

FOR COORDINATION WITH State

<b>DISPATCH</b>		CLASSIFICATION <b>SECRET</b>	PROCESSING ACTION
TO	Chief, European Division	XXX	MARKED FOR INDEXING NO INDEXING REQUIRED
INFO.	Chief [ ]		ONLY QUALIFIED DESK CAN JUDGE INDEXING
FROM	Chief [ ]		MICROFILM
SUBJECT	CALL/CATHATCH/[ ] Alleged U.S. Documents from U.S. Sources on Willy Brandt		
ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES			
REF: [ ]			
ACTION: See paras 1 and 2.			
<p>1. Forwarded herewith for your examination and review are a copy of the documents cited in Reference, which are alleged to be from U.S. archives. The stamps and other markings on the copies have been examined here and appear to attest to the authenticity of the copies, which were possibly prepared from microfilm. We would appreciate your comment on the authenticity of the materials and the possible means of access to them.</p> <p>2. It occurs to us that because of their age, all being from 1944, these documents may be among those in archival holdings available to serious students and historical researchers. Your specific comment on this possibility would be appreciated.</p> <p>3. A copy of these materials has been made available to the Chief, LNBUZZ, for his information. Apart from noting the interesting content of the reports, the Chief, LNBUZZ remarks that if the entirety of the documents were published, the total effect would not be damaging to Brandt. However, if the most damaging portions were extracted and treated tendentiously, a potentially embarrassing political effect could be achieved. (Judging from the political reputation of the publisher, we estimate that precisely such a selective treatment would be intended.) Since reference is made to a predecessor organization of BKHERALD, this aspect might also be</p> <p style="text-align: right;">...continued...</p>			
Attachment H/W: as stated		DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2007	
Distribution: 3 - C/EUR (w/Att H/W) 2 - COS/[ ] (w/O Att)		5 APR 74	
E2 IMPDET			
CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE	
	[ ]	5 April 1974	
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER	
	<b>SECRET</b>	[ ]	

CONTINUATION OF DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER
--------------------------	----------------	----------------------------

S E C R E T

□ □

brought out publicly. Against the possibility that these items may be published, it would be helpful to have the above points already researched.

4. □ □, as of 24 March and 5 April, had no further information as to whether any or all of the documents would be published.



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 4027  
CONFIDENTIAL

AMERICAN LEGATION  
Stockholm, Sweden  
September 2, 1944

Subject: Views Expressed by Willy Brandt,  
German Social Democrat.

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

MICROFILMED AT THE  
AMERICAN LEGATION,  
STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN.  
DATE SEP 7 1944

Sir:

I have the honor to report that a member of the Legation's staff has had a conversation with Willy Brandt, a German Social Democratic exile who has been mentioned in various previous despatches, for example, despatches no. 3142 of April 11, 1944 and no. 3399 of May 22, 1944, both of which transmitted translations of memoranda on German questions written by Brandt.

It may be reiterated that Brandt was forced to leave Germany in 1933 because of his previous activities as a Social Democratic youth leader. He went to Norway where he became a Norwegian citizen, married a Norwegian girl, and was active in the Norwegian labor movement. He was put in a concentration camp in Norway by the Germans but finally succeeded in reaching Sweden. Members of the Legation's staff who are acquainted with Brandt, as well as American journalists in Stockholm, all consider him to be thoughtful, forceful and thoroughly democratic in his outlook. Although he possesses Norwegian nationality, it is believed to be his private hope to return to Germany and participate in the democratic reformation of that country. Because of his background and his abilities, it is not difficult to foresee that he might have a promising political future in Germany and it is therefore believed that the Department will wish to bear him in mind, in case of future developments.

The information and views which he set forth in the conversation referred to above have been partially reported in the Legation's telegram no. 3412 of August 31, 2 p.m. He stated that recent information from Berlin indicates for the first time the development of a general psychology among the mass of the people to the effect that no matter how bad post-war conditions may be they cannot

RECEIVED  
DEPT. OF STATE

NOV 16 AM 11 40

862,011-2-3102  
NOV 16 1944  
CONFIDENTIAL

be any worse than present conditions. If this information is reliable and if the reaction is general, it is of very great significance as indicating the collapse of Goebbels' terror propaganda. Brandt himself, however, added a word of caution as to the difficulties of estimating accurately the general morale in any given place and illustrated his meaning by referring to Hamburg. He said the opposition has always retained a more solid core there than elsewhere and the Hamburgers have apparently never been won over to strong anti-English feeling even after the heavy bombings of their city. Nevertheless it has just been reported to him by a seaman from Hamburg that when the news of the recent bomb attempt against Hitler reached Hamburg women wept in the streets for sorrow.

