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1. Summary of Case

- a. The DA in this case is Klaus MANTEL (true name), born 19 September 1931 in Berlin. From an unstated date until the beginning of 1949 MANTEL worked for Siemens's Co., in Berlin. At the latter time he became involved in an unspecified irregularity, fled to the Soviet Zone to avoid the consequences, and found work in the uranium mines at Aue. In the autumn of 1950, MANTEL became involved in another "irregularity" (this one involving falsifications of the analysis of uranium) and in December again fled, going to mother in Berlin/Spandau (West Sector) and seeking unsuccessfully to obtain status as a political refugee. He returned to Aue, where he was arrested on 9 May 1951. Transported to Karlshorst and sentenced there to fifteen years, he was returned to Aue. Here he was told (by persons unspecified) that he could escape his sentence only by agreeing to work for the SRIS (specified by ZIPPER as HVD). In July 1951 he began working as an informant at shaft 6h in Aue.
- b. Somewhat later MANTEL was sent to visit his father, living somewhere in the Soviet Zone, and attempted to determine what he was doing and what ties he had with other former officers. This attempt was largely unsuccessful. He was then directed to repeat the maneuver, the target this time being his uncle.
- c. The "uncle" (by courtesy rather than blood tie) is Karl-Heinz STREITLOW, born 12 January 1915. STREITLOW was then living with MANTEL's mother, whom he later married (about June 1953). STREITLOW had been an agent of ZIPPER's General Agency (GV) G since April 1952, a fact which the SRIS apparently knew when targeting him. At an unspecified time MANTEL visited STREITLOW and told him of his compulsory association with SRIS, including the assignment to assess STREITLOW. The latter promptly reported to ZIPPER, and arrangements were made via STREITLOW for a Berlin meeting of MANTEL and V-4360, a representative of GV G.
- d. This meeting took place in a cafe on 17 July 1952. V-4360 queried MANTEL about the uranium works at Aue. The latter's answers were subsequently evaluated as true but of little significance, and ZIPPER could not determine whether the lack of significant information resulted from ignorance or deliberate reticence. V-4360 further determined that most of the ID's given MANTEL were aimed at the recruitment of STREITLOW in order to penetrate the western IS which he was believed to serve. V-4360 then briefed MANTEL on specific questions asked of him by his "uncle's" friend and the answers given, both to be repeated to his SRIS control officer. (COMMENT: ZIPPER made an error here. The questions are detailed and show knowledge of the Aue mines.) MANTEL was further to describe his uncle's "war-comrade" (i.e., V-4360) as an agent of the Kaiser Ministry (i.e., Ministry of All-German Affairs, not believed to have an intelligence arm of its own); as having ties to Amt Blank (German rearmament). MANTEL was able to identify his recruiter, the case officer who succeeded him, an interpreter, the address at which his SRIS agent meetings were held, phone numbers there, and license numbers of three vehicles used. (COMMENT: Personalities mentioned are, respectively, a Major or Lt. Col. fru SUCHJURKIN, a Sr. Lt. fru SUROKIN, and Rita VOLODINA. Traces on the first and last were negative and on SUROKIN were inconclusive. The license numbers also remained unverified.) Meetings were arranged by letters sent to MANTEL in his SRIS alias, Klaus VOGT or VOIGT.

- (1) Elements of control were mixed from the outset. MANTEL was fond of his mother, who lived in West Berlin and was pro-West. On the other hand, his wife and child lived in the Soviet Zone; and his marriage appeared happy.

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- EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods Sources
(2)(C) Foreign relations

