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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED		CROSS FILED BY	
ZJL-745	9 Nov 1951		
Military Figures Connected with Rearmament and Conflicting Intrigues re the HATTORI Plan: DOI Akio		3 Feb 1954	
Source: [] []		Evaluation: C-3	
<p>Sub-source for paras. 4-8: TSUJI Masanobu. Date of info. as of 3 Oct. 1953. Info. required: 7 October, 1953.</p> <p>There is a general rumor afloat that DOI Akio is extremely well acquainted with OGATA Taketora (奥田 重太郎) and with Prime Minister YOSHIDA Shigeru, and that the latter consults DOI frequently and values his opinions highly. MATSUMI Kiichi has denied the rumor, particularly in reference to YOSHIDA, as completely baseless. There is no link between DOI and YOSHIDA Shigeru. However, it is quite definite that a very intimate friendship does exist between DOI and OGATA Taketora. The probable reasons for this rumor are as follows: first, DOI and YOSHIDA are both well-known from the same area, Kochi Prefecture, which many superficial commentators view as significant; then, OGATA is a very loyal follower and subordinate of KOJIMA Isamu (小島 磯雄), who acts as one of YOSHIDA's best paid lieutenants. Since (Sub-source knows) KOJIMA Isamu very well, he is aware that KOJIMA does not share OGATA's regard for DOI at all, but in fact has rather contrary opinions. Therefore, DOI has no direct line to YOSHIDA.</p> <p>5. During the days right after World War II ended, DOI Akio, then Chief of Staff of the 13th Japanese Army, was detained at Nanking at the same time that TSUJI Masanobu was. TSUJI was at that time engaged in underground Sino-Japanese collaboration operations in the South China area, from Nanking. At that time, DOI was leading an amazingly luxurious if not extravagant existence for a person supposedly under detention on war-crimes charges. DOI apparently had had full control over the confidential funds of the 13th Army as its Chief of Staff. During his post-war days at Nanking, it was rumored on the basis of his obvious style of living and entertaining, that he was appropriating approximately ¥300,000 per month for his own living expenses from erstwhile Japanese Army funds.</p> <p>One day, the Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army told TSUJI that an investigation and search by the Chinese Mission in Tokyo had</p>			
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- (2)(A) Privacy
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to have by DOI received that five thousand dollars in U.S. money (cash) were hidden in bank linings. The Chinese general indicated that the problem had been relayed to him from the Chinese Mission in Tokyo, who wanted to know what should be done about it. He relayed this to TSUJI, obviously waiting for a comment. TSUJI presumed immediately that DOI could not have such a large amount of foreign currency legitimately as his own by any stretch of the imagination, and therefore came to the conclusion that it was ill-gotten gains or appropriated funds. Yet TSUJI felt that if he told that to the Chinese Chief of Staff, it would cause a great dishonor to Japan and even more, it would cause undue hardship to thousands of poor, righteous Japanese people repatriating from China, who would then be searched, interrogated, and annoyed no end as a result of DOI's selfish acts. Therefore, TSUJI promptly replied to the effect that it was nothing to worry about: TSUJI knew that Lt. General DOI had contemplated aiding in their Sino-Japanese Collaborative Operations after return to Japan, and in fact had told TSUJI that he would send to Japan the money necessary to back those operations. The Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army apparently believed this, thought it was a fine idea, and said that he would advise the Tokyo Mission to replace the money quietly and then would pigeonhole the matter. After TSUJI returned to Japan, he went to DOI to urge the latter to use the money in question for the relief of families who had suffered the loss of husbands and fathers during the war. DOI merely laughed at him and flatly refused to do so.

