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Vol. 1 OF 2

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

The United States Senate R1789

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Saturday, October 18, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

> WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, S. E. WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

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shelburne nash 1) STAFF INTERVIEW Saturday, October 18, 1975 ٠, United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental 6 7 Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, \mathbb{C}^{*} Washington, D. C. Q \bigcirc The Staff met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.r in 1/-: : Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel. ۲... Present: Elliot Maxwell and Frederick Baron, Professional 1. . Staff Members. 1 . \Box Ŀ, 1~ : . <u>:</u> .· : :

TESTIMONY OF SIDNEY GOTTLIEB; ACCOMPANIED

BY TERRY F. LENZNER, COUNSEL -- resumed

Mr. Baron. On the record.

Dr. Gottlieb, we are resuming now a session that we left off in the middle yesterday concerning executive action.

And before we pick up with the substance of this session, I would like to go through the same formalities with you.

You are aware that you have a right to counsel?

Dr. Gottlicb. Yes.

Mr. Lenzner. Yesterday we stipulated to each and every right, advice of counsel, warning and alert regarding Senators being present that we have had on the record the last five times we have been here. And it seems adequate for Elliot. We stipulate and agree to the same directions and advice that we have received on each occasion.

Mr. Baron. Then you are satisfied that you have received a satisfactory advisory as to rights, and you are willing to testify without a Senator present?

Mr. Lenzner. Yes.

Mr. Baron. To pick up, then, where we left off yesterday, we were trying to place a date on your conversation with

about Executive Action as best we could based on your recollection and any refreshing of your recollection that we can achieve by reviewing these notes and relaying testimony to you. We were at the point where I was asking

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you whether the fact that the phrase "25/1" on his notes indicates to him that this consideration took place on the 25th of January of a certain year.

Is that any help to you in placing the conversation in time?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not really. Assuming that is true, and I guess it is, it could have been January or any number of years as far as I am concerned.

Mr. Baron. And the final bit of information I wanted to give you to see if we could refresh your recollection on this subject is the fact that when notes the final time he said that he was "almost certain" that the conversation took place on January 25, 1961.

Does that in any way help you place the conversation in time?

Dr. Gottlieb.

Mr. Lenzner. Did he express any factors that helped him decide that it was that year rather than a prior or or and the second subsequent year that might help Sid?

Yes. testified that he had a Mr. Baron. recollection of being called in by Richard Bissell in ca 1961 to discuss the launching of a project to develop assassination capabilities at the CIA. Bissell asked in that conversation to take charge of the development of that Bissell called an Executive Action project.

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was later established under the cryptonum ZRRIFLE.

said that it was most likely, based on his recol lection of his activities on Staff D and his shift over to th Cuba task force, that the conversation would have taken place in early 1961.

Dr. Gottlieb. I just thought of one other thing. The is mention in these notes of the U-2. It is of little help t you, I feel, but it is there. I was trying to recollect when I first became aware of the U-2 project. And clearly this would have to be after that, if he and I talked about somethinabout the U-2. But my goodness, that just puts it in any number of years after a date that I can't remember.

Mr. Lenzner. I suppose one of the problems, too, is that
Dr. Gottlieb has already testified that he had a conversation

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with Bissell about something close to this subject, if not
directly on it early 1960. So it would not have come -it would not be a singular or aberrational conversation for
Dr. Gottlieb to have had this with

He obviously had
at least one, if not more, conversations of a similar nature
prior to this.

Mr. Baron. Let me give you one more bit of background and see if this brings anything back. If I remind you of the fact that there was a change of administration on January 21, 1961, when John Kennedy took office, would that help you recal whether your conversation with took place before or a

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the change of administration?

Dr. Gottlieb. That brings up only one association in my mind, and that has nothing to do with this. And that was the snowy night of his inauguration. But I can't hang this on that ladder at all. I just don't associate this meeting with that event.

Mr. Baron. So it doesn't help you either way placed on | i either side of the inauguration?

Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Mr. Baron. Let's turn to these cryptic phrases on the notes of and see if you can fill in for the record the meaning of any of these phrases or the discussion that surrounded these notations.

At the top of ____ notes it says, "Exec Actions".

Do you have a clear recollection of using the phrase

1.3(a)(4) Executive Action" when you discussed assassination capability

... with

Dr. Gottlieb. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. Did inform you that he was establishing a project to develop assassination capabilities?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't remember that. In those terms I remember the conversation being a sort of a wondering one. It was clear to me that he wanted to know what I understood the capability of the clandestine service in this general area to be.

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But my recollection is that he wondered all over the lot, asking what I was doing, and talking about things having nothing to do with assassination.

Mr. Baron. Once more for the record I would like to ask you, what recollection do you have of anything that you and said dealing with assassinations or assassination capabilities?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't have any specific recollection, I really don't. I can only make an assumption that I went over the materials at Camp Detrick, because that was the only capability we had that was relevant.

Mr. Baron. So you assume that you would have explained to the nature of the lethal, or potentially lethal, or incapacitating materials that the CIA processed or had access to?

Dr. Gottlieb. But even that is an assumption.

Mr. Baron. said that although he didn't have a completely firm recollection on this point, he thought that this conversation was held at your request upon your taking a new job. And I will read you his testimony on this subject to see if this at all refreshes your recollection as to who took the initiative for the conversation or when it took.

said at page 53 in one of his early transcripts:
"As best I can recall this conversation, this was a sor

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of an exchange of ideas in briefing session probably held at the request of Sid Gottlieb in my office shortly after he either took over a new job in TSD or took over as actual Chief of TSD, which was the Technical Services Division of the Clandestine Services."

Fred, my notes from my prior briefing Mr. Lenzner. indicate that testified at least on one occasion that he received instructions from Bissell to create an Executive Action capability, and that Bissell told that Dr. Gottlieb had already been cut in on these discussions, and that he should talk with Dr. Gottlieb about

Mr. Baron. I think that that is an accurate rendition of testimony and the report that must have given to the Inspector General's office in their preparat of the report in 1967.

But despite that act, he maintains that this particular conversation was held at the initiative of Dr. Gottlieb, and was occasioned by a switch of jobs.

Dr. Gottlieb. All I can say is that you are aware, am sure, of the actual fault in his memory, because he dida become Chief of TSD until at least six years later.

He simply said that you took over as ne Mr. Baron. Chief at TSD or actually took over at TSD. When did you move to TSD?



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Dr. Gottlieb. I moved back from TSD from Bissell's office. I would have said it would have been after this date in my memory, it would have been several months after this date. I would have to check that.

Mr. Baron. When you say this date --

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Dr. Gottlieb. 1-25-61 is the one that we are hanging

Mr. Baron. Would you have been taking on any new job at about this time, January 25, 1961?

Dr. Gottlieb. The best I can say to that question that might be helpful, if you look at the notes, which we haven't gone through, a good many of them refer to work I was doing at the time in my job as scientific advisor to Bissell.