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- (2) A simple code was arranged so that MANTREL, in a letter to his mother, could report the Soviet reception of his information about his uncle's friend. (COMMENT: This step appears unnecessary and insecure.)
- e. On 23 August 1952, on SRIS orders, MANTREL again visited STRETLOW. (For unstated reasons V-4360 was not present, although he may have appeared on 24 and 25 August.) OV G protected the series of meetings which then began by keeping MANTREL, unadvised of the location until the last moment, by changing meeting-sites with each meeting, and by instituting surveillance of meetings (which revealed that the SRIS, despite these precautions, was counter-surveilling.) V-4360 later debriefed STRETLOW, who attributed the following remarks to MANTREL after his return to Aus on 24 July 1952:
- (1) In order to keep the Western IS interested SUROKIN decided that MANTREL, released from Wisnith A.G. to give him more time for espionage, would have to be reinstated there as an analyst-geologist. (Two other men were discharged to make this move possible, a fact which made MANTREL unpopular with his new colleagues.)
 - (2) On 3 August 1952, SUROKIN presented MANTREL to a new SRIS type who introduced himself as Ivan SERKEWITSCH. (COMMENT: The closest trace here is to a Major SEROYEVIKH, reported in MAV-265 of August 1947 to have been an SRIS officer at the Hotel Imperial in Vienna. Physical descriptions show parallels and no serious discrepancies.) MANTREL was asked if he had not been required to sign a secrecy or loyalty pledge, by his uncle's comrade, said no, and was confronted by distrust which he found it difficult to allay. He was informed that penetration of his uncle's organization was now his sole assignment. He was given a few days of practical training to help him play his double role. (For example, where subjects of particular interest to the SRIS were discussed in MANTREL's presence by his uncle and the uncle's friend, MANTREL was to show lack of interest and even steer the conversation into other channels. He was to write nothing. He was to ask the Western IS to build a courier channel into him. He was to study his uncle and determine his weak points. He was to attempt to bring his uncle to East Berlin, where STRETLOW would be promised a bank account of 50,000 to 100,000 DM in his own name. MANTREL was to refuse any money from the Western IS, except costs, in order to create the impression that he was an idealist. Questions about Aus could be answered insofar as MANTREL knew the answers from his own experience. The SSD was to be kept from all knowledge of the case.)
 - (3) MANTREL reported a new license number, also uncheckable.
 - (4) The SRIS paid MANTREL ca. DM (East or West not stated) 1200 between 24 July and 1 September 1952, but was warned to leave all but twenty marks behind before going to his next meeting with his uncle.
- f. At the close of the series of meetings on 23 - 25 August 1952, V-4360 gave MANTREL the following instructions:
- (1) To describe meeting places accurately.
 - (2) To state that he did not believe that his uncle could be recruited.
 - (3) To repeat to the SRIS new technical ID's re Aus.
 - (4) To inform the SRIS that no decision about a courier had yet been reached.
- g. Checking possible losses, ZIPPER determined that MANTREL knew the true identities of his uncle and of one other agent, not involved in the case, plus an alias of V-4360. The ZIPPER CE staff, as a general precautionary measure, directed OV G to start sealing off STRETLOW.

MANTEL next wrote STRETLow to propose meetings on 18 and 19 October 1952. Because V-4360 was ill, STRETLow postponed until 25 - 26 October. V-4360 was still sick, and STRETLow had MANTEL write his report. Highlights follow:

- (1) On 24 October a man "HEIER", possibly of German origin, debriefed MANTEL in Aue about his work in the uranium mine there.
 - (2) Personnel of SRIS Aue traveled frequently to Dresden.
 - (3) MANTEL provided information about uranium production at Aue, part of which he declared had been authorized for release by the SRIS but part of which had been specifically prohibited. Evaluation showed all of his information, however, to be largely worthless; ZIPPER released none of it in information reports.
 - (4) The SRIS had given MANTEL the following ID's:
 - (a) To recite his costs and problems to V-4360 in order to prove his readiness to carry out assignments.
 - (b) To speak to his uncle alone, hint at a brighter future, and note his reaction.
 - (c) To attempt to determine, from his mother, albeit cautiously, the "uncle's" financial circumstances.
 - (d) If alone in the uncle's home, to note (but not write out) any names and addresses found there, not forgetting that he might have been left "alone" under observation for the express purpose of testing.
 - (e) To tell V-4360 that continued trips to Berlin would be too dangerous for MANTEL.
 - (f) To tell the Western IS that he should not be asked to provide technical information about Aue, for the sake of his own security, and that his value lay in a penetration of the SRIS. (COMMENT: ZIPPER headquarters had reached the same conclusion!)
 - (5) MANTEL was given these and other, less important ID's in written form; at the bottom of the sheet was a pledge not to exceed instructions, which he signed in the cover name Klaus VOOT.
- h. V-4360 next met MANTEL on 6 December 1952 in West Berlin. Surveillance revealed no counter-surveillance. (V-4360 used the standard technique of meeting MANTEL and STRETLow in a public place and then directing them to a hotel room.) MANTEL reported as follows:
- (1) He had told the SRIS that the absence of V-4360 had been caused by illness.
 - (2) He had stated that a Herr RICHTER (alias of V-928, not involved but known as ZIPPERite to MANTEL) had replaced V-4360. (COMMENT: No one had authorized MANTEL to tell this lie, which was obviously both needless and very dangerous. Neither ZIPPER nor POB comments on this fact.)
 - (3) He was told to press again for a courier. (COMMENT: As build-up material and to avoid the SRIS insistence on a courier, GV G had requested permission to give MANTEL a middle-grade S/W system, already blown, and seemingly had authorized MANTEL to tell the Soviets that he would be given S/W.) MANTEL was to tell V-4360 that S/W could be only a temporary solution and that a courier was made necessary by MANTEL's increasing difficulty in reaching Berlin.
 - (4) He was given a new emergency telephone number in Freital.

