arriving shortly after midnight. There he was given a routine bag search and questioned briefly. The civilian told BAKMAN he would have to wait until morning for a more complete interrogation, as the civilian did not speak good German. He spent the night in the Kommandatura. From 0800 to 1200 the following morning he was interrogated by the civilian with the aid of a female interpreter. He was given lunch and then that afternoon transported by car, license number unknown, to Baden.

8. He was not placed into the prison immediately. Inside the compound, which has a green wooden gate, he was taken to the second small building on the left. (The larger prison building is on the right.) Here he was placed in a room in the cellar which did not appear to be normally used as a cell. When BAKMAN was put into the room, reading material and glass and metal objects with which he could harm himself were removed. He was given plenty to eat and treated well--except for constant interrogation day and night. After three days, the night of 4 February, he was transferred to the main

BEST AVAILABLE COPY




EA11A-5891

prison, cell #11. He first spent three or four days alone, without inter-
rogation. Then Kurt SCHUBERT was put into his cell, as a spitzel. Inter-
rogation did not begin again until five or six days after SCHUBERT's
arrival.

9. (Current Paragraphs 7 and 8 above differ from the account pre-
viously given by B. PAMM and reported in other sections of this report. He
began the above account with the statement, "Now I'll tell you the true
story." B. PAMM had previously claimed that he was taken directly from Huns
to Baden, that he arrived in Baden at night and never saw the outside of the
prison, that he was taken immediately into the main prison, and that he had
been interrogated very little at night. B. PAMM said that this is the story
the Soviets told him to tell in the event he was interrogated after his release.)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

1142654



8704 5891

MICROFILMED
JUL 22 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

REPORT OF INTERVIEW OF HERBERT BARTMAN

30

Information Report #17

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

Subject: Alleged reasons for arrest of Herbert BARTMAN

1. BARTMAN maintains that he was arrested for four reasons: derogatory allegations made by Alfred HENNING, name turned up in many reports on Gurtov BART, Soviet's lack of knowledge on the source of his income, suspicious behavior during interrogation of Felicitas nee ROSENTHAL.

2. HENNING testified that in 1947-48 BARTMAN had worked for Fritz WITTE on behalf of the Austrian intelligence service; for Dr. (Frau) WILLIAMS, the head of American intelligence in the Landesgerichtstrasse; and for the CIC office on Rooseveltplatz.

a. BARTMAN confessed to collecting political information for WITTE in 1947-48. The information was passed to the GeVP. He told the Soviets that he had no regular sources, just occasional contacts from whom he elicited information, and that none of the reports concerned military targets. The Soviets allegedly believed this. He also denied having used his wife as a source of information on the Soviet Censorship Office. The Soviets claimed to have a copy of a CIC report on the Censorship Office which could have originated only with HENNING. BARTMAN alleges that he told the Soviets he never collected information on the Censorship Office because he did not believe it was secrets he thought all four sources had access to this office. If the Soviets conducted secret censorship, he did not know about it. The Soviets allegedly believed him.

b. Concerning the allegation that he did intelligence work for Dr. WILLIAMS, BARTMAN explained that the only WILLIAMS with whom he had contact was the head of the VOK Education Division, and that the purpose of this contact was to get American support for the cultural activities of the Bund Akademischer Freiheitskämpfer. The Soviets allegedly finally believed this and admitted that WILLIAMS was only a Cultural Officer.

c. Regarding HENNING's statement that he had seen BARTMAN enter the CIC office on Rooseveltplatz, BARTMAN said that this was so vague that it did not even have to be refuted. He explained that the Soviets were always inclined to believe him rather than HENNING because so much of HENNING's testimony had proved unreliable, whereas he had been innocent of everything except the WITTE contact and had been able to give a complete and consistent story with apparent willingness and details which could be checked out.

INDEX

CS COPY

Handwritten notes: 8/11/45, 8/11/45 to EAVA-5891

Handwritten notes: 11 Feb 44

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Grid of empty boxes at the bottom of the page.

EA 111 501

5. All the derogatory information possessed by the Soviets dates back to the year 1948. They had no information more recent than that, knowing only that in the past the subject had been making what appeared to be a good living. The fact that they did not know the source of this income was further cause for suspicion, and one of the reasons for the arrest was to check into the subject's activities from 1948 to 1953. "ALAN" never did satisfactorily explain to them the source of his income during this period.

6. Felicitas nee KACHTAL, in her interrogation by the Soviets, gave the following information which casts suspicion upon "ALAN":

a. "ALAN" has many visitors in the apartment and smokes American cigarettes with the tax-free stamps.

b. In May 1952 "ALAN" flew from Leningrad to West Germany. As the Russian airfield at Kocorochin is the only one in the Leningrad area, the Soviets accuse him of having flown there that he must therefore work for the West. "ALAN" stated that he actually flew from Kocorochin to a small town.

c. "ALAN" makes frequent trips to the American Zone. He said that during the first half of 1952 he travelled to Leningrad every second week to confer with officials at VVOZ.

d. "ALAN" could not report the source of his income.

7. "ALAN" was released from prison because they could not prove that he had acted detrimental to the Soviet occupation power. Auxiliary factors which helped him were his wartime resistance contact with Marshall TRUMAN and the death of Stalin, which caused a certain loosening up of the Soviet attitude.

