

This case should not be mentioned to the GIS. Since our knowledge of this operation is not received openly in all respects, ignorance on our part is to be expected.

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CASE NAME: "CICERO"

AGENT NAME: Guenther HOFE "LENA"

GIS C/O: Hqs: Heinz FELFE @FRIESEN
 Berlin: Hermann GISKES (replaced?)
 Berlin: Erich SCHMIDT (in direct contact with the agent)

CIA C/O: ^E ^U known to GIS as: Vladimir Konstantinovich ^{replaced during leave in mid 57 by "Felix" Belov}

OPPOSITION C/O: SHCHUKIN; previously GEORGIEV and VOLGIN ^{he id/w Arkadi Konstantinovich BOIKO}

OPPOSITION SERVICE: RIS, probably KGB in Karlshorst

OPPOSITION TARGET: Penetration of the Bonn Foreign Office, Chancellery, and Press Bureau (Bundespresseamt) by spotting and development of information on personnel in these offices; political conditions in the Federal Republic.

OPPOSITION CONTACT: Personal meetings in case officer's car and in various Karlshorst safe apartments. Also has S/W system for emergency communication with C/O, when in W. Germany, and a Berlin telephone number.

GIS CONTACT: West Berlin Safe apartment. Safehouse keeper is an old school chum. On Lena's trips in West Germany, GIS C/O (SCHMIDT) reserves a room in same hotel. When Lena's schedule is too tight for a thorough debriefing in West Berlin safehouse, he makes use of a recorder in the safehouse and dictates the major events since his last visit. The tapes are then flown to Bremen for transcribing and processing, and the information forwarded to GIS Hqs.

SUMMARY: a) Born in 1914, Lena is a member of the Central Committee of the NDPD (Nationalische Demokratische Partei Deutschlands), is in charge of the "Verlag der Nation" (the NDPD publishing house in Berlin), and is Editor in Chief of the National Zeitung (official organ of the NDPD). He joined the NDPD soon after the war allegedly because it contained officers and other persons with whom he felt he could best associate. In 1948 or 1949, in order to salve pangs of conscience about his Eastern residence, Lena sought out a former Luftwaffe officer friend (the present GIS safehouse keeper in West Berlin), who lived in the French Zone of Germany; and through him established contact with the French IS, for whom he worked as a source of political information. The GIS (which may or may not have known this fact in 1953) began efforts to contact and recruit him in the Spring of 1953 and succeeded in both that summer. Although Lena allegedly offered to sever his FIS ties immediately, the jurisdictional problem was not solved until an FIS-GIS conference in August 1954 when the French agreed to drop him.

supposedly allegedly "STEPANOV" believed to id/w Sergei Ivanovich STEPANOV

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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EXEMPTIONS FROM DISCLOSURE

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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- b) Early in 1954, Lena was visited by the Soviet officers fnu GRENKOV and fnu VOLGIN who introduced themselves as members of the Soviet High Commission interested in information on the Foreign Ministers' Conference then being held in Berlin. Subsequent contact was maintained by VOLGIN who recruited Lena for the RIS in March 1954.
- c) As this case developed, it was regarded as so important that General Gehlen personally briefed Adenauer and Hans Globke on it. The GIS now consider it their most important CE case. Lena is given no specific assignments by the GIS; he merely reports on his contact with the RIS, their EEI's, etc. The GIS appears to have a concrete control over Lena. He is paid a generous salary which is deposited in a West German safety deposit box.
- d) Lena's priority objective for the RIS was and still remains the penetration of the Bonn Foreign Office and other federal offices in Bonn. He was directed to recruit a number of persons in the East Zone, to set up a West Zone newspaper to provide them with cover, and to organize them into an agent network concentrated on Bonn. On the Bonn target, Lena also spots and reports on persons employed in various federal offices in Bonn. Virtually all of these leads have been supplied by his RIS case officers.
- e) The net at present consists of Lena as chief, two courier-support agents, Johann Herbert RUEDEGER and ^{Rudolph} HARNISCH (who undertake specific missions in West Germany), a low-level member who serves merely as a letter drop, fnu PRODOVSKY (phonetic), and an unrecruited special contact, Dr. SCURLA. The net is known as the Gruppe KATZBACH. While Lena directs the net, it now appears that RUEDEGER and HARNISCH are also in direct contact with the present RIS case officer SHCHUGIN.
- f) A second objective of the RIS is the reporting of political conditions in the Federal Republic. Periodically, Lena makes extensive trips to West Germany, ostensibly in connection with publishing business. As a journalist and political figure, he has a great number of prominent and informed contacts in the Federal Republic. He is thus considered somewhat of a political pundit by his RIS case officers, who appear to value his judgement in this field very highly. Recently at the request of SHCHUGIN, he wrote up a detailed study on the formation of a Neutrality Party in the Federal Republic, which the case officer stated would be sent directly to Moscow.
- g) Lena was directed by VOLGIN from the inception (RIS) of the operation in March 1954 until August 1954, when VOLGIN allegedly left on home leave. From that date until May 1955 he was directed by fnu GEORGIEV, who like VOLGIN, was stationed in or near Karlshorst. From then until the present, he has been directed by Vladimir Konstantinovich SHCHUGIN, also stationed at Karlshorst. The RIS does not pay Lena because of his alleged political motivation. Instead, Lena has made some special requests, such as an attempt to go to a German-Russian football game in Moscow in 1955, which however fell through at the last minute because of some unspecified difficulties with the travel bureau. The residence of Lena and his immediate family in East Berlin is the only known concrete handle. Lena has no other relatives in the East.