- (5) He was advised to reconcile his differences with his wife. (COMMENT: Here the SRIS makes its first slip, although neither MANTEL nor ZIPPER seems to have caught it. As was learned much later, MANTEL's wife had been separately recruited by the SRIS without his knowledge; in fact, she concealed this fact from him until after the case had ended. The SRIS apparently feared at this time that marital strife might lead to a serious rift and thus to their loss of a window into this DA case.)
- (6) He was briefed on CIC. (COMMENT: Why is not clear. The SRIS knew that STRETLOW and V-4360 were ZIPPERites, though perhaps not at this time.) According to this information, CIC consists of four parts: espionage, sabotage, diversion, and surveillance. It uses both single agents and nets; Germans are frequently used. It uses the "most brutal means"; and if MANTEL fell into CIC hands, he would be finished.
- (7) He was briefed for his next trip from Dresden to Berlin.
- (8) Between 27 October and 5 December 1952, the SRIS paid MANTEL something more than 1000 DM. (COMMENT: It is worth noting that MANTEL, apparently acting in accordance with SRIS orders, did not wish to accept DM 50 offered him by V-4360 at this meeting and had to be persuaded by his uncle.)
- i. V-4360 then briefed MANTEL as follows:
- (1) He had actually been ill at the time of the last meeting.
 - (2) He gave MANTEL the S/W mentioned above and instructed him in its use. MANTEL was given the (ZIPPER) cover name of Karl WERY.
 - (3) He told MANTEL to tell the SRIS that the results produced to date did not warrant the use of a courier.
- j. On 16 December 1952, MANTEL paid his mother and STRETLOW an unexpected visit. Little of importance resulted. MANTEL stated that the SRIS had been very happy to get the S/W but had not yet been able to analyze it.
- k. On 26 March 1953, OV G reported that some time before 15 February V-4360, still ill, had been replaced by V-856. (COMMENT: This move brought to 4 vs. 4 the number of IS personalities that MANTEL was able to report to each side.) V-856 debriefed MANTEL in Berlin on 15, 16, and 17 February 1953. (COMMENT: On the 15th for 1½ hours, on the 16th for 8 hours, and on the 17th for 2 hours. This three-day stay could have been shortened by one day, thus lessening subsequent SRIS suspicion that MANTEL was giving the opposition too much cooperation.) CI measures, as described above, were taken.
- (1) It developed that MANTEL had given the SRIS completely detailed and accurate physical descriptions of STRETLOW and V-4360, as well as a photograph of the former. He reported addresses "used" (in what sense is not clear) by STRETLOW.
 - (2) Further, MANTEL had again invented a story and related it to the Soviets. He had said (which was untrue) that he had been visited in December 1952 by a courier calling himself "HAUPT". He described IB's given him by this non-existent courier and the courier himself. Between Christmas and the New Year, he told them, and again on 6 January 1953, he was again visited by this courier. Allegedly the SRIS now feared that "HAUPT" would visit MANTEL's wife. Accordingly a party was given, during which MANTEL's wife was advised that her husband was a Soviet agent. (COMMENT: If this story contains any truth, which is doubtful, then the purpose of "giving" this information to Christa MANTEL was to continue to protect her cover vis-a-vis her husband, since she had already known the fact for a long time.) MANTEL, whose wife now signed a secrecy pledge, felt that in effect she had now been recruited by the SRIS. Despite these developments, MANTEL invented a fourth visit from "HAUPT"

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in mid-January 1953, during which "HAUPT" was supposed to have stated that because of tightened SSD controls no further courier visits would be paid.

- (3) On 11 February 1953, another SRIS meeting was held at which formerly identified Soviet officers appeared plus a new man, not identified. MANTEL was asked if he were willing to bring his mother into East Berlin and agreed in principle but said that she would not come. The Soviets shifted to the uncle. They knew that MANTEL's mother had asked him to buy a rug for her. They proposed that MANTEL lure STRETLOW into the Soviet sector on pretence of needing his advice in the purchase of the rug. He was to take him to a specified carpet shop. SSD personnel in VoPo uniforms would then conduct an area check of documents. MANTEL would give the Soviets a signed confession of his work for a Western IS, implicating STRETLOW. On the basis of this confession STRETLOW would be pressured to work for the SRIS.
- (a) MANTEL was then told which persons working on "Objekt 96", shaft 269, Aue mines, he could name to the Western IS and which persons he could not name. (He supposedly named all whom he knew.)
 - (b) The agent was told to ask the Western IS for a watch-sized camera.
 - (c) He was to tell the Western IS that he had to know in advance the time and place of meetings with the courier, so that the latter would not go to MANTEL's home and meet his wife.
 - (d) He was directed to ask STRETLOW whether he knew personally his East Zone subsources and attempt indirectly to ascertain their identities. As with other questions, he was specifically warned not to ask the question more than once. (COMMENT: There is only one slight indication that STRETLOW had any subsources. MANTEL had once ventured to the SRIS, however, a guess that he did.)
 - (e) After STRETLOW had been pressured into working for the SRIS, MANTEL would continue to keep him under observation.
- (4) On 12 February 1953, another SRIS meeting enabled MANTEL to describe three new persons, one of them a driver whose name or alias he learned; a new license number (by now he had reported about a dozen), and a new safehouse. He was driven from Aue to the control point of the Berlin sector border in a three-car, eleven-man caravan. After being shown the carpet shop to which he was to bring STRETLOW, he was sent over to West Berlin. He returned alone, stating that he had been unable to find STRETLOW.
- (5) Having thus debriefed MANTEL on SRIS activities, V-856 obtained from him technical reports on Aue which MANTEL had allegedly copied in his office and smuggled into West Berlin on his person. He then directed MANTEL to tell the SRIS that V-4360 was still ill and that another case officer, name unknown, had taken over. This case officer was very dissatisfied with MANTEL's work, which remained unsatisfactory despite the use of a courier. For this reason "HAUPT" would not be sent to MANTEL any more. MANTEL was to be sufficiently active politically to reassure SSD etc. He was further to state that he had been given refresher training in S/W and would perhaps be given the developer at the next meeting, so that the new case officer could write back to him. ID's for Aue were now made very general, so that the SRIS could no longer draw inferences about the extent of the enemy's knowledge. Finally, he was to report the next meeting site and state that he would be advised of the date by mail.
- (6) To his report of this meeting V-856 appended a good analysis of the agent, stating that he was entirely materialistic and could be considered pro-ZIPPER only in matters concerning the safety of his mother and STRETLOW.

