


~~Secret~~



(b)(3)



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

DDP

WEEKLY SUMMARY

~~Secret~~


6 March 1970
No. 0360/70

~~SECRET~~

The **WEEKLY SUMMARY**, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.

WARNING

The **WEEKLY SUMMARY** contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States, within the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.



(b)(3)

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Middle East - Africa

THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

19

TURMOIL CONTINUES IN MIDDLE EAST

21

There has been no progress toward a general Arab-Israeli settlement, and the exchanges of gunfire and invective are growing ever sharper. Meanwhile, traditional divisive forces are at work among the Arab states and the Palestinian commando organizations.

NR Record

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TURMOIL CONTINUES IN MIDDLE EAST

Having made no progress toward a general Arab-Israeli settlement--not even a return to a cease-fire--the contending nations are engaging in ever sharper exchanges of gunfire and invective.

Arab chiefs of state and leaders of the major fedayeen organizations appear to have been sobered by the reaction to the airline bombings, and most have issued statements deploring the incidents. Moscow's initial reaction to the Swissair crash was to accuse Israel and the US of using fabricated press reports to implicate the Arabs. Both Soviet and Arab propagandists continue to inveigh against Israeli bombings of Egypt, and to call for international condemnation of US support for Israeli "aggression."

Israel

Israel's initial fears that a general panic among civil airline operators would cut its aerial lifeline have receded since the Arab terrorist bombings of the ~~Swissair~~ and Austrian aircraft on 21 February. Suspended passenger, mail, and air-freight flights to Israel have been almost completely resumed; concerned governments and airlines have taken additional security precautions; and international organizations dealing with civil air traffic are to hold formal meetings on the terrorist threat in the near future.

Israel's hawkish minister of transportation, General Weizman, has indicated that Israel will await the results of international attempts to eliminate the danger before resorting to independent action, which would almost certainly take the form of retaliation against Arab interests. Prime Minister Golda Meir and Foreign Minister Eban have both emphasized that Israel's objective is to ensure the safety of civil aircraft flights. At the same time, they have made it eminently clear that they would regard any constriction of Israel's air transport connections as an extremely serious matter.

Weizman equated the prospect of a de facto aerial blockade with Nasir's closing of the Strait of Tiran in 1967. Mrs. Meir said flatly that terrorist attacks against air transportation "must stop." Unless the airlines adopt effective security measures of their own, she added, Tel Aviv will act to protect the "freedom of aviation."

(b)(1)

Israel-Egypt

International revulsion over the two airliner explosions served to divert the critical attention that had been focused on the

(b)(3)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Israeli air raid near Abu Zabal in Egypt on 11 February that left some 100 Egyptian civilians dead. Even before this, however, the Israelis had resumed their deep-penetration bombings of Egypt.

Mrs. Meir told students at Hebrew University that the purpose of the raids was to relieve Egyptian pressure on Israeli forces along the Suez Canal, to disrupt Nasir's plans for a new war, and to make the Egyptian people aware of the falseness of Cairo's claims of military prowess. Although she soft-pedaled the thesis that Tel Aviv is seeking Nasir's downfall, it is unlikely that the Israelis' objectives in this regard have changed.

The Fedayeen

Fedayeen leader Yasir Arafat, already under attack within his own organization--Fatah--because of his relatively conservative stance, may find his position even more shaky as a result of his recent trip to the Soviet Union. Arafat's main objective in Moscow was to gain some measure of political recognition, or at least increased status for the Palestinian cause as a national liberation movement.

Moscow side-stepped the question of political recognition of specific fedayeen organizations by giving Arafat a pledge to work for more-official international recognition, but only after the fedayeen had formed a single united organization, almost an impossible prerequisite at present.

Moscow may try to soften the rebuff slightly by providing some additional support through regular channels, and Arafat may gloss over his failure by seeking support from other quarters in the coming months.

Lebanon

The government may face renewed difficulties because of fedayeen activities. Some guerrilla organizations have reinstated full-scale paramilitary training in Palestinian refugee camps, despite public announcements that such training had ceased. To forestall any government interference, the fedayeen may try to keep Lebanese security forces from re-entering the camps.

Moreover, some of the commando groups have reportedly infiltrated large numbers of their men into southern Lebanon over

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the last two weeks, despite the army's efforts to restrict them to the Mount Hermon area. The new arrivals have resumed operations against upper Galilee and may have also opened up a new front in western Galilee. Their operations have included firing from Lebanese territory into Israel, an action that was specifically prohibited by the government-fedayeen agreement last November.

Israeli officials, while keeping a wary eye on developments in Jordan, have decried [redacted] the "very large" increase in fedayeen activity on the Lebanese border. [redacted]

Jordan

King Husayn may be mulling over some changes in his cabinet. [redacted]

According to press reports, "diplomatic sources" in Beirut consider Foreign Minister Rifai the leading contender for the premiership.

A reshuffle at this time would be generally construed as linked to the negotiations several weeks ago between the King and the fedayeen, who had demanded various cabinet changes throughout the preceding crisis.

A Damascus press agency last week quoted Yasir Arafat as saying the King "agrees" with the commando organizations regarding the replacement of Prime Minister Talhuni with Rifai. Arafat is said to have added that the fedayeen also want the King's uncle, Sharif Nasir, removed as commander of the Jordan Arab Army, but he did not indicate whether the King had "agreed" to this as well.

Husayn will probably delay any reshuffle for some weeks in order to avoid the appearance of knuckling under to the fedayeen. Whatever the King's motivation for reshuffling the cabinet, however, he will almost certainly suffer some loss of prestige that will redound to the fedayeen's advantage. The replacement of Sharif Nasir, in particular, would be widely interpreted as a significant concession on the King's part. [redacted]

Libya

The ruling Revolutionary Command Council may have begun implementing a decision to withdraw the Libyan troops that had been sent to Egypt in recent months. According to a variety of sources, the troops may have already returned to their home bases. A number of the Council's members, [redacted] oppose junta leader Qaddafi's pro-Egyptian policies. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~