

Chief, EE

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Operational/CART/ZIPPER

ZIPPER's CE Organization and Operations

**KAPOK**

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- REF: (1) EHLA-6080, 26 October 1953 (3) EHLA-12193, 11 January 1955  
(2) EHLA-8127, 15 March 1954 (4) EHLA-7666, 15 February 1954

SYNOPSIS: A summary review of ZIPPER's CE Organization and operations.

1. During the first part of this year we had occasion to give more than the usual number of briefings at FOB. Inasmuch as our last dispatches in this general field were References 1 and 2, and in view of the imminent departure of undersigned, this may be the right time to bring you up to date on ZIPPER CE matters.

2. For the purpose of briefing representatives of the Clark Committee we told ZIPPER that a budgetary review required a listing of the status of CE cases being run. Attachment #1 hereto is a copy of the memo prepared, on a rush basis, by @ RISCHE of ZIPPER Headquarters' CE staff. Among other things, it points out that lack of an adequate number of well qualified, trained and experienced CE agent handlers has constituted a problem (not unique to ZIPPER). Definite steps have been taken to correct this weakness. ZIPPER's training school has established a CE course of two weeks' duration. Starting with no precedents and no guides, the CE and training staffs spent a great deal of time preparing the curriculum and the various lectures; trial lectures were given to members of the Headquarters CE staff for critique and amendment. Finally, by the first of the year, the first course was given to field base CE staff members and chiefs of

Encls:

- |   |  |
|---|--|
| 1. ZIPPER Memo #11403                   | 10. East German Cases                        |
| 2. Themen und Zeitplan fuer GA Lehrgang | 11. Hungarian Cases                          |
| 3. Summary Chart of CE Cases            | 12. ZIPPER CE Reports                        |
| 4. Anlaufende GA Verbindungen           | 13. Headquarters CE Organization Chart       |
| 5. Laufende GA                          | 14. Field Organization Chart                 |
| 6. Anlaufende GA                        | 15. Diagram of CI/CE Field Agents            |
| 7. SRYS Cases                           | 16. UJ-BROLLERY Cases Handled by Field Bases |
| 8. Polish Cases                         | 17. ZIPPER Memo #7322                        |
| 9. Czech Cases                          |  |

Distribution:

- 3 - EE, w/1 Cy ea. Atts. 1-6, 15-17; 4 Cys ea. Atts. 7-11; 2 Cys ea. 12-14  
3 - COM, w/1 Cy ea. Atts. 1-6, 12, 15-17; 2 Cys ea. Atts. 7-11, 13-14

24 March 1955

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

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(2)(B) Methods/Sources   
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

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field bases. Hereafter the course will be repeated every two weeks, with facilities for compartmented training of two separate groups at a time, filtering down the organizational chain to reach the agent-handlers themselves. We expect that marked improvement will be noted by this summer. A copy of the curriculum, with names of instructors appears as Attachment #2.

3. We prepared a chart (Attachment #3) showing the breakdown of ZIPPER's 31 "cases" during the period August 1954-January 1955, along with costs. The cases total 6 BRIS, 2 Polish IS, 3 Czech IS, 13 East German IS, 6 Hungarian IS and 1 other. It should be noted that unclarified or tentative cases are considered "Angelegenheiten" and are not included. ZIPPER actually gave us the information in the form of individual case sheets arranged in three groups:

- a. 7 cases being dropped (Attachment #4)
- b. 15 Active cases (Attachment #5)
- c. 12 cases under development or in initial stages (Attachment #6).

4. For a brief summary of the status of various current CE cases see respectively the following attachments:

(7) BRIS, (8) Polish, (9) Czech, (10) East German, (11) Hungarian.

NOTE: A listing of ZIPPER CE cryptonyms appears in Reference 3. Attachment #16 shows a breakdown of UJ-DROLLEK cases to date by field bases.

5. As pointed out in Attachment #1, these CE cases alone yielded to ZIPPER 795 incoming CE reports during the six months' period (August 1954 to 1 February 1955), averaging about 132 reports per month and substantially equal in number to the 731 reports received during the like period a year previously. POB noted substantial improvement in quality over the production of the previous year. During the period late fall-winter 1954-1955 ZIPPER's overall quantitative yield of CE reports from all sources, averaging ca. 475 reports/month, represented less than 20 per cent, actually 17 per cent, of reports of all types. Of CE reports received, ZIPPER disseminated an average of almost 60 per cent, actually 57 per cent.

a. The CE percentage of the reporting from various sources varied widely, from 90-100 per cent (specialist CI/CE groups such as field bases 4 and 142 (ex-GV L) and the Bavarian border police), to 50 per cent for the "interrogators" group, to less than 25 per cent for major "all-around" field bases operating especially against the GDR. The latter reflected concentration on military intelligence, the two leading northern (11) and central (161) bases showing only 15 per cent of their reporting in the CE field and the southern base (12) less than 4 per cent; bases specializing in satellite operations ranged from about 10 per cent for the Polish and Czech fields to about 18 per cent for the Balkan areas.

b. From November 1954 to February 1955 "interrogators" reports showed a decline unmatched by agent reports whose ratio to interrogations rose from 1.8 (392:218) to 4.5 (361:80).

