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## **National Intelligence Daily**

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Wednesday 22 September 1982

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
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Contents		
Israel-Lebanon: New Information on Massac		
Israel-Lebanon: New Information on Massacr	re 1	
2 Israel: Pressure on the Government	3	
	• • • • • • • • • • • •	
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	Top Secret	
	TCS 2922/82	

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**Beirut** 



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		(b)(3)
(j) 15	SRAEL-LEBANON: New Information on Massacre	
Y Ev ma	Israel continues to draw down its forces in West Beir vidence of Tel Aviv's involvement in the events surroundin assacre at the refugee camps is mounting.	ut. g the (b)(3)
br gu	The Israelis have withdrawn at least two additations of troops from West Beirut and have turver part of it to the Lebanese Army, but at leasingades remain to search for weapons caches and luerrillas. The remaining members of the Muslim Remaining Members of the Membe	rned t three PLO Mura-
bı	itun militia reportedly have fled or gone into h	iding. $(b)(3)$
5	Meanwhile, Red Cross and Lebanese volunteers	con-
ے re	inue to uncover more bodies in the camps. Initiate eports of 300 dead have now been revised upward east 600.	al press to at (b)(3)
er er	Comment: Israel is moving slowly to relinque ontrol of the city to the Lebanese Army, probably nsure that as many PLO guerrillas and arms caches ossible are found before it withdraws its own for	y to s as rces.
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15	sraelı Role ın the Massacre	
Y		(b)(1)
	ommander in Chief of the Christian Lebanese Force	
	adı Frem, ordered elements of his forces. primar halange, into the Sabra camp.	(b)(3)
	Some time after these forces entered the cam	
4		(b)(3)
		(b)(3)
	Christia leader Haddad's men were responsible for assacres at the Shatila camp and the nearby Akka	the (b)(3)
	co	ntinued
	1 Top Secret TCS 2922/8: 22 September	2

	Top Secret		
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	Gaza hospitals.		
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4			
	Tel Aviv has now admitted publicly that the Phalange		
	was encouraged to "cleanse" the camps of PLO elements, but disavows any responsibility for the massacres. The		
5	Israelı Defense Force denies that Haddad's militia was		
_	involved.		(b)(3)
	Comment: Tel Aviv's denial probably stems from		
_	its desire to shift the blame away from the Israeli		
5	Defense Force, which exercises complete control over Haddad's militia.		(b)(3)
		(b)(1)	
ı	it is estimated that 1,000 Palestinian civilians,	1	
5	and perhaps more, were killed during the 36-hour period	,	
,	the Christian militia was in the camp.		(b)(3)

Top-Secret
TCS 2922/82
22 September 1982

## Israeli Knesset Representation

	Seats
Coalition	64
Lıkud	46
Herut	24
Liberals	18
Laam	3
Akıva Nof	1
National Religious Party	6
Agudat Israel	4
TAMI	3
Теніууа	3
Hurvitz/Ben Porat	2
Opposition	56
Labor Alignment	50
Labor	42
MAPAM	7
Citizen's Rights Movement	1
Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Communists)	4
Shinui	2

			(b)(3)
3	ISRAEL: Pressure on the Government		
	The Labor Party will use the special session of the scheduled for today to push its demand for an independent into the massacre in Beirut and cite recent events there of its contention that Prime Minister Begin's policies on are bankrupt.	inquiry	(b)(3)
/	Comment: If Labor decides to challenge Bed power, the party probably will encourage the two parties—the National Religious Party and Agudat and dissidents in the Liberal faction of Likud the coalition and form a new government. The Nate Religious Party is increasingly disturbed over thardline stance—party members were particularly at the Prime Minister's rejection of their reques an independent inquiry—and might be agreeable to appeal from Labor.	o religious : Israel :0 desert ational Begin's vupset	(b)(3)
	The Religious Party is already holding cont Labor, according to press accounts. If Begin of party an acceptable compromise on the inquiry is however, he probably can keep it from bolting.	fore the	(b)(3)
	Begin apparently has decided to maintain hi tive stance and rely on the substantial support policies in the Sephardic community to ride out troversy. Further revelations of the government handling of the massacre and its refusal to perm kind of inquiry could seriously threaten his holpower, however, even if he survives the immediat	for his the con- 's mis- it some	(-)(-)

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TCS 2922/82
22 September 1982