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SUBJECT: GENERAL - Intelligence
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1. The enclosed article "Japan's General Election and the
Activities of 'Soldier Candidates'" was written by [redacted] and
received through [redacted]. We are forwarding it as background infor-
mation that may be useful, and also as an interesting analysis by
[redacted] showing an apparent lack of activity in the October election
by organizations of ex-military men.

2. A small portion of the article was disseminated in a [redacted]
report.

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JAPAN'S GENERAL ELECTION AND THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
"SOLDIER CANDIDATES"

I

Many Japanese of the leading class (Shido Kaikyū) who had been purged after the war, reblossomed in the recent (1 October 1952) election and won seats; and of these, the results of the (contests involving) former soldier candidates are worthy of notice.

There were two ex-military candidates; one of them won a seat with the largest number of votes in his district, while the other lost, running last in his district. The former was TSUJI Masanobu (#11929/2398/0207), 49, of the First District in Ishikawa-ken; the latter was UOYAMA Yasuhira (or Kohēi) (3282/1557/1660/1627), 40, of the First District in ~~Ishikawa-ken~~ ¹⁷⁰³ ~~Ishikawa-ken~~ ¹⁷¹² ~~Ishikawa-ken~~. I shall discuss below the connections of these two men with the recent election and their connections, as military men, with organizations of the ex-military; and I shall also give my considered opinion of their future prospects.

II

TSUJI Masanobu was a member of the 36th class of the Military Academy (Rikugun Shikan Gakkō). He headed his class both in the Military Academy and the War College (Rikugun Daigaku). During the war, as an Army operations staff officer of the Imperial General Headquarters he directed the Guadalcanal and Imphal operations, and he became known as the ablest man of the Army (sic). A full colonel at the war's end, he was regarded by the Allied forces as a war-criminal suspect but was successful in remaining free. In the October elections he became a candidate from his native Ishikawa-ken, and of the 251,411 effective ballots cast in his district he received 39.2% (sic) or the astonishing figure of 64,912 votes. This was sufficient to elect him with the highest number of votes and to give him a lead of 13,408 votes over the candidate in second place.

If TSUJI's astonishing success in the election is studied, the reasons for it probably can be listed as follows:

1. TSUJI was commissioned a 2nd lieutenant at the age of 22 and immediately assigned to the Kanazawa 7th Regiment of Kanazawa City as an instructor of recruits. He remained there training recruits for eight years, then was promoted to captain and entered the War College. By that time he had trained a total of 16,000 soldiers. Those whom he trained are now between 40 and 50 years old; some hold important positions in Ishikawa-ken, and many are in that "backbone middle-class" of the prefecture. It is easy to perceive that they came to feel a strong admiration for TSUJI as he became famous. In fact, many of them exerted themselves to the utmost during the elections campaign by driving vehicles, preparing halls for meetings, putting up posters and the like. TSUJI is said to have spent almost no money on the election campaign, and this was possible because so many of his supporters were men who had been trained by him.

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At the same time TSUJI's supporters were consistent in their refusal to back the candidates recommended by the political bosses in the district, or, in fact, any other candidates at all. They helped only TSUJI, who had trained and looked after them when they were army recruits. Historically the people of Ishikawa-ken, including Kanazawa City, were of the MAEDA clan (a "1-million koku" clan), and those who are 40 years old or more retain a deep sense of duty and loyalty. The Ishikawa people also tend to feel strong admiration for notables and heroes. Thus TSUJI had precisely the attributes that would win him the support of those in his native district who were approximately his own age. This is the first reason why TSUJI was able to win in the election with the highest number of votes.

2. TSUJI is strongly opposed to the group which is trying to reconstruct the Japanese army from the National Police Reserve (National Security Force). He thinks along the lines of the East Asia League (Toa Renmei) that was sponsored by the late Lt. General ISHIHARA Kanya, and he is thoroughly anti-American and anti-Soviet in principle. He also advocates "civilian soldiers" — an idea which he has worked out himself. TSUJI's ideas, actions and speeches are winning the support not only of those approximately his own age but also of the younger stratum which opposes rearmament on the grounds that it is being used as a factor in the haggling between the U. S. and the Soviet Union. Thus TSUJI's popularity is basically different from the vague popularity of, for example, MATOYAMA Ichiro. This is the second reason why he was elected with such wide popular support.

In short, TSUJI Masanobu is a military man but he was not elected by any organization of ex-soldiers. The actual fact is that he was elected by the popular support of his native place. (Note: the so-called military (ex-soldier) organizations will be discussed later.)

III

On the other hand, consider the case of YUGAWA Yasuhira, who was a candidate for the First District in Kumamoto-ken. He was unsuccessful, bringing up in the rear with only 0.111% (sic) of the total of 367,310 ballots of which he obtained 3,460.