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Attachment to  
EHL-A-13407

(EHL-A-13282, 24 March 1955)

## KAPOK

6. Paragraph 5 of Reference 2 reported that the general CI fund ("C.II.1") was only about 5 per cent of the operational funds available to the bases. The centrally controlled "C.II.2" fund, for CE and political intelligence and CI/economic intelligence, at that time amounted to 15,000 DM per month. The peak expenditure in any month occurred in April 1954, when 23,566 DM were spent for "CI" activities. However, since June 1954 these expenditures have been averaging around 10,000 DM per month.

a. By way of comparison the following average figures are shown for the 7 months' period July 1954-January 1955:

		<u>Ratio to CI</u>	
(1) Tactical Intelligence:	110,526 DM/Mo.	12:1	
(2) Strategic Intelligence:	6,184 "	7:1	
(3) Defection Inducement:	3,464 "		
(4) CI Activities:	9,355 "		(About \$2,225/Mo.)
(5) Sum (1) through (4):	188,529 "	21:1	(CI is ca. 7%)
(6) Total Costs:	1,671,839 "	186:1	(CI is ca. 1/6%)

b. Undersigned considers that the funds available to ZIPPER for CE purposes are inadequate. Money is needed now primarily to hire and train promising young men to be the CE case officers of tomorrow.

NOTE: With 5 per cent of operational funds, the CE effort produced ca. 20 per cent of ZIPPER's reports.

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c. CE agent reporting showed concentration geographically on the following areas:

- |     |               |      |                    |                 |
|-----|---------------|------|--------------------|-----------------|
| (1) | West Germany: | 175* | mostly from bases: | 4, 142, 11.     |
| (2) | GDR:          | 145  | mostly from bases: | 11, 161, 4, 12. |
| (3) | Austria:      | 29   | mostly from bases: | BB, 2.          |
| (4) | Hungary:      | 19   | mostly from bases: | 142, 2.         |
| (5) | CSR:          | 9    | mostly from bases: | 4, BB.          |

\* Average Reports Per Month

d. For further comparative details see chart enclosed as Attachment #12.

6. Financially, we do not believe that there have been any substantial changes in ZIPPER's small CE budget since the writing of reference 2, whose paragraph 5 reported that the general CI fund ("C.II.1") is only about 5 per cent of the total operational funds available to the bases. The centrally controlled fund ("C.II.2") at that time amounted to 15,000 DM per month, but it had been allocated to political intelligence and CI/economic intelligence as well as CE. Undersigned considers that the funds available to ZIPPER for CE purposes are inadequate. Money is needed now primarily to hire and train promising young men to be the CE case officers of tomorrow.

NOTE: With 5 per cent of funds, CE effort produced ca. 20 per cent of reports production.

7. Since 1950 the ZIPPER CE organization has been growing slowly but steadily in importance and ability. The headquarters is now reasonably staffed, both as to quality and quantity (except for central card file personnel, clerical-secretarial help and junior case officers) to provide effective headquarters CE direction and backstopping. With a couple of notable exceptions, members of the CE staff at headquarters are competent and experienced, several with extensive wartime and/or pre-war experience. Any one interested in ZIPPER CE personalities should read the individual  data sheets or, at least, reference 4, which is incorporated into this dispatch by reference. In view of changes which have occurred, a chart of ZIPPER headquarters CE organization is appended as Attachment #13.

8. ZIPPER CE organization in the field is based on some specifically CE but minority assets directly subordinated to Hqs. CE section direction, plus CE sections which exist in only some of the field bases. In such bases the CE section is viewed, organizationally, somewhat as a military staff section, subordinated directly and exclusively to the field base chief, or his chief of operations. As such, it suffers from the defects inherent in such a system, whose most outstanding flaw is that centralized direction required for most effective CE work is rendered difficult by lack of a direct CE command channel. This situation, however, is not uniquely ZIPPER's. Field base chiefs have stressed OB collection and have tended to neglect CE until recently. The basic field organization in broad outline appears in the chart enclosed as Attachment #14. For further information on field

base 142 see EGLA-8126, 15 March 1954. A more detailed diagram of the various CI/CE agents in the field is given in Attachment #15, gleaned primarily from CI/CE listings in the "Optik."