Brandt gave it as his opinion that the opposition movement was by no means totally destroyed after recent events and the trial and execution of Witzleben and his colleagues, although the failure of the plot and the strong measures by the SS and Gestapo have probably been sufficient to preclude the possibility of any further attempt until the actual collapse of the regime has begun. He stated that one of the executed officers was the liaison man between the military group and the civilian opposition movement. When asked which one, he at first said he could not divulge that information but he finally said in strict confidence that the liaison man was Count Yorck von Wartenburg.

In connection with the demand for unconditional surrender which has been voiced by the United States and Great Britain since Casablanca, Brandt made the interesting observation that in the beginning this slogan was welcomed by the anti-Nazi opposition leaders in Germany because they felt it indicated a thoroughgoing determination on the part of the Allies to have no dealings whatsoever with the Nazis. Only later, and under the impress of subsequent repetitions and interpretations of the slogan did the opposition come to feel doubt and alarms about it because it seemed to indicate that the Allies would not deal with any German government of any stripe, no matter how democratic or how anti-Nazi. That feeling of uncertainty about Allied intentions toward Germany, as distinguished from the Nazi regime, has been deepened by the lack of a consistent propaganda policy by the Anglo-Americans, according to Brandt. He expressed interest, in this connection, in the United Nations intentions with respect to the establishment of United Nations military control and/or a provisional German government after capitulation. His anxiety arose out of a recent press report from an Allied source allegedly based on statements by well-informed diplomatic circles to the effect that the United Nations plan a joint Anglo-Soviet-American Military Control Commission for Berlin which would apparently govern the country directly for some time without the medium of even a limited German government. Brandt feels that this will be a great mistake from the point of view of the United Nations who should by all means try to enlist the assistance of some kind of German government.

Adverting

Adverting to the question of Germany's eastern boundaries, and prefacing his remarks by the statement that he himself had no nationalistic feeling about it, nor any sentimental attachment to any particular boundary, he expressed the fear that there would be imposed a boundary between Poland and Germany which would be so inconsistent with ethnic and economic and historic considerations that no German government could possibly accept it except under protest. The question would thus become an open and continuing cause for grievance on the part of the German people and would undoubtedly be used by nationalist agitators.


Brandt was asked what his own solution for the eastern boundary problem would be. He replied hesitantly, and with the deprecating remark that this was only his personal and unimportant opinion, that there should be first of all an unbroken (geschlossen) border, that is to say, there must be no Corridor. He would return the Corridor to Germany, disregarding all questions of the nationality of the local population, and give to Germany also Danzig and a small part of western East Prussia. The rest of East Prussia including Koenigsberg would go to Poland. Danzig would be available to Poland as a port also. He added that there should in such case be a complete exchange of populations in the regions affected. This is a not unreasonable suggestion, in the Legation's opinion, coming from a German.

Brandt remarked that if the whole of East Prussia and Danzig and the Corridor are given to Poland, there will be Germans who will privately accept it as a drastic but final solution of an almost insoluble problem but they will never dare admit their views openly. Brandt himself asserted that East Prussia is not economically necessary to Germany as its value as a granary was entirely dependent on the German high protective tariff on grain before the war. East Prussian grain could never compete with Canadian and American grain if the tariff were removed.

The conversation turned for a time on the possibility of a post-defeat underground movement by the Nazis. There are persons who believe that there is little likelihood of any continuing Nazi underground movement after the war, because of the alleged German docility under authority, or because the Nazi movement, in contrast to the underground movements which have flourished in the countries overrun by Germany, will have nothing to hope for from outside friends or for other reasons. Brandt was emphatically of the opinion that there will be a strong Nazi organization and that it will resort to violence on an impressive scale. In fact, he asserted his belief that at least the first German government after the Nazi regime will be entirely assassinated by the Nazis. The Legation shares Brandt's views and feels that it will be

a dangerous underestimation of Germany's potential threat  
in the future to assume that the Nazi movement will melt  
away like snow in the face of a democratic victory.