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- (7) The new case officer also warned STRETLOW not to go to East Berlin under any circumstances. (COMMENT: This decision may have been right, but it does not seem to have been reached after any consideration of the alternative. Had STRETLOW been permitted to be "turned" by the SRIS, ZIPPER would have had a DA about whose loyalty to Germany and ZIPPER there seems to be absolutely no doubt.)
1. On 29 March 1953, the next meeting between V-856 and MANTEL took place in West Berlin. STRETLOW had been spirited away from his home by ZIPPER, with the cover story that he had business in Bonn, to protect him against possible kidnapping. (It had been determined that he seemed to be under surveillance.)
- (1) MANTEL reported that he had had to submit written reports to the SRIS on his last meetings with V-856 and to cover each story twice, writing on different days.
 - (2) The SRIS refused to release any more data from Aus. The agent was to explain to ZIPPER the reasons why such information could no longer be obtained.
 - (3) MANTEL was also to gather every possible piece of information about V-856 and STRETLOW.
 - (4) MANTEL was now to state to STRETLOW that Western IS material implicating himself and STRETLOW had been found by the Soviets in MANTEL's quarters. If STRETLOW would double for the Soviets, they would not hang him when they marched into West Berlin. If this plan failed, STRETLOW and MANTEL's mother were to be lured into East Berlin on a new pretext.
 - (5) It was learned that the Soviets had succeeded in surveilling an earlier meeting of V-856 and MANTEL.
 - (6) V-856 indicated sharp dissatisfaction at this meeting and told MANTEL that there was little point in prolonging so unprofitable an arrangement.
- m. ZIPPER now began to feel that the play should be ended. MANTEL was providing no more useful information and was suspected (probably correctly) of having reported accurately to the SRIS everything he knew, with the single exception of the fact that he was performing the same service for ZIPPER. It was therefore decided to move STRETLOW and family, including MANTEL's mother, to West Germany. Should the SRIS then send MANTEL to visit his parents in the American zone, ZIPPER would be interested in continuing the play because (they felt) they would have improved control.
- n. V-856 next met MANTEL and STRETLOW in West Berlin on 16 June 1953 and MANTEL alone on 17 and 18 June. No new and significant operational techniques appeared (on either side) because the play was now narrowing down. (Consequently these meetings are herewith reported in far less detail.)
- (1) MANTEL reported that he had provided the Soviets with a print of the house key to STRETLOW's apartment and with a detailed sketch of the apartment. It appeared that the Soviets were now planning a direct kidnapping. (Earlier the Soviets had taken MANTEL to Chemnitz and dictated to him a letter to STRETLOW stating that the Soviets had discovered that he was working for a Western IS and would execute him unless STRETLOW cooperated with them. The Soviets later decided not to use this letter.)