9. In addition to its own controlled agencies, ZIPPER obtains CE information from various Western intelligence services (Swiss, French, Spanish, Danish, British), with which official liaison is maintained. In addition, official liaison is maintained with a number of West German offices, whose productivity varies generally in inverse ratio to the extent of involvement of those offices in pure intelligence/CE activities. Thus, ZIPPER obtains little more than an exchange of name trace requests/replies and very little CE information of value from the BfV, its main competitor in the West German CE field, even though the BfV's deputy chief is a former ZIPPERite. ZIPPER maintains liaison with and obtains CE information from such offices as the BKA (Federal Criminal Police), the SG (Federal Security Group), various LKAs (State Criminal Police Bureaus), LfVs (State Security Bureaus), Bavarian and Federal border guards (BGS), and the ZKI (Zollkriminalwissenschaftliches Institut). In many of these offices solid personal connections have been exploited to develop into quasi-penetrations. The CE man for Bavaria's LKA is SCHREIBNER, of "NORDEPOL" fame, a former ZIPPERite. The chief of Bavaria's LfV is Martin KIEDMAYR, a long-time ZIPPERite. Further information on ZIPPER-BfV-LfV contacts is contained in EGLA-9847, 13 July 1954. As another example of the manner in which contacts are utilized: In October 1954 an individual in Camp Valka, near Nurnberg, gave CE tips to V-91, who passed them on to ZIPPER headquarters. The BfV found out about this source for leads and sent a CE man of its own to take over. ZIPPER was able to call on Bavarian Minister HOEHNER to block this, asserting Bavarian state's rights vis-a-vis a federal man. Relations are also maintained increasingly with the federal court in Karlsruhe and with the federal prosecutor (Oberbundesanwalt). Indications are that ZIPPER has been making steady progress towards achieving some measure of unification and centralization in the West German CE field, as well as assuring itself of eventually attaining a prominent if not exclusive role therein.

10. The nature of future KUBARK-ZIPPER relationships has been discussed in broader context in other dispatches by [ ] From the CE standpoint it may be interesting to glance at Attachment #17, a memo written in late fall 1953 by ZIPPER's CE chief, outlining his desires for the interim period until legalization. This document should be read in context of its date; i.e., a period when KUBARK insight and "control" was at its zenith. ZIPPER was then especially interested in selling itself to the government as a "pure German" organization un-penetrated by KUBARK. Our insight and partially directing participation in such sensitive matters as communications and CE, particularly with regard to budgetary inquiries and approvals, were considered especially undesirable by ZIPPER. Consequently, ZIPPER's emphasis, as will be noted by readers, was negative, i.e., on abolishing requirements for reporting source identification data and financial-operational details, as well as reducing true name identifications of ZIPPER personnel. The document was intended primarily for "optical" reasons, i.e., to show any visiting government inspectors the official basis of our relationship, stressing the very limited nature of KUBARK insight. In point of fact, we did then formally and voluntarily relinquish some of the "controls" most irksome to ZIPPER. However, CE reporting on various cases continued virtually unchanged, with detailed operational reporting still being given to us.

a. For the post-legalization phase, @ Dr. KLAUSNER envisaged:

- (1) Cessation of accountings by ZIPPER for funds expended for CE.
- (2) Exchange of name trace requests and other information to continue as before.
- (3) Reporting and close cooperation on double agent cases involving U. S. interests to continue as heretofore.

**NOTE:** Most Eastern espionage cases have at least one mission to collect and report information on U. S. forces and/or penetrate same, hence our interest in the great majority of ZIPPER CE cases seems assured.

- (4) Reporting on DA cases directed at purely German interests, e.g., Bonn government, will be limited to CE information reports on the Eastern intelligence services, personalities, methods of operation, etc. The specific identification and location of the DA will not be identified nor will we be provided with copies of the pure German interests build-up material furnished the enemy.
- (5) Personal contact between working-level case officers will continue as before, but, for optical reasons, contact will take place outside of the ZIPPER headquarters compound, in a safehouse. Dr. KLAUSNER did not insist that this be a ZIPPER house, but seemed to envisage use of a ZIPPER and/or KUBARK safehouse.

b. For some time ZIPPER and SMOPIA have been conducting liaison on CE matters. The ZIPPER headquarters working-level case officer most concerned is normally called in on any given case to discuss operational details whenever this is considered necessary. We have no doubt that KUBARK will enjoy a better relationship; we cite the SMOPIA relationship merely as an indication that, in dealing with a non-trusted, "so-called" service, on a basis of quasi-independence, ZIPPER has not in practice limited the contacts to a very small and isolated official "liaison office." POB/CE personnel have been following deliberately a policy of maintaining and expanding personal working-level contact, officially and socially, with as many of the ZIPPER headquarters case officers as possible. This well-established and growing trend is a definite, positive factor for maximum favored liaison in the future, limited only by an excessive rate of turn-over and loss of KUBARK CE personnel whose long-term services are required in this field. Of the nine men who have served in POB's CE section, three have left or will probably have left KUBARK before next year and only three appear as probably likely to be serving with or available to POB/CE by that time. Inasmuch as   is already committed to Headquarters ZIPPER desk, this last figure should be reduced to two; this figure, out of nine, speaks for itself.

11. In the past POB called attention to a number of weaknesses in ZIPPER's

CE service, nor have all of them yet been corrected. Nevertheless, viewed in proper perspective in the German scene, it seems fair to say that this service should be considered effective and professional; it is certainly more than normally cooperative and furnishes us CE information not obtained through other sources, including German and even U. S. offices, with whom KUBARK has direct, official liaison. Long-range CE interests can best be served in Germany by one central CE service, which will fit best within the framework of the German foreign intelligence service, which we believe ZIPPER will become. If this develops, we believe that KUBARK will enjoy most favored service status with a foreign intelligence service accustomed to close cooperation with KUBARK in the CE field. Geopolitical and other factors point to a high degree of mutuality of interests over an extended period of time, specifically as long as the USSR and its satellites continue as a threat to Germany.