6. It is a matter of almost universal knowledge in Japanese Army circles that DOI is a man of mean, ill-tempered, and vindictive character. There is no single officer of general rank (to sub-source's recollection) who would be desirous of cooperating with DOI in any project for rearmament because he is so selfish and mean.
7. DOI is one of the persons most violently opposed to HATTORI. This dates from his days as Chief of G-1. He was an extremely difficult chief to deal with, and was extremely unpopular with all of the subordinates and staff officers in the Operational Plans section of G-1. In fact, because of repeated instances of vindictive disciplinary action and complete ignoring of competent staff advice, a movement to boycott and obstruct his orders got underway very shortly after he relieved TANAKA Shinichi. This reached scandalous proportions. Even such a gentle person as KUSUDA Nagao (藤田正夫), a graduate of the 35th class at Army General Staff School, graduate of Army War College, and at that time a subordinate officer (as Lt. Colonel) in the Operational Plans Section of G-1, became furiously angry at DOI on one occasion and struck him. For all of this opposition and insubordination, DOI blamed HATTORI, who was exceedingly popular and intimate with the Operational Section officers even after TOJO removed him to make him his military aide. After DOI was transferred to be chief of the Harbin THKK, which was obviously a command inferior to that of G-1, General Staff HQ, his replacement, MIYAZAKI Shuichi, immediately reinstated HATTORI as his Ops Plans Chief. DOI, without reflecting whatsoever on his blundering errors in strategy nor on his faults of character, blamed HATTORI and accused him viciously of bringing about his own demotion from the post of G-1; he has never ceased to maintain that HATTORI flattered and curried favor with the younger officers in G-1 and led them into boycotting his orders and becoming thoroughly insubordinate. Therefore, HATTORI is one of the persons

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... few subordinates who rated DOI's ability highly and resp
... HAYASHI Saburo, former colonel, who once worked for DOI in
... It is quite certain that HAYASHI Saburo is a
... (SI-317)

THIS IS PERTINENT
TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS DOCUMENT.

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(S-1-74)

Reference is made to report dated 10/1/51.

- On 24 September 1941, source visited TSUKAMOTO after his absence from seeing him, and talked with him concerning recent matters. The following is a summary of comments made by TSUKAMOTO at that time concerning TSUJI, IWAKURO, IMAKURO, and KAWAMURA Saburo. (Data acquired: 27 September 1951.) (Sub-source: TSUKAMOTO Takoto.)

- a. ~~X~~ TSUJI Masenobu is in TSUKAMOTO's opinion a very wonderful person in character as well as ability, but he has shown irresponsibility and complete lack of appreciation of Japan's present circumstances. What TSUKAMOTO has to say against TSUJI is stated with full realization of TSUJI's good qualities. For a long time, TSUKAMOTO very fiercely supported and defended TSUJI's character and actions against persons who maligned him. For example, at a certain meeting held around 1947 or early 1948, IMAKURO Hideo condemned TSUJI and TSUJI's actions very flatly. At that time TSUKAMOTO quarreled violently with his former superior, and fiercely refuted IMAKURO's denunciation of TSUJI. IMAKURO had pointed out that many persons had been put into adversity because of TSUJI's rash statements and careless manner. For example, IMAKURO stated that it was TSUJI's evidence and careless speech which had brought about condemnation of Lt. Gen. KAWAMURA as a war criminal and had achieved the latter's execution. TSUKAMOTO had retorted quite hotly that both IMAKURO and KAWAMURA had been senior officers of TSUJI. They had had every opportunity to express privately to TSUJI their opposition to what he was doing, and if they had, in all likelihood, TSUJI would not have gone ahead and ignored their advice. In spite of the fact that they were predecessors and superiors of TSUJI, they remained indifferent to what he was doing and preferred to stand aloof in private as a bad man who was causing many persons trouble and adversity. TSUKAMOTO maintained that that was not the attitude of a senior officer and that they themselves were guilty of not exercising discipline privately over TSUJI's actions. The meeting at that point came to a deadlock, but it was a good example of the manner in which TSUKAMOTO at one time supported TSUJI even against his own superiors. However subsequently, when TSUJI published his various books, TSUKAMOTO became completely fed up with him. Reading through these books, TSUKAMOTO noticed that TSUJI was completely lacking in reflection over his personal responsibility or his responsibility as a member of the Japanese Army for having thrown Japan into its present status. A soldier is not entirely responsible for waging war, and always carry out orders. On the other hand, TSUKAMOTO maintained that those who have once been regular officers of the Army should be able to introspect regarding their personal and organizational responsibility for disaster and aggression, and should thereafter lead an unassuming and humble life with a modest attitude in the present situation. TSUJI's books show not a bit of such self-introspection and humility. His statements are made in a fashion that indicates that his opinion is that

