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1. Summary

a. The principal figure in this case is Wilhelm LUECKE (true name), born 27 May 1917, in Koeln. During World War II LUECKE was a radio specialist ("Funk-Meister") in the German Army. In October 1939, he married in Koeln. He alleges that he believes himself to have been divorced in December 1944. In Duisburg, March 1946, he married again; this marriage was annulled in 1949. Nevertheless, German courts brought a bigamy charge, still unresolved, against LUECKE.

b. In 1948, perhaps to escape the bigamy charge, LUECKE moved from Germany to Vienna, where he found work as a laboratory assistant with Perlmoecker A. G. He also took up residence in the Soviet Sector, Kaltenleutgeben, where one of his numerous girl-friends continues to reside.

c. On 3 April 1953, LUECKE and a friend, or acquaintance, Bernhard NICKEL, were (according to LUECKE) summoned to appear at the Konsendatura in Mauern bei Wien. (LUECKE later told his ZIPPER case officer that he had told the above mentioned girl-friend that he was "at one point" in contact with the Russian Konsendatura ((SOLA-7318.)) Whether this comment referred to his visit of 3 April 1953, or to some other contact, is not stated.) At this meeting, he alleges, he was questioned in detail by a Soviet officer. Further meetings followed, and the officer asked LUECKE to give his German language lessons. This officer introduced him to two others (one apparently an SBIS positive type, the other comm.) LUECKE planned to vacation in Western Germany soon (June 1953.) Although no mention is made of recruitment (i.e., there is no indication that LUECKE was ever asked if he were willing to engage in espionage for the SBIS, and no mention is made at this time of a secrecy or loyalty pledge, or of remuneration,) LUECKE was allegedly given a series of ID's to fulfill while in West Germany. These included German-American relationships; the political situation in Western Germany; existing German military units; types of airplanes seen; obtaining of maps; and new construction by such firms as Siemens. (Comment: LUECKE provided his ZIPPER case officer with these ID's on 18 June 1953. Only when questioned directly on 27 June and 3 July 1953, did LUECKE add that he had been given additional assignments to seek out relatives, friends, and business acquaintances in West Germany as possible future sources, support-points, etc.)

d. LUECKE went first to Munich and there contacted (on SBIS orders) a Dr. Finn KNAPP of Siemens, who promised to try to arrange a job for him. (LUECKE had worked for Siemens before.) He then went to Koeln and visited his brother-in-law, Hans ROCKENBACH, a shipping clerk, allegedly to ask his advice about reporting the story to the SIS. ZIPPER further alleges that at just this psychological moment ROCKENBACH, by purest chance, ran into his old friend, V-2982, whom ROCKENBACH knew to have been a Gestapo man earlier.

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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Date: 2005

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EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(2)(A) Privacy

(2)(B) Methods/Sources

(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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RODGENDORF told LUECKE's story, "and V-2982 persuaded him to allow his (V-2982's) allegedly unspecified connections to handle the case. (Comment: This version seems improbable and ignores the possibility that the SRIS had already spotted V-2982, and directed LUECKE to establish contact with him in order to obtain more information about ZIPPER.)

e. LUECKE allegedly returned to Vienna on 4 July 1953, and reestablished contact with his SRIS case officer on 6 July, by pencilling a sign, according to instructions, on a wall between Mauer and Liesing. The agent meeting was held in an open space near Mauer. (The first two meetings, during the preliminary phase, were held at the Kommandatur; the third was held in a meadow near the Laxenburg-See, where the fourth was also held. These three meetings, like that of 6 July, followed the same pattern; the agent was picked up at a predetermined point by vehicle and driven into the countryside.) The vehicle used on 6 July, bore the license E-42084. (Headquarters and SOB replied negatively to a trace request on this number. No answer from Vienna is in the file.) LUECKE allegedly reported on individuals whom he had met in Western Germany, plus OB in the Koin area and German border police. His reports were vague, and the case officer was dissatisfied. (Comment: This statement seems calculated to reassure ZIPPER.) After a trivial intervening meeting, LUECKE was asked on 3 July 1953, if he were willing to take W/T training. He agreed and signed a pledge that he would work solely in the interests of the SRIS, using his cover name, SERVATIUS, for the purpose. He was paid ANS 1500. He also furnished information on a Siemens employee, fru MARKOWSKI, although he initially denied having done so. The ZIPPER case officer had to force this admission from him, a pattern of concealment which appears with some frequency in this case. LUECKE also provided the SRIS with data on his Viennese mistress, Maria STEINER.