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_

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ATT. MENT 7 TO EGL-A-13282

SRIS CASES

*Done*  
1. UJ-DROLLERY # 15 (LOTTERIE), July 1953 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: RIS (probably KGB/CE), Vienna, now Karlshorst.

Contact: DA has personal RV with Russian CO, Peter III, in East Berlin; formerly had RV's in Vienna; also formerly contacted by courier from Vienna in Munich; transfer by RIS from Vienna to Berlin January 1955.

*mission: 21 Mar 1956  
EGLA-18338*  
Mission: Electronic devices manufactured by Siemens-Halske Co., Munich; contact former military cohorts; contact Russian emigres; acquire position official office Bonn; maintain contacts Siemens-Halske Co. to receive information after acquiring new position; probably penetrate ZIPPER.

Build-up: Siemens-Halske Co. devices cleared with Siemens-Halske Co. and Bonn by ZIPPER.

Aim: Identify SRIS CO; operation methods; targets; degree of penetration of ZIPPER; learn identity other RIS contacts in West.

Comments: Recently learned that RIS has known all along that DA had contact with West intelligence agency; this information known to original ZIPPER CO but not reported; it is necessary to investigate this CO as well as his superior who are very good friends; necessary to conduct detailed interrogation of former CO, V-2982, his superior, V-2978, and DA, V-2982.5.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: © KUTZBACH; Field Base 161; V-2978; Agent-handler: V-7868.

*Done*  
2. UJ-DROLLERY # 18 (REPTIL), November 1953 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: SRIS (probably KGB/CE), Merseburg and/or Karlshorst.

Contact: DA contacted through couriers to West Germany.

Mission: Spy on ZIPPER.

Aim: Identify ZIPPER personnel named to RIS; identify RIS personnel.

Comments: Originally handled by ZIPPER Hqs. © RODERICH, hence little known about this case.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: © RODERICH; Field Base 161; V-2978; Agent-handler: V-7627.

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SRIS Cases (Cont'd)

3. UJ-DROLLEKY # 19 (RABE), March 1954 - \_\_\_\_\_ (see comments).

Target: SRIS (probably KGB/CE/Austro-German), Moscow.

Contact: DA received one letter addressed to his home in Munich (not answered).

Mission: Spy on ZIPPER. *(assumption only, from 10 yrs imprisonment of agent)*

Build-up: None released to our knowledge.

Aim: None.

Comments: No written reports from ZIPPER.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.:  C RODERICH; Field Base: unknown; Agent-handler: unknown.

4. <sup>Doc</sup> UJ-DROLLEKY # 20 (ARGUS), October 1953 - Present Status "Dead."

Target: RIS, probably Karlshorst.

Contact: DA has or had personal RV's with RIS CO, BORIN, in East Berlin; reported to ZIPPER by mail.

Mission: Vetting persons and addresses assigned by SRIS.

Build-up: Such information as DA could acquire on people and addresses on his own.

Aim: Identify ZIPPER personalities known to RIS; identify RIS targets and employees.

Comments: C HERMANN, ZIPPER Hqs., states that DA has not submitted anything since July; DA's address unknown to ZIPPER; he cannot be contacted.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.:  C HERMANN; Field Base 142; Agent-handler: V-2912.

5. UJ-DROLLEKY # 21 ("IWAN"), Peddler; dropped. Was handled by Field Base 4.

6. UJ-DROLLEKY # 112-D (LENA), July 1953 - \_\_\_\_\_ Active.

Target: RIS (probably KGB), Karlshorst.

Contact: DA has personal RV with Russian CO in Karlshorst (VOLGIN and GEORGIEV).

Mission: Report on political conditions in Germany; occasionally check assigned personalities in Germany; rarely report on military targets as assigned; primarily Foreign Office, BDR.

Build-up: Cleared with Bonn Government directly by ZIPPER.

Aim: Identifying RIS personnel; learning RIS operations procedure; trip to USSR for vacation for DA.

Comments: Source has received only informal training in the form of operational briefings; source is extremely observant; short periods of time spent by source in the West make his reporting to us very difficult; ZIPPER presently using recorder to facilitate his debriefing; propose permit source to accept VOLGIN's invitation spend vacation in USSR in May at same time as VOLGIN there on vacation himself.

## Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: © FRIESEN and © HERMANN;  
Field Base 11; Agent-handler: V-18140 and V-1401.

7. <sup>DA</sup> UJ-DROLLERY # 1222 (SCHWABEN), 1950-1951 and 1953-September 1954.

Target: SRIS

Contact: DA had personal contact with NDPD and RIS in East Berlin.

Mission: Reporting on political opinions in West and maintaining contact with former military acquaintances.

Build-up: Cleared by ZIPPER with Bonn.

Aim: Identification of SRIS personnel.

Comments: No ZIPPER control of DA; incomplete debriefing of DA; questions still outstanding for DA debriefing; DA instructed by ZIPPER not to re-enter East Zone.

## Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: © RISCHKE; Field Base 12;  
Agent-handler: unknown.

POLISH CASES

1. UJ-DROLLERY # 351 ("PREUSSEN"), September 1951 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: Polish Intelligence Service.

