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6 Apr 1953

UJ DROLLERY 16

1. Summary

a. UJ DROLLERY 16, also known by ZIPPER designator, V-11530, was a medical quack (no license) who appeared in Vienna ca. 1944 or 1945, and began treating Soviet military personnel for VD. Recruited by CIC (Major Peter Chambers), he was dropped in early 1949, because of endangered security, and moved out of Vienna. MAVA-1221, 29 April 1948, lists the foregoing, and adds that these facts and additional information were passed by a Bulgarian agent [ ] to the Bulgarian IS, so that this service (and, perhaps, the SRIS) were aware of the status of V-11530 at least as early as April, 1948. Soon after CIC dropped him, Detachment 35 picked him up on behalf of their projects MEMPHIS and MOLINE. Detachment 35 dropped him in 1951 for a number of indiscretions, and a refusal to submit to operational control. (According to our records, Detachment 35 dropped him in "early 1951." V-11530 claims, however, that he was not dropped until he became seriously ill, and was hospitalized at the end of November, 1951.)

b. In July, 1951, V-11530 was approached by the SRIS in Vienna, and by mid-August, 1951, he had begun to report to the SRIS everything he knew about the AIS, both American case officers (thirteen in all, CIC and Detachment 35; one subsequently KUBARK, but soon dropped) and AIS agents. (One POB memo lists ninety-eight persons, all with direct or indirect IS ties, known to V-11530. It is a reasonably safe assumption that he listed nearly all of these for the SRIS. He also listed all information known to him, which was considerable, on an MOB operation.)

c. During a period of hospitalization in Salzburg for TB, November, 1951, to April, 1952, V-11530 was recruited by a sub-agency leader (V-11501) of ZIPPER's UM organization. ZIPPER did run traces with us, and as a consequence [ ] (at that time at KUBARK headquarters) strongly advised against recruitment, even suggesting that V-11530 could well be an SRIS agent. The agent was recruited despite this warning, and began to provide the SRIS with all information on ZIPPER which became available to him.

d. For somewhat obscure reasons, V-11530 confessed to V-11501 on 17 July 1953, after two years of doubling for the Soviets, that he was an SRIS agent. UM nevertheless decided to attempt to double V-11530 back against the SRIS. The record makes it clear that, from this point on, V-11530 told each service most of what he knew about the other. ZIPPER apparently believes that V-11530 withheld from the SRIS the vital fact that he had revealed to ZIPPER his status as an SRIS agent, a contention given weight by the Soviet arrest of the agent in November or December, 1953. On the other hand, analysis of SRIS information which V-11530 supplied ZIPPER, indicates some inaccuracies.

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e. According to [ ] the SRIS case officer of V-14530 became suspicious, ca. September, 1953, that his D/A was actually working against him. The SRIS arrested the agent in late November or early December, 1953, and turned him over to the Bulgarians.

## 2. Supplementary Information

a. The information provided by V-14530 about the SRIS is a curious mixture of truth and falsehood. It appears, however, that the bulk of the information submitted on this subject by V-14530 was true and significant.

(1) He correctly describes his case officer, whom we know [ ] to have been Vladimir PRILEPIKOV, MVD Vienna, and also provides a good deal of supplementary information which is accurate at all checkable points (type of vehicle; hobbies; language skills.) On the other hand, his description of the lieutenant colonel whom he describes as the Kommandant in Urfahr (actually, Col. from YAKOVCHUK at that time) is wholly wrong. (It remains possible that he saw the man whom he described, and was mistaken only in the position which he assigned him.)

(2) He submitted to ZIPPER an S/W pad furnished him by the SRIS. KRTOFAZ analysis (EGTA-02556, 27 November 1953) of a sheet from this pad showed it to be a previously unknown S/W system which "may be classified as being of high security."

(3) On the other hand, some operational details reported by V-14530 seem incredible. For example, after entering the Urfahr Komendatura openly, he is disguised with dark glasses and another man's hat (on another occasion with dark glasses and false moustache) before being driven to a nearby safe house. Yet, at the conclusion of this meeting, his case officer, for no discernible reason, drives him through Urfahr streets, undisguised, for ten minutes before letting him out at the busiest corner in Urfahr - this in a Soviet plated vehicle.

(4) Yet, when the license number of this car, and other plates reported by V-14530, were checked by VOB, they were found to be known SRIS plates.

(5) Similarly, V-14530 told ZIPPER that his Soviet case officer intended to place another highly trained SRIS officer in touch with an old Viennese friend of V-14530, one Lilly KREVENKA, a former (AIS) letter-drop for V-14530. KREVENKA would then inform V-14530 by letter that she was in touch with a Soviet officer who was willing to defect. V-14530 was to show the letter to his ZIPPER case officer, state that he knew the officer concerned and knew him to be anti-communist, but refuse to become involved himself, thereby forcing ZIPPER to reveal a new operative, from whom the Soviet officer would draw ZIPPER ID's. [ ], however, remembers only that V-14530 denounced one Emilia KREVENKA to the SRIS as an AIS agent.