f. W/T training began on 14 July 1953. Initial sessions were held on the shores of a lake "in the direction of Vienna-Stadlau." Two SRIS trainers were used during the schooling, but LUECKE reported only first names and generalized descriptions, so that tracing was to no avail. The training site was soon shifted to Keltentrusckongasse 20/17, Vienna. (Comment: ODOPAL reports of 1947 list this address as an SRIS installation used for W/T training. As ECLW-611, 15 February 54, points out, it would seem unusual for the SRIS to use the same address for W/T training for seven years.) LUECKE signed another pledge, promising secrecy about his W/T training. Training lasted for four months, until 12 November 1953. The daily schedule was work from 0800-1200, lunch 1200-1300, and work 1300-1600. (Comment: All details on training are included in attachments to the original only of ECLA-7136, 21 January 1954. Original and attachments went to Staff D, which has processed. No Staff D analysis has been furnished the ZIPPER desk, however, or, at least, no copy of such an analysis appears in the UJ BROLLERY 15 file. It is recommended that the ZIPPER desk request the results of analysis from Staff D, since LUECKE's W/T training is obviously one of the major touchstones for determining whether the agent ever had direct SRIS contact and, if so, whether he is reporting accurately to ZIPPER.) On 9 November, LUECKE

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was told that three days later he was to go to Venice for an eight-day stay and that during this period he was to send W/T reports from there. Instead, and allegedly without the knowledge of the SRIS, LUECKE went to Munich. He claims to have read in Austrian papers that the Italians had arrested three SRIS agents in Venice and to have grown afraid. He was reportedly persuaded to return to Vienna, where his absence had allegedly gone unremarked. Subsequent checks by ZIPPER and EUBANK showed that no SRIS agents were arrested in Venice at this time. An examination of the Austrian newspapers for the indicated dates, showed no such story. Requestioned, LUECKE became vague and said that perhaps he was to have gone to Milano. (Comment: The entire story seems to have been a fabrication for reasons which remain unclear. If, as seems possible, LUECKE was directed by one CHALUPA (see below) and for the SRIS to go to Munich immediately upon completion of alleged W/T training, for reasons unknown to us, the story of arrests in Venice may have been designed, though very clumsily, for cover purposes.)

g. LUECKE was also given new ID's for his next trip to Munich. Most of these concerned technical/scientific developments at Siemens, where LUECKE was to find employment as a specialist. LUECKE was given ANG 2500 for transportation to Munich and initial costs there. He was given a cover address in Vienna through which he could write to his SRIS case officer. (Comment: The address is Paul SEVETENAY, Landgutgasse 3/18, Vienna 10. ECLA-7833, 1 March 1954, reports that Paul SEVETENAY is the true name of an existing person living at the listed address and consorting with Russians. In view of Maria STEINER's rather wide acquaintance with others connected with this case, it might be profitable to determine whether she also knows SEVETENAY. Re STEINER; see below.)

h. LUECKE learned the true name of his ZIPPER case officer, and even addressed letters to him in this name.

i. LUECKE left Vienna for Munich on 18 November 1953, and established contact with his ZIPPER case officer, V-2982, two days later. On 21 December 1953, he began working for Siemens, testing telegraphic and other technical equipment. Subsequent questioning caused him to enlarge upon, and, in some respects, alter the background information which he had previously given ZIPPER. It was also learned that LUECKE had made a trip to Salzburg on 22-23 August 1953, although he had made no previous mention of this trip. ECLA-7360, 11 February 1954, states that queries on the matter were initiated, but the file contains no results.

j. LUECKE then sent several letters to his live drop, but, since leaving Vienna, he has allegedly been out of contact with the SRIS which, also allegedly, has made no effort to get in touch with this trained W/T operator. Partly to see his amorous, glamorous mistress, Maria STEINER, LUECKE was permitted to go to Vienna from 17 to 24 July 1954. While there, he "chanced" to run into Karl CHALUPA. (Comment: This would seem the coincidental working of the same blind fate which led Hans HORNBERGER to V-2982. It should be