Contact: Unclear (see Comments, below).

Mission: Unclear, owing to insufficient reporting to date. No definite missions from PIS to source have been ascertained. Possibilities appear to be as follows: (1). To spot, within and without his front organization, personalities for recruitment by the PIS. (2). To extend, on behalf of his officially recognized group, invitations to PIS agents who can travel in Western Germany under the guise of journalists, artists, scientists, educators, etc. (3). To recommend for travel to Poland West Germans who may appear to be susceptible to PIS assessment and recruitment. (4). To further, with his front organization, Polish psychological/political aims in West Germany.

Build-up: None necessary to date.

Aim: To date, exploratory in nature to determine PIS intelligence personalities, tasks, training, support agents, service groups in West Germany, Berlin, East Germany, Poland.

Comments: PREUSSEN makes annual trips to Poland, ostensibly to attend various cultural events. ZIPPER has tended to consider him as a high-level and sensitive producer of military, political, economic positive information, with little emphasis on the CE aspects of the case. PREUSSEN's position, ability to travel to Poland, and history as a PW make it seem likely that he has been recruited by the Polish security or intelligence officials, and it appears equally possible that he has contacts with intelligence officers during his trips to Poland. Since he has never been subjected to CE interrogation, nothing has come to light on the possibility of his being serviced by courier, letter drop or W/T, any one of which could be used by the PIS.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.:  RISCHE; Field Base 12;  
Agent-handler: V-4168.

2. UJ-DROLLERY # 354 ("WALFISCH"), December 1954 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: Polish UB, Gdynia. *Dropped*

Contact: DA claims to have contact with various UB officers in Gdynia when his ship puts into that port. No letter drops used to date. No other clandestine communications aids known.

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Polish Cases (Cont'd)

Mission: (1). To become recruited by Western Intelligence, preferably ZIPPER.  
(2). To observe and report on the activities of members of his ship's crew.

Build-up: None necessary to date.

Aim: (1). Obtain information on UB organization, tasks, training.  
(2). Determine UB activities, personalities in Hamburg area and other cities of Western Germany.

Comments: Operation to date appears to be definite UB CE provocation. It is complicated by the following factors: (1) original lead to DA and his recruitment by ZIPPER was accomplished through personalities associated with BEDUFFY, SMYOTIA, [ ] and known to or actually controlled by the UB; (2) the DA has been in touch with [ ] to whom he appears as a defection target; (3) ZIPPER's lack of sufficient opportunity to date to subject DA to intensive CE interrogation.

Western

Personnel: POB: [ ] ZIPPER Hqs.: @ GREGOR; Field Base 9;  
Agent-handler: V-21390.

3. UJ-DROLLERY # 1007 ("FERNANDO"), April 1952 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: Polish Intelligence Service (Committee for State Security and Foreign Division of Polish Communist Party).

Contact: "FERNANDO" admits to contacts in Warsaw, while on business trips, with MBP agent CZUMENIN, whose uncle, GORSKI, resides in Munich. It is unknown whether other types of contact (courier, letter drop, W/T) is maintained to FERNANDO.

Mission: Unclear. From ZIPPER's reporting to date, these possibilities appear: (1) to handle economic transactions for Satellites (especially Poland) for ultimate benefit of Polish CP; (2) to bribe Western officials (largely members of the German Federal Government) for business favors and thus to prepare the groundwork for future bribes or blackmail leading to intelligence recruitment; (3) to ascertain NATO military and economic needs (military intelligence).

Build-up: None necessary to date.

Aim: At this stage, twofold - (1) to collect proof of tax evasion on the part of FERNANDO and other members of his firm complex as a lever to gain his complete cooperation with ZIPPER's effort against the PIS; (2) failing FERNANDO's cooperation, to use executive action to put him out of business.

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Comments: This exploratory operation was undertaken originally to exploit FERNANDO's business trips to Poland and other Satellites for the collection of positive military, political and economic information. This case was originally handled for Buero Bavaria by V-12052, V-13703 and V-11672 (Hqs. File No. 201-10252) who, because of his early release from Czech PW imprisonment, has recently become an object of suspicion on the part of both POB and ZIPPER. It did not receive ZIPPER CE attention until July 1953. Subsequent investigation has uncovered factors which could conceivably lead to CE take on services other than Polish, i.e., Emil HOFFMANN's Karlshorst connections; KARPIK's trips to Hungary; DIETSCHWEILER's journeys to Czechoslovakia. It would appear that without a very strong lever ZIPPER will find it exceedingly difficult to utilize FERNANDO as a viable DA; ZIPPER is presently exploring other contacts within the complex, and this path would seem the more profitable in spotting specific targets for CE exploitation.

Western

Personnel: POB: [ ] ZIPPER Hqs.: © RISCHE; Field Base 11;  
Agent-handlers: V-13924 (Munich area); V-13910 (Frankfurt/Main,  
Nordrhein/Westfalen, Spain).

ZIPPER CZECH CE CASES

1. UJ-DROLLERY # 230 ("BURSCHENSCHAFT"), December 1953 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: Czech Military Intelligence

Contact: DA has personal RV with Czech CO, "POBENIL," in East Berlin. Originally DIDs were used, but they have not been serviced for a long time.