So,I clearly had that job. Because several of the things mentioned here were not TSD projects.

Mr. Baron. So this review of the notes then does help you bracket the time frame of this meeting with greater specificity than you were able to do yesterday, in that you know that this conversation must have occurred before you left your position as science advisor to Richard Bissell?

Dr. Gottlieb. I am just deducing that from these notes.

Now, it is possible, you know, that we were talking about

something that happened before. But I think the most likely

thing is that I was probably in that job. Because I see him

by these notes asking me what my job was.



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Once again, during what period of time were Mr. Baron. you science advisor to Bissell?

Dr. Gottlieb. To the best of my memory, I would say that would be in the period of late 1959 or early 1960 to about the middle of 1961.

Mr. Baron. So would it be your assumption now that your conversation with Harvey that is memorialized in these notes took place during this period of time?

Dr. Gottlieb. That would be an assumption.

Mr. Baron. Returning to the notes, then, what does the phrase "magic button" refer to?

Dr. Gottlieb. I know of no project capability or technique that we referred to by that name. And it doesn't mean anything to me.

Mr. Baron. We have discussed the narcotics bureau.

Do you know what "for a living" would refer to?

Dr. Gottlieb. I am sorry.

Mr. Baron. The next note says "RIS 201 cover".

And has testified that that referred to the Russian Intelligence Service.

Do you have any recollection of a discussion of the Russian Intelligence Service in the context of assassination planning?

Dr. Gottlich. No. But I don't know whether you have an testimony on the 201 at all. But that means to me a 201 file



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is the basic biographical file on an individual that is associated with the Agency.

Mr. Baron. One of the things that _____mentioned in discussing the Russian Intelligence Service is the possibility that an assassination attempt by the U.S. Government might bring retribution from another government and thus might not be a wise tactic.

Do you recall any such conversations?

Did have anything to say No. Dr. Gottlieb. about the narcotics bureau, or the Magic Button? might help mc -- help you.

Mr. Baron. I don't believe that he did.

I would say here he might be talking Dr. Cottlieb. about possible coversations from both of those references.

Mr. Baron. When uses the word "bankruptcy" in the next line on the notes he has testified he is referring, I believe, to the bankruptcy of operational planning or pursuit that would lead to trying an assassination. And it indicated to him that he was not in favor of assassination planning at that point.

Do you recall any discussion like that with him? Dr. Gottlieb. No.

He has characterized his discussion you as "a general philosophic discussion of assassination and assassination techniques". And he didn't mention the



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discussion of specific technical devices, although he would allow for that possibility...

Do you recall any general philosophic discussion?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. But I want to remind you that when you said, what did we talk about that related to assassination, I said I didn't have any specific knowledge, I made an assumption that I would talk about the capabilities that I did.

I want to re-emphasize that I have no specific remembrance of talking about assassination capabilities. I would only say that, reading his notes, it certainly was a conversation that was not specific on assassination just by the nature of the notes, because there are things in here that clearly go way beyond that.

And when you ask me, was it a philosophical conversation, I would have to say that I don't remember that.

Mr. Baron. Will you take a look at the drawings on the notes next to the words "narcotics bureau". And then again in the middle of the page there is a doodle or a drawing that is pointing to the word "examples of 3 'wrong'. And up at the top of the page again there is a third drawing that is next to the words "Jim A.".

Do any of those drawings appear to you to be sketches, however rough, of technical devices that you may have been discussing with

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Dr. Gottlieb.No. When I first saw these they were just doodles as far as I was concerned, and I don't remember any drawings, or us looking at sketches, or anything like that.

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Mr. Baron. Where the notes say "Not a TSD problem", does that bring anything back to you?

Dr. Gottlieb. No. I would only make the assumption that in that area that if we were talking about assassination, he would be saying that this is not TSD's problem in terms of this group that he is talking about.

But that is not based on a specific remembrance.

Mr. Baron. Moving to the phrase "apply brakes", has indicated that that phrase probably refers to the operational requirement that you be able to stop an assassination operation at some point in mid-stream if necessary.

Do you recall discussing that requirement with one of the state of the

Mr. Baron. The next phrase on the notes is "last resort

1.3(a)(4) beyond last resort, and a confession of weakness.

has testified that that referred to his attitude toward assassination.

Do you recall his pressing himself in those terms or having any discussion that involved those terms in reference to assassination?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember either way on that point, whether he did or he didn't.

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Mr. Baron. We have discussed the next phrase already about "El Benefactor." So let's move down to the phrase "framework of Sid's job". And then it refers to the name "Ledford".

Does that or the phrases below it about "Elint R & D memo" bring anything back to you?

Dr. Gottlieb. Well, it doesn't bring anything specific back to me. But here is where we get into this point that we were talking about, the job I had at the time he was talking to me. And Elint R&D was, as I remember it, an area that was not handled by TSD at all at that time or any time up to the time I left CIA. And it was one of the areas that I was loo ing into. And I forget now which component of CIA did it at that time in the context of the job that I did for Bissell as his science advisor.

You are aware of what Elint means, and so on. And that is what it means to me reading it now.

Mr. Baron. So it would have nothing to do with a discussion of assassination capabilities?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't think so

Mr. Baron. The next note refers to translating machine And it goes on with some other cryptic references.

Would those notes refer to in any way to the discussion of assassination capabilities?

Dr. Gottlieb. I doubt that very much. I think it ref



more to the matter I just mentioned, of the work I was doing as Bissell's science advisor.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that looked at the letters "CB" and said that referred to a man who was known as Country Boy at that time.

Does that help you out?

Dr. Gottlieb. I was trying to get something about the

chemical branch. It really doesn't.

Mr. Baron. Then there is a note that says "Comment Gear". Does that refer in any way to the discussion of assassination capabilities?

Dr. Gottlieb. That would be in the same context as we mentioned Elint R&D or translating machines, something I was looking into in connection with the job I had at that time, having absolutely nothing to do, as I remember it, with assassination.

Mr. Baron. And finally, there is the word "Anasthesia" misspelled.

Does that refresh your recollection in any way as to the discussion you had with

Dr. Gottlieb. No, it does not refresh my memory.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of the source of authority for discussing assassination capabilities or establishing a project to develop assassination capabilities at the CIA?



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You are asking me on the basis, are you, Dr. Gottlieb. of an independent recollection of anything I have heard from my counsel's being briefed or what I have read or heard today, independent of that?

Mr. Baron. First, let me ask you that.

No, I have no recollection of that. Dr. Gottlieb.

Mr. Baron. Now, on the basis of your refreshed recollection, based on the briefings you have received and the materials you have seen, what can you tell us about the source of authority for discussing assassination capabilities or establishing an assassionation capability project.