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noted that LUECKE, on earlier occasions and again immediately before his trip to Vienna, had been specifically forbidden to renew his contact with CHALUPA.) The two men arranged a later meeting at which CHALUPA told LUECKE that he was under suspicion of working for an AIS installation in Munich. LUECKE claimed to have denied the charge, and to have convinced CHALUPA of its falsity. The result was that CHALUPA promised to convince the SRIS that a mistake in identity had been made. CHALUPA also inquired about the identity of LUECKE's lawyer in the pending bigamy case, allegedly on grounds that the SRIS would intervene in the case on LUECKE's behalf. LUECKE and CHALUPA met again a few days later, by arrangement. The latter stated that LUECKE's SRIS case officer had gone to Berlin and that his deputy was not authorized to intervene in the case. (Comment: ZIFFER and POB speculate upon the possibility that a shake-up had occurred at SRIS Vienna at this time, such speculation being made upon remarks attributed to CHALUPA by LUECKE. A check with the appropriate headquarters section has shown that there was no such shake-up in July 1954.) CHALUPA also indicated to LUECKE that the SRIS was now less interested in Siemens and would like LUECKE to get a job with the Horn government. On 24 July 1954, LUECKE returned to Munich. Because EOLA-11429, 17 November 1954, mentions no subsequent SRIS-LUECKE contact, the agent would appear to have been out of touch with his SRIS case officer for a full year. (Comment: An analysis of the case by a ZIFFER headquarters CE specialist led him to the conclusion that LUECKE might have been turned by the SRIS during his Vienna visit in July 1953, and that the agent should be put on ice, or dropped, if clarification could not be obtained. The ZIFFER analyst does not, however, consider the possibility that LUECKE may have been an SRIS penetration agent from the beginning of this case.)

2. Maria STEINER and Karl CHALUPA

a. Maria STEINER was (according to LUECKE) born 20 February 1920, in Alland, Austria, and presently lives at Cornyasse 8, Vienna - Kaltentengebren (Soviet sector.) She works as a machine operator in a factory in Boadun, Austria; has an eight-year-old son; and is believed divorced, or separated. LUECKE began boarding at her home (again, according to LUECKE, apparently the sole source of information on STEINER) in 1950, and soon began an affair with her. Up to April 1954, at least, LUECKE continued to receive frequent letters from STEINER at his address in Munich.

(1) The only possible trace turned up on STEINER appears in NAVA-9497, 3 October 1951, which lists a Maria STEINER as the chief Austrian interpreter in the Soviet Central Kommandatura, Bellaria Building, Vienna. She was later reported to be an employee (clerk) with USIA.

(2) According to LUECKE and the letters from STEINER herself, she knew that LUECKE had been in touch with a Kommandatura in or near Vienna. She knows personally Bernhard WICKEL (para. 1c, above), and Karl CHALUPA (see below.) She also knows personally, or at least has met, LUECKE's Soviet case officer. She frequently wrote, or perhaps writes, anonymous letters to LUECKE, some of which enclosed money, although she is supposedly living in poverty. The file contains no originals of these letters. (Comment: It is felt that the originals should be inspected to determine whether they contain enough blank space to suggest

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the use of S/W and, if so, that the ZIPPER technical section submit these letters to thorough testing. It is conceivable that LUECKE has not been out of touch with the SRIS for a year, as would seem to be the case, and that instead "STAINER" (who may not exist, or who may serve as a letter-drop only) has forwarded funds and instructions to LUECKE with considerable regularity.)

b. Karl CHALUPA (according to G-2 Austria files) was born 17 July 1921, in Vienna. He was, or is, a KPOE member. LUECKE claims to have known him since ca. 1951. LUECKE further alleges that after his initial visit to the Konsentura in April 1953, he was told by CHALUPA that the latter made constant trips to Germany, Italy, and the USSR. Subsequently, CHALUPA allegedly "admitted" to LUECKE that he had been an SRIS agent at one time, but had switched to the Czech IS. CHALUPA then tried to recruit LUECKE for the Czech IS, and LUECKE agreed. LUECKE also reported to ZIPPER that he informed CHALUPA in November 1953, that he, LUECKE, was an SRIS agent, and had received W/T training from the SRIS.

(1) Traces (SER 35187, 22 January 1954) showed that CHALUPA was 1/w POHD 8, who had had brief contact with VOB in the summer of 1948. CHALUPA had organized a Czech communist cell in Vienna in 1941; had prepared leaflets announcing the arrival of the Red Army in 1944; had joined the Vienna Staatspolizei in 1945; and had assisted the Soviets in searching and confiscating houses. He was dismissed from the police early in 1948, and later that year had claimed total disillusionment with communism and willingness to work for VOB. He was not used.