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h) The RIS handling of Lena to date has been unprofessional in the extreme. His relationship with his case officers has been one of agent ascendancy. In keeping with their respect for his political judgement, at no time has there appeared to be any question of his bona fides. All three case officers have discussed operational plans and details at length with him, which in many cases had no bearing on his own immediate operation. As a result, the GIS were aware almost immediately of the recruitment of "THEODOR" and the operational plans regarding "ASKARI" (see summaries of these operations).

i) At the same time however, the GIS are also fully confident of Lena's bona fides. This judgement is based largely on the volume and importance of the political and operational information they derive from the operation in comparison with what they feel could be the RIS take or the value to the latter of passing deception material. All information and data derived from Lena has consistently checked. At the same time, the GIS are monitoring to a large degree what they feel is the RIS's major effort in Germany, the Bonn target. Lena is assessed by the GIS as an ideal agent--versatile, a realist, an "ice-cold calculator," a work-horse, and well motivated.

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Case LENA (UJ DROLLERY 112 D)

1. Abbreviations

The following abbreviations appear in this report:

- a. BfV (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz, literally Governmental Office for the Protection of the Constitution) is the Bonn office officially concerned with IS matters.
- b. DDR (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) is used by all East Zone officials and by ZIPPER to designate the Soviet Zone of Germany.
- c. KVP (Kassinierte Volkspolizei) the military police in the Soviet Zone of Germany.
- d. NDFD (Nationalistische-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands, or National-Democratic Party of Germany) is a Soviet-controlled party, its leaders and membership having been appointed into the Sovzone government by Soviet officials. In fact, it was founded with the initiative, sponsorship, and money of the Soviets, aided by key SED personnel, and is dominated by the SED.
- e. SED (Socialistische Einheitspartei, or Socialist Socialist Unity Party), the Communist Party in the Soviet Zone of Germany.
- f. Sfs (Staatsministerium fuer Sicherheit, or State Ministry of Security), under Ernst Wollweber, is that branch of Sovzone government concerned with state security. The Vopo (Volkspolizei, or People's Police) come under its jurisdiction. The information submitted by LENA suggests the possibility that the Sfs has its own intelligence branch.
- g. VVN (Verein der Verfolgten der Nazi Regime, or Association of Nazi Persecutees), a Communist-front group established throughout Germany.

2. Summary of Case LENA

- a. LENA is a member of the Central Committee of the NDFD and is also in charge of the "Verlag der Nation" ("National Press"), the NDFD publishing house in Berlin. He began working as a source of the FIS (SDFCE) at the beginning of 1949. ZIPPER (which may or may not have known this fact in 1953) began efforts to contact and recruit in the spring of 1953 and succeeded in both that same summer. Although LENA offered (claims ZIPPER) to sever his FIS tie immediately, the jurisdictional problem was first solved at a French-German IS conference held in Pullach in August 1954. At this conference, LENA was discussed and the French agreed to drop him.
- b. During the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Berlin, 25 January - 18 February 1954, LENA was informed by the deputy chairman of the NDFD, fru ROMANS, to expect a visit on 30 January 1954 from a member of the Soviet High Commission, who was seeking information on this conference.
- c. On 30 January two Soviet officers, who introduced themselves as fru GOSKOV and fru WOLAIN, called on LENA. Subsequent contact was maintained by WOLAIN, who recruited LENA as an GRIS agent on 5 March 1954.
- d. LENA's priority assignment was and is the penetration of the Bonn Foreign Office. To this end he has been directed to recruit a number of persons (ca. eight) in the East Zone, to set up a West Zone newspaper to provide them with cover, and to organize these persons into an agent network concentrated on Bonn. As this case developed, it was regarded as of such importance that UTILITY personally briefed Adenauer and Hans Globke on it.

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- e. WOLGIN directed LENA on this project until 3 August 1951, when the Soviet officer left, allegedly on home leave. From that date to the date of latest reports (2 November 1951) LENA has been directed by Mrs GEORGIEV, who, like WOLGIN, is stationed in or near Karlsruhe.
- f. To date LENA has recruited one sub-source, Johann Herbert Muederer, a section chief in the Verlag der Nation. He is working on other recruitments. He has also made two fairly extensive trips to West Germany, ostensibly because of publishing interests, and has submitted detailed reports to the SRIS on these trips.
- g. Finally, one Mrs MEISSNER, a first lieutenant in the WVF, attempted on 3 August 1951 to recruit LENA for an unspecified organization which POB believes may be the IS arm of the SCS, although there is no other evidence of the existence of such an organization. LENA informed GEORGIEV, who subsequently stated that he had interceded with Ernst Kollweber and had thereby effected the withdrawal of MEISSNER from the case.

3. Principals in Case LENA.

- a. POB staff members responsible (by cryptonym):
- (1) [] Chief POB/CE
 - (2) [] POB/CE staff member.
- b. ZIPPERites (by ZIPPER designator):
- (1) @ FRIEDER, on ZIPPER headquarters CE staff.
 - (2) V-18140, CE chief of ZIPPER's northern field agency, formerly called GW B and now designated Dienststelle 11.
 - (3) V-1401, in a sub-agency (field) office of Dienststelle 11. V-1401, a positive case officer, maintains contact with LENA but is directed by V-18140.
 - (4) V-9743, not further identified, may have served as agent-trainer for LENA.
 - (5) V-13889, whose role in the operation is left unspecified. It is reported that he was working for both the FIS and for ZIPPER and was dropped by the latter after the conference mentioned in para 2 a above.
- c. SRIS personalities
- (1) Mrs GREENKOV (name by which LENA knows him) is allegedly a member of the Protocol Section of the Office of the Soviet High Commissioner, Karlsruhe. LENA reports that he was born about 1919, is ca. 5 ft 7 in, blond, wears glasses, speaks very good German with a slight Russian accent, is well-educated (especially in Russian classical literature), and is well-informed about political matters in Sovzone, Germany. He may serve as liaison officer to the CDU/East (Christian Democratic Union, a nominally center-to-right party which, like all other Sovzone branches, is SED-dominated). It is further reported (by LENA?) that his immediate superior may be one M.V. IVANOV, who in turn is subordinate to A. L. GRIOV, described as the chief of the branch (presumably of the office of the high commissioner) charged with supervision of Sovzone political affairs. The telephone number given LENA by GREENKOV is Berlin 50 12 14.
 - (2) A Berlin Documents Center trace, based on a 1950 report, lists a Lt. GREENKOV as a member (September 1950) of the Soviet Control Commission and the guest of a CDU/East party convention. In November 1952, this GREENKOV was liaison officer between the SCC and CDU headquarters.