Respectfully yours,

  
Herschel V. Johnson

Microfilmed  
Signed confirmation copy by mail  
Copy to American Embassy, London (Political Division)  
File copy

File no. 800  
PL:rc

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
STATE

INCOMING  
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AND RECORDS

BJR - 74

Stockholm

This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SECRET)

Dated September 14, 1944


Rec'd 9:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

3661, September 14, 6 p.m.

Department's attention is particularly invited to  
story reported in Legation's press telegram 3592 of  
September 14 (re Legation's No. 3631 of September 12,  
10 p.m. reporting details of British contact in  
Stockholm with executed Adam von Trott). Legation  
learns this article was written by Willy Brandt, young  
anti-Nazi German who has been subject of Legation's  
3412 August 31, 8 p.m., and despatch 4227 September 2,  
He is obviously well informed concerning opposition  
organizations and views. Department will note his  
account of von Trott's views and British reaction and  
reply does not differ from British Legation account.  
Furthermore, article's assertion that contacts were  
made by other routes than Stockholm is borne out by  
British Legation which says Foreign Office received  
reports of similar contacts by von Trott in Berne,  
Ankara and either Madrid or Lisbon.

With these



862-01/9-1444  
CONFIDENTIAL

-2- #3661, September 14, 6 p.m., from Stockholm.

With these indications of reliability of Brandt's information, article can be considered as giving one of clearest glimpses yet obtained of organization and views of German opposition groups.

Legation learns indirectly from Brandt that Trott sought contact with Soviet Legation in Stockholm during last visit in June but contact could not be made in time.

Brandt believes July 20th plot was launched prematurely as outcome of Trott's contacts with Allies in attempt to prove sincerity and existence of opposition movement.

Foregoing completes information currently in Legation's hands concerning Trott and German opposition movement. Reference should also be made to Legation's 2309, June 26, 9 p.m. and to 3502 September 11, 8 p.m.

Taken together with press telegram under reference and Legation's 3631, September 12, 10 p.m. these messages, based on information from German, Swedish, British and American sources, clearly indicate views of von Trott and German opposition, together with act that Trott was in contact with British but not (repeat not) with Russians. Information further gives definite basis for



--3-- #3661, September 14, 6 p.m., from Stockholm.

basis for conclusion that an organization existed which was working to overthrow Hitler before July 20th, an organization which had widespread contacts and ramifications among leaders from most diverse political, economic, military and religious groups but which probably lacked wide popular foundation.

JOHNSON

WMB:NPL



THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
RECEIVED OF THE  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 3399.

862.01/6 39

AMERICAN LEGATION

Stockholm, Sweden,  
May 22, 1944.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Subject: Future Developments in Germany and  
Possible Sources of Future German  
Leadership as Viewed by German-  
Norwegian Journalist.

MICROFILMED AT THE  
AMERICAN LEGATION,  
STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN.  
DATE MAY 30 1944

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

1/

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a memorandum which has been written by Willy Brandt, a naturalized Norwegian of German birth, setting forth his views about the various groups within Germany from which revolutionary and post-revolutionary leadership might be expected to arise. The present memorandum expands but does not materially add to the views expressed by Brandt in a previous memorandum which was transmitted under cover of the Legation's confidential despatch no. 3142, dated April 11, 1944, on the subject "Views of German-Norwegian Journalist on Factors Involved in the Coming German Revolution". It is understood that the present memorandum, like the previous one, was written by Brandt for the information and use of an American journalist in Stockholm, and it has only indirectly come into the Legation's hands. Brandt is a young but apparently thoughtful and serious observer of the German scene, and one of the representatives of the Office of Strategic Services who is widely acquainted with German refugee circles in Sweden considers that Brandt is one of the ablest in the entire lot and is the one most likely to play some role after the war, in spite of his Norwegian nationality.