Mission: Win over German employees of U. S. Army; set up espionage net.

Build-up: Coordinated with G-2; attempts are being made to defect against German border police (BGS), future German army and armaments industry.

Aim: Schooling, preferably in Prague.

Comments: Source has received no training by the CIS. His wife is the more aggressive of the two and probably appears more attractive to the CIS, especially since she has more time available for espionage activities. It is hoped to deflect the operation to the wife and to have her receive training.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: @ HORNBERG; Field Base 161;  
Agent-handler: V-2653.

2. UJ-DROLLERY # 233 (MAGENBITTER): Dropped

3. UJ-DROLLERY # 235 (REISELUST), September 1954 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: Czech Security Service (StB), border case, low-level. Case officer prob.: 1st Lt. CRIMALA in Marienbad.

Contact: DA has personal RV at the German-CSE border in Bavaria with a "border guard officer"; each stays on his own side of the boundary.

Mission: Information on personnel in the border area, including CIC.

Build-up: Requires coordination with G-2 and CIC.

Aim: Obtain identification of other Czech agents in the area; achieve service element penetration by having DA employed by Czechs as courier-- DA has worked for Czechs for over a year; provide training, on-the-job in CC operations for Field Base 4, which is new to DA operations.

Comments: DA's brother is employed as a teletype operator by the Bereitschaftspolizei in Fuerstenfeldbruck; allegedly the Czechs have not displayed any interest in him. Partially as a result of our urging, ZIPPER intends to call the DA in for intensive interrogation.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: @ HORNBERG; Field Base 4; Agent-handler: V-2967.

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ZIPPER Czech CE Cases (Cont'd)

4. <sup>X</sup> UJ-DROLLERY # 236 ("ADVENT"), September 1954 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: Czech Security Service (StB), Bratislava, CE or EM office.  
Contact: Courier servicing expected once DA starts reporting.  
Mission: One-year commitment to work on DA's brother, who is a Czech emigre in Bavaria.  
Training: DA was recruited and trained in SW, cipher and use of DLDs by StB in the CSR.  
Comments: Activation is awaiting full legalization; i.e., completion of normal processing as a refugee. Also ZIPPER is studying the extent to which the operation might have leaked during ODOPAL interrogation in Linz, Austria. The field base handling this case has no CE staff officer. The DA is described as "high-type, with a good background."

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: @ HORNBERG; Field Base 5;  
Agent-handler: V-14178.

5. <sup>X</sup> UJ-DROLLERY # 237 ("ULEMA"), May 1953 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: Penetration of Czech Trade Mission, Frankfurt/Main. Agent is not a DA but is employed as driver with Czech Trade Mission; has personal meetings with ZIPPER CO.  
Aim: Determine what, if any, Czech IS operations are run from this installation.  
Comments: Agent has been in contact with ZIPPER for an extended period. ZIPPER reporting, which ceased in September 1953, now has been resumed, along with determination either to exploit this asset profitably or drop it entirely.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: @ HORNBERG; Field Base 161;  
Agent-handler: V-14222.

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EAST GERMAN CASES

1. <sup>X</sup> UJ-DROLLERY # 113 ("SCHREINER"), April 1953 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: Sfs, Karl Marx Stadt (Chemnitz).

Contact: DA has personal RV's with Sfs in Chemnitz safehouse. DA was given S/W ink for writing to accommodation address. Meetings occasionally arranged through DA's brother, an Sfs informant in Chemnitz.

Mission: Prior to 11 April 1954 ODOPAL, BDJ, WTS, BFV and ZIPPER, after DA moved to Ravensburg, and upon resumption of contact 6 November 1954, military installations in Weingarten, Ravensburg and Ulm. Public opinion towards German rearmament.

Comments: DA, who formerly lived in Hof, moved to Ravensburg in the French Zone, April 1954. Sfs dropped contact at that time and did not resume until November 1954 when DA's brother from Chemnitz visited him, arranged for DA to return for meeting with Sfs Chemnitz. This only ZIPPER Sfs case to date in which Sfs provided DA with S/W ink.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.:  C HORNBERG; Field Base 161;  
Agent-leader: V-2982.

2. <sup>X</sup> UJ-DROLLERY # 113-A ("BILANZ"), April 1953 - Dropped.

3. <sup>X</sup> UJ-DROLLERY # 115 ("SUHL"), June 1953 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Dropped ?

Target: Penetration of Sfs Suhl.

Contact: Agent allegedly employed Sfs Suhl, had personal RV's West Berlin with ZIPPER CO.

Aim: Obtain information on Sfs Suhl.

Comments: This has been identified as an Sfs play against ZIPPER. DA finally stopped West Berlin RV, supposedly due to his close friend's arrest for black marketing activities. Arrangements made for mail contact, film received through this contact has been determined as not taken with camera in agent's possession, but product of professional equipment. ZIPPER plans hostile interrogation of agent if he appears again in West Berlin.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.:  C REYMANN; Field Base 161;  
Agent-handler: V-9961.