- (b) POB believes GRENANOV i/w GRENANOV. No other traces.
- (2) Frau VOLAIN (name by which LENA knows him) himself stated that he is an BRIS officer. LENA describes him as 6 ft or 6 ft 1 in, dark hair, slender, well-cut features, speaking broken German, knowledgeable on scientific and technical matters. VOLAIN has stated that he was an intelligence officer at the Orel Front (Nius River) and in the Crimea during the war. After the Soviet occupation of the East Zone of Germany he worked (he claims) in various headquarters. (At another point, however, he claimed - in January 1954 - to have been in Germany only a short time.) He further alleged that he is married and has a family.
- (a) A CIC report attached to MOCA-44768 lists a Lt. Col. Ivanovo VOLGIN, born ca. 1912, ca. 6 ft 4 in, strong of build, black hair, dark eyes, reported as commandant of Soviet PW Camp 324 (location unspecified) in October 1949. POB believes this lieutenant colonel to be i/w their man.
- (b) No other likely traces are at hand.
- (3) Frau GEOMISIV (name by which LENA knows him) remains obscure because tracing data has not yet been forwarded by POB.

d. Source LENA

- (1) True name is Guenter (or Guenther) Hofe. He was born in 1914. Trained in banking, he worked in banks in various places (including London) before the war. During the war he was a major and the C.O. of an artillery battalion. He alleges that he joined various Communist-designated groups (KDPD, Kulturbund, and Pan-Gentrus) in order to fight communism from within. The 1952 Berlin telephone book lists his address as Berlin-Friedrichshagen, Rueggelsaedam 272, phone Gk 57 63. In the early summer of 1954 he successfully completed a two-year correspondence course in political science and law. The course, given by the Walter Ulbricht Administrative Academy, prepares the student for high governmental posts in the Sovzone administration. Hofe is a member of the central committee and the cultural-political committee of the KDPD and is in charge of that party's publishing house, "Verlag der Nation". He is also editor-in-chief of the National Zeitung, central organ.

e. Other Germans involved

- (1) Karl BOHM, according to LENA, was born ca. 1914 and lives in Berlin-Wandlitz. LENA further reports that he was born in Bavaria and is said to have served a six-year sentence there, during the war, on a charge of attempted treason. He moved to the Soviet Zone after 1945. He controlled a group of publishing houses there and became, in 1951, deputy chief of the office for literature and publishing. His Berlin telephone is 22 25 75. Using the nom-de-plume Peter BOMST, he has written and published a book on atomic energy.
- (a) MOCA-11342 lists a Karl BOHM, believed identical, as born 5 March 1915 and living at Berlin-Pankow, Parkstrasse 20. He was reported in 1948 as an East Berlin VVW member. He was also editor-in-chief of Heuer Weg, a magazine published by the central committee of the SED. Between 1933 and 1945 he was tried, sentenced, and confined for illegal KPD activities in Muenchen or Dachau (Bavaria).
- (b) Additional info available but not pertinent.

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- (2) Dr. Wilfrid ESCHENBACH was, until the beginning of February 1951, the leader of the "production group for Western Germany in the central section of the Verlag der Nation". ZIPPER was unable to find any evidence that he works for any Western IS.
- (3) First Lt. (NVP) Frau WEISSNER, presumably living in the Leipzig area, is described by LEMA as born ca. 1922 (Detailed physical description available). He claimed that in 1941 he was with the 292d Division at the Jelna Band (Soviet Union). LEMA believes that he is currently assigned to the intelligence arm of the NVP. A source from the East Zone border police, who defected to the West, identified a first lieutenant Frau WEISSNER of Leipzig, same general physical description, as having been the SFS liaison officer in Schoenberg.
- (4) Johann Herbert HUESCHNER was born 2 June 1922 in Hesel and now lives in Berlin-Friedrichshagen, Broestpromenade 25. He is a section chief in the Verlag der Nation.
- (5) Hans-Juenter SCHAEFER is editor of a Munich newspaper, Deutsche Woche, Lipowskistrasse 3.
- (6) Herwart Otto Richard SCHMANN, Berlin-Pankow, Parkgrafenstrasse 5, born 18 September 1918 in Dresden, is chief foreign editor ("Lektore") in the Verlag der Nation.
- (7) Dr. Frau SCHUBA was a leading official in the German Ministry of Education until 1945. He is now a journalist working for various newspapers, including the National Zeitung.
- (8) Dr. Karl WITTE is an author living at Bysoneckstrasse 39, Frankfurt am Main. He was born 11 July 1900 in Berlin. According to WOLA-10977, 1 April 1952, FBI files contain no evidence that WITTE was ever employed by ZIPPER but he is nonetheless a ZIPPER special connection, presumably because he is an old friend and correspondent of former General Franz HALDER.