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(6) Again, V-14530 reported that at the nineteenth meeting, held in Erfahr, his case officer proposed Weyer as the site of the twentieth meeting. Although, (once again,) the possibility of simple error exists, there is also a possibility of fabrication here. Even on a detailed map, Weyer looks as though it were in the Soviet Zone, whereas, in actuality it is in the American Zone.

b. UJ DRILLERY 16 is complicated by the fact that three other men admitted, truly or falsely, that they were SRIS agents.

(1) The most important of these is Ferdinand SCHAEFFER, Volkdeutscher, born 3 August, 1924, in Rumania. Like V-14530, SCHAEFFER had an involved IS history. SCHAEFFER told V-14530 that he (SCHAEFFER) had been recruited by Petru CONSTANTINESCU (a professional peddler, who once had ZIPPER ties, and who was working for the FIS at this time) in 1949. He was sent to France for training in preparation for commitment in Rumania, was adjudged unsuitable, and was hired as a safe-house keeper at the school. (Subsequently, some students at this school were among FIS agents air-dropped into Rumania, and there arrested and tried. POB suggests SCHAEFFER's possible complicity, although subsequent interrogation and LOFLUTTER failed to substantiate this suspicion.) At an unknown time prior to 1949, ZIPPER had recruited SCHAEFFER, but dropped him in January of that year for a security breach and suspected theft. CONSTANTINESCU picked him up soon thereafter, as did MIS. The latter organization dropped him (reason unstated) on 1 March 1950. CONSTANTINESCU appears to have dropped SCHAEFFER in late 1952. According to his own statement to V-14530, SCHAEFFER was recruited by the SRIS in Vienna in late October, 1952, as the result of a chance meeting with an SRIS recruiter. (Comment: SCHAEFFER seems to have been an unscrupulous liar and may well have been recruited by the Soviets long before this date.) At some point in 1953, SCHAEFFER went to CIC and volunteered the information that he was an SRIS agent, but was so blatant in his attempts to wring money out of this admission, that CIC considered him merely a swindler and dropped all contact with him on 17 August 1953, after forcing him to sign a pledge (which he promptly ignored) to stay out of IS work. On 28-29 August 1953, SCHAEFFER admitted his SRIS tie to V-14530 and, by his account, made it clear that he was dealing with the same case officers who were directing V-14530. The latter had initially established contact with SCHAEFFER in a Salzburg DP camp about June, 1953, on SRIS orders. These orders were that V-14530 should represent himself as an AIS agent to SCHAEFFER, recruit him for the AIS, and then try to get ZIPPER to buy him. In addition, V-14530 was directed to make inquiries of SCHAEFFER re one Otto HEINZELMANN (who, subsequent events suggested, was probably like SCHAEFFER, already in the employ of the SRIS at this time.) When SCHAEFFER admitted his SRIS tie to V-14530, he added that he had told only the Soviets about HEINZELMANN and, therefore, had reason now to suspect that V-14530 was, himself, a Soviet agent.

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a. This involved picture is made yet more complex by the fact that V-114530 promptly reported the above to the SRIS, being indignant that they had blown him to another agent. The SRIS case officer, according to V-114530, thereupon admitted that SCHAEFFER was a Soviet agent, (Comment: Such an admission seems somewhat improbable,) but reassured V-114530 by adding that SCHAEFFER had been deceived as to V-114530's true affiliations, because the SRIS had informed him (SCHAEFFER) that V-114530 had learned about HEINZELMANN from the AIS and that the AIS had learned about him through a leak in the SRIS. (Comment: Such a "reassurance" is obviously absurd. Had the Soviet case officer actually told both V-114530 and SCHAEFFER that the AIS had a penetration of this type into the SRIS, both agents would have had no choice, but to eschew all SRIS contact from that point on.)

b. V-114530 alleges that he met SCHAEFFER again on 8 September 1953, and that the latter added yet another element of confusion to the case by reporting that he had met an old friend, one Anton STEFAN, on 6 September, and that STEFAN had confessed to SCHAEFFER that he (STEFAN) was an SRIS agent. STEFAN alleged that he was directed from Floridsdorf/Vienna. (SCHAEFFER, like V-114530, was directed from Vienna and Moedling.) STEFAN had, thereupon, tried to recruit SCHAEFFER on behalf of the SRIS. Later, however, SCHAEFFER was confronted with STEFAN in CIC offices, and concluded that STEFAN was a CIC provocation agent.

c. Despite the fact that the can was, by now, overflowing with worms, UM decided to recruit SCHAEFFER, (already dropped once by ZIPPER for poor security and theft,) and V-114530 accordingly directed SCHAEFFER to fill out a PMS.