Dr. Gottlieb. My impression now -- and I can't base this on a specific conversation or a specific word that I read or have heard -- but my impression now is that Bissell asked

to create such a capability, or discussed with him creating such a capability. But that is based on everything I have heard since you briefed my counsel and since we have been talking about it.

Mr. Baron. Does anything that you have heard help you call anything about the source of authority for the discuss of assassination capabilities, or the development of project beyond Richard Bissell?

Dr. Gottlieb. Absolutely not.

So you have no knowledge of authority co Mr. Baron. from Alan Dulles or from the White House for these discussions



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or this project?

I have no knowledge of that at all Dr. Gottlieb. either from my independent recollection or from anything I have heard since.

testified that he took a Mr. Baron. set of notes at some point, probably in 1961, after he had held some discussions with Richard Bissell on the subject of developing an Executive Action capability. And these notes contained a phrase that indicated to that Bissell had told that the White House had twice urged him to set up an Executive action capability.

Did mention anything in that connection to you when you had your discussion with of Executive Action capabilities?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my remembrance.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge from any source 17 of White House urgings for the development of an Executive Action project?

> Dr. Gottlieb. I do not.

Mr. Baron. I don't have anything more for you.

Dr. Gottlieb. I hope that has been helpful.

Let me ask you one more question. Mr. Baron.

Yesterday we went round and round on the different occasions on which you discussed Executive Action capabilities or assassination capabilities with senior officials at the CIA

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The only specific names that you could bring back were Bissell 1.3(a)(a) and based on this refreshing of your recollection, and then three EEP's, Karamessines, Helms and Desmond FitzGerald.

> Dr. Gottlieb. And I mentioned that those three were based on a remembrance of briefing them on general capability associated with TSD and the assumption that I talked about these things with them.

Mr. Baron. Were specific targets against whom assassination capabilities would be used ever discussed with either of those three men?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my remembrance.

Mr. Baron. Was there anyone else at the CIA with whom you discussed the development of an assassination capability.

Mr. Lenzner. Other than what he has testified to already?

Mr. Baron. Other than the general briefings that you Mave already testified to.

> Mr. Lenzner. And the end Castro matters?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Dr. Gottlieb. To my remembrance, no.

(Discussion off the record.)

My learned counsel, Mr. Maxwell, advises

me that I should ask you about

in this context.

Did you ever discuss the development of assassination capabilities with either of those men or make an assignment to them to inquire into assassination capabilities?

Dr. Gottlieb. Are you talking now about specific targets? I need to understand the question better, because these are two people that worked with me, and were associated with Camp Detrick.

So, in that context we certainly talked about the materials there. I am not talking about any specific conversations I can recollect, but just in the course of a working relationship.

Mr. Baron. First, did you ever discuss the development of materials that could be used in an assassination attempt against a specific individual with

My answer to that is, not to my re Dr. Gottlieb. membrance.

Mr. Baron. And without mentioning the name of a specific individual, did you ever have discussions with or for your own purpose of developing materials that could be supply to an operator for an assassination attempt?

Dr. Gottlieb. And my answer to that is, I would have to have done that. I don't remember specific conversations but in the course of implementing the Camp Detrick work would have to have done that.

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Mr. Baron.

But in the context --

Dr. Gottlieb. If you are talking about in the context of the Executive Action Group, if that is the question --

Mr. Baron. No, I am saying, in the context of calling upon CIA technicians or laboratories, or materials at Fort Detrick, for use in any kind of assassination operation or preparation for an assassination operation?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have already testified my remembrance to that as to and Castro. You mean beside what I have testified?

Mr. Baron. Right.

And my answer is, not to my remembrance. Dr. Gottlieb.

Mr. Baron. To your knowledge, did either

have independent discussions with CIA officials in the Clandestine Services about the need for materials or devices that could be considered assassination capabilities

Dr. Gottlieb. To my specific knowledge, things that knew about that they and not me talked about, not to my remembrance.

Mr. Lenzner. In all fairness for the record, Sid, may have said this before, as I understand it; there may be distortion of the Fort Detrick materials. Those are studied not solely for offensive uses, isn't that correct?

> Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Mr. Lenzner. You ought to amplify that perhaps a little

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bit. Because it sounds now in this conversation like they were solely for that. And I think you ought to make it clear what they were there for.

Dr. Gottlieb. Let me comment that the work with Camp Detrick and the material which they kept on our behalf had both an offensive connotation in the sense of preparing for a contingency either in a hot war or some special operation that was levied on TSD, and also as a defensive study of the potential of U.S. individuals or installations being covertly attacked by BW materials abroad.

Mr. Baron. You keep referring in our discussion of Executive action to an Executive Action Group.

What do you have in mind when you use that phrase? Dr. Gottlieb. I thought I was playing back a phrase that I heard from you that had reference to this specific mission that Bissell was asking of

I have been using it in that context.

Mr. Baron. Let me distinguish two things.

was asked to set up an Executive Action project testimony, primarily consisted of one asset who was asked to spot other potential assets who might be used at some future point for dirty deeds. But Elliot Maxwell brought out several days ago the fact that there was at the CIA. something called a And I wonder if you were referring to that committee when

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used the term Executive Action Group.

Dr. Gottlieb. Not at all. That committee came as news to me in my remembrance. And some of the notes that you showed me indicated that the genesis was in the period that I was overseas.

Mr. Maxwell. That is speculation on our part.

Mr. Lenzner. It is not speculation that it came as:

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Mr. Maxwell. No. But the origins of the committee.

Dr. Gottlieb. And I am just making that comment derived from materials that you gave me to read and the dates on them.

Anyway, in answer to your question, I was not referring to that group when I talked about Executive Action. I was referring to this activity that we are centered on in today's testimony that involved

Mr. Baron. Has any of your testimony and review of documents on the subject of Executive Action refreshed your recollection so that you could add some more detail to the record about this

Dr. Gottlieb. No, it hasn't

Mr. Baron. Offithe record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

We will commence with the next file representing ,

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material we have on the operational use of drugs.

Dr. Gottlieb. The file that I am now looking at is entitled in the interrogation in 1958, file II.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Gottlieb. Back on the record.

The reading of the material in this file doesn't stimulate my memory at all of any involvement of mine nor anything I heard about in this operation.

I would note also that it was in the period that I was in Europe.

Mr. Maxwell. That is correct.

The Deputy Chief of the Eastern European Division indicates that there was a ruling from the Chief of Operations, of the DDP, that drugs were not to be administered in this particular case. The interest that we have in this, because it was not administered, but rather proposed and considered by the CIA, or lower levels of the CIA, was in the decision-making process in regard to drugs and what light you might be able to shed on that. I think the record indicates

of drugs with a number of other individuals that had then proposed to the Deputy Chief of the CI staff that the CI staff give appropriate consideration to a proposal to administer the drug to the subject.