It is believed that little need be added in the way of comment to the observations which the Legation made in its despatch under reference. In connection with the remarks on page 7 of the enclosed memorandum concerning German trade union proposals for the rebuilding of their movement and for taking over the apparatus of the Arbeitsfront, reference may be made to the Legation's confidential despatch no. 3023, dated March 16, 1944, entitled "Report of 'National Conference of the German Trade Unionists in Sweden', held in Stockholm on February 26 and 27, 1944".

Officer of the Legation recently discussed at some

length

- 2 -

length with a Hungarian author, who is in very close touch with German refugee circles in Stockholm, this very question of the future reestablishment of the German trade unions and the degree to which the present machinery of the Arbeitsfront should be retained for working purposes. The author in question, Stefan Szende, whose book, "The Last Jew from Poland", has just been published in Sweden, stated that he has had many long discussions with Fritz Tarnow, social-democratic German trade unionist, who is apparently in favor of retaining a considerable portion of the Arbeitsfront organization and building up a strong unitary trade union group on the foundation of the Arbeitsfront. Szende, who is a close friend and, in a sense, a follower of Paul Hagen (Karl Frank), advanced with great earnestness the idea that although it might be necessary as a strictly practical matter and as a purely interim measure, to take over the "organization" of the Arbeitsfront -- that is, the funds, the records, the typewriters, the office space, if any is left -- this should be limited to the briefest possible time and the name and, to the greatest extent feasible, the personnel of the Arbeitsfront should be eliminated the moment the Nazi regime falls. Furthermore, Szende argues, there must be restored complete freedom of organization to the workers so that if, perhaps regrettably, they fail to unite themselves in one single organization, they may be free to form various trade unions. In any event the trade union movement must be divorced from state control and state connections and must be thoroughly independent.

The foregoing observations and the enclosed memorandum are reported for their possible usefulness in connection with post-war planning.

Respectfully yours,

  
Herschel V. Johnson

Enclosure: ✓

1/ Memorandum *WP*

Microfilmed.

Signed confirmation copy by mail.

Copy to American Embassy, London (Political Division).

File copy.

File no. 800

PL/vn

Enclosure no. 1 to despatch no. 3399 dated May 22, 1944, from the American Legation, Stockholm, Sweden, entitled "Future Developments in Germany and Possible Sources of Future German Leadership as Viewed by German-Norwegian Journalist".

Source: Original Memorandum, in English, written by Willy Brandt.

MEMORANDUM.

The Nazi defeat will bring the whole German administration to the brink of disaster, and seriously affect its economy. Moreover, it is very probable that through the military defeat, a considerable group of the German population will be redeemed. This assumption has been confirmed through reliable reports of morale coming lately through Swedish, Norwegian and Danish channels.

What powers will now play the important part in the elevating of the German people? What aims will the post-Hitler revolution strive after? Will they be constructive or only destructive?

One may ask what right I have to ask these questions. Hitler has taken once my citizenship and twice my home. On account of my fights against the Nazis I had to leave Germany in 1933. This did not prevent me, in the following years, and not only outside Germany, to work with illegal anti-Nazi organizations. Since the 9th of April 1940 I have tried in every way to do my part in the Norwegian fight for freedom. For me this was only a continuation of anti-Nazi work in other forms. I had to fight to regain two fatherlands: a free Norway and a democratic Germany. Under peril of not always being rightly understood, I have defended against my German friends the Norwegian point of view, and against my friends of occupied countries, the point of view of a "future Germany".

The starting point of my consideration is that after the Nazis' military collapse, many different interests among the Germans will make themselves felt. Widely different aims will be proclaimed when the real anti-Nazis and the many opportunists turn to all-out agitation. An unrestrained terror will be directed against the Nazi leaders and Gestapo people. The Nazi buildings will be stormed and the Hitleristic organizations destroyed. Notwithstanding the differences in many spheres, many Germans will agree in one thing: to restore elementary democratic rights. It is to be hoped that neither the German anti-Nazis nor the occupation forces will be so silly as to give the Nazis democratic rights. Otherwise the demands for freedom of conscience and opinions and for a minimum of organizations and press freedom are

the

- 2 -

the natural reactions to many years of suppression.