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...and his reputation with him is wrong. Furthermore, the publications have done a great amount of harm to other persons. ... has stated. For this reason at the present time ... to the public a facade of nobility and attempts to ... support, but this is possible only if his past ... and his past political manoeuvres against the govern- ... he has caused to leaders of the Japanese Army in ... Despite his past underground life engaging in Sino-Japanese ... TSUJI called on his good friend KUSUDA Masuo in an attempt ... to Premier YOSHIDA, and through the publication of ... he has succeeded in propagandising the myth that he is one ... finest samurai. The income from these books, he has quite ... announced, has been used for the relief of his unfortunate ... and subordinates, and it has been done after it was clearly ... established by TSUJI that he himself was not a war criminal. If TSUJI ... is such a humanitarian, he should let his actions speak for themselves ... of publicising. Furthermore, in view of the fact that TSUJI's ... name was removed from the war criminal list in a very hasty decision, ... it is quite possible that this is mere "conscience money". ... does not know the detailed circumstances behind the reasons why ... TSUJI's name being removed from consideration as a war criminal, ... is inclined to believe the reason that the wife of ... did the most to achieve this by getting close to Major ... Willoughby of G-2 OH Q.

b. TSUKAMOTO expressed doubts as to his own wisdom in criticising ... to Source, but stated that if he were to be permitted to ... it would be on the same basis as that for his close friend ... Considered in the light of Japan's historical record from ... TSUKAMOTO could not understand how HATTORI could take public ... attain any responsibility with either the Japanese or American ... He maintained that if HATTORI reflected for one moment upon his ... responsibility for the war and for causing it with any ability ... at all, he could not presumably get into any public office. ... has unashamedly and brazenly accepted public office in response ... with the Japanese and American Governments. ... information for the Police Reserve got underway last year ... decided by Maj. General Sheppard, under General Willoughby, ... to appoint HATTORI the Chief, and to name ... Chief of G-1, ... Chief of G-3, and ... of G-4. ... representative appointment, all four had ... taken a courtesy visit to MASUHARA, who had ... been appointed Director-General of the National Police Agency ... MASUHARA nor his Assistant Chief, ... and had ... any such plan made by Major General Sheppard, ... official. Therefore, both MASUHARA and ... were quite ...

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The unexpected goal of this group headed by HATTORI. It became quite obvious in the course of the conversation that HATTORI and his henchmen expected to be ordered to start drawing up plans for the military organization of the MRF as soon as expedient. Whether or not former field grade officers should be recruited in the Police Reserve had constantly been a subject of heated discussion. HATTORI quite obviously anticipated being chosen as Chief, as had been tentatively planned by Maj. General Sheppard. However, nothing had been definite, and the so-called "Sheppard Plan" later encountered the opposition of Maj. General Whitney, head of Government Section, SCAP. Through General Whitney's influence with General MacArthur, it was not materialized. As a result, this courtesy visit by HATTORI and his gang ended in a mere comedy. In the light of all this it is hard to understand why HATTORI and his group are even to the present day so desirous of interfering with the formation of the Police Reserve. At that time they might have made a pretext out of the fact that they had no choice but to comply with the directives of the G-2 GHQ; however, even in that case, it is quite obvious that they in no way showed their responsibility by indicating clearly to American authorities that field grade officers of their seniority and age should never have received such a directive because of their past actions. The fact that they unashamedly accepted the responsibility conclusively shows that they lacked in any deep reflection over their responsibility for war guilt as individuals and as officers. In particular the Police Reserve would certainly turn into a rather horrible throwback, if such an incorrigible ultramilitaristic thug as HORIBA Kazuo had anything to do with it. HATTORI has maintained that he has no interest in political activities and has no political ambitions, but both his actions and TSUJI's show that they have similar political ambitions. For what reason should HATTORI seek a pretext to visit MATSUMURA several times and to meet with MATSUMURA Yasunasa in the company of Col. AKAMATSU? As a result, it seems to any observer that what HATTORI says is in complete contrast to what he does. Although TSUKAMOTO does not know the size of the intelligence organization under HATTORI's control, rumor has it to the effect that it is maintained on a very large scale. It is generally reputed in the public that HATTORI is a military strategist and that TSUKAMOTO is merely a tricky politician. However, to TSUKAMOTO, they both seem to be pretty much political tricksters. HATTORI has stood on his fine reputation as a military strategist, but it might be pointed out that anyone is capable of winking out military operations who has a certain amount of common sense, and to use this as a basis for great reputation and authority is a very thin argument. In TSUKAMOTO's opinion, the planning of military operations and drawing up of strategy is not something which requires any great master mind nor any real professional technique, provided staff work has been adequately accomplished.