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and was familiar

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with the proposed treatment and in agreement with such.

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The proposal to administer drugs was to assist in

The group apparently called together to consider the

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verifying certain facts considered essential to the case.

proposal was the same group that had considered the 14 March
19 1958 memo from Mr. Helms in regard to the formation of
10 policies and procedures for the use of drugs in aid of the

DDP mission.

And the principal question is whether, although you were out of the country when you returned, whether while you were out of the country it was discussed with you or communicated to you that this Committee was in the future to be the committee that considered proposals for the operational use of drugs, or whether there were other bodies to which these proposals should be referred.

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't have enough of a remembrance of that to usefully comment on it.

Mr. Maxwell. Given the description of the individual as a psychotic with strong paranoid trends, and given the description that "from a medical standpoint" he should be confined to an institution", would you agree with a proposal to administer drugs

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I have trouble with questions like that. Dr. Gottlieb. You are asking me to hypothesize, if I were there would I That is a bit tricky for me. I find it hard to answer. I have to take myself back to that time and that sort I would rather not comment on that since it is of thing. hypothetical, and I wasn't there.

Pardon me for a minute.

(Confers with counsel.)

My counsel advises me that it is appropriate here to comment that I don't have a specific remembrance, but I know these cases happened, because you asked me yesterday, I think, were there cases where TSD for me decided we shouldn't go ahead with it on grounds such as these because of the health of the individual, the mental health and physical health.

And I think I testified then, yes, I can't remember the specifics, but there certainly were some. And in that context, going through the hypothetical situation you are asking me on now, I think I would have agreed in this case that we shouldn't have administered drug or anything else to this chap for the simple reason that the possibility of breaking through his illness and so on, and damaging him -- I mean, there was a chance of hurting him, and there was also a minimum possibility of getting any useful information.

So, I think my answer would be, yes, I would have agreed with that decision.

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I have seen one file, by the way, I Mr. Lenzner. don't know whether that is it or not, that indicates that a decision was made on these grounds not to go forward with the administration of drugs.

Dr. Gottlieb. And we agreed with it?

Mr. Lenzner. Is that the file? I thought I saw one.

There is one example that I remember I pointed out to Sid.

Mr. Maxwell. There is a reference in the file in

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regard to in 1954 where the cable from , and particularly to Dr. Cottlieb, indicates that because of a previous suicide attempt headquarters did not recommend the use of P-1, and the succeeding cable from Dr. Gottlieb in that judgment, the administration of P-1 to that individual.

Mr. Lenzner. At this point all the files begin to merge as all the days are.

Mr. Maxwell. There is one reference to a memo from the Dcputy Chief of the CI staff to the Chief of Operations of the DDP, who later ruled that drugs should not be administered. And that reference is that "for your further information, the Office of Security is prepared to arrange for his permanent confinement to a mental institution upon the request of the Office of Operations".

To the best of your recollection, while you were at the

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Agency, did the Agency make use of any relationships that it

Dr. Gottlieb. I have no remembrance of that at all.

And that is interpreting your question as broadly as I know how, even beyond what you said. I have no remembrance of

any facilities that I knew anything about that were used for any purpose like that.

Mr. Maxwell. Will you just move on to the next file?

Or. Gottlieb. That file is labeled "No Better Interrogation 1958".

I notice reading the first file here that it refers to another case. But you want me to stick to "no better"?

Mr. Lenzner. There is a cover memorandum that references it, too. There is overlap in all of these files?

Mr. Maxwell. That is correct, with the cover operating because they were continuing from the operating divisions.

The next file is in chronological sequence.

Dr. Gottlieb. But you don't want me to discuss the

"No Better" case?

Mr. Maxwell. If you can add anything. But the record should hote that it was at a time when Dr. Gottlieb was out of the country.

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pr. Gottlieb. In the interest of time, because I do specifically remember. reading this yesterday, I have no independent recollection of this. I don't remember it being mentioned to me when I got back, or later than that. I think there was one dispatch about getting the materials back and the bottles being empty. That still would have been a period that I wouldn't have anything to do with, that I have no remembrance of.

I would like to take a two-minute break here.

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Mr. Naxwell. On the record.

The "No Better" file includes a memorandum for the Chief of Operations from the Deputy Chief of the Counter Intelligence staff indicating that an Ad Hoc Committee composed of Dr.

Global Counter Intelligence had considered and the Deputy Chief of Counter Intelligence had considered livest from the Near East Division to administer P-1 to an

andividual a

The decision by this Ad Hoc Committee apparently was one chain in the approval mechanism for administering P-1 as of Jul of 1958. When you returned from overseas were you told about the existence of a committee such as this to approve drug operations?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't have a specific remembrance of that. But I want to remind you that the period from the

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in 1961, when I got back to sort of a line job in TSD, was a period that I was not concerned with in this area, I wasn't primarily. I had no line responsibility.

Mr. Maxwell. There was no line responsibility, as I understand it. However, you were at that time scientific advisor to the DDP?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

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Mr. Maxwell. And during that time my understanding is that you prepared a report entitled "Scientific and ...

Technical Problems in Covert Actions Operations", which included as an appendix a section entitled "The Applicability of Special Chemicals and Biologicals to Clandestine Operations".

In preparing that report do you recall whether you had learned of a group within the Agency which approved applications of chemicals or biologicals in support of clandestine operations.

Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't remember that. I remember the report. I remember in fact reading about it in some material you gave us on the Inspector General's report. But I don't remember hearing about such a group -- I am not saying I didn't, but we are talking about specific remembrances, or that approval mechanism being an item of special attention enough for me to look into it in that particular report.

Mr. Maxwell. The membership of the Ad Hoc Committee,



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at least in regard to this operation, included a number of individuals associated with TSD, is that correct?

Dr. Gottlieb. Say that again.

Mr. Maxwell. The membership of the Ad Noc Committee which considered this operation --

Dr. Gottlieb. I would have to read it again, but I remember Gibbons and being on it.

Hr. Maxwell. That is correct.

Dr. Gottlieb. From what I read there, yes.

Mr. Maxwell. From the material that you have read, and from any recollection that you might have independent of that, would it be likely that TSD was in some way involved in the consideration of future requests for the operational use of drugs?

Dr. Gottlieb. On the basis of what I have read so far, my answer would be yes, that is very likely.

Mr. Maxwell. The memo also indicates that P-1 would be used first, and if that were not successful, Meretran would be used. Although you were not involved in this operation, having had some knowledge of the application of these drugs in the past, do you have an opinion as to why that sequence might be used?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have no opinion. I have the impression that that is the reverse of what was usually done.

Now, maybe I am remembering a doctrine or technique or



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procedure that was based and came in later on experiences like the ones they had. But as I read this file, that operation never came off. So, they wouldn't have had any experience factor derived from that operation.

Mr. Maxwell. Would the membership of this committee represent the same membership as the QKNILLTOP Committee?