The democratic character of the German revolution will probably soon be recognisable. But democratic justice must not be restricted only to the Nazi leaders. Not less responsible than the real Nazis are those who supported their policy. A settlement with Prussian militarism is on the programme. Officials, judges and police will in great quantities have to be thrown out, interned or jailed. Such measures lie none the less within the framework of a consistent democratic revolution which unfortunately was not fulfilled in 1918/19.

A revolution like this is bound to have social consequences. If one shrinks back from these consequences, one endangers democratic improvements. One of the first demands will be to confiscate the estates of the "Junkers". These will either be divided or transferred to the Labor Unions.

Heavy industry and high finance are also responsible for the war. The indispensable purge will leave many factories ownerless. If one wants to break the influence of German pro-war monopoly capitals, one has to put the cartels and finance institutes in official hands. A democratic guaranteed control of industry also gives one of the most essential foundations for a real demilitarization of Germany, and for an effective German participation in the economic rebuilding of Europe.

What forces in Germany are ready and able to undertake such a profound transformation of society? They are not to be found in the army. On the contrary they are to be found among the working classes, in co-operation with parts of the church movement and with the bearers of a new German liberalism. Too long has the democratic world been under the illusion that the generals one day would replace the Nazis and take Germany's fate into their hands. It was forgotten firstly that the old officer generation was linked up with the Nazis in their fight against democracy, and that they were for war of conquest, and, secondly, that most of the younger German officers are real Nazis. Only in cases where close connections to liberal and churchly radical circles exist, the army opposition can be said to have anything in common with democracy. These circles do not, since 1942, see any possibility of bringing a change in the war by their own interference. At that time they offered to send prominent representatives to London and Moscow. London refused to accept the technical proposals. With the Russians no contact was established as the Gestapo destroyed a big illegal organization, even having some members in the War Ministry in Berlin. This organization was called "Rote Kapelle".

It is true that the catastrophe policy and prestige strategy of Hitler did develop a strong resistance among the officers. It is also true that many of the old Prussians are beginning to be desperate. A known case is

that

- 3 -

that of Nicolaus von Falkenhorst, who was German Commander-in-Chief in Norway. He is not a Nazi, is a deadly enemy of Terboven, the Reichskommissar of Norway, and made no secret of his aversion to Quisling and his gang. Nevertheless von Falkenhorst after New Year exaggeratedly declared his loyalty to Hitler and exhorted the men to go on fighting till the last cartridge. The generals also now understand that they today find less resonance among the population than a year ago. Losing generals are less attractive than victorious marshals.

Notwithstanding this it is possible that Hitler will first be replaced by a generals government. This can even be very useful. Hitler's generals ought not to be spared from signing the documents in which the defeat is acknowledged and the armistice terms set forth. Should a dictatorship of generals be more than a short temporary solution, there will unavoidably be a sharp conflict with those powers, who are serious about democratic renewal.

Not only the officers, but also the soldiers must be thought of because the connection "Wehrmacht Party" in spite of all friction is so clear and because there are so many Nazi officers, the demand for the election of representatives among the soldiers soon find certain echo. This does not preclude that several front officers might be acknowledged as leaders, and in certain cases even play a very active role in the revolution. The army cannot, however, form the basis of a new German administration. Already the realization of the demobilization demands an inclusion of soldiers councils. Tendencies to organizations of such councils are to be found for instance in illegal cells among the military and naval units in Norway.

In this context the question arises of what will become of the German youth in uniform. They miss every experience of a democratic education. They will be marked by their experiences on the front. They are lacking in professional education, and the participation in a normal life. Democratic reserves are firstly to be found among small groups of the young working-class people who have remained strongly influenced by their parents. They are also partly to be found among the intellectuals. I know that what happened at the University of Munich a year ago was of symptomatic importance. The existence of many anti-Nazi organizations at many high schools has been emphasized by many arrests and executions during the last months. I have also reason to assume that circles among the young technical intelligentsia will support a democratic policy. The German youth is not only a unitary pro-Nazi reserve. My own experiences are from the spring 1940, as I -- happily not recognized -- as a Norwegian prisoner-of-war came to talk with a great number of young German soldiers. Friends of mine who together with the deported Norwegian teachers were sent to the coast of the Arctic Ocean, and an acquaintance who during the war worked

illegally

- 4 -

illegally during a whole year in Germany, have told me the same things; namely, that the most corrupt year classes are those who took part in the Nazi movements before 1933. The generation that has grown up after Hitler took over power, is a political, but only partly Nazified. We need not fear that they will stand on the Nazi side of the barricades during the revolution. The most important thing to do is to give these young people work and to re-educate them by letting them participate in political life.

