



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

SAVA 73-4

5 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

SUBJECT : Unsolicited Testimonial

1. As you will recall, shortly after the President's 17 May 1972 instructions that the overall U.S. propaganda/psychological warfare effort against North Vietnam should be overhauled, intensified and improved, we established -- in conjunction with ARVN's General Political Warfare Directorate (GPWD) -- a new radio program beamed at the north and known as "Channel 11" or "Mother Vietnam." The program was and is built around a particular female announcer, whose real name is Hien but has herself virtually become "Mother."

2. Ever since this program was started (on 1 June 1972), it has shown signs of tweaking tender chords within the Party structure. It has been sharply attacked in Nhan Dan and apparently has generated a fairly broad, and faithful, audience within North Vietnam and the NVA. We have just received another unsolicited testimonial to this program's impact from sources within North Vietnam.

3. According to a GPWD memorandum sent to our Saigon Station on 2 March, on Sunday, 13 February, three ARVN officers accompanied the Four-Party Joint Military Commission to Hanoi to witness the release of a group of U.S. POWs. These three (all born in North Vietnam) were the first ARVN officers to see Hanoi since 1954. Among the three was a Lieutenant Duong-Phuc, a correspondent of the South Vietnamese equivalent of our Armed Forces (Radio) Network. When Communist Party cadre saw Lieutenant Duong-Phuc

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speaking into his tape recorder about what he was witnessing in Hanoi, the cadre realized Lieutenant Duong-Phuc was a correspondent for the ARVN radio. The cadre then began asking Lieutenant Duong-Phuc about the "Mother Vietnam Program." Even though the ARVN Lieutenant professed ignorance about the program, "two Communist cadre of Hanoi Radio," as the 2 March GPWD memorandum put it, "revealed to him the following opinions as if to burden all their anger on him." The GPWD memorandum goes on to recount:

"The Communist soldiers disclosed the following:

"1) The power of Mother Vietnam program is very strong, it can be heard very clearly and its reception is very easy.

"2) Miss Hien, the announcer of Mother Vietnam program is very well-known to cadre of Hanoi Radio.

"3) Miss Hien's voice is very gentle and affectionate (in contrast to the hostile, sour voice of the Hanoi Radio announcers).

"4) The substance of Mother Vietnam program is very reactionary, the people wouldn't listen to it even if they are allowed to (in reality, all foreign radios are forbidden to the NVN people except for Hanoi, Liberation, Moscow and Peking radios).

"5) Everyday, the cadre of Radio Hanoi have to tape the whole of Mother Vietnam program then type it out and submit it to the Vietnam Lao-Dong Central Party.

"Through the above revelations, we can conclude that Mother Vietnam program has become a headache for the Hanoi Communist authorities. It is certain that this program has created a pretty favorable impression in NVN, therefore

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Hanoi had to order its cadre to follow closely Mother Vietnam program everyday and never hesitate to attack it as Hanoi regards Mother Vietnam program as reactionary and is harmful to the morale and psychology of the NVN people."

4. Even allowing for a little hyperbole on the part of the GPWD, the fact remains that such a spontaneous tirade from two members of the Hanoi Radio staff is quite a testimonial to Channel 11's impact.

James R. Schlesinger
Director

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VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS STAFF
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 5 March 1973

TO: The Director

FROM: G.A. Carver, Jr.

SUBJECT:

REMARKS:

Bill Colby and I were chatting after the 5 March Morning Meeting and jointly thought you might find it useful to forward something along the lines of the attached memorandum. The President's 17 May instructions were quite tart and explicit. (To be blunt, he blew a fuse -- justifiably -- over the poor state of the overall U.S. Government psychological warfare effort against North Vietnam.) The attached discusses a step taken in direct response to the President's wishes, a step that seems to have worked along the lines he directed.

G.A.C.
George A. Carver, Jr.

Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

Attachment

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