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- (2) The SRIS gave MANTEL a series of plausible excuses to explain his lack of information on the mines at Aus.
- o. ZIPPER was, by now, eager to get out of the play but felt that dropping any Sovzone source at that time (the time of the uprisings throughout the Sovzone) would look odd. It was planned that STRETLow would make a job application in Bonn to Amt Blank and that MANTEL would report this development to the Soviets. (COMMENT: This play seems to be bad timing on the part of ZIPPER; it might easily have impelled the Soviets to try an immediate snatch of STRETLow. Since STRETLow seems to have been under SRIS surveillance at this time or shortly before this time, ZIPPER may have feared that if MANTEL continued for a time to report his presence in West Berlin after STRETLow and family had actually moved out, the SRIS would have known that MANTEL was lying and arrested him. Similarly, keeping MANTEL in the dark until the move had been made would have been out of keeping with the previously established pattern of family intimacy and could have led the SRIS to the realization that MANTEL had betrayed their plans to kidnap STRETLow. Since ZIPPER had decided that it had no equity left in this play, it would have seemed most logical to move the STRETLow and MANTEL families to West Germany simultaneously, without any prior notice to the SRIS. At the same time a fake arrest of MANTEL and wife in West Berlin could have been arranged (or MANTEL "arrested" in West Berlin while Christa and child were visiting her in-laws) to throw the SRIS off the trail and prevent them from attempting to track MANTEL down as a traitor.)
- p. EGIA-5680, 30 September 1954, reports that whereas MANTEL's initial reporting on the Aus mines had been largely valid and valuable, his later reporting was "partially inaccurate, partially improbable, and not worthy of dissemination."
- q. BRLA-6080, 27 October 1953, reports that the wife of MANTEL had visited STRETLow and family and had made obvious attempts to secure information about STRETLow which would confirm his IS status and even facilitate kidnapping. One Kurt LICHTERFELD (true name), who knew STRETLow during the war, had also approached him and attempted to obtain information from him under such circumstances that it seemed probable that he, like MANTEL's wife, was acting on SRIS orders. ZIPPER had therefore evacuated STRETLow to the Stuttgart area and was attempting to get him a job in the border police.
- r. After arriving in Western Germany (apparently in early October 1953), STRETLow received two letters from MANTEL. These letters may have been written at SRIS direction or direct instigation. (COMMENT: Although MANTEL and STRETLow had arranged a clumsy code to indicate by letters whether STRETLow was in immediate danger of kidnapping, ZIPPER does not seem to have provided them with some simple trick - for example, the omission of a symbol otherwise inserted - to enable STRETLow to determine whether MANTEL was writing under compulsion or of his own initiative. If the reason that this step was not taken was that ZIPPER could not be sure that MANTEL would use the indicator honestly, then the play should have been terminated long before it was.) These letters state the following:
- (1) MANTEL was ready to travel to West Germany, leaving wife and child behind, to investigate the possibility of getting work and starting a new life there.
- (2) MANTEL wanted to know when STRETLow or his mother planned to come back to Berlin to pick up belongings left there.
- s. When MANTEL returned to the Sovzone on 18 June 1953 (see paragraph l.n, above), the uprisings were in full swing. To protect himself, he revealed to a Soviet officer that he was an SRIS agent. He was temporarily jailed in Karlshorst but was then driven to Aus, where he met one of his former case officers and a newcomer. Because of the uprising, MANTEL was

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used temporarily as an informant reporting on dangerous or dissident workers at the Aue mines. (There actually was a sabotage ring which MANTEL penetrated and betrayed to the Soviets; he also appeared in court as a witness against members of this ring.) The following paragraphs summarize, briefly, developments between June and December 1953, when the operation ended with all members of both families (MANTEL and STRETLOW) in Western Germany. (COMMENT: The sixty-five page ZIPPER memo covering this period contains a good deal of significant detail on the SRIS and on ZIPPER. The time allowed for this study of UJ DROLLERY cases is drawing to a close, and a detailed analysis of this lengthy report cannot be undertaken now. It is felt, however, that this report, as well as UJ DROLLERY cases 1 through 10, should also be summarized and analyzed later. Finally, on the basis of all twenty-one cases, conclusions should be drawn.)

- (1) In the middle of July 1953 the SRIS offices at Dr. Goerdelerstrasse, Aue, were turned back to the Germans. All subsequent agent meetings with MANTEL were held in vehicles.
- (2) Christa MANTEL visited her parents-in-law in West Berlin from 12 to 14 September 1953. This visit was SRIS-directed; its purpose was primarily to determine whether STRETLOW, on the verge of moving to West Germany, would help MANTEL to settle there too.
- (3) For two weeks after his wife's return, MANTEL was unable to establish contact with any SRIS case officer at any of the three telephone numbers given him for the purpose. (Neither POB nor ZIPPER reporting explains this hiatus.) When MANTEL finally did make contact, it was with a new case officer who directed MANTEL to bend his efforts toward moving to West Germany. Toward this end MANTEL was to arrange a West Berlin meeting with STRETLOW at which all plans for the move would be completed. His wife and child were to follow him shortly, so that the suspicions of the Western IS would not be aroused. (COMMENT: There is reason to believe that the new case officer, @ PETROV, was sincere when he made this statement to MANTEL. It is surprising, however, that the SRIS, for the sake of the agent's cover, would toss aside their only element of control. By this time STRETLOW and family had moved to Western Germany; the SRIS had abandoned plans to kidnap him. It was then planned to send MANTEL, son of STRETLOW's wife, with his own wife and child, into Western Germany to live and from that vantage point to continue to report on STRETLOW. It may be that MANTEL's above-cited betrayal of Aue workers had inspired almost unlimited SRIS confidence in him and that the SRIS was therefore willing to risk continuing a play in which all control elements would vanish. But it is even harder to understand what they expected to get. MANTEL had told @ PETROV that there was no further chance of doubling STRETLOW, and @ PETROV had apparently agreed, adding merely that there were ways to make IS work distasteful to STRETLOW. It is true that their risk would be far less with MANTEL in the American Zone; but this kind of negative thinking does not justify the continuing of an operation and is wholly at odds with the aggressiveness which the SRIS displayed throughout this case.)
- (4) @ PETROV made it clear that MANTEL's control had shifted from his former case officers in Aue to @ PETROV, who worked out of Berlin.
- (5) MANTEL was to accept any offers of schooling from his Western IS. @ PETROV added that his predecessors had, however, managed the case so poorly that it was unlikely that MANTEL would be given schooling.