YUGAWA is 40 years old (9 years younger than TSUJI), and was a member of the 45th class of the Military Academy. A classmate once described him thus: "He is a man of simple mind and it can be said fairly that he is pure-hearted. He is a man of simple mind and it can be said fairly that he is pure-hearted. He is a genuine man of action." As a 2nd lieutenant attached to the 3rd Regiment of Asabu Tokyo, YUGAWA was one of the leading performers in the February 26 (2-26) incident of 1936, which has been called "Japan's revolution." Together with 1st Lieutenant ~~NOMAKA~~ Shiro (6851/0022/0934/6745), one of the ringleaders of the incident, he directed the attack on and occupation of the Metropolitan Police Board Headquarters. YUGAWA thus was one of the leaders of the so-called insurrection force.

However, at that time YUGAWA was so young (he had just been commissioned 2nd lieutenant) that the army judiciary took pity on him and at the courtmartial did not treat him as a ringleader. Consequently, instead of being executed he was

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sentenced to imprisonment for life. As a result of successive amnesties he was released after serving only four years and returned to Kumamoto. So, unlike TSUJI, YUGAWA did not remain a soldier until the end of World War II; his military career ended in fact when he was still a 2nd lieutenant.

The YUGAWA family to which YUGAWA Yasuhira belongs by adoption, is the Kumamoto branch of the family of Dr. YUGAWA Hideki¹ (3282/1557/4423/2885) of Kyoto University, a winner of the Nobel Prize. Dr. YUGAWA's branch is the head-branch of the family. YUGAWA Yasuhira was adopted into the Kumamoto branch of the family on 17 February 1936, just nine days before the 2-26 incident. The YUGAWA family, however, did not disown him but welcomed him back upon his release four years afterward.

After the China incident began and militarism was riding the crest of the wave, the fact that he was a former soldier proved advantageous to YUGAWA. His family being wealthy as well as renowned in the provinces, YUGAWA established an airplane-parts factory during World War II and became its president. He also belonged to the Taisei Yokusan Kai, the only wartime political party, and was a leader of the Kumamoto-ken branch of the Yokusan Senen Dan, which was a department of the Yokusan Kai. In addition he was active in central headquarters of the Yokusan Kai. At the end of the war YUGAWA converted his factory to peacetime industry, and shortly after being depurged he became a candidate in the October elections with the backing of his family's name.

The reasons for YUGAWA's defeat, and with the lowest number of votes, probably were:

1) He did not possess explicit political ideals or convictions as did TSUJI, but had become a candidate aimlessly.

2) He was merely a member of a provincially prominent family, without sufficient personal popularity to win the people of his district. While possessing simplicity and executive ability, he was not able to compete with other prominent figures who were running in the election. (Among the prominent candidates were OASA Tetsuo² (1129/7802/0787/3948), a former Cabinet Minister; and MATSUMAE Shigeoyoshi (2646/0467/6850/5030), former president of the Communications Board who, after coming into controversy with TOJI Hideki was conscripted into the army.)

3) Although YUGAWA's connection with the 2-26 incident proved advantageous during the war, it did not have the same popular appeal as a military career and did not win him any support as an individual.

4) From the beginning of the campaign no one, not even among the ex-soldier groups, believed that YUGAWA would be elected.

For the foregoing reasons, there were no supporters willing to work for YUGAWA's election at their own expense, as was the case with TSUJI. To summarize the effect of his military record on his election showing, it can be said that while, strictly speaking YUGAWA was an ex-soldier, his military record was entirely different from that of TSUJI, being limited to participation in the 2-25 incident. YUGAWA did not have the background or the real ability necessary to win him support as a soldier.

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IV

TSUJI was supported by the population of his district because he was a prominent figure and had helped many of his supporters in the past, whereas YUGAWA clearly received no support from any ex-soldier groups. This would suggest that the ex-soldier organizations had no direct relation with the election.

The question now arises, do the ex-military men have a real organization? Some persons believed the ex-soldiers were organized and would move in on the elections. Some thought there was an underground organization of ex-soldiers and that it was pushing TSUJI as its candidate. This idea, of course, proved to be entirely unfounded.

X SHIMOMURA Sadame (0007/2625/1253), former general and former Minister of the Army, is an example of his age group of prominent surviving army officers, some of whom are listed in Attachment A. He is more than 65 years old and therefore beyond the pre-war retirement age. Thus he is already too old to be a front-line military leader and in addition he lacks the qualifications to lead younger men. It is, in fact, impossible for ex-officers of his age to take open, active leadership. The military profession requires basically a professional technician, but the men of this group have no knowledge whatever of atomic-age military tactics. It may be concluded that top leaders now must be physically fit and less than 50 years old.

X The group of ex-officers of the 34th to 39th classes headed by ex-Colonel HATTORI Takushiro (2591/6752/0587/0934/6745) would seem to meet the foregoing requirement in regard to age, but since only about 60 members of the 34th to 39th classes are in the National Police Reserve (National Security Forces) the group actually is not very strong. Most ex-officers of the later classes have had no experience as commanders except below the regimental level. Therefore some of the impartial and intelligent ex-officers have commented that the present problem is not one of "rearmament" but of establishing a "new armament"; that is, unless troops are trained in current military tactics they will not become a genuine army.