(2) Despite ZIPPER orders to sever connections with CHALUPA, LUECKE informed him by post of his Munich address, and CHALUPA visited LUECKE in Munich on 16 and 17 December 1953. This meeting was covered by ZIPPER. It was established that LUECKE did meet a man answering CHALUPA's description. According to LUECKE, CHALUPA stated on 17 December, that he had informed his superiors in the Czech IS about LUECKE, and that the latter wished to recruit him.

(3) On 9 February 1954, LUECKE received from CHALUPA a letter stating that LUECKE could expect a visit soon from Maria SHIMMER (as far as ZIPPER knows this visit did not materialize.) CHALUPA also warned LUECKE to exercise the utmost care.

(4) In response to a telegram, LUECKE met CHALUPA in Munich on 8 May 1954. CHALUPA then allegedly informed LUECKE that he (CHALUPA) no longer worked for the Czech IS, but was, instead, employed by the SRIS and was, in fact, working for the same persons with whom LUECKE had been in contact. CHALUPA reportedly told LUECKE that he would presently receive instructions, and that he should be prepared to report personally in Vienna. He also debriefed LUECKE, who claims to have

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passed only material previously cleared by Sizems and ZIPER for the purpose.

(5) The last LUECKE-CHALUPA contact is outlined in para. 1j above.

### 3. Analysis

a. All conclusions about the validity of this case must be tentative because evidence is scanty. Particularly valuable would be the Staff D analysis of LUECKE's training, as mentioned in para. 1f, above. It is worth noting that the information submitted by LUECKE is too unspecific to permit identification of any SMIS personalities with whom he allegedly had contact; that no confirmation was obtained on the one license number that he reported; that he has not, allegedly, been furnished a W/T net to date; that he seems to have concealed information from his ZIPER case officer on several occasions and to have presented fuller or more accurate accounts only under questioning; that he made an unexplained trip to Salzburg in August 1953; that he has persisted in maintaining contact with Maria STEINER and Karl CHALUPA, both of whom presumably have some sort of contact with LUECKE's SMIS case officer, despite being directed to drop these contacts; and that the extent of the information which he would be able to provide the SMIS about ZIPER (rather than Sizems) does not seem to have been assessed, although we do learn that he managed to learn the true name of his case officer. It can be said that ZIPER learned very little about the SMIS from this agent. The only two points that would seem to lend any validity to his story are the existence of Paul SEVENTENAY, known to consort with Soviets (para. 1g above), and the use of the W/T training site in Vienna by the SMIS for the same purpose some seven years earlier. Neither of these items is weighty; in fact, neither proves anything. On the other hand, the lack of profit from this operation, the circumstances under which the agent approached ZIPER, and the role played by CHALUPA (who, as noted above, seems to have attempted to penetrate KUMARI in 1948), all suggest that this operation may have been a planned SMIS penetration of ZIPER from the beginning.

b. It is still more difficult to analyze ZIPER's handling of this case, because of a dearth of data. The comment made by the G RICHKE, the ZIPER headquarters CE man assigned to the case, that the case officer seems to have accepted the agent's stories naively, and at face value appears justified. We learn nothing of such matters as how agent meetings are arranged; how frequently; where, etc. We do not know whether ZIPER W/T specialists tested the agent's claim to have had SMIS W/T training in order to determine whether the claim was true, or whether the agent's knowledge of W/T was derived solely from experience in the German Army. We know nothing of the extent to which the agent gained an insight into ZIPER. We can assume that ZIPER followed its usual policy of permitting the agent to retain money allegedly

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received from the BRIS. At FOB request, the case officer did prepare a brief study of the character and motivation of the agent; but, as FOB points out, this document is superficial and nearly worthless. At various times, the ZIPPER CE staff made sound operational suggestions; having LUECKE checked by someone within Siemens (EOLA-8329, 1 April 1954); recruiting a female to be played onto LUECKE; and arranging to place controls on his room in Munich (EOLA-7405, 3 February 1954.) If any of these measures were carried out, no results have been reported.

h. Recommendations

a. As noted above, it is recommended that the letters of Maria STEINER be tested by ZIPPER for S/W.

b. It is recommended that LUECKE be placed on LCONVULSER. (ZIPPER has some aversion to the technique but:

c. Should these measures, or the plans made by ZIPPER and outlined in para. 3b, above, yield concrete indications that LUECKE is BRIS-controlled, then FOB and ZIPPER might consider having LUECKE arrange another Munich meeting with CHALUPA (or even possibly STEINER, who has indicated a willingness to come), in order to pick them up for interrogation.

d. It is felt that ZIPPER should, in any case, prepare a study of the extent of possible damage, including a who-knows-whom chart for LUECKE.

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