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- (6) Normal and emergency contact arrangements were made by @ PETROV against the day when MANTEL would be living in West Germany.
- (7) @ PETROV expressed a desire to meet MANTEL's wife, and such a meeting was arranged, although not through MANTEL's intervention.
- t. The above developments were reported by MANTEL to STRETIOW in West Berlin on 23 - 25 October 1953, when STRETIOW was picking up the rest of his possessions. STRETIOW directed MANTEL to report the following to @ PETROV.
- (1) STRETIOW was about to receive a new intelligence assignment, concerning which no details were known as yet.
 - (2) STRETIOW requested MANTEL to delay his move to West Germany until he himself was settled.
 - (3) STRETIOW would help MANTEL to gain recognition as a political refugee, but he would have to support himself while settling in West Germany because he had not worked long enough for the Western IS to have earned assistance.
 - (4) It might be possible for MANTEL to work IS-wise for STRETIOW, but the possibility was indefinite.
- u. MANTEL met @ PETROV in Berlin on 5 November 1953 and was taken to a safehouse on Waldow Allee in the Karlsruher compound. (Compare with UJ BROLLERY 112-D.) @ PETROV stated that MANTEL's move to West Germany would be delayed by the GEXER flap (desertion of a ZIPPERite in Berlin to the Soviets) because ZIPPER would now be exceptionally suspicious of anyone arriving from the East Zone. He added that he believed STRETIOW to be working for ZIPPER. He also stated that pressure would be the only means of inducing STRETIOW to work for the SRIS.
- v. On 27 November 1953 MANTEL met @ PETROV and a new personality, @ Georg, in Berlin. @ PETROV provided detailed instructions for a recruitment of STRETIOW.
- (1) MANTEL was to go to his mother and state that he had been subjected to SRIS interrogation and had broken, implicating his stepfather, STRETIOW. The Soviets were holding MANTEL's wife and child to insure his own return. If he returned without having recruited STRETIOW, he and his wife would be given life imprisonment; the child would become a ward of the state.
 - (2) After the mother had had time to work on the stepfather, MANTEL was to approach him directly and repeat the story. STRETIOW was then to be guaranteed amnesty for work against the USSR, freedom from all financial worries, asylum in the Sovzone in case of need, security (he would not be required to travel to the Sovzone and could meet SRIS agents in Switzerland, Sweden, or Finland), and the sum of 100,000 DM deposited in any bank as security for these pledges. MANTEL was to be dropped out of the picture after STRETIOW began work.
 - (3) If STRETIOW refused, MANTEL was to state that the Soviets would deal with MANTEL and family as outlined above. In addition, they would publish an expose of STRETIOW and ZIPPER which would not only force ZIPPER to drop STRETIOW but would also make it impossible for the latter to secure other employment elsewhere in Western Germany.
 - (4) To prove good faith, STRETIOW was to write a report listing all he knew about the structure of ZIPPER, names of ZIPPERites, plus anything known about Ant Blank.

- (5) If STRETLOW disappeared for any length of time, MANTEL was to return to the Sovzone as rapidly as possible. If STRETLOW asked for a description of @ PETROV, he was to be answered truthfully in all particulars except @ PETROV's height.
- w. STRETLOW was compelled to make his own decision and decided to spar for time. (COMMENT: It is by no means clear why STRETLOW had not been given detailed instructions on how to deal with this situation. ZIPPER certainly had more than ample warning of Soviet intentions.)
- (1) He agreed to work for the SRIS.
 - (2) He required that the SRIS understand that his work for them was not idealistically motivated.
 - (3) He required that he be given a contact in Switzerland.
 - (4) He required an immediate payment of 3000-5000 DM to assist himself and family should they have to flee.
 - (5) He required a large, unspecified sum as guarantee that his material would not be published for its propaganda value, thus exposing him.
- x. MANTEL returned to Berlin on 3 December 1953 and soon indicated by letter that all was well and that he would return to West Germany on 13 December. When he did so, he reported that @ Georg had taken him over during the absence of @ PETROV. @ Georg had interrogated him in detail about the "recruitment" of STRETLOW and had made him write out and sign a full account. Then he had stated the following:
- (1) The next STRETLOW-MANTEL meeting was to be delayed.
 - (2) STRETLOW was to send his wife to the Soviet Zone as a hostage; MANTEL would be in the American Zone during the same period as a counter-hostage.
 - (3) STRETLOW would meet an SRIS representative in Vienna in two weeks. STRETLOW was to furnish detailed information about ZIPPER.
 - (4) STRETLOW was to get DM 500 against true name receipt.
- y. MANTEL returned to West Germany on 13 December 1953 and sent his wife a prearranged telegram. She fled, in accordance with prior arrangements. All principals were reunited in Wuerzburg. Since the SRIS had made propaganda hay out of the GEYER case and ZIPPER feared that it might do the same thing with UJ DROLLERY II, ZIPPER beat them to the punch with brief articles in three newspapers. STRETLOW went back to Berlin in February 1954 for the last time, to arrange the shipping of his furniture to West Germany. While there he was approached by persons whom he suspected of acting on SRIS orders. There were no further developments.