4. <sup>X</sup> UJ-DROLLERY # 120 ("KRAEHE"), January 1954 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: Sfs Magdeburg.



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East German Cases (Cont'd)

Contact: Personal RVs with SFS CO in Magdeburg safehouse.  
Mission: Information on political parties and personalities in Braunschweig, border police, American military installations.  
Aim: Identification of SFS personalities and installations in Magdeburg.  
Comments: It is considered likely that the SFS hopes to achieve a penetration of one or more political parties through the DA, as judging from the material passed for build-up, there seems no other justification for their continued contact with him.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: @ KUTZBACH; Field Base 11;  
Agent leader: V-1619.

5. UJ-DROLLERY # 122 ("PIKKOLO"), November 1954 - Dropped.  
6. UJ-DROLLERY # 124 ("ROT-WEISS"), February 1955 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: Sfs Potsdam?  
Contact: SMYOPIA DA in contact with Potsdam SFS. DA apparently travels to Potsdam for RVs with SFS CO.  
Mission: SFS evidently hopes to penetrate ZIPPER/POB compound.  
Build-up: Coordinated by SMYOPIA with ZIPPER directly, limited background material on ZIPPER non-operational support-type personnel passed to SFS through SMYOPIA.  
Aim: Determine SFS operational techniques, personnel, and source or sources of names in their possession.  
Comments: ZIPPER is still attempting to obtain details from SMYOPIA.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: @ KUTZBACH; SMYOPIA: As yet unknown.

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ATTACHMENT // TO EGL-A-1328.

ZIPPER HUNGARIAN CE CASES

1. UJ-DROLLERY # 300 (ADLER), April 1951 - \_\_\_\_\_ . To be dropped.

Target: Hungarian Military Intelligence (KATPOL), Budapest and Vienna.

Contact: DA maintains contact through SW letters to Budapest and Vienna and through one-way radio transmissions from Hungary to West Germany.

Mission: American military information as well as future penetration of the new Wehrmacht.

Build-up: In coordination with G-2, military information and personality information was passed to the KATPOL.

Aim: Case to be dropped for lack of production.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: @ RODERICH; Field Base 2;  
Agent-handler: V-14411.

2. UJ-DROLLERY # 302 (FILIUS, ex-GEIER), July 1950 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.

Target: Hungarian Military Intelligence (KATPOL), Budapest and Vienna.

Contact: DA maintains contact through SW letters, prearranged clear text post cards and one-way W/T transmissions from Hungary to West Germany. He has accommodation addresses in Hungary and Vienna, the Vienna address being the most used at the present.

Mission: DA is employed in an American military installation where he has the assignment of reporting on any and all information of military significance. He is, in addition, to act as a spotter of other people who might be susceptible to Hungarian recruitment at a later date; recruitment to be carried out by a third party.

Build-up: Coordinated with G-2. We have attempted to steer the case into the field of spotting and recruitment and away from military targets.

Aim: To learn Hungarian operational methods and to increase our knowledge of Hungarian assets in the West.

Comments: DA has been trained in Hungary within the last 15 months. At this time he was given a refresher radio course, and further training in clandestine procedure and military recognition. Delivery of agent W/T promised.

Western

Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: @ RISCIRKE; Field Base 142;  
Agent-handler: V-2618.

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3. UJ-DROLLERY # 303 (ERNOE): Dropped
4. UJ-DROLLERY # 305 (PFLEIFER, ex-BASTLER), June 1954 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.
- Target: Hungarian State Security Service (AVH), Vienna.
- Contact: DA has had meetings with two Hungarians who apparently operate with Vienna as headquarters. The meetings take place in Soviet-occupied Linz/Urfahr. Reporting is done at meetings. For the present no other communication channel has been established. Positive identification of the case officers has not yet been made.
- Mission: Thus far, DA has received missions in the emigre field only; renewing emigre contacts for purposes of maintaining knowledge of the emigre movement in the West. There has been special emphasis placed on RFE employees and RFE installations. Future plans call for DA to obtain a German passport so that he can travel more extensively and make future meetings in Switzerland. There has been brief mention of establishing him in a cover firm.
- Comments: The DA has received no training from the Hungarians thus far. He has a daughter in Budapest who reportedly is first soprano in the Budapest opera. In order that he might complete his passport application, the Hungarians obtained transcripts of his diploma and birth certificate from Budapest.
- Western  
Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: @ KUTZBACH; Field Base V-91;  
Agent-handler: V-91.2.
5. UJ-DROLLERY # 306 (REVANCHE), November 1954 - \_\_\_\_\_ . Active.
- Target: Enemy service as yet undetermined, probably Hungarian State Security (AVH).
- Contact: DA has thus far been contacted at his home by the Hungarian case officer.
- Mission: Still vague, will probably settle on emigre and economic reporting.
- Build-up: None thus far.
- Aim: Identification of Hungarian assets in the West.
- Western  
Personnel: POB:  ZIPPER Hqs.: @ KUTZBACH; Field Base 2;  
Agent-handler: V-14910.