Dr. Gottlieb. I would have to read again who was on

Mr. Maxwell. DreaGibbons, Dr. Gunn

Mr. Karamessines, and the Deputy Chief of the Counter Intelligence staff.

Dr. Gottlieb. I am going on my remembrance of who was on the Artichoke Committee. There was much more representation from the DDP on this committee than there was on the Artichoke Committee, or the Hilltop Committee.

Mr. Maxwell. Are you using those two interchangeably?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, because I understand the Hilltop
group was a follow-on of Artichoke. Again, we have talked about-this is a confused area, but what I am trying to say here is,
this committee sounds to me -- and I am just giving you advice
sort of because I don't have a specific remembrance of it -it sounds to me like it is much more of a DDP Committee with
a couple of other people tacked on.

In other words, it is something the DDP asked for internal to his organization.



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Mr. Lanzner. What is this Committee called?

Dr. Gottlieb. It has no name yet. It is an ad hoc committee.

Mr. Maxwell. There is no name attached to it.

Mr. Lenzner. And they were reviewing the specifications

of P-1 and A-2?

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Mr. Baron. Yes.

Dr. Gottlieb. Did I make that clear enough?

Mr. Baron. In regard to this committee, yes.

Dr. Gottlieb. Artichoke and Hilltop -- and I am talking about Hilltop in connection with a coordinating group and not a project -- those Artichoke and Hilltop Committees were more representative of the whole Agency.

Mr. Baron. The memorandum that was prepared by this ad hoc committee then went to the Chief of Opearations of the DDP, Mr. Helms. There is no indication of further approval for the administration of P-1. Was it your recollection of the administration of P-1 or Λ -2 in which you were involved that the authorization by the Chief of Operations that DDP would be such, or was there a requirement that the DDP himself signed off on these?

pr. Gottlieb. I think on the basis of what I have read and what help that gives me in jogging my own recollections, that I had the impression it was the DDP. And I think we have cables on other operations where the DDP approved.



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But I am not sure of that.

Mr. Baron. If the committee considered, the Ad Noc Committee considered the operational use of drugs, how would that be reflected in at all in TSS files, TSD files?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't think it would have any reflection on TSD files.

Mr. Baron. So, a meeting that was attended by Dr.

Gibbons and would not be referenced at all in-

TSD files?

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Dr. Gottlieb. No. And the reason I say this is just a general recollection I have that we tried very hard not to keep operational files like this in our hands, they were in the hands of the operational division, or in this case whoever was running this committee.

Mr. Lenzner. I don't want to interpolate here, but it does seem like from these files that operational use was in several instances approved by cable to the or to these outlying areas.

Is that not right? There do seem to be cables that reflect that.

Dr. Gottlieb. This is in terms of what kind of record was kept. What I am saying is, I don't remember a record being kept in TSD of the operational side of this. We assumed this was a sensitive area, that the operational people who were running these operations, which we were supporting,



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were in control of whatever files.

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Mr. Maxwell. The authorization, in response to counsel's comment, was often contained in cables. But that wouldn't necessarily obviate the requirement that there be other papers reflecting the authorization or reflecting meeting in which authorization was sought or received? What we would like to be able to try to do is understand what records might exist, and where they might be located.

Dr. Gottlieb, will you go on to the next operation?

Dr. Gottlieb. The next operation is called

Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Dr. Gottlieb. I have read this file. It brings back no recollection to me of anything I was involved in personally nor do I have any recollection of it.

Mr. Maxwell. The record should show that Dr. Gottlieb was not in the country at the time this proposal was made, and being shown this only for the purpose of jogging his recollection as to whether this interrogation, involving as it apparently was going to, 31, might have been discussed with him.

Dr. Gottlieb. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

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Given the thinnest of this particular file, the committee has not been able to determine where or under what . a approx circumstances the interrogation was proposed or whether in fact it took place. The file does indicate that the proposal was approved by the Office of Security, which would, if I understand your testimony, differentiate it from earlier PI-1 interrogations to the best of your recollection.

Is that correct?

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I think my comment on that would have Dr. Gottlieb. to be based on what I have read, but not to an independent recollection of mine. There was a procedure coming in at this time where the DDP had a committee on which security was represented, this ad hoc committee we referred to in cases dated before this one that commented on cases of P-1 interrogations.

And on that basis I would say, in answer to your question, yes, that is correct.

The earlier P-1 interrogations in which Mr. Maxwell. had you had been involved, particularly not to the best of your knowledge involved security approval, is that correct?

Gottlieb. That is correct.

they were much earlier than this Tr

Mr. Maxwell. The nemo also reflects that TSS had ap

proved P-1 in one interrogation, and that

attention to this one sentence -- The Officer to give the

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P-1 was familiar with its use, and had worked with the tech nique in Europe."

Do you have any recollection of who that might refer Dr. Gottlieb. For instance, -- and I am basing this of what I have read and trying to help you -- is considered part of the possibility of using P-1 -- as I remember in this operation, we weren't sure whether he did or not -- that wou fit him. As far as I am concerned, I have trouble remembering, as I told you, in those 1954 cases whether or not P-1 was used. I don't remember it being used. But if it was used, I would be another who would fit this description.

Lashbrook also could have, although I don't remember any specific cases where he was involved in P-1 use interested but he could have been.

Mr. Maxwell. Was ever involved in P-1 use involved in P-1

Dr. Gottlieb. I really can't comment accurately on that. I would have to say, not to my specific remembrance.

Mr. Maxwell. Does it refresh your recollection at a that the approval for this would be needed in the field by

1 February 1959?

Dr. Gottlieb. No, that doesn't refresh my memory.

I was the person they were talking about, there is nothing
about 1 February in my time there. I didn't leave Europe us



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September of 1959, if that is one of the relevant considerations. I really can't help on that.

Mr. Maxwell. Apparently -- and I have not independently confirmed this with the Office of Security -- this referred to the best of your recollection, were there any other instances, aside from the files which you have seen, where P-1 was used:

Dr. Gottlieb. None that I can specifically remember.

I am understanding your question to mean, another on the basis of my independent recollection, or on the basis of anything I read, whether there are cases of the uses of P-1

Mr. Maxwell. Not involving things that you have read, to your independent recollection were there other cases, other than the ones that you have r ead?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my independent recollection, and I might add, nor based on anything that I have read.

You are talking about Europe now?

Mr. Maxwell. No, I am talking about;

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't know how you woule define the

file, which comes later. And based on what I have read, that was used.

Mr. Maxwell. I am differentiating that from

when there had been

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knowledge of --

Dr. Gottlieb. That is a confusing question. And my answer is the same whether you make that qualification or not, but it is confusing, because

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But anyway, my answer is, I don't remember any other

uses.

Mr. Maxwell. In order to make the record clear, were there any uses of P-1 that you can recall?