2. Analysis and Comments:

- a. UJ DROLLERY II is not a DA case in the usual sense of the word but rather the account of what happened when two hostile intelligence services became aware that their shared agent was little more than a mailman, delivering all the packages in his possession to both sides with a fine lack of discrimination. This result was achieved because of a rather high level of professional competence displayed by both sides. The agent, only nineteen or twenty years old when pressured into working for the SRIS, and not yet twenty-one when the double play started, is obviously no match for the various professionals, Soviet and German, with whom he must deal. (In fact, MANTEL recognized this fact himself at times and, in the latter part of the case, became frightened.) ZIPPER's decision to enter upon the play was made quickly, if not precipitately, and without taking time to assess MANTEL's suitability for his role. (In fact, the standard procedure of studying a potential DA carefully and writing an objective character analysis before embarking upon the play is not followed by ZIPPER. In cases studied to date,

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either no analysis is made, or it is made after ZIPPER is committed.)

- b. ZIPPER counter-punches throughout the operation, leaving the initiative in SRIS hands. This technique is valid as long as the opposition does not realize that it is dealing with a double, so that it is imperative for the agent to continue all established behavior patterns. It becomes inapplicable when each side realizes the true nature of the case. The SRIS had clearly a defined goal in this operation: to penetrate ZIPPER, first via MANTEL, then via STRETIOW, and finally through whatever contacts STRETIOW had. It pursued this goal aggressively and fairly consistently, although it did waver between plans to obtain physical possession of STRETIOW and plans to leave him in West Berlin or West Germany while putting him under pressure. ZIPPER, on the other hand, wavers violently on such basic issues as whether the case should be prolonged or terminated, whether its goal should include technical data on uranium mining in Aue or not, and whether MANTEL was deceiving them or dealing honestly with them.
- c. It is doubtful that OV G revealed the full extent of MANTEL's knowledge of that organization. He knew STRETIOW's superior, at least by alias - a fact which appeared only after POB, following a headquarters query, asked this question directly. It should be pointed out that a natural tendency on the part of ZIPPER to reveal no more to POB about its own personnel and working methods than is necessary makes it difficult to tot up the probable profit and loss columns in their DA operations. On the basis of information available, US DROLLERY 11 looks like a draw.
- d. The above conclusion, however, is based upon the assumption that MANTEL and, more particularly, his wife, were successfully interrogated by ZIPPER after the case ended. Christa MANTEL is certainly a highly suspicious person. In the early phases of the operation she made repeated pro-Russian statements which she later tried to explain away. The date of her recruitment is uncertain and may well have preceded - even by a lengthy period - her husband's knowledge of that recruitment. She concealed from him the receipt of gifts or cash. He professed to be unaware of her basic political convictions. She asked Frau STRETIOW for a medicine which would cause an abortion and at the same time urgently requested that the mother conceal her pregnancy from the son, suggesting a possibility that someone other than MANTEL - and perhaps even a Soviet - was responsible for her pregnancy. In its close-out report POB mentions that Christa MANTEL will bear watching, but neither the steps taken nor the results are reported. If MANTEL has remained in touch with ZIPPER, if his wife is in the picture, and if she is in touch with the SRIS, then there can be no doubt about who won this ball game.
- e. ZIPPER staff personnel (BV N, OV G, and LO, i.e., headquarters CE man) were clearly shocked to learn that MANTEL had furnished far more information to the SRIS than he had been authorized to do (accurate descriptions, photo of STRETIOW, tracing of the key to STRETIOW's apartment, full details on agent meetings with ZIPPER personnel, etc.). It is felt that ZIPPER's estimate of MANTEL and STRETIOW tends to be colored by the fact that they are Germans, that STRETIOW was an army officer, and that these men and their families were under Soviet pressure or the threat of such pressure. Thus, ZIPPER attempts to make out a case for not allowing an SRIS recruitment of STRETIOW on grounds that little could be gained, whereas the facts of the case suggest that such could have been gained (note desire of SRIS to meet STRETIOW in Vienna and the offer to provide a contact in Switzerland, Sweden, or Finland). Moreover, STRETIOW could far more reasonably have been expected to remain loyal to ZIPPER than could be expected of MANTEL. One suspects that the decision not to risk this play was based on the subjective factors cited above rather than the arguments advanced.