8. (Comments: In giving the above information "ALAN" was vague and was frequently caught contradicting himself or making illegal statements. This agent received the impression that most of the above information is not true.)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY


11/16/54



3. Concerning his connections with Gustav REI and Anselm REI, BERNI explained as follows. The Bund Demokratischer Freiheitskämpfer was founded in March 1946. The first Federal Chairman for the Bund was Gen. Paulus REI. He was succeeded by REI in the Winter of 1946-47, and REI was succeeded by (Mrs) REI in December 1947. The organization was banned by the Austrian police in 1948. BERNI was Vienna Chairman throughout the life of the organization. BERNI was Federal Youth Officer and a member of the Federal Committee (Vorstand) throughout the life of the organization. The Bund Akademischer Freiheitskämpfer, a youth group closely connected with the Demokratischer Freiheitskämpfer and the BDF was founded in December 1946. BERNI became Federal Secretary in February 1947, Deputy Federal Chairman shortly thereafter, and Federal Chairman in the Summer of 1947. He held this position until May 1952, when he resigned because of ill health and business duties and was succeeded by Dr. Julius R. About 75% of the members of the Akademischer Freiheitskämpfer were also members of the Demokratischer Freiheitskämpfer, and due to his position in both organizations he had frequent contact with REI during the years 1947-52. He very seldom had contact with REI, and in fact hardly ever had occasion to speak with him.

4. The Soviets told BERNI that both the Demokratischer and the Akademischer Freiheitskämpfer were front organizations for intelligence activity and accused BERNI of having partaken in this activity. To the Soviets BERNI allegedly denied any knowledge of any intelligence activity on the part of these groups, and he allegedly convinced the Soviets he was telling the truth. To this event, BERNI said the following is the true story, complete as far as he knows it. At the end of 1947 BERNI attended a meeting in the CIA office in Wenzelsgasse in which the Bund Demokratischer Freiheitskämpfer was discussed as a means of collecting and transmitting information on the Soviet Zone of Austria. The CIA officer who conducted the meeting used the cover name Fr. "Barry". BERNI was taken to the meeting by Anselm REI, who appeared to be in frequent contact with Fr. Barry. Also present at the meeting were Major a.u.c. (Mrs) REI, "Manna T", Johann Strauss-Jaske; a man whom BERNI has since identified by personal description as probably being Armand REI and several other persons, names unknown. Allegedly neither BERNI nor REI revealed to the Soviets that BERNI was present at this meeting. REI, although he attended this meeting as a confident and co-worker of REI, alleges that he had nothing to do with the planned clandestine activity of the Demokratischer Freiheitskämpfer because he did not like the security procedures which were being followed. He was allegedly introduced to other persons present under his true name and was driven home after the meeting in an Army jeep. BERNI confided to REI in 1947 that he was also in contact with a Fr. "Johnson" of CIA and with a representative of the French Intelligence Service. BERNI believes, although he can give no basis for this belief, that REI was in contact with REI until 1952.

REST AVAILABLE ONLY TO THE FBI



CAVA ~~5/57~~

10

~~VIR-7107~~

MICROFILMED
JUL 22 1967
DGS MICRO. SER.

5 January 1951

[]
[]
[]

Hand, n. iter

Informal request of 25 December 1950

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DGS MICRO. SER.

The files of the Vienna file attachment contained a trace on one Dr. Walter P. Merchant, born 22 December 1898 in Vienna, address: Vienna II, Bahngasse 6, who is listed as a visa applicant to France. (IC stated they had no traces on this man. The document appears to be a copy of a memo from the American Embassy, Vienna; it is dated 24 March 1947.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Distribution:

4 []
1 []
1 []
1 []
1 []

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED

CS 227
Exec 26 to L.A. 5/57

11 Jul 54
[]

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

EAVA-5891

MICROFILMED
JUL 28 1967
DOC. MICRO. SER.

10
44-7738

5 January 1964

[] []

Informal report

Informal report of 29 December 1953

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

There were no traces in the Vienna file attachment files of the subject. However, a Johann K. [redacted] was listed in a book dated 1952 (month obliterated), who was described as being born on 3 July 1905 in Vienna, having a card no. 2064/43, address, Vienna 211, Postergasse 3, occupation, beer stein-kurat.

Distributions:

- 4 [] []
- 1 [] []
- 1 [] []
- 1 [] []
- 1 [] []

27 to EAVA-5891

11 Jul 64
[] []

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] [] []

7. RAUBACH allegedly to have had no further intelligence contacts until early 1949, when he met Fritz H. at a conference of Bezirks Chairman of the OVP (Grand Congress). When asked who else worked for H. B., he at first denied knowing any others. When agent expressed surprise and repeated the question, RAUBACH said that Otto BASSLER, now under Soviet arrest, was H. B.'s contact man to the East, but that RAUBACH did not know him personally. He then stated that Alfred KLOKOVSKY was also in H. B.'s group. KLOKOVSKY was working for Josef Adolf UFFER, who in turn was working for the Americans, but then UFFER lost his American contact, so RAUBACH brought KLOKOVSKY into contact with F. EP. Theodore UFFER, from Graz, worked with UFFER and KLOKOVSKY, but not directly for H. B. Theo ALBERT worked for SIBEL and KLOKOVSKY, but also for H. B., and later for Herbert K. H. H. B. is now in Graz working for Guetter u. Schram. Contact with H. B. stopped at the end of 1948. Agent asked RAUBACH if he was certain these were the only people involved, and he replied that there was no one else. Agent asked if he hadn't obtained reports for F. EP from his wife, but RAUBACH denied this. When agent expressed scepticism, RAUBACH claimed that she was untruthful all the time and that he had gotten no reports after they were married, i.e. his wife was not a source. (Comment: RAUBACH denied by implication any knowledge of Richard DOLF and Walter KOURA, from whom RAUBACH is known to have received reports which he passed on to H. B. Also, RAUBACH maintained contact with H. B. until at least the Spring of 1949, and probably until much later.)