4. Status of LEMA prior to GRIS Recruitment

- a. As is stated in para 2, above, LEMA holds responsible positions in East Berlin. These include the following:
 - (1) Member of central committee and cultural-political committee of the party leadership of the NDFD.
 - (2) Member of the presidential council of the Cultural Association for the Democratic Recovery of Germany.
 - (3) Member of the Pen-Zentrum, an authors' consortium.
 - (4) In charge of the "Verlag der Nation", the NDFD publishing house.
 - (5) Editor-in-chief of the National Zeitung, central organ of the NDFD.
- b. Presumably because of the IS potential inherent in these positions, the FIS recruited LEMA as a political source at the beginning of 1949. ZIPPER claims that LEMA subsequently (summer 1953) alleged that he accepted only because he did not know how to establish contact with the FIS, that he was dissatisfied with FIS handling at that time (when recruited by ZIPPER), and that he offered to withdraw from further

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IS association with the French. In fact, however, the FIS-LENA tie was not broken until after August 1954. At that time the case was discussed by both sides, during a French-German conference in Pfullen, and the French, (according to ZIPPER) agreed to withdraw. (ANALYST'S COMMENT: Thus LENA was employed by both ZIPPER and the FIS for more than a year, despite his alleged willingness, from the beginning of his association with ZIPPER, to drop his tie with the French. It is therefore not improbable that during this year ZIPPER continued to debrief him on his knowledge of the FIS and caused that tie to be broken only when the ore had been largely extracted.)

- c. ZIPPER claims that LENA's reports on the NDFF were reliable and valuable, and that the FIS considered him their top political source.
- d. LENA had made a number of trips to West Germany on various missions connected with publishing. These trips were financed in West Marks by the office of Karl BOSEK (governmental office for literature and publishing). In return, BOSEK required intelligence reports on these trips and openly stated that such reports were passed to leading offices of the DDR government. LENA had submitted such reports. (It is of interest that BOSEK also promised to provide LENA with an emergency SPE telephone number.)

5. FIS Recruitment

- a. Between 25 and 30 January 1954, LENA was told by fru HEDWICH, deputy chairman of the NDFF, to expect a visit from a member of the Soviet High Commission on 30 January 1954. The visitor, alleged HEDWICH, wished to ask LENA for information about the Foreign Ministers' Conference, then being held in Berlin.
- b. On 30 January Soviet officers fru GRENKOV and fru WOLGIN appeared. They stated that they were interested in the above-cited conference and that LENA should call them at Karlshorst if he had any important information to convey on this subject. They asked a number of questions on the NDFF. WOLGIN, who had borrowed a brochure from LENA, called back on 18 February and then went to LENA's office. Here he asked a number of questions about the journalistic sources from whom LENA obtained information about Bonn and laid on a meeting for 3 March in a Soviet restaurant in East Berlin. During the 3 March meeting WOLGIN clearly stated that he was an SMIS officer and made a recruitment offer. LENA requested time for reflection, and a meeting was set for 6 March 1954 in Karlshorst. WOLGIN also gave LENA his telephone number in Karlshorst: 50 15 02.
- c. Before 5 March WOLGIN telephoned LENA and arranged to pick him up in a vehicle on 5 March at the East Berlin subway station. He appeared as scheduled in a vehicle bearing license number ID-56-53 and drove him to a house inside the Karlshorst compound. (LENA failed to get street name or house number.) WOLGIN launched into a speech combining an appeal to patriotism (defense of the German fatherland) with the standard SMIS pitch about preserving international peace. He said that he was pleased that LENA was willing to serve these goals and reassured LENA when the latter expressed concern about security. WOLGIN then stated that LENA's sole mission would be the penetration of the Bonn Foreign Ministry. He asked about extant ties in Bonn; LENA had none but thought he could form them.
 - (1) WOLGIN dictated a brief security-and-loyalty pledge, which LENA was required to sign in true name.
 - (2) The case officer assigned LENA the cover name KATZMACH. This name was not taken from a list or otherwise predetermined. LENA states that WOLGIN saw a cat jump a stream at the psychological moment and thus selected the cover name.

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- d. On 6 March WOLGIN and LENA again met by prearrangement (report does not state place of meeting). WOLGIN made inquiries about the collaboration of LENA with Karl BOEHM and also asked whether BOEHM worked with the SIS. (LENA did not know.)
- 6. LENA's Career as an SIS Agent, 7 March to 3 August 1954. (ANALYST's COMMENT: 3 August 1954 is the date of the last reported meeting. As of 2 November 1954, however, the case was still alive.)
 - a. LENA was in West Germany from 7 to 13 March 1954. On his return he prepared reports on various publishing matters and journalists in Western Germany. (ANALYST's COMMENT: The copy of this report which ZIPPER provided was forwarded as an attachment to EGIA-10954; it consists of some sixty pages and in the interests of brevity is not summarized here.) LENA gave a carbon to WOLGIN, at a meeting arranged by the latter, by telephone, on 13 March. WOLGIN termed the report too detailed and stated that in the future the SIS would determine what LENA could pass to BOEHM. LENA pointed out that BOEHM was, in one sense, his boss, and that he drew funds from BOEHM's office. WOLGIN said that LENA should gradually withdraw from his present functions and become, nominally, a free lance writer. LENA asked if WOLGIN were interested in Amt BLANK (Some government office dealing with reeducation). WOLGIN said he was interested only in the Foreign Ministry. He added that money was of no consequence in obtaining a penetration there. The case officer did not arrange the next meeting.
 - b. Subsequent meetings of WOLGIN and LENA occurred on 20 and 27 March, 12 and 24 April, and 4, 5, 8, and 10 May 1954. ZIPPER states that the meetings of 5 and 6 March were held inside the Karlshorst Compound in a house at Waldow Strasse 51-53. (On one occasion WOLGIN, LENA, and driver were checked by the guard at the gate. WOLGIN showed a pass or documentation for himself as well as a pass for LENA.) ZIPPER does not report the location of meetings held on 20 and 27 March or on 12 April. All WOLGIN meetings thereafter, starting on 24 April, were held in the same compound at Roemerweg 102. (A COM Germany dispatch provides some information on the Karlshorst Compound, but ZIPPER has apparently failed to provide sketches of it or of the safehouses within it.
 - (1) At the first of these meetings (20 March 1954) WOLGIN outlined so far-reaching a plan that ZIPPER compares it with the Rote Kapelle case. He stated again that LENA's sole assignment was the penetration of the Foreign Office in Bonn. To this end LENA was to organize an agent complex dubbed the KATZBACH Group, with himself as leader. As WOLGIN explained later (4 June 1954) this group was to consist, in addition to its P.A., of two spotter-tippers, two recruiters, a surveillance team, and two handy men (to be used as couriers, cut-outs, procurers of safe houses, etc.) All members of this team would have to be someone residents at the beginning of the operation. They must be familiar with Western Germany and have ties to West Germany. They must be completely reliable politically, above average in intelligence, and hard-working. They must be prepared to move to Bonn and live there. Initially (20 March) WOLGIN stated that his office would provide employment and cover, as well as training before the agents departed for Bonn. Subsequently (on 2 July 1954) WOLGIN discussed with LENA the feasibility of establishing a new, right-wing newspaper in or near Bonn to provide cover for the net. In his 4 June briefing WOLGIN added that only LENA could know the full picture and that no subordinate member of the KATZBACH net could be allowed to know another in an IS capacity.

