

15 FEB 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

**SUBJECT: United States Support to the Tibetan
Resistance Movement**

The attached memorandum is submitted for the Director's use in briefing Secretary Rusk on the background and current status of the support which the United States Government is giving to the Tibetan resistance movement.

Signed William V. Broe

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Attachment a/s

Acting Chief, Far East Division

cc: DDCI

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FE/CH/TTF/ [] (15 February 1961)

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1. Background. The United States Government has been committed to support of the Tibetan resistance movement since 1951. This commitment has been in three main fields; asylum and support for the Dalai Lama; military aid to the Tibetan resistance; and political support for the Tibetan cause.

a. In the summer of 1951, following the Chinese Communist invasion of Eastern Tibet, representatives of the Dalai Lama contacted officials of the Department of State and CIA and obtained written and oral assurances that if the Dalai Lama decided to flee Tibet the United States Government: 1) would help him find a country of asylum and contribute to the maintenance of his establishment; 2) would support his case if he should appeal to the United Nations and 3) would attempt to give military assistance to the Tibetan resistance. These promises were made [redacted]

[redacted] after

consultation in Washington between the Department and the Agency. However, there was no need to carry

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through these promises at that time as the Dalai Lama decided to remain in Tibet.

b. When the Dalai Lama visited India in 1956 the questions of asylum, United Nations support, and assistance to the resistance were discussed by his brother and representative, Gyalo Thondup, [redacted]

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[redacted] Decision on asylum and United Nations support was again obviated by the Dalai Lama's decision to return to Tibet. Limited United States support of the military aspects of the Tibetan resistance date from this time.

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2. Implementation to Date. After the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet in March 1959 he asked that the United States Government make good on its past pledges of subsidy and United Nations support. (In these and subsequent dealings with this Government, the Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Thondup, has been the principal representative of the Tibetans. In our view, he has demonstrated honesty and integrity in his dealings with us.) The United States has carried out the following program of assistance to the Tibetans. All aspects of this program have been coordinated and approved

through the Special Group with continuing State-CIA consultation.

a. Asylum. There was no need for United States intervention to obtain asylum for the Dalai Lama as this was granted voluntarily by the Government of India. The Dalai Lama has only limited funds available to him, however, and we have paid him a covert subsidy [redacted] since October 1959. The Dalai Lama uses this money to help maintain his personal and governmental establishment at Dharamsala and to carry on his religious and social work among the Tibetan refugees in India. The United States also contributes additional support for the political and propaganda activities carried on by the Tibetans.

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b. Aid to the Resistance. Following the Dalai Lama's return to Tibet in 1956 the Central Intelligence Agency, at the request of the Department of Defense, agreed to train a small number of Tibetans for an exploratory and reporting mission to the Tibetan resistance movement which had been organized at this time. These agents were split into [redacted] teams and parachuted into Tibet in late

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autumn 1957.

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Following open and widespread rebellion by the Tibetans in 1959, [Redacted] teams of resistance agents were trained and dropped back into Tibet by the Agency during the period from November 1959 to April 1960. Substantial amounts of guerrilla warfare materiel were also dropped to these agents and the resistance forces they contacted. These forces were dispersed in heavy fighting with regular Chinese Communist military units in the spring and summer of 1960. Drops of personnel and equipment into Tibet were discontinued in May 1960 as an aftermath of the U-2 incident. Subsequently, the President authorized resumption of overflights in November 1960

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c. **Political Support.** After the Dalai Lama arrived in India in 1959 he asked for official United States espousal of the Tibetan case at the United Nations. The United States took the following courses of action in support of the Tibetans.

(1) In June and again in July 1959 the Department asked Agency representatives to tell the Dalai Lama that the President and the Secretary of State both continued to give their personal attention to developments in Tibet. The Dalai Lama was "to be assured of our concern that his Government have full opportunity to present its case to world opinion. If he should decide to go to the United Nations, the United States would do whatever it appropriately could to assist him."

(2) Department and Agency officials explained to Tibetan representatives that United States sponsorship of a United Nations resolution was considered tactically unwise, but that this Government would back the Dalai Lama's efforts to find

other sponsors.

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
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
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The Tibetans were at

first reluctant to settle for anything less than recognition and support for their independence as a sovereign state but have reluctantly come to accept the principle of self-determination as their best hope in the present international situation. Largely at the advice of the United States Government the Dalai Lama was persuaded to couch his 1959 appeal to the United Nations in terms of Chinese violations of human rights in Tibet. The hope was held out to the Tibetans that a case based on self-determination could be built which would give them a continuing claim upon international attention. The Tibetans subsequently took comfort from the Secretary of State's public letter of 29 February 1960 reaffirming United States interest in seeing this principle applied to their situation.

(6) In late summer of 1960 Mr. Thondup again asked the advice of the United States on how

to proceed with the Tibetan case at the United Nations. Thondup was told that the substance of the appeal would depend on what the sponsors were able to market at the United Nations. The official United States Government position - that we would like to see the strongest resolution favoring the Tibetans passed at the United Nations, particularly in terms of self-determination, but that the determining factor on substance must always be what would secure the greatest number of votes on record at the United Nations - was formally communicated to the Dalai Lama in a letter which Secretary Herter sent him in October 1960.

(7) Secretary Herter and Under Secretary Merchant reaffirmed this position to Gyalo Thondup when he called on them in Washington on 27 October 1960. As you know,

**this year's appeal has been sponsored by
the Thai, Malayan, and Irish delegations.
New Zealand and Cyprus are also considering
joining the sponsors. The United States
Delegation has lent what support it could in
light of the tactics adopted.**




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**3. Current Plans. These activities represent a plan of
action designed to maintain the viability of the Dalai Lama and
his movement as an alternative to Chinese Communist rule in
Tibet. This movement has cost the Chinese Communists trained
manpower and material which they can ill spare. They have paid
an even heavier price in terms of their reputation, particularly**

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in Asia, for their actions in Tibet. By forcefully putting themselves on the Indian borders the Chinese have caused a radical evolution in official Indian attitudes toward Communist China. Unofficial feelings in India run even higher and lend substance to the possibility of joint action with the Indian Government on utilization of Tibetan resources and their cause to contain the Chinese Communist militarily and politically. Both the Dalai Lama and Gyalo Thondup appreciate the axiomatic importance of their remaining in India.

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a. The Dalai Lama has undertaken a program of reform and personnel changes within his political establishment, designed to make it more representative and responsive to the wishes of his people. This political establishment at Dharamsala is coordinated with the resistance organization through selected interlocking personnel. He plans to draft a blue print of these reforms as his plan for Tibet which he will

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offer as a challenge to the Chinese Communists.

This challenge will include a request that the United Nations sponsor a plebiscite wherein the people of Tibet would choose either his or the Chinese Communist plan for their rule.

[Redacted]

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The

Dalai Lama has adopted them in full awareness of the difficulties involved in their implementation. He sees them, however, as a further move to demonstrate and record his and his people's interest in finding a peaceful solution to their problems.

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d. The Dalai Lama views the current resolution before the United Nations in realistic terms. He knows it will provide no magic solution to their problems, nor is he interested in playing a pawn's role in the cold war. He sees this resolution merely as another step in establishing a record among the international community of his people's efforts to determine their future by peaceful means.

4. The entire course of action outlined above, political, military, and psychological is necessarily inter-related and dependent upon positive United States action. This means vigorous support of the Tibet resolution at the United Nations, promotion of the Tibetan cause through diplomatic channels, continued military probing actions into Tibet,

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