8. HUBER worked for the Americans in Frankfurt am Main and also for Dr. Gerald P. T. HUBER. In 1949 HUBER denounced RAUBACH, H. B., Dr. Arthur J. IMFIELD, Alexander V. VOPIVAC and others to P. T. HUBER. RAUBACH alleged that he has never met HUBER personally and that he knows nothing about his activities since 1943. (Comment: This appears unlikely.)

EXTRACTED FROM

EAVA-5891

(11 FEB 54)

~~SECRET AVAILABLE COPY~~

DC J. NO. 5171 5891

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

IP

TO : Chief, EX
FROM : Chief of Base, Florida
SUBJECT: Operational/REMOVE
Interrogation of Herbert BAUMANN

DATE: 11 Feb 54

~~MICROFILMED~~
~~JUL 8 1955~~
~~REC. MICRO. SEC.~~

1. Attached herewith in two copies for EX is a report of []
[] Interrogation of Herbert BAUMANN. It will be noted that the report
was written in sterilized fashion so that it could be passed to CIC. Not
passed to CIC, but included for your information, are the results of our
traces in CIC files. Cryptonyms of agents mentioned in the report by true
name, and sensitive comments and additions which could not be passed to CIC,
are being forwarded to Headquarters under separate cover. Our comments on the
interrogation as a whole will be included at that time.

2. For Sals; One of the two attachments designated for SOB is a
sterilized copy which should be passed to G-2.

Attachments: N/w
Rept. of Interrogation *none for RI/AF files*

9 February 1954

Distribution:

- 1 EX, w/2 attchs.
- 1 []
- 1 CE, w/attach.
- 2 Sals, w/attchs. (2) (1 to be passed to G-2)

27 atts H/w

INDEX

~~ES COPY~~
~~24 Encls~~

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

RI COPY

RECLASSIFIED	
RI/AN	
RI/CTD	

119254

6-2-6807

EAWA-5891

11 FEB 54

RESTRICTED

EAVA-589

REPORT OF INTERROGATION OF HERBERT BAYMAN

Subject: Operational Report #1, 21 December 1953

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. CIA, Vienna, arranged a meeting between a FBI Agent, using the alias name of Mr. BART R., and Herbert BAYMAN at 1100, 21 December, in the CIA offices at Vienna III, Fleischstrasse. A chronological account of the meeting will be given, as the chronology is useful in assessing the extent of BAYMAN's reluctance to talk. Agent opened the discussion by querying BAYMAN on the amount of time he has available. In reply to agent's questions, he said he is not now working, so he has all the time which agent might desire to spend with him. He is still recuperating from his experience in Soviet prison and is suffering from an abscess, which he will probably have operated on in the spring. He plans eventually to get some sort of business job, but he has no particular prospects in mind at the present time. His present source of income is \$1 600 per month pension as a wounded resistance fighter, plus a sum of money which he inherited from his parents.

2. Agent asked if he didn't still receive money from the Russians. After replying with a question as to why he, who was just recently arrested and interrogated should be receiving money from the Russians, agent commented that it must not then be true, as some of his former friends are reporting, that he is now working for the Soviets. BAYMAN inferred he had heard that such rumors were being spread and said they were doubtless due to petty jealousies and the fact that he had been released from jail by the Soviets, which is a somewhat unusual occurrence. Agent agreed that it was unusual and told him that since he was now listed in our files and in the Austrian police files as a Soviet agent, it would be best for him to relate the full story of his intelligence activities, his arrest and his interrogation by the Soviets, so that we would be able to prove to our own satisfaction that he actually is not a Soviet agent. He said he would be happy to tell everything he knows.

3. To start sounding out BAYMAN's actual willingness to talk, agent took as a starting point several questions arising from CIA's earlier interrogations. According to that report, he claimed his former wife, ~~FRITZ KURTEL~~ and ~~OLDSCHNIDER~~, was in contact with the KIS through one ~~(Mrs) KURTEL~~. BAYMAN now states that he believes the full name is Fritz KURTEL, and that he works under Mr. ~~ALTMAN~~ in the ~~KIS~~ ~~Abteilung~~ ~~OK~~, the KPO's Central Committee. OLDSCHNIDER met him in 1951 when she was a student at the KPO's two week school for ~~Gewerkschafter~~ in ~~Geheimdienst~~ in Vienna I, ~~viadrstrasse~~, number unknown. He was head of the school at that time. Her assignment for KURTEL was reporting on BAYMAN. He also believes she has been in contact with a Soviet officer of the KIS. It was either KURTEL or the Soviet to whom she gave the information leading to his arrest. The CIA report also says his wife is in contact with one ~~Lutz WILFANG~~ (often referred to erroneously as Volfgang WILF), who allegedly works for the Soviets. BAYMAN claims he did not say that WILFANG works for the Soviets, although it is possible that this is the case. He is an

INDEX

CS COPY

11 72654

att #1
to EAVA-5891

1111
[]

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Austrian who was formerly with the French Foreign Legion. He was arrested and interrogated by CIC in 1949 or 1950 and was then picked up by the Soviets and interrogated on his CIC interrogation. He was dismissed from the ICPC several years ago. BAUMANN appeared to talk freely on both these topics and to be willing to tell any details known to him.