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- (2) On 20 March 1954 WOLGIN also directed LENA to start acquiring target data by going to Bonn a week later and inspecting seven foreign office installations there to determine their security (guard systems, regulations for visitors, etc.). LENA was also to determine restaurants, clubs, etc. frequented by foreign service personnel. He provided LENA with a list of persons with whom he was to try to form acquaintances for the purpose of determining their living habits. He also provided LENA with fourteen addresses of offices and individuals to whom LENA could turn for assistance while in Western Germany.
- (3) LENA proposed four persons as agent candidates, and WOLGIN authorized a direct recruitment attempt by LENA on one: Dr. Sigard PAULSEN, Bonn journalist.
- (4) On 20 and again on 27 March 1954 WOLGIN proposed that LENA make his forthcoming trip to West Germany in the company of Dr. Ima SCURLA (see para. 3e (7) above). (ANALYST'S COMMENT: This trip, which LENA made without SCURLA, did not materialize until May.)
- (5) On 12 April WOLGIN gave LENA a series of extremely high-level but somewhat vague ID's without indicating how such information was to be obtained. These included major policy decisions of the Bonn government, relationships of that government with other nations, U.S. plans to bring West Germany into the North Atlantic Pact, Bonn plans for another reunification of Germany and Austria, etc. (ANALYST'S COMMENT: The total list of ID's covers the whole range of West German foreign policy and seems to represent wishful thinking by WOLGIN and/or pressure from his superiors. LENA had not recruited a single sub-source at this time and had no ties to Bonn personalities informed about these matters.)
- (6) On 24 April WOLGIN stated that his Karlshorst office had informed all interested German governmental offices that no future IS assignments were to be given to LENA. The latter objected on grounds that BOENEN's office financed his trips in exchange for information and that this and other branches of the Sovzone government might think LENA untrustworthy as a consequence of the order. In a later talk with BOENEN the agent did indeed find him reluctant to finance further trips by himself or Dr. SCURLA. LENA requested DM (West) 610 for a 10-18 May 54 trip to Western Germany. BOENEN claimed that his finances were low and that he could not advance more than DM 350. He added the advice that LENA forget about the trip and concentrate on his approaching examinations from the Walter Ulbricht Academy, since passing these exams would qualify him for high governmental posts.
- (7) LENA next saw WOLGIN on 4 May and told him of the change in BOENEN's attitude. At further meetings on 5 and 8 May WOLGIN provided East German gasoline coupons and DM 160 to supplement the 350 from BOENEN. LENA receipted in cover name KATZBACH. Case officer to agent cover channel, explained WOLGIN, would consist of general delivery letters in LENA's true name. LENA was to check for these in Koeln, Frankfurt/Main, and Munich.
- (8) LENA took the trip as scheduled and, on his return, reported to BOENEN's office the results of conferences with West German publishers, political information, technical data, and data on personalities with an IS potential - all this despite WOLGIN's instructions of 24 April. On 20 May he phoned WOLGIN and a meeting was set for 24 May. (Until July 1954 WOLGIN regularly met LENA at the East Berlin subway station and drove him to the Karlshorst compound. Thereafter he merely met him at a parking lot just outside the compound and, with the same vehicle and driver, escorted him inside.)

LENA submitted a carbon of the report which he had given BOENI plus a separate report on the ID's outlined in paragraph 6b (2), above.

- (9) On 27 May 1954, WOLGIN and LENA discussed possible agent candidates for the KATZBACH group. On 28 May, LENA submitted further reports on his trip and a financial accounting. He also returned an unspent DM 120, which action greatly surprised WOLGIN, who said that the practice was not to be recommended. WOLGIN asked detailed questions about the agent's health and psychological well-being at this meeting.
- (10) On 3 June, LENA met BOENI again and drew the conclusion that BOENI now knew that he was working for the SMIS.
- (11) LENA met WOLGIN again on 4 June. The case officer directed the agent to determine which members of Pen-Zentrum, East or West (LENA being a member), had ties to the Bonn Foreign Office. He ordered LENA to drop all ties with one Manfred von BRAUCHTITSON, for unspecified security reasons. He further directed the agent to arrange with Dr. Sigurd PAULSEN (paragraph 6b (3) above) to have copies of the Bonner Aussenpolitischen Korrespondenz sent to a cover address in Berlin-Tempelhof. WOLGIN further mentioned one C. A. WEBER (a journalist in Munich who, according to ZIPPAR, may have a tie to a western IS) and added that he intended to take up direct personal contact with WEBER. He then listed three journalistic sources of WEBER's--frü SAUER in Bonn, frü ROSENFELD in Paris, and Dr. Karl WITTEG in Frankfurt. (Re the latter see paragraph 3c (8) above.) (ANALYST'S COMMENT: If WOLGIN intended to have LENA obtain from these three men more information about WEBER prior to recruitment and to have LENA maintain the contacts as one check upon WEBER's reliability after recruitment, the idea seems sound. What seems almost incredible, however, is that an SMIS case officer would be so unprofessional as to notify a recruited source that he intends to recruit another man who is, moreover, a personal acquaintance of the source.) After further discussion of the planned structure of Group KATZBACH, WOLGIN urged LENA to recruit Dr. frü SCUKLA (paragraph 3c (7) above) into the KATZBACH net, terming this acquisition vital. He also wished LENA to recruit Rudolf HANNISCH (see below). He suggested that LENA, as the employer of HANNISCH, pressure him into acceptance of agent status if HANNISCH were reluctant. (LENA knew, however, that HANNISCH had made trips to West Germany in February and April 1954, that his subsequent reports to the NSPD had been considered unsatisfactory, and that HANNISCH had then stated that he would not engage in conspirative work.) WOLGIN further urged the recruitment of one Eugen PHEM, who holds various leading NSPD functions. LENA proposed the recruitment of Howard SCHUMANN (paragraph 3c (6) above), whom the NSPD then planned to appoint deputy director of the Verlag der Nation. (LENA knew at this time that SCHUMANN was already working as an agent of some arm of the SMIS.) LENA also proposed the recruitment of Herbert BUNDEMEIER (paragraph 3c (4) above), chairman of the union at Verlag der Nation.
- (a) WOLGIN now took up technical matters. He said that LENA (and presumably, after recruitment, other members of the KATZBACH group) would be given training in S/W and ciphers. At a still later date W/T training would be conducted.
- (b) He proposed giving LENA a flashlight with one hollow battery for concealment of incriminating paper.