Dr. Gottlieb. He showed me the file. But that is not relevant.

Mr. Lenzner. With reference to

Dr. Gottlieb. He is not talking about

Because if you are talking about their

use of P-l in a

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Mr. Lenzner. That is confusing,

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Mr. Maxwell. That is the problem that we are facing now. And I don't think we need to face it. We can simply say, any use outside of what you have seen in the files

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Dr. Gottlieb. The answer is, not to my remembrance.

Mr. Maxwell. And in particular any use to the best of your

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recollection outside of these files of P-1

Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my remembrance.

You asked me a general question yesterday about using P-1 on, I think you said, foreign individuals in the U.S.

And I said no. And I assume that would include this category.

Mr. Maxwell. I wanted to focus on this particular one.

would you like to go on to the effects file?

Dr. Gottlieb. The next file is labeled

Can you do better than I reading this almost impossible cable?

Mr. Maxwell. I believe that this cable was mistakenly attached and refers in fact to the

Dr. Gottlieb. I see.

On the basis of that, this brings nothing to my memory as far as I am concerned. And at this point I have no recollection of whatever operations planned or executed that this refers to -- I shouldn't say executed, carried out.

Mr. Maxwell. Would it be your impression from what you have said and from any independent recollection you might have of the procedures followed within the Agency that the phrase in the memo dated 23 April 1959 to the Deputy Director of Security which is as follows:

said that if a request is made he will receive

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it and then let all committee members know immediately" refers to the committee formed while you were away, which considered operational use of drugs in the previous instance.

Dr. Gottlieb. It sounds that way to me.

Mr. Maxwell. Would you go on with the next file?

Dr. Gottlieb. The next file is labeled "is September 1959;

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

pr. Gottlieb. I have read the file, and I have no independent recollection of what operation that refers to, nor was I briefed later when I came back. I just have anothing to add at this point.

Mr. Lenzner. That is again 1959?

Mr. Maxwell. 15 September 1959.

Dr. Gottlieb. I was not back then.

Mr. Maxwell. The memorandum to the Chief SRS, dated

15 September 1959 on the subject of possible use of drugs

and hypnosis in operational areas refers to discussion
between the Deputy Chief of the Counter Intelligence staff, the
writer, who was the Deputy Chief of SRS, and representatives

of TSS. It indicates that TSS had apparently opposed the
attempt to use hypnosis. To the best of your recollection.

was TSS in other instances involved in the consideration of

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hypnosis by the Agency?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think my answer to that would be yes. I can't hang it on a specific case. We had an interest in hypnosis. We had done some research on it. My interpretation of that memo, upon reading it, is a little different than you. Reading the interest in security in it, I assume it has something to do with narcohypnosis rather than hypnosis unaided by drugs.

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Had TSS ever been involved previously Mr. Maxwell. in any narcohypnosis?

> Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Had they been involved in consideration o . Mr. Maxwell. of proposals to use narcohypnosis operationally?

I assume they would have in the sense. Dr. Gottlieb. that TSS was recommended on the Artichoke Committee.

The underlying memorandum dated 21 Mr. Maxwell. August 1959 indicates that an another CIA officer , and that the writer of the memo would talk with would also talk with _____ It notes that "the writer will also inform his chain of command, since use of hypnosis and drugs on this case called for a committee meeting with an ultimate decision by Mr. Melms."

This would apparently reflect a similar approval mechanisas as we have even in the last files with the Chief of Operations Dr. Gottlieb. I would agree with that.

Nr. Maxwell. -- being involved, as well as the Office of Security of the Counter Intelligence staff.

Dr. Gottlieb. The Ad Hoc Committee.

Nr. Maxwell. And TSS, or TSD at that time.

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Mr. Maxwell. Would you go on to the next file?

Dr. Gottlieb. The next file is labeled

May-June-July 1960

Mr. Maxwell. Before going on with that file, Dr. Gottlieb, can you, to the best of your recollection, independent of what you have seen in these files, put a name on that committee?

Dr. Gottlieb. Independent of what I have seen on these files, you are talking about the Committee that seems to have been headed by the Deputy Chief of the CI staff and referred to in the memos I have seen as Ad Noc Committee? I really can't.

Mr. Maxwell. We have talked in the past about the authorization process for the use of P-1 prior to the formation of this group. If there was a committee or group of people involved either in discussing the research or the operational use, can you put a name on that committee?

Dr. Gottlieb. During this period?

Mr. Maxwell. Prior to the end of 1957.

Dr. Gottlieb. Well, we both agreed -- or I have testi-

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fied -- that was a very confusing area, what committees there were, and what names they had. And to me the names Artichoke Committee and QKHILLTOP Committee, if we can call it that, had something to do with the approval --with the discussion of research programs and the approval and discussion of certain operations. To my remembrance, prior to the formation of the Committee that you were referring to, we so far had been called the Ad Noc Committee, the P-l operations were not taken up by a committee, but were approved by the DDP.

May we go on to that file? Mr. Haxwell.

My first comment on this file is that Dr. Gottlieb. I don't think I would have remembered their operation without reading it. But having read it, I do have some memory of the -- is it okay that we refer to that individual that way-- being involved in it. And the rest of my knowledge of the specifics comes from reading these two

files. Mr. Maxwell. Do you want to sum up what your impression is of those two files?

Dr. Gottlieb. My impression is that





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Mr. Maxwell. Do you remember playing any part in the process?

Dr. Gottlieb. Personally. There is a reference here

-- I will have to reread it --

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the case was mentioned or discussed with me, and I really would
have to reread it, but I either discussed with the operational
people involved or suggested to

that the possibility of P-1 be looked

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Mr. Maxwell. Did you recall any other information about your role in that, independent of the --

Dr. Gottlieb. No, Independent of it, I would have said, before I read the file, I couldn't remember any role.

Mr. Maxwell. Now, with the file, can you remember anything other than --

Dr. Gottlieb. What I have said? No.

Mr. Maxwell. There is a memorandum in the file dated 6 July 1960. The memorandum is for the DDS, and is signed by the Deputy Director of Security. It notes that all interrogation techniques, including the polygraph, had failed in this particular instance, and it was therefore "proposed that a certain drug be used on this subject and this office" -- apparently referring to the Office of Security -- "approved at a meeting of the drug committee on 1 July 1960."

Prior to reading this, did you have any recollection of

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a body called the drug committee or a group called the drug committee within the CIA?

Dr. Gottlieb. No. I made the assumption that it was this same Ad Noc Committee.

Mr. Maxwell. But you have no independent recollection of

Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Mr. Maxwell. Will you go on to the next one?

Dr. Gottlieb. This file is labele

to -- and I have looked it over before, but

I want to reread it.

Ar. Maxwell. I think it would be useful if you can look at the part referencing your involvement, which should be marked by a blue slip?

Dr. Gottlieb. All right.