ZIPPER CE REPORTS

A. By Field Bases:

	Oct '54	Nov '54	Dec '54	Jan '55	Feb '55	Aver. %
<b>Field Base</b>	<b>No. - % of CE Reports to Total Reports from Field Base</b>					
2	12 - 11 %	15 - 20 %	8 - 13 %	16 - 25 %	12 - 22 %	18 %
4	78 - 82 %	96 - 71 %	90 - 89 %	82 - 94 %	95 - 98 %	87
5	2 - 7 %	- 0 %	3 - 6 %	7 - 19 %	- 0 %	6
9	- 0 %	- 0 %	2 - 5 %	2 - 30 %	6 - 15 %	10
11	73 - 10 %	122 - 17 %	95 - 15 %	89 - 17 %	83 - 13 %	15
12	25 - 3 %	40 - 5 %	25 - 3 %	25 - 3 %	33 - 4 %	4
73	4 - 1 %	6 - 1 %	1 - 0 %	7 - 2 %	1 - 0 %	
161	51 - 15 %	33 - 10 %	34 - 14 %	39 - 17 %	57 - 17 %	15
88	30 - 19 %	33 - 20 %	25 - 14 %	30 - 17 %	6 - 4 %	15
142	39 - 59 %	42 - 100 %	42 - 100 %	37 - 93 %	42 - 100 %	90
** Other	86 - 100 %	74 - 100 %	90 - 100 %	29 - 100 %	19 - 100 %	
*** 98		151 - 7 %	63 - 42 %	84 - 59 %	90 - 50 %	
<b>Total CE:</b>	400	612	478	450	444	477
<b>Total Rpts:</b>	2957	3017	2776	2464	2800	
<b>% CE:</b>	14 %	20 %	17 %	18 %	16 %	
<b>* Disseminated:</b>	273 - 68 %	351 - 57 %	254 - 53 %	218 - 49 %	254 - 57 %	

\* # CE Reports Disseminated - % of CE Reports Disseminated to CE Reports Received

\*\* Bavarian Border Police

\*\*\* "Interrogators," i.e., Refugees and Returnees Interviews

**SECRET CONTROL**  
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ATTACHMENT 12 TO EGI-A-13282

**B. By Areas:**

Field Base: \*\*\*

	Nov '54	Dec '54	Jan '55	Feb '55	2	4	5	9	11	12	73	161	EB	142
West Germany	59 * - 184 **	63 * - 183 **	35 - 188	29 - 142		36 %			14 %					20 %
USSR	88 - 156	57 - 151	31 - 106	41 - 168		14 %			43 %	14 %		24 %		
Austria	24 - 32	4 - 44	- 28	3 - 13	23 %								35 %	
USSR	2 - 6	1 -	3 - 1	1 -										
Poland	1 - 1	1 - 2	- 2	1 - 3				43 %						
CSR	39 -	14 - 7	5 - 13	5 - 14		28 %							20 %	
Hungary	- 13	2 - 16	- 25	- 20	18 %									27
Yugoslavia														
Rumania		- 1	1 -	- 1										
Bulgaria	1 -													
Other	4 -		1 - 11	- 3										

\* "Interrogations"  
\*\* Agent Reports


\*\*\* Average % of Field Base Agent Reports to CE Agent Reports

**SECRET CONTROL**

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ZIPPER HEADQUARTERS CE ORGANIZATION

ATTACHMENT 13 TO EGL-A-13282



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FIELD ORGANIZATION CHART

Headquarters - Operations

Field Bases:

- 2 - Freilassing  
No Change
- 5 - Vicinity Munich  
No CE Office
- 9 - Augsburg  
No CE Office
- 11 - Bremen  
CI Chief: KOHLER, from 142  
(Replaced HOLTE)  
CE: "GIEBEL" (GISELES)
- 12 - Munich  
CI Chief: V-4102 @PESCHEL  
CE: V-4168 @ROETRICH,  
being replaced
- 13 - Stuttgart Area  
CE in Berlin: V-2681 @BUCHLOH
- 14 - Darmstadt  
CI Chief: V-8815 @MERTENS  
CE: V-2653 @DIRK
- 15 - Munich Area  
CI/Security: V-11625 @CONRAD  
CE: V-7500 @SCHAEFER  
UV-15 "Waldkapelle Ost"  
(Investig. Squad, Austria)  
@SCHAEFER

CS Section (122)

CIFB 4 (ex-Bav. gp. of OV L)

Munich, Weuroberg, Amberg, Berlin  
Investigations in Bavaria  
Surveillance in Bavaria  
Police in Bavaria  
CE - Czech-Bavarian Border  
CE - SFS Thuringia  
CE - SFS Berlin  
About 40 Men  
Includes "723," ex"Waldkapelle,"  
Headquarters Investigations Squad.  
Chief: V-2770 @SCHLEIM  
CE Officer: None Yet

CIFB 142 (ex-150, ex-OV L)


Mannheim  
Police in, and West German Checks  
1 CE Case: UJ-DROLLERY #302  
ca. 12 Men  
Chief: V-3030 @BENDER

Special

V-91 @ SCIRKI  
Princip  
V-2881 (Dr. )  
"Special"

**SECRET**  
US OFFICIALS ONLY  
ORGANIZATION CHART

ATTACHMENT 14 TO EGI-A-13282



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