- (a) He said that he would procure a non-forged West German identity document for LENA's use. LENA asked whether the BRIS could obtain non-forged identity documents for West German governmental personnel, and WOLGIN said, "No." (ANALYST'S COMMENT: ZIPPER reports no statement by WOLGIN - or by GEORGIEV, who gave a forged document to LENA on 3 August 1954 - as to the intended use. Since LENA has traveled frequently in West Germany and is a well-known journalist, the use of an assumed identity appears ill-advised.)
- (d) WOLGIN added that LENA would be trained in use of the Minox and would be given such a camera before his next trip to West Germany.
- (e) WOLGIN asked if LENA were willing to approach former BRIS sources in West Germany in order to reactivate them, and LENA agreed. (ANALYST'S COMMENT: WOLGIN's instructions that LENA recruit certain new sources and reactivate others seem at odds with the expressed opinion of ZIPPER and of WOLGIN himself that LENA is a high-level source.)
- (f) LENA objected to traveling in West Germany with Sovzone plates and suggested buying a vehicle in Western Germany which would continue to be registered there. WOLGIN said that he would consider the suggestion.
- (g) WOLGIN was exceptionally cordial throughout this meeting, which was enlivened by cognac. He seemed to be attempting to establish a more personal relationship with LENA.
- (12) The next meeting was again arranged by a prior telephone call. (ANALYST'S COMMENT: WOLGIN frequently ignores the standard practice of setting each future meeting at the beginning or end of the current meeting and therefore telephones LENA at his office to make meeting arrangements.) It was held on 18 June 1954. WOLGIN stated that Hewert SCHUMANN had worked for other components of the BRIS and was not highly thought of, so that he should not be considered for recruitment into the KATZBACH Group. LENA said that because SCHUMANN was slated to become deputy director of the Verlag der Nation, he would have to be a member of the group, since this position would make it impossible to conceal the group's activities from him. The only alternative would be to discharge him from the publishing house. WOLGIN chose the latter course and stated that he would ask GRIGOROV to recommend SCHUMANN's dismissal to HUBMANN, deputy NDPD chairman.
- (13) After another telephoned arrangement, LENA met WOLGIN at the Karlsborst parking lot (just outside the compound). WOLGIN stated that he had to prepare a three-months' plan on the KATZBACH Group, the plan to cover goals and methods. He passed this task on to LENA. When the agent objected that he was preparing for final examinations in his correspondence course, given by Walter Elbricht Academy, WOLGIN said that his work for the BRIS would be taken into account in grading his exams. (ANALYST'S COMMENT: Although such interference by the Soviets would not necessarily finger LENA to school authorities as an BRIS agent, it would definitely reveal Soviet backing and hence lead to a possible presumption of IS work. Here, as in other matters, WOLGIN seems somewhat heedless of the security of his source.) After reviewing previously issued ID's, WOLGIN directed LENA to obtain compromising material, whether

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political or private in character, about Konrad ADENAUER and Dr. Walter HALLSTEIN (Bonn Secretary ~~of State~~). He said that at the moment this ID had one of the top priorities throughout all branches of the SMIS.

(14) A meeting of 17 July 1954 was also arranged by telephone for the Karlshorst parking lot. Instead of driving LENA inside the compound, however, WOLOIN drove him to Mahlsdorf and back, conducting the meeting en route.

- (a) Dr. SCUSLA had recently returned from West Germany and had submitted a report to the NDDP, a copy of which LENA handed to WOLOIN.
- (b) WOLOIN said that SCHUMANN would be released from the Verlag der Nation and that LENA was to make his recruitment pitch to RUESCHER during July.
- (c) The case officer directed the agent to obtain PHS data on Dr. Wolfram BESCHENBACH (paragraph 3e (2), above), alleging that BESCHENBACH, a foreign editor with the Verlag der Nation, was a ZIPPERHITS. (ZIPPER checked, denies such a tie, and states that it found no evidence tying BESCHENBACH to any Western IS.)

(15) The next meeting, in the following week, repeated the pattern of driving from Karlshorst to Mahlsdorf and back. WOLOIN returned SCUSLA's report (about which he was very enthusiastic) to LENA with instructions to have SCUSLA identify his subsources.

c. At this point, an interruption in the pattern appeared. A Frau WEISSNER (at least he so introduced and identified himself to LENA; see also paragraph 3e (3), above) called on LENA in his office on 3 August 1954 and identified himself as a first lieutenant of the KVP. Without recruiting LENA or even asking him to consider recruitment, WEISSNER (who was well-informed about LENA's prior trips to West Germany) listed for LENA a long series of ID's which he wished LENA to satisfy. (The full list appears in Attachment 4 to WOLA-10954.) WEISSNER was chiefly interested in Amt Blank, although in general he was interested in any persons in West Germany having access to classified military information.