4. Agent next turned to Soviet interrogation techniques during his arrest, whereupon resistance was immediately encountered. He said only three persons took part, a Captain, who was his interrogator, a Major, who was the prosecutor (Staatsanwalt), and a civilian interpreter. He knew no names. Personal description was not asked for. He was arrested 11 January and released 16 June 1951. He was interrogated constantly during the first weeks, then less during the middle part of his arrest period, and then not at all toward the end. Concerning details, he volunteered nothing and avoided most direct questions. What he meant by the "first weeks" he was reluctant to pin down. First he gave the impression it might be two weeks, then ten, and finally settled for six to eight weeks. What he meant by "constant" could also not be determined. In desperation he finally said it was eight to sixteen hours, but agent had the impression he just pulled these figures out of the air. Now this time was divided into interrogation sessions and breaks for rest, sleep, or eating he would not say. He claimed he did not have to write anything for the Soviets. The interrogator took notes, and on the basis of these drew up "protocols" which were shown to him for his approval and then signed by him. The subject of the interrogations was predominantly the personalities and activities of the Bund Unabhängiger Freiberger Österreichischer, of which BAUMANN is the head, but they also concerned a few of his personal friends and political personalities with whom he has had contact. When asked by agent how many names he gave the Soviets on which they quizzed him, he replied that there were twenty or at most thirty. (Comment: These names are listed in a later paragraph.) After a sceptical look, agent passed on to another topic.

5. Agent next asked BAUMANN how many people with whom he has had intelligence contact are now in Soviet custody. This was immediately limited to persons arrested by the Soviets in 1950 or later. BAUMANN claimed that Victor QUINN is the only one. After "thinking" a bit, he added Alfred SCHNEIDER, but denied any others. Agent brought up the name of Josef (Supp) MASCHER. BAUMANN denied ever having worked with or even having ever met MASCHER socially. His only knowledge of the name MASCHER is that he remembers reading in the papers in the summer of 1951 that MASCHER was arrested by the Soviets. Agent commented that it was quite unusual for BAUMANN to remember the name if his only knowledge of it was his reading the one article in the newspaper. BAUMANN answered that he has a good memory for names. (Comment: It is unlikely that BAUMANN has ever met or seen MASCHER. Agent returned to the MASCHER issue frequently during the remainder of the meeting.)

6. Agent requested BAUMANN to give a summary of all his intelligence activity since 1943. He started by giving briefly his contacts in the Austrian resistance movement in 1943 and 1944. He worked in the group under Major Karl SCHOLZ and others from Lehrkreis 17 of the German Wehrmacht. He was twice arrested by the Gestapo. SCHOLZ's group had contact with CBS through Fritz HOLLER

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

and Earl FURBY, and with the British through Johannes LITLITZ and Erik JANTER. In January or February 1945, RAUMANN took up radio contact with Marshall POLBUCHIN of the Russian general staff. Agent did not make RAUMANN elaborate in detail, as it is presumed the entire story is well known. From April 1945 to 10 July 1945 he worked under Dr. Heinrich GURMAYER in the Staatpolizei. On 10 July he was arrested, allegedly as a former Nazi, but actually because he opposed the Communist infiltration into the police. He was released on 8 March 1946.

7. RAUMANN alleged to have had no further intelligence contacts until early 1948, when he met WITOLD B at a conference of Friedrich Obmannser of the OVP Jugend Bewegung. When asked who else worked for W.B., he at first denied knowing any others. When agent expressed surprise and repeated the question, RAUMANN said that Otto HESSER, now under Soviet arrest, was W.B.'s contact man to the Staatpolizei, but that RAUMANN did not know him personally. He then stated that Alfred MLOKOVSKY was also in W.B.'s group. MLOKOVSKY was working for Ignaz Adolf URBAN, who in turn was working for the Americans, but then URBAN lost his American contact, so RAUMANN brought MLOKOVSKY into contact with W.B. Theodore HART, from Graz, worked with URBAN and MLOKOVSKY, but not directly for W.B. These ALBERT worked for HARTL and MLOKOVSKY, but also for W.B., and later for Herbert KORN. W.B. is now in Graz working for Eustace A. Strauss. Contact with W.B. stopped at the end of 1948. Agent asked RAUMANN if he was certain these were the only people involved, and he replied that there was no one else. Agent asked if he hadn't obtained reports for W.B. from his wife, but RAUMANN denied this. When agent expressed scepticism, RAUMANN claimed that she was sending all the time and that he had gotten no reports after they were married, i.e. his wife was not a source. (Comment: RAUMANN denied by implication any knowledge of Richard WOLF and Walter KOUBA, from whom RAUMANN is known to have received reports which he passed on to W.B. Also, RAUMANN maintained contact with W.B. until at least the Spring of 1949, and probably until much later.)

8. URBAN worked for the Americans in Frankfurt am Main and also for Dr. Oswald P. T. BLUMBERG. In 1948 URBAN denounced RAUMANN, HESS, Dr. Arthur WEINHOLD, Alexander WOODFORD and others to P. T. FLECHNER. RAUMANN alleged that he has never met URBAN personally and that he knows nothing about his activities since 1948. (Comment: This appears unlikely.)

9. Agent asked what intelligence contacts RAUMANN took up after the demise of the W.B. operation. He stated that since then he has not been active in intelligence work. Agent expressed considerable surprise and disbelief at this assertion, but RAUMANN stuck to the statement.

