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UJ DRILLERY 17

1. Summary

An SRIS base station triangulated as south of Berlin is maintaining two-way W/T contact with an agent in Durlach/Karlsruhe (Western Germany.) The agent, and most members of his family, are KPD and/or FDJ. The agent transmits intelligence on the U. S. Army in the area; the information is gathered by himself and his father. The agent's younger brother revealed the foregoing and such supplementary information to the Karlsruhe criminal police, who in turn notified the BfV-LfV. The BfV began monitoring the traffic. A W/T expert, working for the BfV, informed ZIPPER, sub rosa, on the case; the handing of such information to ZIPPER subsequently became legalized and above-board when ZIPPER cryptanalysts were called in by the BfV to crack the W/T code. ZIPPER informed POB. An AIS jurisdictional squabble resulted, because GDOFAL was out in on the case, apparently earlier than was ZIPPER, by the BfV. As of last report (EGCA-41301, 12 May 1954) CIC is continuing to maintain primary AIS jurisdiction.

2. Principals in UJ DRILLERY 17

- a.   POB/OK.
- b. @ KUTZBACH, ZIPPER staff/OK, coordinating with
- c. ZIPPER agent V-2601, who leaked the case from the Karlsruhe Kripo to ZIPPER. V-2601 obtains his information from the W/T agent's brother.
- d. Lt. Col. Otto SAMLOWSKY, assigned to West German border guards, under the Ministry of the Interior, a W/T expert called into case by the BfV. SAMLOWSKY passed all technical W/T data to ZIPPER, at first surreptitiously and without authorization. (UTILITY seems to have had personal contact with SAMLOWSKY.)
- e. Hannelore HAUMANNSEN, @ Heidi STOLL, FDJ functionary. Was arrested by German police, Heidelberg, and transferred to Karlsruhe jail sometime prior to 28 January 1954. (Charge not reported.)
- f. Edwin MESSNER, born 16 November 1929, in Durlach/Karlsruhe, living there at Elmargenbruch 18. A KPD member since June of 1946, he was recruited by the SRIS in 1951, or shortly thereafter. Starting in September, 1953, he was given more than three months of W/T training in Erfurt/Sovzone. The W/T set was transmitted by air at Christmas, 1953, from Berlin via Paris to Bad Oes, near Baden-Enden. From here it was transported by SRIS courier to a dead drop near Durlach/Karlsruhe, from which it was recovered by the agent. After the arrest of HAUMANNSEN (see above,) the agent volunteered his services as an informer on the FDJ to V-2601 (see above,) apparently to gain cover for his W/T work, about which he has not informed V-2601.

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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
- (2)(A) Privacy
- (2)(B) Methods/Sources
- (2)(G) Foreign Relations

g. Roland MISSNERER, younger brother of above, who formed acquaintanceship of V-2601 as the result of the latter's contacts with his brother. Roland subsequently began to inform V-2601 in detail on the case.

h. Alois MISSNERER, born 16 January 1908, residing at address listed for son, Edwin, above. EPD number since 1 May 1929, member EPD Kreisleitung, PDJ leader. Transmits either U.S. Forces C. I., or requests (not clear which) to BRIS base station via son, Edwin, and W/T, Soviet agent.

i. Rita MISSNERER, daughter, functioning as courier between Alois and Edwin. (Reason for this function is not clear, since father and son live in the same house.)

### 3. Technical W/T Data

a. Very detailed and technical W/T data, slugged [ ] has been forwarded by [ ] from COM, Germany to Staff D. Major technical references are PULL 7272 (IN 12188); PULL 7326 (IN 11139); EOLA-7394 and Attachment 1, 1 February 1954; EOLA-7576, 11 February 1954; enclosure to EOGA-36233, no listed date; EOGA-36999, 11 March 1954; and enclosures; EOLA-8076, 11 March 1954; EOGA-37680, 23 March 1954; and others.

b. The analyst, no W/T expert, will not attempt to summarize the technical data (much of which is at Staff D, not ER/ZIPPER.) It will suffice to state here that transmission is made on house current only, although the set will function on batteries, from the agent's home. The set, which functions on 90 to 250 volts, is contained, without accessories, in four units the size of cigar boxes. According to PULL 7526 (IN 23827) the set itself is identical with a Soviet set appearing in EUCOM Intelligence Summary 124, 7 November 1951. The latter set, described as a two-way espionage radio set, was picked up in Forross. Encoding is based on fixed key phrases and a seven-column transposition system. The agent transmits and receives according to an BRIS traffic plan covering (1) blind, general training transmissions from Base for practice by all W/T agents in Western Germany; (2) specific blind operational transmissions, base to agent; (3) two-way contacts; and (4) alternate guard channels kept open by the base on a 24-hour basis.

### 4. BRIS Information Derived from UJ REGISTRY 17

a. Analysis strongly suggests an RU operation. The use of W/T itself, and the exclusively military nature of the ID's, all aimed against U.S. Forces in Germany, both point toward this conclusion.

b. As for BRIS personnel involved, nothing is known. One German courier has been identified, a "Wilfried" SCHMID, born 3 August 1922, Karlsruhe, now living in Weimar. Whether SCHMID works as a courier for this operation is not clear.

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c. The agent was trained in an Erfurt safe-house in September-October and November-December, 1953. He returned to this safe-house during 1-7 February 1954. He was also given W/T training at an unstated time in Berlin.

d. Re/pover and finances; the agent has set himself up as the self-employed owner of a pig farm. He was to receive more than 2000 DM West to establish this business, and 250 DM monthly thereafter (on a bi-monthly basis.)

e. Re functions; the agent works as a source and a courier, as well as a W/T operator. On 1 February 1954, he went from Karlsruhe to Erfurt, taking with him photographs, made by himself, of railways and bridges, as well as (presumably) OS reports prepared by his father. He returned on 7 February.

## 5. KUBARK Equity

a. It appears that Staff D has obtained a large amount of valuable technical data from this case. Other components of KUBARK headquarters have been less fortunate, chiefly because of two limiting factors. The first of these is that the source of all information (apart from monitored broadcasts) is the agent's younger brother, whose informant role is unknown to the agent, so that the source is dependent upon remarks dropped by the agent, plus occasional physical access to equipment, etc. The second limiting factor is the complexity of the channel; source to Krippe to LfV-DRV to ZIPPER to FOB. This channel gives rise to the assumption that we do not receive in full even the limited information available to the agent. KUBARK is clearly in no position to alter either of these factors.

b. The last informative report on this case is dated 22 April 1954. There can be no doubt that numerous significant developments have occurred since then. It is felt that FOB should be urged to prepare another summarizing dispatch, resembling BOLA-8708, as soon as possible.

c. The SRIS also tried to recruit the source in this case. He rejected the offer on the grounds that his normal schooling prohibited acceptance. Since he represents our only access, apart from monitoring of broadcasts, this decision was fortunate. Should UJ ISOLLERY 17 terminate in such fashion that the source is not involved or under SRIS suspicion, it is suggested that he attempt to get the recruitment offer renewed, and then accept.

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