- (1) WEISSNER did obtain a verbal security pledge (i.e., a promise to discuss the conversation with no one else), but took no further steps. (The revelation of a lengthy list of ID's including persons named as recruitment targets, seems an amazing performance in view of the fact that the requests were made at the first WEISSNER-LENA meeting and without even an accompanying recruitment pitch. LENA speculates that BORNH tipped him to WEISSNER, and that the latter therefore considered LENA reliable from the outset.)
- (2) WEISSNER displayed a small folding identity booklet with a grey linen cover. Inside, on the right, was a photograph of WEISSNER in the uniform of a first lieutenant of the KVP and WEISSNER's signature. On the left was the inscription "German Democratic Republic - Ministry of the Interior". LENA believes that the words "Administration of German People's Police" may also have appeared here.
- (3) Later that same day LENA told his new case officer, Frau GEORGIEV, of WEISSNER's visit (re GEORGIEV, see below). The case officer appeared angry. In an effort to determine the type of identity document carried by WEISSNER, GEORGIEV produced his own, which was about the same size but had dark red covers rather than grey and carried the photo on the left instead of the right-hand side. Subsequently GEORGIEV remarked that he had gone to Leipzig to see the 1954 fair and had taken the occasion to call Ernst WOLLMEIER, chief of the SMIS, and get WEISSNER hauled out of the picture.

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(h) The most interesting point in this episode is the possibility which it suggests that the KVP has an intelligence arm, paralleling the GRU. If so, and if GEORGIEV's comment can be taken at face value, this office would seem to come under over-all SFS jurisdiction. ZIPPER states, in Attachment 4 to B31A-10954, that there is no other evidence suggesting that the KVP has an IS function and is therefore inclined to believe that WEISSNER is a liaison officer between the SFS and the Ministry of the Interior. The ZIPPER desk here at KUBARK headquarters, however, states that other reports have attributed an IS office or branch to the KVP.

d. WEISSNER had telephoned some days before 3 August to make an appointment - prior, it would seem, to 31 July 1954, since on that date LENA told WOLGIN of the call. Case officer and agent had again met at the Karlshorst parking lot, and WOLGIN escorted LENA inside the compound (by vehicle) to Roemerweg 102. WOLGIN told LENA to stall WEISSNER until further orders. The following points were also discussed:

- (1) WOLGIN now wanted LENA to undertake the recruitment of C. A. WEBER.
- (2) He informed LENA that the West German identity card with which he would be provided was not very good, was not to be shown to Eastzone or Westzone police, and was to be destroyed if LENA found himself in difficulties. Should the Eastzone police find it, LENA was to ask for the local director of state security (SFS) and have him call WOLGIN's Berlin phone number, 50 18 02 (office switchboard). After using the card (ZIPPER does not report that WOLGIN gave any further directions regarding the circumstances under which the card was to be used, or the purpose of such use), LENA was to hide it in Koeln and report the hiding place upon his return to East Berlin.
- (3) He directed LENA to obtain compromising information on ADENAUER and HALLSTEIN, as he had done before, and added BLANKENHORN and von BERTANO to this list.
- (4) He instructed LENA on cover channels. Case officer to agent would consist, as before, of general delivery letters in LENA's true name, and the agent was to check for these at specified stops along his route. For agent to case officer WOLGIN provided a (presumed) cover name and post office box number in East Berlin.
- (5) WOLGIN then said that he would soon leave with his family for a vacation in Moscow and wished to introduce one GEORGIEV, who would run LENA during WOLGIN's absence. (LENA concluded, from WOLGIN's *attitude that* superior.) GEORGIEV was then introduced. He speaks very good German with an English accent, which he attributed to several semesters of study of English. GEORGIEV gave LENA a new ID concerning West German publishing circles and then drove his home, parking some distance from the house. En route he arranged to meet LENA again on 3 August at the parking lot.

GEORGIEV is WOLGIN's

e. About this time LENA had recruited his first subsource, Johann Herbert RUESCHER. LENA had first proposed this recruitment (paragraph 6b (11), above); and on 17 July WOLGIN had directed LENA to proceed with the recruitment before the end of the month (paragraph 6b (14), above). LENA had called RUESCHER into his office; had hinted at IS work, simultaneously implying that such work was to be done for the NDPD; and had asked RUESCHER if he were willing to work more "intensively" than in the past. RUESCHER agreed. LENA reported the conversation to WOLGIN on 24 July, and WOLGIN directed LENA to have RUESCHER sign a loyalty pledge similar to the one which he himself had signed for WOLGIN. LENA was forbidden to mention the NDPD or the SFS as the employing agency; WOLGIN advised him to evade questioning on this point. Should RUESCHER refuse recruitment,

a security pledge (re silence) was to be exacted. (WOLGIN mentioned that this practice is SOP with the GRIS.) Should RUDENBERG accept, he was to be given immediate assignments, including the writing of a PHS, obtaining a safehouse for the KATZBACH Group, obtaining West Berlin cover addresses, and ferreting out persons (unmarried) who were willing to process through West German refugee channels. (This last ID was dropped later.) LENA followed these instructions, and RUDENBERG was recruited without learning anything about the IS for which he was to work. LENA had him sign, in true name, a loyalty and security pledge. On 27 July LENA showed the pledge to WOLGIN. At the latter's suggestion LENA held another meeting with RUDENBERG on 2 August. Following instructions, LENA had RUDENBERG add to the pledge the following: "I will sign my reports 'BACHMANN'." That evening LENA and RUDENBERG met again. Still carrying out WOLGIN's orders, LENA instructed his new subsource to prepare a PHS, including any ties to persons in West Berlin or West Germany and furnishing details on his career as a Hitler Youth Leader. He also gave RUDENBERG the ID's listed for him by WOLGIN.

