



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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OCPAS/CIG



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# **National Intelligence Daily**

*Wednesday  
29 September 1982*

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*CPAS NID 82-228JX  
TCS 2928/82  
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


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


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# Beirut



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① ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israelis Pull Back

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10 Israel's agreement to vacate Beirut International Airport today removes the last obstacle to the deployment of the US contingent of the multinational force. Small numbers of Palestinians evacuated last month from Beirut are continuing to infiltrate back into Lebanon.

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9 Israel yesterday withdrew its forces from the Beirut port area and the Galerie Semaan Crossing. Lebanese Army units and members of the Italian peacekeeping force took charge of the port. The Italians also moved into the Shatila refugee camp and the Bi'r Hasan district. Israeli troops are now concentrated south of the airport and in the foothills around the city.

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11 Comment: US Marines are expected to land today and take up positions in the area around the airport. The entire multinational force should be deployed throughout West Beirut by tomorrow.

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PLO Reinfiltration

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2 approximately 120 of the PLO fighters evacuated to Tunisia were sent last week to Tripoli, Lebanon, by way of Cyprus and Syria. Other Palestinians from Tunisia reportedly have passed through Greece on their way to Syria and then Lebanon.

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In addition, some Palestinian fighters sent to Syria have reentered Lebanon.

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4 Palestinians were secretly infiltrating into the Bekaa Valley across unguarded sections of the Syrian-Lebanese border.

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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10 S after the Israeli invasion, Fatah established a headquarters in Shtawrah to direct operations in the Bekaa Valley. PLO activities in northern Lebanon are commanded from the local headquarters in Tripoli. [Redacted]

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10 All the major PLO guerrilla groups have forces in the Bekaa and northern Lebanon, and the commander of one of the smaller groups reportedly moved his headquarters recently from Damascus to the eastern Bekaa. There are now approximately 5,000 to 7,000 regular PLO fighters in northern and eastern Lebanon, supplemented by 2,500 to 5,000 irregulars. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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7 there was no longer an organized PLO threat in Beirut. [Redacted] some of the Palestinian fighters had been killed or captured and others had melted into the civilian population after disposing of their weapons. [Redacted]

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10 Comment: Only a few hundred Palestinians evacuated from Beirut apparently have reentered Lebanon, but the number is likely to increase. PLO leaders seem determined to continue guerrilla operations against Israeli forces in Lebanon as a key part of the Palestinian "armed struggle." The attacks are certain eventually to provoke a sharp Israeli retaliation. [Redacted]

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Shias Killed During Massacre

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[Redacted]

Witnesses attribute the killings to the Israeli-controlled forces of Major Haddad. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Tel Aviv's Next Steps

*The assassination of Bashir Jumayyil and the uproar following the massacre in Beirut have dealt severe blows to Prime Minister Begin's hopes for arranging a peace treaty with Lebanon and securing the quick departure of Syrian and PLO forces from the country. Begin nonetheless shows no signs of scaling down his political goals in Lebanon and appears determined to push for movement on these issues.* [Redacted]

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Begin's need for concrete political gains to offset the growing internal criticism of his policies on Lebanon probably has increased since the massacre. [Redacted]

[Redacted] Israeli efforts to pin the blame for the killings on the Phalange and the precarious position of the new Lebanese Government have made early progress toward a peace treaty unlikely. [Redacted]

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For the near term, the Israelis will press the Lebanese for trade normalization, establishment of a working group on bilateral ties, and other tangible signs that relations are developing. At the same time, they will continue to stress the need for an eventual peace treaty and to use their control over southern Lebanon as a bargaining chip. [Redacted]

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The Israelis may even use their ties to the Phalange militia to put pressure on President Amin Jumayyil. [Redacted]

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Israel is not impressed by arguments that its pressure taints Amin and makes it difficult for him to negotiate. [Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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Syrian and PLO Withdrawal

Israel continues to assign a high priority to the removal of remaining Syrian troops and PLO fighters in the Bekaa Valley and northern Lebanon.

[Redacted]

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Israel probably still prefers a diplomatic solution to this problem. If the frontlines remain quiet and Damascus curtails guerrilla activity, Tel Aviv could maintain current positions without too costly a commitment of troops.

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If guerrilla activity continues, however, Israel is likely to keep at least three brigades on the frontlines and periodically strike Syrian and Palestinian positions to discourage such activity.

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Should Tel Aviv decide only military force can remove the Syrians and Palestinians, it will have to move before the weather turns bad in mid-October.

[Redacted]

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Israel could drive the Syrians out of Lebanon in a winter campaign, but casualties would be much higher, and it would be more difficult to provide logistic support. Moreover, Israel probably could not keep the Syrians and Palestinians out of Lebanon without maintaining a sizable force in the Bekaa Valley.

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Security in the South

Israel clearly had hoped for a peace treaty that would allow its forces to withdraw from the south while maintaining a 40-kilometer security belt policed by Christian militia leader Major Haddad. The Israelis were leaving nothing to chance, however, and even before Bashir Jumayyil's assassination they began to prepare for a long stay.

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
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Haddad has been allowed to extend his area of control to the Al Awwali River and Lake Qir'awn in the north. He has declared Sidon the capital of "Free Lebanon," apparently with Tel Aviv's blessing, and has coerced and cajoled Lebanese villagers in the south to join his militia. Meanwhile, Israeli civil administrators operating under the aegis of the military governor for southern Lebanon have been organizing local "police" forces that operate under Israeli control.

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The UN peacekeeping force--stationed in the south since Israel's incursion in 1978--and the Lebanese Army have been rendered completely powerless in the region by the Israeli military. Israel's negative opinion of UN forces has prompted Tel Aviv to oppose a new or expanded UN peacekeeping operation in Lebanon.

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Israel claims the UN force was unwilling to prevent Palestinian guerrillas from attacking northern Israeli settlements and, in some cases, aided and abetted the guerrillas. The Lebanese Army's reputation was not much better, and Israel disarmed some units and confined them to their barracks after the invasion this summer.

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Outlook

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In the absence of a peace treaty, Tel Aviv probably will continue to strengthen the pro-Israeli militias in the south and encourage them to extend their areas of control. Haddad's militia already has taken up positions in the Bekaa Valley and is expected to assume a larger role in patrolling the security zone. Nevertheless, Israel probably will maintain a military presence in the south, as it has since 1978, to augment the militias.

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