10. Agent next asked how many names the Soviets quizzed him on during his interrogation.

Q: How many?

A: How many?

B: About twenty.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

A: No more?

B: No more.

A: I don't believe you.

B: Well, thirty at most.

A: Write them down on this paper.

BAUMANN wrote down the following names: Franz RYKO, Gustav GRONH, Dr. Julius WEIZ, Dr. Hans BOCHNER, Dr. Walter WERTH, Hans ALBERT, Harald FRICKSON, Robert WELER, Heinrich WITTE, (aka) SCHWABE, Dr. (aka) WILLING, (aka) BROCKMAN, General Emil BETHGART, (aka) BROCKLY, Lutz WILFANG, Foreign Minister Karl BRUNER, State Secretary Ferdinand GILF, former Chancellor Leopold WITZ, Hans FRIEDL, Josef HUBER, Alois GRAND, Gustav RYKO, Maria SCHNEIDER, Felicitas BAUMANN and COLB-SCHMIDT, and Fritz WIES.

11. Agent picked out the names of the three Americans and queried BAUMANN on what the Soviets already knew about them, what they asked, and what BAUMANN told them. The information has been supplemented by information received during a re-interrogation on the subject at the third meeting and has been written up as Information Report #7.

12. It became apparent at this time that BAUMANN desired to discuss Josef WEIZ, whom he branded as a Soviet agent, but agent was more interested in learning what he did not want to talk about rather than letting him rattle on on topics that were not going to prove anything.

13. In answer to a question as to why he was arrested, BAUMANN explained that it was connected with the arrest of Gustav GRONH and Alois GRAND. GRONH testified that the Bund Akademischer Freiheitskämpfer, of which BAUMANN was head, was in contact with the French and American intelligence services. He does not feel that GRONH so testified in a deliberate attempt to incriminate him. BAUMANN maintains the allegation is false. He did admit having received support for his organization from the French General Emil BETHGART, but claims it had nothing to do with intelligence activity. The support was in order to further the purposes of the organization and took the form of free quarters, free train rides, and 12,000. Similar support was provided by the Educational Division of USACA. (Comment: At the end of the meeting BAUMANN admitted he was not arrested in connection with the RYKO-GRAND affair.)

14. Agent asked about the exact location of the prison, but BAUMANN claimed he did not know. He was taken to the prison at night, with shades drawn in the car, and driven around in circles on the way. He could only say that it was on the edge of the town of Baden, near a railroad line.

15. Asked about the current whereabouts of KLICOVSKY, he replied that he is still in jail. Asked how he knows this, he said he assumes it because KLICOVSKY was guilty of intelligence activity against the Soviets and the Soviets do not

-5-
UNRECORDED COPY

release such types. As far as BAUMANN remembers, KLITSCHKY was arrested in May 1952. The last time BAUMANN saw KLITSCHKY was in 1948. (Comment: No BAUMANN-KLITSCHKY contact since 1948 is difficult to believe.)

16. Asked about other persons arrested since 1950 whom he believes are still in jail, BAUMANN gave the names of (fsm) [redacted], resided in Vienna [redacted]; STRANGL (this is Raymond STRANGL; BAUMANN claims he has never met or seen him); (fsm) DANIEL (this is probably Hans DANIEL); Arnold [redacted]; and Walter [redacted]. (Comment: In meeting 14, BAUMANN gave the names of many others who were in prison with him, but at this first meeting he denied having met any other prisoners during his arrest.)

17. Asked about his connections to Gustav [redacted] and Annela GRAND, and the intelligence contacts of these persons, BAUMANN gave the following story. GRAND was national leader of the Bund Demokratischer Freiheitskämpfer; RIPP was head of the Vienna branch of the organization; and BAUMANN was Youth Referent for the national organization. At the end of 1947 BAUMANN accompanied GRAND to one meeting with a Mr. "Harry" at the "CIC office" in Parsallanzen. GRAND was apparently in constant contact with "Harry". The meeting lasted five hours and concerned training and planning for using the organization to collect and transmit intelligence reports on the Soviet zone of Austria. BAUMANN allegedly never participated in the activity because he did not like CIC's security - he was introduced by true name and driven home in an Army jeep after the meeting. The Soviets never learned that BAUMANN accompanied GRAND on this visit. GRAND confided to BAUMANN in 1947 that he was also in contact with a Mr. Johnson from PS3 and with the French Intelligence Service. He believes GRAND was in touch with G-2 until at least 1952 and that the organization of the Bund Demokratischer Freiheitskämpfer was used for transmitting reports from the Soviet zone of Austria. He believes GRAND was completely incapable as an intelligence operator.

18. Agent next turned to pressing for information on government personalities to whom BAUMANN has passed reports or with whom he exchanged reports. BAUMANN steadfastly denied ever having participated in such activity, and eventually said that the only possible instance of this might be the fact that he contributed information to the Ret-wiss-Zeit book on the Austrian Resistance Movement. For this purpose he met with Legationrat (fsm) SEIFERT and with Dr. (fsm) VALDREIN and Dr. (fsm) APPEL, two of GRUBER's secretaries. (Comment: This is Dr. Kurt VALDREIN, GRUBER secretary from 1946 to 1948, and Dr. Wilhelm APPEL, GRUBER secretary after 1948.) These contacts were irregular between 1947 and 1949. BAUMANN finally admitted that he might have given them a few bits of political information and that in return he received preferential treatment in visa affairs for some of his people in the Bund Akademischer Freiheitskämpfer. He denied any other intelligence contacts in the government. (Comment: This conflicts with other information available to this office.)