(Discussion off the record.)

Hr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

Dr. Gottlieb. I am stopping here in my rereading of this file because you wanted some discussion of this cable that mentions my participation in the planning for this operation. And as I said before, I wouldn't have remembered this without reading this cable, I wouldn't have remembered my participation. But now that I read the cable, I can only say that I apparently did discuss this operation with

and then later with

back in headquarters

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Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall whether or not you agreed that

Dr. Gottlieb. Not independent of this cable, but read

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection of the grounds

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the case warranted the use of A-2 and possibly P-1.

upon which you made that judgment?

Dr. Gottlieb.

ing the cable, that is exactly what I did.

I can only say, based on a general remembrance of how these

No, I don't specifically recall that.

cases were discussed, that here was a psychology,

with some experience in these materials in terms of the

fact that he was familiar with them, and familiar with other

operations in which they were used. And he would have dis

cussed with me from his psychological point of view the possib

operational benefits to be derived. And hearing that, I

probably agreed with him.

Mr. Maxwell. How was he familiar with this?

Dr. Gottlieb. From the fact that he worked very close!

probably had discussed with

have read all the material, and so on, he was research program involving P-1 and A-2.

Where would the material be? Would Mr. Maxwell. material be available to him at TSD?

Dr. Gottlieb. No, it would have been available to

And it wasn't unusual for the psychologi

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at all to have access to these files, they were frequently consulted in terms of drug assisted interrogations.

In a few cases they happened to be, but much more in discussions of indirect assessment problems. They spent when they were at headquarters more time with the area divisions than they did in TSD because of the nature of their work.

And they were always looking at operational files.

Mr. Maxwell. But to the best of your recollection, there wouldn't be files on TSD's role, let's say, in Small Ground Dry Cleaning in TSD?

Dr. Gottlieb. No, there would not.

Can I interrupt for a minute and talk to my counsel?

I can do it later if you wish.

(Recess.)

Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

Dr. Gottlieb. I think I have made the general comments on this, and I am ready to respond.

Mr. Maxwell. There is a 25 May cable from the Director to with the releasing officer and the authenticating officer blanked out which indicates that "specific permission from headquarters must be obtained prior use of any unorthodox techniques".

Would unorthodox techniques apply only to P-1, or would they apply to Artichoke type techniques as well?

Ur. Gottlieb. I assume that they would apply to

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Artichoke type techniques as well.

Mr. Maxwell. And this special permission from headquarters requirement is consonant with your recollection of the procedures utilized?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, it is.

Mr. Maxwell. If A-2 or P-1 was brought to

or an interpretation, or if it were taken to

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who would have 'actually provided the material?

Physically how would the individual who was conducting the interrogation have gotten it?

Dr. Gottlieb. He probably would have gotten it from somebody in the chemical branch of TSD.

Mr. Maxwell. What kinds of logs were there kept by the Chemical Branch of TSD?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't really remember that.

Mr. Maxwell. Would every instance of a release of P-1 or λ -2 be logged within the branch?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't have a remembrance of what records were kept, if any, I just don't know.

What I am trying to say is that I didn't keep those recurs personally, and I really don't remember if records about a matter like the one you are asking about were kept.

Mr. Maxwell. At one point did you serve the Chief of the Chemical Branch of TSD?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, at some point I did.

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Mr. Maxwell. What were the dates of that service, if you can recall.

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Dr. Gottlieb. I would say the dates were 1951 to 1957.

Mr. Maxwell. During that period of time you were involved in at least one p-l interrogation, and according to your recollection at least two. You were both persons who might well have had the material, and also were responsible as Branch have had the material, and also were responsible as Branch Chief for providing it. In those circumstances do you recall the procedures that were followed in releasing the material?

The procedures that were followed in releasing the material?

Dr. Gottlieb. My problem is that I don't remember the procedures, and that I probably was not the person personally handling the LSD.

Mr. Maxwell. Who would that have been?

Dr. Gottlieb. Possibly Dr. Lashbrook, or I am saying, I just don't remember. That is one of those 20-year things.

Mr. Maxwell. The question is raised in the context not only of these interrogations and the release of A-2 and P-1, but it might be broadened to include the procedures utilized in TSD for the release of products of the MKNAOMI program as well. There is information that was made public about the passage of treated darts from SOD to CIA.

Do you recall the records that were kept of the receipt of materials from the MKNAOMI program from SOD?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't recall that. As I say, I was not

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personally involved in it. And I don't recall whether there were procedures or what those procedures were.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall any logs being kept indicating either receipt or disbursal?

Dr. Gottlieb. I recall there were logs on documents that we got. That was a standard procedure. But I
don't remember what the analogous thing with materials was.

Nr. Maxwell. When you were head of the chemical branch or deputy chiefof TSD or Chief of TSD, do you recall at any time seeing an inventory of the materials prepared at SOD for CIA which had been transported to CIA and were presently being held?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember seeing such an inventory.

Mr. Lenzner. Somebody mentioned, I can't remember who it was, that there were trips made to and from Fort Detrick to obtain materials from their inventory — I thought maybe it was you, Elliot, that mentioned that to me — for the purpose of not setting up a standard schedule so that fort Detrick wouldn't know exactly when the CIA was about to use materials if they were going to use them, and that the only record that was available was the log kept at:Fort Detrice as to when those materials were out. Somebody told me that now.

I don't think L dreamed that.

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Mr. Maxwell. There is testinony from

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Detrick for MKNAONI Products, and that the levying of the requirements was not necessarily connected with an actual operation, but was done in order that Fort Detrick would never be able to pinpoint an actual operational requirement. And has testified as to the presence of logs in regard to classified documents, but has provided no information on other record-keeping and other ways of logging in the materials from Fort Detrick.

I think the first part of that is what you are referring to.

Mr. Lenzner. If the Agency was going to such efforts to keep Detrick from knowing when and what they were doing, I suppose they may not have kept records lying around of --

Mr. Maxwell. The question is not of whether they kept records lying around, the question is whether, given the nature of the materials and the instruments available, a log would not be kept so that the AGency itself would have records of what materials they had on hand and how the materials were controlled, and when they arrived, and when they were tested, and when they were disbursed, or when they were returned to fort Detrick.

You don't recall any such record?

- Dr. Gottlieb. I don't recall that. If it is helpful : will comment that the discussion that just took place betwee:

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my counsel and yours probably pointed to the reason for bo my hazy recollection of this, namely, that there were no su records, because of the sensitivity of the area and the des to keep any possible use of materials like that recordless.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall what kind of medical info mation was transmitted from the field to headquarters in regard to possible interrogations?