<sup>was</sup>  
d. V-114530, arrested by the Soviets on or about 28 November 1953. SCHAEFFER was interrogated and LOFLUTTERED by KUSARK personnel between 20 and 31 December 1953. The results tend to demonstrate that SCHAEFFER (like V-114530) was indeed a Soviet agent and that he (like V-114530) had, in effect, told the SRIS everything he knew. Finally, checkable information about the SRIS which SCHAEFFER provided ZIPPER, proves largely accurate but is also, for the most part, a duplication of information provided by V-114530.

e. After this interrogation, SCHAEFFER was turned over to the French (see para. 2b (1), above) and sentenced by them to fifteen years at hard labor.

f. In addition to SCHAEFFER and STEFAN, one Otto MAI appears within the UJ BROLLERY, 16 framework as a self-confessed SRIS agent or, more accurately phrased, as a self-claimed KPOe courier to the SRIS in Urfahr and Moedling. MAI made this "admission" to V-114530 (and subsequently to V-114501) on 4 October 1953. His reasons for "confessing" are, like the motives of V-114530, SCHAEFFER, and STEFAN, extremely obscure. (He claimed that he had long wished to harm the KPOe, although for years his livelihood had been dependent upon that party.) The story told by MAI is so fantastic that it can, upon the face of it, safely be dismissed as blatant fabrication. MIA offered to obtain and supply ZIPPER with KPOe intelligence, and also to make his

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*into his confidence. RIBYTKI  
may also have been  
Testing*

V-14530

courier pouches available for examination before delivery, and to do this - despite his poverty - without recompense. On 17 October, V-14530 reported the MAI case fully to the SRIS, and thereafter MAI obviously avoided all further contact with V-14530 or V-14501. (Comment: It is possible that MAI is merely a low-level swindler who noted that the constitutionally indiscreet V-14530 was an agent, and decided to try to milk him. It is also possible, however, that MAI was played into V-14530 and V-14501 by the SRIS. V-14501 refused, for a time, to consider the recruitment of Ferdinand SCHAEFFER. FRIEYKOV, blocked in this attempt to run a separate line into V-14501, may have decided to make another play without taking V-14530 (of whom he was already suspicious) by waiting to see whether V-14530 would report MAI's "confession." (V-14530 did so and the SRIS disclaimed any knowledge of MAI.)

3. Analysis and Commentary

a. It is felt that ZIPPER ran this show rather poorly. UMI became involved in extremely complicated gambits and shadow-boxing, meanwhile losing sight of fundamentals. Examples follow.

(1) Neither V-14530 nor Ferdinand SCHAEFFER should have been recruited in the first place. Both had had a long and dubious IS record before ZIPPER recruitment.

(2) Once V-14530 had admitted an SRIS tie, he should never have been given serious consideration for a D/A role. By the time that he had made this revelation, he was already known to ZIPPER as being a probable homosexual, a very heavy (probably compulsive) drinker, and a person whose emotional instability led him to conspicuous extravagance. The only person for whom he shows much feeling during this case was his mother; and the fact that she was living in Bulgaria had given the SRIS its initial hold on the agent, by his own statement. To top it all off, V-14530 was so seriously ill with tuberculosis that frequent hospitalization was necessary. In brief, there was no reason to feel that V-14530 could stand the strain of a D/A operation without a split of loyalties, and there was ample reason to feel that he could not.

(3) V-14530 reported that he was paid fairly generously (by Soviet standards.) ZIPPER, reporting, mentions SRIS payments to the agent only at the tenth, thirteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first meetings; but it is probable that several other payments were made as well. The reported payments were, respectively, 1500, 2000, 1500, 1500, 2400, 4000, 1000, and 2000 ANS. As in its other D/A cases, ZIPPER apparently made no effort to apply the principle that a D/A must be paid only by the service for which he is actually working, and must turn over to that service all funds paid him by the opposition. Failure to apply this principle may have been one of the reasons why V-14530 worked "loyally" for both sides. Moreover, the net result was to give the agent far more money than he could wisely handle, and thus give him the opportunity (of which he availed himself most thoroughly) to spend money conspicuously.

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b. It is also felt that, as a result of the above, the SRIS gained more from this case than did ZIPPER. ZIPPER learned no identities (those mentioned here derive from [ ] and KUBARK/REDCAP in Austria,) and could not even be sure of which component of the SRIS was on the other end of the line, (identified later again by [ ]) On the theory that he was protecting the security of V-14530, a theory which seems incredible in view of the fact that V-14530 had already confessed to penetrating the UM organization on SRIS orders, UM allowed a second SRIS agent, SCHAEFFER, into his family. Meanwhile, the SRIS had gained a wealth of valuable information, unfortunately, concerned far more with the AIS than with ZIPPER. Finally, this two-way flow was permitted before ZIPPER could assess the value of what it was getting on the SRIS (as we have noted, some of this information does not seem sound) and without reference to the fact that it could not control, or even determine, the kind or amount of information which would be given the SRIS. The final Soviet arrest of V-14530, and the turning over of the agent to the Bulgarians, cannot be regarded as evidence that the Soviets had come to realize that they were on the losing side in this ball game. On the contrary, it seems likely that the SRIS realized that it had extracted everything of significance that V-14530 could provide, and cold-bloodedly decided to dispose of the agent before they themselves had been hurt.

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