19. Agent next asked with which Austrian police officials he has had contact. After some hesitation, he listed Insp. Josef HIRSCHLACHER, Insp. Herbert DEISCHNER, Insp. (fsm) PLATTNER, and Insp. (fsm) ADAM. As BAUMANN appeared to be having difficulty remembering the names, agent suggested that Insp. (fsm) HANFROD might be one of his contacts, but BAUMANN replied that he had never heard of him. BAUMANN then continued with the names of Insp. (fsm) STRARITSCH, Insp.

JUST INFORMATION

-6-

(Sms) MARSHALL, and W. Oswald FURMAN R. BAUMANN first referred to the above persons as co-workers who provided police protection for his Bund Amdiaischer Freiheitkämpfer, then stated that his only contact with them was when they were investigating the Freiheitkämpfer and that he tried to get them to lay off, and then finally admitted that he had exchanged reports with most of them.

20. As to the source and subject of information which he collected and passed to the police, he said most of it was "operational information" needed by the Freiheitkämpfer for their propaganda and raiding activities against the Neo-Nazi and Communist parties. Most of it was on the VDU and Nationale Liga. His steady source was Alfred Robert KILLER, member of the VDU. He frequently received information on the VDU and the Nationale Liga from Landtagsabgeordneter Heinrich FIRCHER. He elicited information from Nationalrat (Sms) SLAVIK of the VDU.

21. At this point agent commented that BAUMANN's unwillingness to cooperate allowed only one conclusion to be drawn, that he was now working for the Soviets as alleged. BAUMANN said he doesn't know whether it makes any difference or not, but that he did once work for the Americans, loyally, and that it only got him into trouble. Although he did get some food, he was never paid for his work, not even enough to cover expenses. (Comment: Apparently a reference to his contact with KILLER.) Now, to top it off, he was arrested by the Russians, partially because of his former AIS activity. Agent said that what BAUMANN did in the past is no criterion; he now gives all signs of being a Soviet agent and it is up to him to prove otherwise.

22. Agent asked which of BAUMANN's former contacts had approached him to ask if he had compromised them to the Soviets. He insisted, repeatedly, that no one had.

23. Agent asked if the names MLEKOWSKY, URBAN, and KLIMOVIC had come up during his interrogation. He denied that any of them had been mentioned and stated that he had never heard of KLIMOVIC at all. (Comment: He admitted at the end of the meeting that MLEKOWSKY's testimony had been the prime cause of his arrest.)

24. Agent asked if he knows anyone whom he believes to be an American agent. BAUMANN said he did not, but was eventually forced into a position where he had to admit that there were some people whom he had grounds to suspect might be in contact with the Americans, but he still declined to give names. Finally, agent phrased the question as follows: If you had to name five persons who work for the Americans, whom would you name? BAUMANN gave the following:

- a. State Police employee (Sms) POSKA (phonetic) - He visited BAUMANN briefly at his home and asked him questions about his arrest.
- b. Josef HIRSCHLAGER - only because of his position in the police.
- c. Herbert DREISCHNAPFER.

-7-

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

d. Hans ECKHART - A Reichsminister in the Lower Austrian government who collects information and exchanges reports.

e. After denying that he could name any others, he included Fritz KIEB.

(Comment: This was holding back for no apparent purpose. If he had really wanted to appear to cooperate, he could probably have given 10 names without giving anything away.)

25. Agent asked who had interrogated him on his arrest. He stated that the French had called him in for a two hour interview in mid-July 1953. Questions were mainly on the basis for his arrest, who he saw at the prison, etc. He told them he was arrested in connection with FIDM and TAND and that he saw no one at the prison. A Statepolized employee who gave his name as FOCKA (phonetic) visited him at home in December 1953 and asked the reasons for the arrest and whether or not he had been interrogated by the Americans. This took only about a half an hour. Later, BAUMANN called the Statepolized and asked if they had really sent the men. They denied having done so. BAUMANN believes that FOCKA came on American orders.

26. In response to a repeated query as to which friends or former contacts had come to ask about his arrest, BAUMANN stated that the following persons had asked him about it:

a. Franz PERKO - He used to work with BAUMANN and KIEB. He now collects information, but BAUMANN doesn't know for whom. He mistrusts him because he hasn't been arrested. He asked BAUMANN about Soviet interest in him.

b. Günther FEROCH - Customs official and personal friend of BAUMANN's who helped his wife while he was in prison. He asked about the arrest.

c. After saying there was no one else, he mentioned he had seen Karl OBENBILDER several times since his release and that he had asked if the Russians had mentioned him. BAUMANN said that OBENBILDER was a personal friend of KIEB's who had no part in his intelligence activity. (Comment: OBENBILDER was one of KIEB's penetrations into the FOAJ, and BAUMANN probably knows this.)

27. Without being questioned, and for no apparent reason at all, BAUMANN started talking about Walter MATHEIS. He said MATHEIS was arrested by the Soviets in April 1952 and sentenced to eight years for distributing anti-Soviet leaflets. This was the cause of KIEB's flight from Vienna. BAUMANN said he did not know MATHEIS, but that the Soviets had asked him about MATHEIS and that they had read to BAUMANN the testimony given on him by MATHEIS.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

28. Agent asked the identity of (fmr) SUTSKIN, whom BROWN had listed as one individual on whom he was questioned in detail by the Soviets. He said SUTSKIN was a member of the VDU student group and that the Prudobitakempfer had accused him of libel and instituted legal proceedings against him. SUTSKIN accused the Prudobitakempfer of having broken into VDU Headquarters and stealing a list of political opponents of the VDU. This was true, but the Prudobitakempfer challenged that statement to defend themselves and to publicize the fact that the VDU was keeping a "black list."

