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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED		CROSS FILED BY	
44-5-3-49	ZJL-571	9 March 1951	[] []
Japanese I.S. Personalities		3 Feb 1954	
PERTINENT INFORMATION		Evaluation: C-2	
Source: [] []			
<p>(a) It is definitely felt that Colonel TSUJI Masanobu works for POPOV through HATTORI. Reasons for this opinion being strong enough to be considered fact by Source are personal.</p> <p>(b) Source is a very close friend of Colonel HATTORI and also of Colonel TSUJI, and was a class behind HATTORI (who is about 49) at the Imperial Officers' School. TSUJI visits HATTORI regularly and frequently; Source keeps in fairly close contact with both. One time when visited, TSUJI was engaged in work concerning maps of Korea and North China which he covered hastily on Source's approach, claiming it was some work for Colonel HATTORI. Since TSUJI is well aware that Source is on excellent terms with HATTORI, he would probably not have kept this secret if only HATTORI were involved.</p> <p>(c) In mid-January, 1951, TSUJI received a letter from a Chinese Nationalist leader at Taipeh, Formosa asking him to do the CHIANG Government a favor. Approximately two divisions of Chinese Nationalist troops sought safe-haven in Indochina when the Communists swept into the south provinces of China in 1949. These troops were promptly interned by the French authorities in Indochina, and at first received very unkind treatment. However, since fortunes of war went against the French and Vietnamese in 1950, treatment of the interned troops improved, and there has even been some discussion of using them against the Vietminh rebels and/or Chinese Communists. The Nationalist leader on Formosa, knowing TSUJI's great reputation among the Japanese troops, wanted TSUJI to write a letter to those Japanese serving with the Chinese Nationalist divisions in Indochina asking them not to desert the cause despite adversities, and to other Japanese in Indochina exhorting them to enlist with the Nationalists. TSUJI is deeply and sincerely anti-Communist, but he has no particular love for nor faith in the Chinese Nationalist regime. In addition, he has been in Indochina only twice and has no detailed knowledge of the area nor of the Japanese Army personnel there. He came to Source with the problem. Source advised him to present it to American authorities, to which TSUJI replied that he could easily do that, and probably should, but that still left him with the problem of how to answer this Chinese Nationalist general, who was a personal friend. Eventually, by the end of January, TSUJI's distrust of the CHIANG regime won out over his naive inability to refuse a friend's request, and he wrote back that he could not write such a letter because he had no knowledge of the Japanese in Indochina and did not wish any unprincipled individuals among the Japanese community there to make ill use of his name and reputation.</p>			
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		[] []	

FORM NO. 56-34
DEC 1952

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(135)

NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)

(1) (A) Privacy

(2) (S) Methods/Sources

(2) (G) Foreign Relations

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(d) TSUJI has many foreign visitors and many correspondents from countries all over East Asia because of the trek he made in Southeast Asia and South China and the book he wrote about it. Until recently, his work with HATTORI seems to have concerned mainly the Korean problem, but whether it involves the placement of agents in North Korea or not is not known.

(e) The last week of January, 1951, TSUJI visited Source and stated that he had been asked for an opinion, backed up by research, on the question of whether an invasion of South China by Chinese Nationalists, aided from within by

Chinese anti-Communist guerrillas, stood good chances of success. Source professed his ignorance of such matters, but pointed out that if aided from within, it would probably go as badly as did the Japanese invasion of the same area. TSUJI stated that it was a matter of great consequence and yet he felt that the Americans could not rely on CHIANG Kai Shek and that the authorities in Tokyo should not consider backing such a venture. He appeared to be using Source as a sounding-board for his ideas concerning the problem. About a week later, TSUJI made an unexpected and hurried visit to Source. He asked the latter if he had talked about their conversation to anyone. Source said he had not. TSUJI then insisted that Source promise not to reveal the nature or subject of their earlier discussion to anyone because it was a "top-secret" matter. A few days later, Source was not too surprised to receive a much less naive warning by implication on the same topic from HATTORI, which topic HATTORI approached deviously but rather obviously from a discussion of TSUJI's danger from reputed assassination by fanatical ultra-Nationalists. POPOV had requested the original project of HATTORI and TSUJI, and then had heard from a Chinese source of a security leak on this highly secret topic; TSUJI probably told HATTORI that he had discussed the question with Source, and both became unduly concerned; without a warning from POPOV, it is unlikely that either one would worry at all about sharing secrets with Source.

(f) TSUJI has received warnings and threats several times from what appears to be a wide variety of ideological crackpots, but even his best friends doubt that he is in any real danger; it is merely that to some people he is sort of a symbol of old-style militarism, and to certain Rightist fanatics, he is a symbol of subservient cooperation with Americans, as opposed to the violently anti-white wing of Pan-Asianism. TSUJI himself is definitely Pan-Asian in his thinking, but along the lines of Japanese cooperation with the other Asian BLOC nations PLUS extremely close and friendly cooperation with the Anglo-Saxon powers to stem Communism and develop Asia.

(g) Between the fame of TSUJI as a patriotic and loyal Japanese soldier and old-style gentleman of the highest tradition and the almost equally widespread stories of his incompetency and childishness, it is difficult to find the true middle ground. Despite a certain naivete, he is considered to be a reasonably capable strategist and operations officer, and there is no question that for a Japanese officer, he is a kind, honest, and loyal gentleman to all. However, in either politics or intelligence work, he is hopelessly lost both by reason of personality and lack of experience.

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT
TO THE SUBJECT OF THIS DOCUMENT.