- c. TSUKAMOTO is supposedly under the supervision and occasional surveillance of the SIB because of the fact he is a purgee. As a matter of fact, the officials from the Special Investigations Bureau and from the MRF often go to see TSUKAMOTO to procure information concerning the activities

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...converse with TSUKAMOTO, the usually ...
...asked the question: What type of ...
...in carrying out rearmament ...
...the Police Reserve? TSUKAMOTO ...
...The formulation of ...
...study and research. Anyone can do it. The term "rearmament" is not ...
...The idea of reviving the Army is also wrong. ...
...Japan is to have a new Army. ...
...In the establishment of that new Army ...
...who have been discussed greatly ...
...of late among the people should be employed. The use of those fellows ...
...of the same type of militaristic ...
...To put it in the most concrete terms, no old soldier is necessary ...
...for the formation of a new Army. The guiding principle of the new ...
...Army which has been a subject of lively debate should be that it is of ...
...the people and for the people and not necessarily with the help of former ...
...military men. People like TSUJI and MATSUDA and TSUKAMOTO are soldiers ...
...of the past era. They should have nothing to do with the new Army.

- d. IWAKURA Hideo often called upon TSUKAMOTO shortly after the Surrender, but he never does these days. TSUKAMOTO does not consult with IWAKURA any more either. TSUKAMOTO claimed that he did not know what IWAKURA was doing at present, but remarked rather sarcastically that IWAKURA was quite fond of attending to other peoples' business and taking care of people. Therefore he presumed that he was still doing "a charity job". Around 1937 or 1938, IWAKURA had MIZUNO Shigeo buy a paper pulp company in Manchuria, through which IWAKURA and MIZUNO were both able to gain their reputations. Therefore, IWAKURA is a great benefactor of MIZUNO. IWAKURA likes to take care of other people for purposes of control, but he does not like to be obligated to any one. For this reason, TSUKAMOTO presumes that in all probability IWAKURA is not receiving very much financial aid at present from MIZUNO Shigeo.

- e. TSUKAMOTO's relations with HAYASHI Saburo are as friendly as ever. HAYASHI has become a distinguished military scholar and is working harder all the time at these studies. While absent in these various researches, HAYASHI writes books and critiques on military matters. In this respect, he is far different from TSUJI. TSUJI produces many publications, but does very little research work. The lecture which TSUJI gave at the Liberalist Club is nothing but an indication of his complete lack of research. At the request of a few members of the Diet from the Democratic Party, TSUKAMOTO introduced HAYASHI to them recently. At that time, HAYASHI made comments on the general military situation which are extremely well received, and considered highly pertinent and intelligent. All of the Parliamentary members who heard the speech were deeply impressed and admired HAYASHI very much.

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17. (Sub-source: TSUJI Masanobu; Date of Info: 5 October; Date Acquired: 7 October 1951.)

HAYASHI Saburo, a former subordinate of Lt. Gen. DOI Akio in the Russian Section at General Staff HQ, is currently cooperating with Lt. Gen. DOI. An article entitled "An Error in What is generally called 'The Mysterious Manner of TSUJI Masanobu'" was carried in the September issue of "Chou Koron" under the name of the Russo-American Problems Research Society (Beiso Mondai Kenkyukai.) It is highly likely that this article was actually written jointly by DOI and HAYASHI Saburo, and information has been received to that effect confirming general impression.