29. Agent, honestly feeling that further discussion was pointless, started to pull together his various papers and told BROWN that if he doesn't care to cooperate, there is not much point in agent's wasting his time with further discussion; I guess you'll just have to remain in our files as a Soviet agent. BROWN shrugged his shoulders. Agent asked him for his address and phone number so that he could be contacted just in case the bees had any more questions he wants asked. BROWN asked what name the caller would give, so that he will recognize who it is. (It doesn't make any difference if the name isn't a true one.) Agent told him Parker, and spelled it out assuring him that he need not fear agent would give him his true name. Just as agent started to stand up signifying the end of the meeting, BROWN asked, "and shouldn't I have some means of contacting you in case something comes up?" Agent asked what he could possibly ever have to say that he hadn't had ample opportunity to say during this meeting, to which BROWN replied that perhaps the Soviets might be after him again. Agent told him that after today's performance we wouldn't bother to lift a finger to help him, no matter who was after him.

30. At this point BROWN suddenly dropped the facade and in a rapid exchange he said he could give important information on Soviet agents; that the fact that he was arrested shortly after RING and RAB was sheer accident and the real reason for his arrest was KLETOVSKY; that the Soviets had a copy of a report he gave NIS on the personnel of the Soviet Censorship Office; and that he had also been in contact with other persons, including Richard VOLZ. Agent asked how many Soviet agents he knows and what their names are. BROWN said he knows several, and agent replied that he knows the names of many Soviet agents, including probably all those whom BROWN knows. There followed a rapid, at times heated, seven or eight minute discussion of security, in which BROWN admitted he had been lying but claimed he would only get himself in trouble if he told any more; complained that CIC is insecure because it has too many fools; that it was plain to see that agent (who said he was from "Headquarters" in Salisbury) was a specialist in intelligence matters and not one of the fools, but that nevertheless the organization as a whole was bad; repeated again that if he talked he was certain he would be arrested again by the Soviets; and that meeting in well known CIC offices is bad security and dangerous to him. This was interspersed at agent's side with frequent statements to the effect that as far as agent is concerned, the day's meeting has convinced him that BROWN is indeed a Soviet agent, and that agent is not going to change the meeting place, not going to take anything but routine security procedures, not going to make any commitments and not going to change his mind until BROWN has proven his willingness and ability to answer truthfully and completely questions which are asked of him. As an apparent impasse was reached at the end of this exchange,

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

BAUMANN commented, almost completely out of context, "There are a number of different American intelligence services." The agent threw the initiative back to BAUMANN with a noncommittal affirmative, there was first a moment of silence and then BAUMANN said, somewhat at a loss for words, "I believe the British and French have several different intelligence services too." Both agent and BAUMANN were standing throughout the above exchange. At this point there was nothing more to be said, so BAUMANN put on his coat and started toward the door.

12. After BAUMANN started to leave, he stopped, apparently reluctant to go, and asked what he would have to gain if he did cooperate.

A: You can judge that yourself better than I.

B: No I can't.

A: First, you would no longer be listed in our files as a Soviet agent.

B: That couldn't make less difference to me.

A: Not right now, but it might later.

B: I don't intend to emigrate or anything.

A: Maybe not, but the Soviets won't always be here to protect you.

BAUMANN shrugged his shoulders; agent did likewise.

A: What do you want me to offer you, money?

BAUMANN at first did not react, then said, "If I tell you these things I'll have to leave Vienna."

A: Why?

B: Because the Soviets will find it out.

A: I don't believe that.

B: I'd have to find a position in one of the Bundeslander.

A: We don't run an employment service, and besides, we don't make any commitments until you've produced.

B: I understand that and know your reasons for not doing so, but nevertheless, my experience is that it doesn't pay to go into these things blindly.

A: My experience is that one always takes up a clandestine contact somewhat blindly.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

EAVA-5891

B: Yes, but (with conviction) it doesn't pay. Remember I was with the police for a while and I know the technique of using a person and then doing him in.

A: As far as we are concerned, you are a Soviet agent until you prove otherwise, and we won't show any confidence in you until you prove that you deserve it.

RAUFMAN shrugged his shoulders.

A: It's obvious that we aren't going to agree today, but it might be worth further discussion. Think it over and come here at 11:00 tomorrow and tell me the conditions under which you will cooperate.

B: Okay.

RAUFMAN lives with his brother, Wolfgang RAUFMAN, at Vienna VI, Koenigsplatz, no. 7/13, and intends to remain there. Telephone number is A-34-3-06-U.

11 Jul 54

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

27 Dec 53

MICROFILMED
JUL 8 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

OP

atkl
EAVA-5891
11 Feb 54

Report of Interrogation of Herbert BAUMANN

Subject: Operational Report #4

1. PCB agent met BAUMANN from 1415 to 1700, 28 December, at the CIE. Massachusetts offices, Room No. 33.

2. At this meeting BAUMANN was debriefed for the information contained in the following reports:

- a. Information Report #12, Kurt JUFFINGER
- b. Information Report #13, Franz FORTSCH
- c. Information Report #14, Other Prisoners at the Central Detach Oshangis.