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- f. Both ZIPPER and the SRIS are influenced by humane considerations, though the SRIS is far less affected. The Soviet recruitment of MANTREL is based on cold-blooded pressure (trumped-up arrest, sentencing to fifteen years, and then the offer of an alternative), and all plans to recruit STRETLow are also based on pressure. On the other hand, there is no use of the control factor represented by MANTREL's wife and child. (They are never jailed, for example.) Nor is nearly as much pressure placed on MANTREL himself, through the unserved fifteen-year sentence, as might have been expected. ZIPPER goes much further in this regard, as has been noted above. Their final decision to end the case is clearly motivated almost entirely by concern for the safety (rather than security) of the principals.
- g. UJ DROLLERY 11 provides an interesting insight into SRIS (believed MVD) handling techniques. Worthy of note are skillful use of pressure in the recruitment of MANTREL; professionalism re meeting arrangements; steady pursuit of a single target from beginning to end of the case; very detailed briefing of MANTREL (up to the point at which he became suspected of telling ZIPPER too much); re-interrogation, as SOP, on earlier reports, thus forcing MANTREL into divulging much more than he had intended ~~off-what~~ authorized to divulge; practical training, particularly in security, given by the case officer and tailored to the operation, rather than theoretical schooling (which would have been grist for ZIPPER's mill); keeping the opposition off-balance by unexpected moves. (MANTREL pays unannounced visits, for example, to his mother and stepfather; his wife also visits them at inconvenient times). Also worth noting is the detail with which the kidnapping of STRETLow had been worked out, although the SRIS did slip in revealing the full plan to MANTREL before its execution. Finally, the recruitment of MANTREL's wife, which seems to have preceded a second recruitment, apparently staged for his benefit when her agent status had to be revealed to him, and using her as a check on both MANTREL and STRETLow, merits note.
- h. ZIPPER handling is also professional, even if allowance is made for the fact that our knowledge of the case comes entirely from ZIPPER. Agent meetings are well protected (with counter-surveillance spotting counter-surveillance!) MANTREL and STRETLow are well screened off from ZIPPER. The use of a blown S/W as build-up material is a bright idea. ZIPPER briefings of MANTREL appear much less detailed, but this is the natural result of assuming the passive role. (Moreover, it may be argued that in this type of case any detailed briefing is an error, since it will be repeated in equal detail to the opposition. Certainly the one set of detailed ID's provided MANTREL by ZIPPER and dealing with technical matters at Aus must be considered an error.) Agent handling of STRETLow was insufficiently imaginative, so that at times - for example, when the SRIS recruitment pitch is finally made - he is forced to rely on his own judgement, without prior briefing. On the whole, however, ZIPPER does a competent job in the realm of tradecraft. The fact that the SRIS drew a stalemate in this match, in which ZIPPER started out with evident advantages, results not from superior SRIS techniques but from decisiveness. The SRIS knew from the beginning what it wanted to get and consistently acted in accordance with this purpose, whereas ZIPPER shows up better defensively (i.e., at keeping the SRIS from attaining this goal) than offensively (i.e., at cashing in on its own opportunities.)
- i. Both sides reached, in time, the realization that they were dealing with a messenger boy rather than an agent whose loyalties would lead him to work against either. The Soviet attempt to lure ZIPPER into sending a courier into the East Zone, for example, is amusingly countered by ZIPPER's retort that the SRIS was not giving MANTREL intelligence of enough value to warrant the use (i.e., exposure) of a courier. Both sides are, however, somewhat unrealistic from this point on, since it is evident that neither is going to tell MANTREL anything that the other really wants to know, yet each continues to try to penetrate the other through MANTREL.

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1. This case also does not merit detailed handling because (a) no DA or even CE interest is demonstrable, and (b) the central figure shifted identities and cover stories so frequently that at date of last ZIPPER report (3 December 1952) neither identity nor background had been established beyond doubt.
2. Max MEIER (possible true name), possibly born 7 September 1920 in Gerbersdorf, Silesia, appeared in Istanbul in October 1952. At the German Embassy in Ankara he had told a fictitious story of being a PW escaped from the USSR. Sent to Istanbul and turned over by the Turkish Security Service to KUBARK there, he "confessed" (another lie) that he had been sent into Turkey by the SRIS. Transferred to Germany and ZIPPER custody, he was repeatedly interrogated. About 15 January 1953 ZIPPER turned him over to the Kripo (German criminal police) because of suspicion that he was identical with a man wanted for bigamy and fraud.