The opposition of the church, looked at from a social point of view, reflects firstly the discontent among the country people and the middle class. We can assume that the church movement will play an important part in the revolution. Particularly in southern and western Germany its more important sector, the Catholic one disposes of a well organized apparatus which might mean very much when the maintaining of a minimum of order is concerned. It is easier for the men of the church than for most other people to keep up their contacts. Since the end of last year they have tried to get into closer contact with notable representatives of other strata who are still free. I myself had recently the occasion to talk with a not unimportant man of the Roman Catholic Party. He convinced me the attempts to establish an embryo-concentration in Germany equal to the concentration of anti-Fascist Parties in Italy had made considerable progress during the last time. Certain representatives of the working class whose names of course cannot be mentioned take part in these efforts; while on the other hand at least a frontier has been drawn toward the circles around Schacht and Gerdeler. One thing is pretty sure, that there will be an important differentiation within the churchly strata. It must not be forgotten that a great part of the Roman Catholic priests have actively engaged themselves with the Nazis. At the Bishops' Conference in Fulda in the summer 1940 the wing which spoke for the war policy of the Nazis won.

The balance within the Protestant church is still more doubtful. Many of its representatives have either directly or via German nationalists gone over to Hitler. People who as a protest against the Nazi policy take part in Catholic processions, will not be governed merely by priests. The situation becomes still more complicated owing to the fact that a number of the most active anti-Nazis in the Church Party at the same time belong to the most Conservatives in covering the solving of the social question.

In real bourgeoisie circles Conservatism is strongly compromised through the alliance with Hitler. In those circles which today play with the thought of a monarchical restoration, one will soon be faced with the question whether to risk an official breach with the democratic movement. There are, however, German Conservatives who under the impression of the development in several occupied

countries,

- 5 -

countries, have decided to choose a positive democratic starting point. Nor have the Nazis completely succeeded to destroy the powers of German Liberalism. But it will hardly be a very important political factor during the revolution. I am convinced that the strongest reserves of a new Germany are among the Labor Opposition. One can blame the old German Labor movement for its lack of constructive policy and its all but heroic attitude in 1933. The fact is, however, that they, in contrast to all the bourgeoisie parties never collaborated with Hitler. It is further a fact that the young generation within the Labor movement has produced the most active illegal work against the Nazis. One should not have any exaggerated hopes concerning the extent of organized underground work, neither in Labor circles nor in other circles. There are also today illegal groups, even more numerous than when the war broke out. But they are firstly very small; secondly, they are isolated from each other; and thirdly, they have not a common ideology. The supporters of these groups are mostly completely unknown. Many of them hardly have the authority which would make them recognized as leaders by the broad layers of the population.

The main point of the Labor Opposition is in reality not the illegal groups, but the works. In spite of all measures, there is still a kernel of expert workers who have gone through the school of the Trade Union movement. Among them there is a stratum of "naturally reliable men". They can create the foundation of free Trade Unions. Later on it may be stated that the -- it might well be said all too weak -- passive resistance in German factories during this war has not been without importance. The strikes during the last weeks, especially in the Berlin district, confirm the lesson from Northern Italy where the workers strongly asserted their influence as soon as they had thrown off the chains of Fascism. It is here important to emphasize that the working places containing "naturally reliable men" can be the most important organizing element in the revolution. From here the danger of complete chaos might be successfully counter-worked. Provided that the co-operation with other working groups and foremost with progressive intelligence circles will be developed, the administration of modern Germany can be built on this base.

In connection with the works and supported not only by the representatives of the industrial workers one could attack the tasks of the feeding of the people and the largest possible maintenance of the production, but also to questions concerning local order and administration. Whatever measures will be taken in connection with the creation of a temporary central government, it will always be necessary to undertake the real rebuilding of a new German democracy from the very bottom. On the basis of many reports and private information we know that the Opposition Labor circles in Germany today hardly feel themselves closely connected with any of the previous political parties. Firstly, they are

interested



- 6 -

interested in forming a free and united Trade Union movement united also in the sense that the Christian labor sector is included.

