

C O P Y

Dispatch No. MGL-A-9989

16 January 1952

TO : Chief, Foreign Division, M

FROM : Chief of Station, Karlsruhe

SUBJECT : General - Operational

Specific - ZIPPER/ROESSLSPRUNG

Reference: MGL-A-9990, MGLA-8740

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIBENCE ABENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION3020 NAZIWAR CRIMESDISCLOSUREACT DATE 2001 2006

1. ZIPPER has produced a proposal named "ROESSLSPRUNG" which is producing CARBAGE material from the Vienna area, Austrian OB, and KPOe Central Committee information. The obvious, and admitted ties to other agencies, plus the very unsavoury reputation of one of the leading figures in the proposal would have led to the immediate rejection of the proposal except for one fact -- the ZIPPER evaluation group rates the CARBAGE production so highly and states that the possibility of fabrication is so remote that we cannot reject this proposal without further study.

We plan to play along with this proposal for about four months 2. during which time we will send youthe report numbers of all reports emanating from this operation as well as samples of the original material it supplies. In this way we should be able to determine whether we are already getting this material, and, if so, where it is coming from. The net supplying this information is allegedly a group of ANDERS Poles working in Austria. This information is submitted to a Polish Colonel in Innsbruck who in turn sends it to another Polish Colonel in Paris who is working for the French. ZIPPER now allegedly gets half the original material collected and photocopies of the rest which goes in the original form to the French via Lunsbruck. ZIPPER allegedly gets all the intelligence produced. The great bulk of this material is still being processed and no MGLs have gone out as yet. The ZIPPER CI/CE section is following this with interest. To date ZIPPER has invested about DM 6000 in the operation. The Colonel in Inacbruck reportedly pays circa 1400 dollars per month for his part of the take. The ZIPPER contact offered to cut out the French but this was rejected since it would have meant that we would have had to make up the \$1400 per month. Paris, London or Austria would appear to be the most likely sources of this information if we are getting it through other channels.

3. The ZIPPER evaluation group has sent us the following material already supplied by "ROESSLSPRUNG":

DIST: 2 - FDM 1 - COS 1 - SIIZ 1 - Vienna

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Through analysis of CARBACE material they have identified:

A Gd. Schutz Division in Moscow. A Gd. Gebirgs Schutz Division in Carpathia. The staff of a Gd. Mechanized Army in Weissus.

They have also numerous confirmations and new identities of units of the 13th Gd. Mechanized Division, the 23rd Flak Division and other units of the central group of troops in western Russia.

NOTE: We assume that ZIPPER has no confirmation on the Divisions in Moscow and Carpathia, or on the Army in Weissus. Their acceptance of this information as genuine is due to the fact that it was culled from original material (letters, orders, etc.) picked-up at Soviet installations.

4. ROESSLSPRUNG also has provided us with copies of the following Russian publications:

TANKIST SCHURNAL WOSDUSCHNOW FLOTA WOJENNYJ WESTNIK WOJENNAJA WYAL ARTILLERIJSKIJ SCHURNAL KRASSNEJ SVESDA STALINSKIJ SSOKOL

5. a. The original approach came to ZIPPER in the fall of 1951 and contact was sought or established to several parts of ZIPPER. V-13690 (see MCLA-9990, para. 1) who knew the leader of ZIPPER's UM very well from the old Sicherheitsdienst days tried through him many times to contact ZIPPER. The UM leader, MANDL, insisted that he had no such connection.

b. Two other men (see MGLA-9990 paras. 6 and 7) approached an unidentified source of GV I with no results.

c. V-13690 through (see MCLA-9990 para. 8) approached ZIPPER's BV S with an offer to supply them with photocopies of material which they were allegedly giving to the BIS in Graz, Austria. BV S was told by ZIPPER's CL/CE staff to play along but to make no commitment. BV S gave the contact man AS 1000 as a cort of retainer but this was later returned to them with the explanation that the case needed reconsideration.

d. Obviously V-13690 preferred his contact to GV G, who had given him retainers of DN 2000 on two occasions. The contact to GV G is the one which now exists, but we know as yet nothing about the method or the personalities of the approach.

3. In September 1951 V-13692 approached the 35 section of ZIPPER and offered them the services of a group collecting intelligence in the Soviet Zone of Austria. NOTE: This multiple approach naturally indicates a fairly extensive knowledge of ZIPPER by the net of V-13690. We do not yet know how this was possible, but will try to tape the matter.

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6. The following personalities appear in this proposal:

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a. V-13690 (see MGLA-9990, para. 1), formerly employed by CIC, Linz, dropped for fabrication and intelligence peddling. Former Hauptbeauftrafter of the RSHA, AMT VI, for Hungary, and Obersturmbahnfuchrer of the SD. GVA reported to ZIPPER in October 1949 on Subject's connection to the Sicherheitsdirektion, Austria. We know this from his CIC days that he was close to RUPERTSBERGER of that organization. He was also reported by GV A to be working with the man now known as V-13692 (see MGLA-9990 para. 2) and with two Austrians (see MGLA-9990, para. 3) for CIC, Linz. V-13690 was at one time head of a net in the CSR for the RSHA and was known as "AMTMANN".

b. V-13691 (see NCLA-9990, para.4) who carries reports and material over the Austro-German border. No information in POB or ZIPPER files.

c. V-13692 (see MCLA-9990 para.2), former Hungarian specialist for Willi HOETTL. As alias KELLER he had an Austrian OB net. GVA reported in 1951 that he was trying to contact ZIPPER.

d. V-13671 (see MGLA-9990 para.5), ZIFPER employee as of June 1951 and probably earlier since ZIPPER requested a Zuzugsgenehmigung for him in October 1949. He worked for BARANOVSKY.

e. Former Polish Officer, (see MGLA-9990 para.9), has contact to the FIS and probably to the BIS. Also to emigrant Hungarian groups dabbling in intelligence. It was reported in March 1950 by GV A that Subject had intelligence dealings with (see MGLA-9990 para.10) who in turn has contact with (see MGLA-9990 para.11) and contact to the FSS in Graz. The wife of Subject born in Hungary nee (see MGLA-9990 para 12) disappeared early in 1950 with documents and valuables belonging to her husband and was reported later in Budepest. V-13690 passes information and material to Subject who in turn passes it to another Pole (see MGLA-9990 para.13) living in Paris.

7. As we stated in paragraph 1 of this memo the above outlined morass would have been rejected out of hand had not the evaluation section of ZIPPER rated the product so highly. We hope that with the small amount of production cited and the names given we can determine quickly whether this is staff we are getting from another sources or sources and whether in truth the ZIPPER evaluation section has not fallen victim to an exceptionally able fabrication ring. They admit that a lot of the reporting shows signs of collation, sifting and evaluation which would point to a rather large and organized agency. If the information included in this memo is not enough to tag the operation as already tapped or known to be a fabrication, we will send all original material possible and reports numbers in the coming months.

Attn: \_\_\_\_\_\_ I suggest you discuss with FDM Chief of Opns at earliest opportunity and provide us with tasis for dealing with ZIFPER - This really looks phoney! W??

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