- f. The second meeting between LENA and GEORGIEV occurred on 3 August, as planned. GEORGIEV said that WOLGIN was leaving on vacation that day, that he himself had returned from a fifty-day leave on 15 July 1951, and that he was soon going to Vienna for eight days.
- (1) LENA gave GEORGIEV the completed pledge signed in true and cover names by RUDENBERG.
 - (2) LENA told GEORGIEV at this time of RUDENBERG's visit at LENA's office (paragraph 6c (3), above).
 - (3) GEORGIEV reiterated WOLGIN's statement that it was imperative that LENA recruit Dr. SCURLA.
 - (4) GEORGIEV gave LENA his West German cover document. This forged identity card is made out to Siegfried WINTER, born 1 May 1915 in Kresmen/Osthavelland, is stamped as issued by the city of Dortmund, and lists WINTER's address as Rielstrasse 5. An analysis by the ZIPPER documentation section shows that it is a remarkably clumsy forgery with the following faults:
 - (a) The correct size is 224 x 106 mm. This document is 221 x 107 mm.
 - (b) The correct entry re validity would read, "Valid until 1 January 1957". The forged document reads "Valid until 1957".
 - (c) The entries within the document and the forged signatures of various officials are all made out in the same handwriting and the same ink.
 - (d) This handwriting looks Cyrillic rather than German.
 - (e) The linen covers are not of the right material.
 - (f) The typography is incorrect.
 - (g) Under ultra-violet light, the paper has a different fluorescence from that of valid documents.
 - (h) No Siegfried WINTER lives at the listed address. In fact, this is the address of the Dortmund Heldeamt, and no one resides there. (ANALYST'S COMMENT: ZIPPER comments that the low level of documentation is at odds with the importance of the source, a point which seems valid despite some tendency on the part of ZIPPER to regard Operation LENA as world-shaking. In addition, it is not clear to this analyst why LENA is given any type of I-Karte. He is a very well-known publisher and journalist, with

numerous acquaintances in Western Germany. Even if the cover name were to be used solely for some such assignment as the reactivation of dead sources, such use would be dangerous. And the use of the document around Bonn would probably be fatal.)

- (i) GEORGIYEV also gave LENA a two-battery flashlight with one hollow battery, in which paper can be concealed. Upon reflection, however, the case officer took the flashlight back, commenting that it was standard issue for the people's police and might therefore look conspicuous in the West. (ANALYST'S COMMENT: This same device has appeared in at least one KUBARK-SWIS case. A variant also appears in WJ DROLLERY 13.)
- (j) GEORGIYEV gave LENA East German coupons for 150 liters of gasoline and DM(west) 400. No receipt was required.
- (k) Upon his return from Western Germany, source was to arrange the next meeting by telephone.

7. ZIPPER Handling of LENA

- a. ZIPPER, understandably, has reported little on this subject. The case officer handling the agent is V-12401, who in turn is directed by V-18140 (paragraph 3b, above). BOLA-11342, 2 November 1954, comments that ZIPPER found it difficult to debrief LENA because he is constantly on the go and because extensive debriefing would throw him off schedule in Western Berlin. Consequently, Dienststelle 11 has set up a West Berlin safehouse equipped with a recorder. During his frequent short trips to West Berlin LENA dictates the major events that have occurred since his last visit. The tapes are then flown to Bremen, where they are transcribed and processed. Highlights are then teletyped to ZIPPER headquarters (3-4 days); detailed reports are sent by courier pouch (8-10 days).
- b. ZIPPER has provided no information about LENA's IS training. (ANALYST'S COMMENT: Should the SWIS place him under surveillance [a possibility suggested by paragraph 6b (1), above] the West Berlin safehouse might easily lead to the blowing of the agent. At the very least, LENA should be trained in counter-surveillance techniques. If the frequency of LENA's trips to West Germany increases, ZIPPER might well consider holding its agent meetings in a West Zone city. ZIPPER also provides no information about LENA's cover story for visiting the West Berlin address.)
- c. Although ZIPPER claims that LENA has been tested, what seems to be meant is that sifting and evaluation find LENA's reports valuable and valid. There is no indication that thought has been given to testing the agent per se. Yet his five years of FIS activity, which ZIPPER attempts to explain away without being very convincing - suggest the opportunist.
- d. There is also no information on such subjects as the total number of ZIPPER meetings to date, the handling of case officer-to-agent coordination, and finances. The ZIPPER reports imply that the SWIS pays LENA only his travel costs. It might be desirable, however, for psychological reasons, if ZIPPER claimed all monies which LENA receives from the SWIS and then paid him for all travel costs, in addition to salary, so that it would be emphasized to LENA that he has only one employer. Allowing the agent to keep funds obtained from the opposition has, however, been ZIPPER SOP in the past.
- e. The analyst realizes that much of the missing operational data cannot be obtained from ZIPPER because the LENA operation is not a "strategic" positive project. It is desired, re such gaps, merely to point out that lack of information makes analysis impossible.)
- f. ZIPPER negotiations with the French re LENA are covered in paragraph 4b, above.

8. KUBARK Participation in Case LARA

- a. At one point in the case ZIPPER approached an unnamed official in Bonn with a request for build-up material to pass to LARA for transmission to the GRIS. ZIPPER was unable, however, to find anyone at Bonn authorized to release such material or clear its release. ZIPPER then requested FOB intervention, although it is not clear what KUBARK was expected to do in what appears a strictly German problem. There is also no indication of whether FOB did act upon this request.
- b. Apart from this request, FOB participation seems to be limited to name tracing, reporting to headquarters, and holding conferences with ZIPPER OS staffers. (This comment is intended as a statement of fact, not a criticism; there is nothing more that FOB could - and perhaps should - do in this case.)