Both TSUJI and YUGAWA have some of the qualifications to become leaders of a "new armament" Japanese defense force. YUGAWA, as stated before, although termed a soldier does not have the character to establish a military organization or to operate it practically. TSUJI believes that a military force guaranteed by the United States will not be of practical use. He also believes it would be impossible to reconstruct the old Japanese defense forces, and he has no intention of trying to use members of the former service in reconstructing an army. It would seem clear, therefore, that neither YUGAWA nor TSUJI was promoted in the recent elections by former military men on behalf of the ex-military.

The organizations of ex-military men are shown in Attachment B. None of these is a powerful or a nationwide political organization. They are more like social groups, with slogans such as "Make sympathy calls on the bereaved families of the war dead"; "Friendship and mutual assistance"; and "Relief for sick and wounded soldiers." None of the groups has any power, and their activities are limited to the exchange of information.

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As will be noted in Attachment B, the four smaller organizations formed a single group called the Kaiko Kai in September 1951. By November of 1952 it had not even elected officers. It is regarded as very unlikely that positive action to reestablish the army will originate with these ex-military groups. In fact, it seems probable that ex-military men during the seven years of occupation lost the ability to rebuild the service. If ex-soldiers take an active part in reviving the army, they probably will be of the generation younger than that of TSUJI Masanobu.

V

TSUJI's probable course of action in the Diet is a question of considerable current interest. If TSUJI should try to become an influential parliamentary figure it is unlikely that he would succeed, and it is unthinkable that he would be able, single-handed, to bring about a revival of positive activity by the stagnant ex-military men. TSUJI is wise enough to realize this. Therefore he probably will organize the youth of the country and push ahead the former Toa Renmei (East Asia League). Consequently his activities will not center in the diet but become more of a popular movement. TSUJI's activities would thus not be limited to the Diet, although it is probable that he will use his position of Diet member to promote his popular movement.

It is also unlikely that TSUJI will become a Don Quixote by following the same road as HASHIMOTO Kingoro (2390/2609/2946/0063/6745), the A-class war criminal and chief of the right-wing organization Sokisei Kai (6375/6134/2585) who was formerly a Diet member. It is probable that TSUJI will forge ahead on a course equally anti-Soviet and anti-American, thinking in his own way about the old Japanese nation and how the new Japanese should be developed. TSUJI knows that as a Diet member he will be unable to produce big results, because he has a good brain, and both he and his supporters realize that the Diet floor is a battlefield on which a staff operations officer does not need to have any soldiers.

¹Field Comment. YUGAWA (usually transliterated as YUKAWA) Hideki, is professor of physics at Kyoto University, a member of the Japan Academy, and the first Japanese to receive the Nobel Prize (physics, 1949). According to The Japan Who's Who, 1950-51, he was born 23 January 1907, the third son of the late Dr. Takuji Ogawa, was graduated from Kyoto Imperial University in 1929 and was adopted into the family of Dr. YUGAWA Geryo.

²Field Comment. The following data on OASA Tadao are from Who's Who in Japan 1939-40; Born July 1889 in Kumamoto-ken; graduated Tokyo Imperial University (law) 1914; police chief Yamanashi-ken; secretary in Home Ministry; same Foreign Ministry; private secretary to Prime Minister; same to Minister of Education 1929; elected to House of Representatives six times from Kumamoto-ken.

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ATTACHMENT A

PROMINENT GRADUATES OF THE MILITARY ACADEMY

<u>Class</u>	<u>Prominent Graduates</u>	<u>Age</u>
First	UGAKI Kazunari (1342/0997/0001/2052), Gen.	Over 80
Ninth	MASAKI Jinzaburo (4176/1505/3928/0005/6745), Gen.	76
Ninth	ARAKI Sadao (5435/2606/6297/1133), Gen.	
15th	IMAMURA Hitoshi (0093/2625/0971), Gen.	Over 70
17th	TOJO Hideki (2639/5391/2894), Gen. KAWABE Shozo (3109/6708/2973/0005), Gen.	
20th	SHIMOMURA Sadame (0007/2625/1353), Gen.; Army Minister at war's end	66
29th	TATSUMI (6591/1570), Maj. Gen.	60
30th	SAKURAI (2937/0064) and WATANABE (3256/6708)	
34th	HATTORI Takushiro (2591/6752/0587/0934/6745), Col.	52
36th	TSUJI Kusanobu, Col.	49
45th	YUGAWA Yasuhira	40
58th	All were 1st or 2nd Lieuts. at war's end	25 to 28
59th, 60th	Were students at Military Academy at war's end	

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ATTACHMENT B

ORGANIZATIONS OF GRADUATES OF MILITARY ACADEMY

<u>Classes</u>	<u>Organization</u>
15th to 24th	One group)
25th to 33rd	Wednesday Society (3055/2656/2585)) Kaiko Kai (0253/ 5887/2585),
34th to 39th	One group, HATTORI Takushiro Manager) organized Sept 51
40th to 58th	Ichigaya Society (1579/6253/2585))

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