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Foreign Liaisons and Operations of the JIS Groups 3 Feb 1954

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3. Operations into Korea and Korean Connections

c. Colonel TSUJI Masanobu, previously reported incorrectly as having returned to Indo-China, is now planned to serve as one of WATANABE Wataru's assistants in future operations into North Korea. Reasons for this switch of plans and for the previous erroneous report are outlined below. TSUJI has his own CIC contacts for whom he has been working since his return to Japan in the latter part of 1949.

5. Southern Operations - Indo-China

The original plan formulated early this spring for operations into Indo-China entailed the use of Col. TSUJI Masanobu as chief of those operations to both Vietnam, Vietnam, and the French government. While at Imperial General Headquarters, TSUJI was the protege of Lt. General ARISUE, then staff intelligence as a Major General; ARISUE continues to think very highly of TSUJI, and the plan was ARISUE's. It was so definitely stated that when NEMOTO went back to Formosa in June, 1950 after a brief trip to Kagoshima, TSUJI was reputed to have been on board. It was TSUJI and WATANABE Wataru who met NEMOTO at the Kagoshima Conference. He was later reported as having gone on from there to Indo-China, (according to information elicited from BABELER/4). The actual facts and mistaken identity came out much later: KUMAMOTO of the ARISUE Kikan, who supervised the third expedition to Formosa in June, took with him not TSUJI but a former Lt. Colonel and Commander of the Shanghai Tokko Kempetai, ~~TSUJI~~ ^{TSUCHIDA} who picked up NEMOTO at Kagoshima. It seems that not everyone shared ARISUE's and WATANABE Wataru's enthusiasm for TSUJI, especially personnel from the Southeast Asia theater of operations. Major General ~~KIMURA~~ ^{KIMURA}, former Commanding Officer of Japanese Military Government for the Burma Theater, and MATSUMOTO Shunichi, former Minister Plenipotentiary to Indo-China and later Vice-Foreign Minister, were the two most influential objectors. MATSUMOTO, as a member of TSUCHIDA's Committee and chiefly through TSUCHIDA and FURUYA personally, had been assisting for some time in placement of intelligence operatives from various Japanese Kikans on ships of his friends going to Indo-China and to Malaya legally and illegally. In the past, he had also had excellent connections to operations of the special Kempai (the Tokko Kempai) in both Indo-China and South China and had maintained a fairly accurate contact system to individual ex-Kempai operatives up to date. When FURUYA approached him on the matter of several ships for the KAWA-GUCHI Kikan's forthcoming fourth expedition in early July, MATSUMOTO agreed, but by earlier discussion with both FURUYA, TSUCHIDA, ~~YAMAZE~~ ^{YAMAZE}, and others, he had made it quite clear that TSUJI was in his opinion quite unsuitable for work in Indo-China, as were most former military men; he demanded introduction of former Kempai special operations officers and Tokumu Kikan men instead of the personnel TSUJI wanted. In early June, KIMURA, a newcomer to the ARISUE Kikan whose chief task it was to "fix" the Maritime Safety Bureau, the Board of Trade and other Japanese government agencies with bribes from the profits, also flatly objected to TSUJI being involved in any Southeast Asia operations. TSUJI, while an Imperial HQ G-2 representative from Singapore in Burma, had apparently made himself thoroughly obnoxious to many of the local commanders as well as to the "political officers" such as KIMURA. KIMURA favored ASADA Goro, former special operative at Bangkok. The general

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consensus of former Southeast Asia staff opinion was that (a) TSUJI was too closely identified with the French; (b) TSUJI was insecure, operationally incompetent, and not liked by natives of the area; (c) TSUJI was thoroughly known and "blown" to the Chinese Communists, who did not like him either. MATSUMOTO introduced professionals such as former Indo-China Tokko Kempai (Colonel) HAYASHI Hidesumi, former Kempai (Military Police) (Colonel) TOMIMURA, and Lt. Col. TOMITA to the federation as well as others. IMAAZI Takeo, as a former Nakano School man, threw his weight against ARISUE's man; at the last minute, the central advisory group ordered replacement of TSUJI by Lt. Colonel TOMITA and the latter went as advance contact agent for about twenty agent personnel to be sent on the fourth expedition.

Although the failure of the fourth expedition delayed dispatch of those agents, they will go about the end of October with the fifth Formosa expedition and will be re-mounted from Formosa with the cooperation of the Chinese Nationalist RAJISHA. ASADA Goro, now with the Foreign Office, TOMIMURA, and possibly HAYASHI Hidesumi will go. HAYASHI is apparently in charge of most Indo-China operatives for the group, but there appears to be someone above him who will supervise all operations in that general area as far as professional intelligence operations are concerned. NEMOTO will be their liaison man unless a better means can be devised. MATSUMOTO Shunichi will continue to aid in the logistic support, and in the overall recruiting policy.

The general plan for Indo-China operations entails playing both sides in the struggle, with the ultimate objective of those operatives on the Vietnam side of securing liaisons into the Chinese Communist connections of the Vietnam. Some information on the Vietnam will be given to the French by those operatives who are aligned on the French and Vietnam side; some information on the French will be used to further the cause of those operatives working for HO Chi Minh.