My German Trade Union friends in Sweden have worked out practical proposals for the rebuilding of this movement. They want to take over the technical apparatus of the Arbeitsfront but banish the spirit of it. A temporary central must be established as soon as possible, but the decisive rebuilding will follow from the local unities. I have heard from Germany that the ideas among the illegal Trade Union leaders have the same tendency. Among the Opposition laborers in Germany the wish for political unity still lives. They did not forget that the split smoothed the way for Hitler. Former Social Democrats would like a new Labor Party to carry on a stronger policy, less directed by legalistic illusions. Former Communists have given up the formula of the "dictatorship of proletarianism". On both sides there is a preparedness to build up a broad liberty party of the laborers on the basis of a democratic socialistic programme. Whether it will be possible to build up such a political party depends on factors which will be settled outside Germany and foremost in the Soviet Union. Today the German Communists declare that they are for Democracy and unity. They are even willing to write off a class war for a long time. They criticize certain circles among the Social Democrats for representing too radical social ideas. Judging only from the contemporary point of view we should have to suppose that the German Communists during the time after Hitler would stand not Left but Right of the Social Democrats. But it is surely wise to count with the change of the positions of different groups. In any case it should be clear that there is no illegal movement of sufficient strength or unity capable of taking over the government immediately after Hitler. On the other hand we may hope that the new organized powers of German democracy will be strong enough to establish and keep up a new order in co-operation with all progressive elements. The way to a new order in Germany cannot go via parliamentary elections. Democracy first has to create the parties and other free organizations, as well as local organs with the aid of which it will be possible to function in the long run. So being, it would be disastrous if the occupation forces would hinder the creation of parties.

A new German government will, in my opinion, immediately be faced with the following tasks, in order to hold its own against the conscious part of its own people and on the other hand to offer the peace guarantees demanded by the Allies:

First the Nazi criminals must be hit at without consideration. They have to be arrested and punished and if it is wanted, to be given over to the Allied nations. All public institutions must be purged from active Nazis. SS. people, Gestapo men and other Nazi

criminals

- 7 -

criminals must be interned, and in so far as they are not sentenced for concrete crimes they should be put to forced labor. It will not be possible to solve these problems if the new government takes over the German police. That is the police of Himmler even though there are a few decent policemen among them. The police itself needs a fundamental purgation.

Secondly, fundamental democratic rights have to be re-established at least in principle and then carried out in practice step by step at least for those who recognize democracy as a basis of work. Within this frame freedom of organization and press will be introduced. But there will be no elections. The basis of the democratic state have to be created in such a way that on one side free Trade Unions and parallel organizations, on the other political parties, can develop.

Thirdly, it is necessary to save the people from hunger and unemployment as far as it is possible.

These tasks are only to be solved if it is determined to take over a great part of the economical control apparatus from the Nazis. If this is not done, there will be a great economic collapse. It is to be provided that reliable people will be put on the top in all economic affairs, and that a democratic control will be built up. Co-operative production and delivering organizations will play a great role. More important than a dispute of dogmas about the question "full socializing" or "free economy" is how to get food and work for the people. This is only to be obtained with the help of enormous systematic measures. This necessity will be emphasized through the letting over of certain parts of economic life into the hands of the public.

The fourth task will be to democratize the administrations on different areas such as education, etc. The municipal self-government has to be made stronger. The cultural and administrative decentralizing has to be co-ordinated with the stronger centralizing in economic spheres.

The solution of these main problems as a base for further development on democratic lines is, however, depending on the attitude of foreign countries toward the German revolution, as well as the foreign policy of this revolution. It is a banality to state that the future German development to a very great extent will depend on foreign factors. I hope that a great number of German Democrats count with the fact that Germany will be a second class great power, that they are serious about the disarmament, that they will render serious help in rebuilding the damaged cities, and that they mean it seriously in the efforts to win the masses of the people in the work for an entire European co-operation, and for a policy of international rights.

I also know that even after the defeat there will

be

PAGE 8

MISSING

J.S.R.