3. Agent opened the meeting by commenting that BAUMANN had now had five days in which to consider the developments to date and asking if any decisions had been made. BAUMANN replied that no decisions had been made and suggested that we start in where we had left off at the last meeting.

4. Agent began by asking BAUMANN for information on a number of individuals:

a. Who is Edward PUMPHREY? (Comment: PUMPHREY is reportedly a friend and intelligence contact of BAUMANN's.)

BAUMANN said he has heard of the name but he can't recall in what connection; he has never met him personally.

b. Who is Karl KRAUTBERGER? (Comment: KRAUTBERGER was a close contact of Fritz REE, possibly known to BAUMANN.)

BAUMANN denied ever having heard of KRAUTBERGER.

c. Who is Hans ZEHARY? (Comment: This name was mentioned by BAUMANN as one the Soviets quizzed him on.)

BAUMANN gave information which has been reported separately.

d. Who is Dr. Julius REE? (Comment: Another name first brought up by BAUMANN.)

REE replaced BAUMANN as head of the Bund Freiheitlicher Freiheitskämpfer in May 1952. He has had no intelligence contacts

INDEX

ES COPY

11 Feb 54

11 Feb 54
to EAVA-5891

SECRET

to BAUMANN's knowledge. He now works as an interpreter for American forces in Vienna. BAUMANN denies knowing in what office HERRI is employed. (Comment: Due to HERRI's American employment, it would be logical for BAUMANN to conceal any derogatory information which might be known to him.)

e. Who is Dr. Jan FRICKLER + HECKY

BAUMANN claimed not to know FRICKLER, but there is a HECKY who is an acquaintance of Yrass NIXED. He lives on Mariahilferstrasse, approximately 145 cm. tall, slim, black hair, small face, about 30 years old. (Comment: This description does not fit FRICKLER + HECKY + COCCIS + SLACHNOI, the man whom agent had in mind.)

f. Who is Klaus HEUNTSCHWEL?

BAUMANN said HEUNTSCHWEL worked as a propaganda referent for Ferdinand GRAP in 1950, that he now works for the Bundeskanzleramt press service. He has seen HECKY in the company of HEUNTSCHWEL, and it was through HEUNTSCHWEL that NIXED met HECKY.

A: Did you ever give reports to HEUNTSCHWEL?

B: No.

A: No reports of any kind?

B: My contact with him was on behalf of the Bund Akademischer Freiheitkämpfer, and of course I gave him information on the activities of this group.

A: But you never passed him reports on the VdU, Demokratische Union, or such things?

B: Well, maybe a few.

(Comment: BAUMANN reportedly used to pass reports to HEUNTSCHWEL on a regular basis.)

g. Who is Dr. Hans SCHUSTER? (Comment: Hans originally mentioned by BAUMANN as an individual on whom the Soviets had interrogated him.)

He is (or was) deputy chairman for Vienna of the Bund Akademischer Freiheitkämpfer. Nothing known of any intelligence connections.

h. Who is Dr. Walter RECHT? (Comment: Hans first mentioned by BAUMANN)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY
SECRET

He is a former functionary of the Freikorps. He fled to England after BACHMANN's arrest. He was in the British army during the war and maintained contact with officers of F.B. ever since. BACHMANN presumes he was working for the SIS, but allegedly knows no details of his contact.

1. Where is Josef Adolf URSAN now and what is his current activity?

BACHMANN alleged that he knows nothing about URSAN since 1958.

3. Who is Ounther T. ARCOFF? (Comment: Name first mentioned by BACHMANN.)

He is secretary of the Vienna organization of the Freikorps. BACHMANN alleged that he has no intelligence contacts to his knowledge, but after BACHMANN's arrest he did contact Herbert WISENHAMMER to ask him to intervene on BACHMANN's behalf.

5. Agent next asked BACHMANN if he had anything to add to the report he gave last time on Margarete UFF, or whether he was prepared to give the source at this time. After some sparring about whether he should or should not give the source, BACHMANN said he could not yet give the source because he was not yet clear in exactly what capacity he was sitting here being interrogated. If the interrogation was a routine interrogation of him as a person who has been released by the Soviets, he does not feel it is necessary for him to give such information. He has already given sufficient information to cause him considerable difficulty if the Soviets find out about it, and he sees no point in risking his neck further for a strictly routine affair. If, on the other hand, the relationship with agent is to continue and be something more than routine, then he recognizes the necessity for giving such information. Thus, BACHMANN summarized, the source cannot be given until I'm certain of just where I stand with you.

4. Agent replied to BACHMANN as follows: The contact started out to be a routine one, but you volunteered the opinion that you could be of further service and, in particular, that you were capable of working on counter-intelligence targets against the Soviets. Whether the contact becomes more than routine depends upon your willingness to cooperate and to present what we consider a workable plan. You have claimed that you have capabilities in the counter-intelligence field, but you haven't yet proven that. The report on DCP was no proof. In the first place, reports without sources are worthless. And until you give the source, we don't know whether that was a one-time affair or whether it indicates a steady source. I won't make this anything more than a routine interrogation until you have proven the capabilities you claim to have and have presented a workable plan. BACHMANN countered that the source of the report was obvious, that it came from another prisoner and that, as agent said, he would not have access to such information on a constant basis. He admitted that he had no sources at the present time, but that such sources weren't necessarily required; there are other ways of getting information.