Dr. Gottlieb. Are we back on I don' recall that, no. There is a reference the the total psychological assessment that Goswood made certainly very useful input as to what use of these material might be helpful. Due to the fact that he had been around for quite a while, and had been given the polygraph, and so on placed if he hadn't been given a rat! complete medical exam. There were very good medical facilities, and an agency occupanted And that was my funderstanding that this didn't come under anything that the

what was transmitted to headquarters from that medical ~ exatiatiationとし、know。

anything to do with, but that a situation that is being hel

of interregation included medical sexualing thon!

Mr. Maxwell. If I am not mistaken your testimony was prior to this that there was not a differentiation in the approval mechanism for A-2 versus P-1, is that correct? br. Gottlich. No. I didn't mean to imply that, becau

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I am not able to differentiate, to say yes or no, except that I can only say that as the years went by $\Lambda-2$ was looked on as an extremely benign substance, a benezedrine thing as to which no one had overhead untoward reactions to, it was considered

Mr. Maxwell. And this was in contrast to --

Dr. Gottlieb. P-1.

a very benigh substance.

Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps you would go on to the next folder.

Dr. Gottlieb. The next folder is called tile 2.

There isn't anything that I read in this file that simulates my memory. I have no knowledge independent of what I read, or have reading this of the activities, whatever they are, that are referred to by this material.

Mr. Maxwell. Would you go to the next file then?

Dr. Gottlieb. The next file is called "!

" file 2.

My reading of this file doesn't bring up any memory independent of what I have read, even after I have read it.

Mr. Maxwell. Apparently the proposal for the administration of an illness-inducing agent was made to the acting Chief of the Counter Intelligence staff.

Would this be consonant with the proposal and approval mechanisms that you have seen in past files or that you might recall being used by the Agency?

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Dr. Gottlieb. I am estimating because I don't know whether you want me to go by my independent recollection, which I have said a couple of times I have none, but from what I have read today, and from our discussion, yes, it would seem like this is something that the medical staff seems to have brought up with them, since they were approached.

I don't see any role by TSD in that.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall independently any other

instances of attempts to induce illness for operational purposes other than this?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember specific instances, but I remember as far as we were concerned in TSD not regarding whatever the medical staff's capacility was, that we did have that as one of our requirements, and there were some materials we had which could simulate illnesses.

Mr. Naxwell. What materials were they, if you recall?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember what they specifically were. I remember that had the peculiar property of producing in a way that was fairly harmless otherwise big red weals on the body. I remember this was, as far as we were concerned in TSD, a valid requirement, and we did some research on it, and we had some capability.

I remember the weal-producing agent. But I don't remember others.

Mr. Lenzner. Is this related to the

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•	1	not?
(Art. 202)	2	Dr. Gottlieb. I didn't read it as such.
7 2004	,s	Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall while you were at TSD
	4	involved in any discussions about the approval of the ap
	5	tion?
	6	Dr. Gottlieb. On this one?
	. 7	Mr. Maxwell. Either in this one or any other illne
	ខ	inducing operation.
	9	Dr. Gottlibb. I sort of feel, sitting here, that t
L7	300	were some, because I have just the general impression t
rd rd	ii.	there were one or two other cases, but I don't remember
د. غ	1:	they were, and I don't remember being involved in the ap
):: [§]	
	1	mechanism.
:: •	1	Mr. Lenzner. They weren't illness-producing mechan
C:] i. d	were they?
Lo.	10.5	Dr. Cottlieb. They were defined illness. If the
ī~	37 1	of a red weal on your skin is not an abnormality, I don
	j ·	know what you call that.
7,000	; .•	Mr. Maxwell. Apparently from this memo
6.0 		Dr. Gottlieb. I don't know what was being use
j	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	that is not clear.
	:: :::	Nr. Maxwell - they were talking about an "i
2		inducing agent, which in the context of the memo do
		indicate that this is necessarily a benign or only o
	<i>.</i>	operation and the second secon
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Mr. Lenzner. But it indicates that the person has asked for something of this nature.

Mr. Maxwell. That is correct. And the question I asked Dr. Gottlieb was not limited to covert application of such agents, but any application of an illness-inducing agent, whether requested or not.

Dr. Gottlieb. Clearly, this area would include, in the cases that I can think of, the cooperation of the agent involved and his knowledge of it.

Mr. Maxwell. Will you go on to 'the next file? Dr. Gottlieb. This file is entitled

As I testified last, when this name was first mentioned I got no connection with it at all.

Now, I have just a vague remembrance, and not from the name, but from mentioned here, of an operation that was proposed at the time.

My memory is very vague about it.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection beyond

No. I do not.

Maxwell; Do you recall

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't have a clear recollection of that

Mr. Lenzner I think when you first mentioned the

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to us before our session, as well as the other information, Dr. Gottlieb said that he had no recollection of this fellow

Mr. Maxwell. I understand that. Given the opportunity that is on the file. to see the material, if any, do you have any independent recollection, vague recollection of an operation involving

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this? Do you have any recollection of any Dr. Cottlieb. 110. conversations that you became aware of as to the choice of biological agent?

Do you have any recollection independent or. Gottlieb. of the material that you have seen of a body known as the

Health Alteration Committee?

Mr. Lenzner. We have been over that a couple of times. Dr. Gottlieb. I do not. For whatever it is worth, I am reading the liealth Alteration Committee as being a group that got that name that was in fact this had Noc Committee we have been talking about. That is based on the succession of things

Mr. Maxwell. Independent of the material that you have I have read. read, do you have any recollection of that?

io, I do not.

ur. Gottlieb.

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
Mr. Maxwell. You said that you don't have a clear recollection of who might

Is your recollection sufficient for you to attempt to identify an individual?

Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Mr. Lenzner. Do you want to describe what file you are looking at now?

Dr. Gottlieb. This file is labeled



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Let me repeat that.

the military use.

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recircogation

I have read this file. Before I had it I have no recollection of it. After I have read it I have a vague remembrance of an incident something like this, and somebody asked me about it. There is a reference in here that someone mentioned it to me, and I said I didn't know anything about

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record

Let's have the last statement you made on the record

Dr. Gottlieb. I will say the whole thing again.

This file seems to refer to some DoD activity in the drug field in the European area having nothing to do with the

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Mr. Maxwell. The cable to the Director from cluded in the file and dated Jahuary 2724,962 indicates that this program, the DoD program in Europe, was quite sensitive, and it goes on and points to this sensitivity as explaining "The lack of cooperation on the local level" and again pointing to the high sensitivity of the drug program, it indicates that it may preclude cooperation "at any level short of ACSI".

Would this refer to the assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in regard to the ACSI?

Dr. Gottlieb. That would be my reading of it.

Mr. Maxwell. Would your reading of the cable be that the CIA learned through a source within the military that the Defense Department was experimenting with a tasteless, adorless, colorless chemical normally administered in alcohol which would be used in interrogation.

That would be my interpretation of it, Dr. Gottlieb. yes, sir.

Mr. Maxwell. Is it your interpretation of the later cables which indicated that the drug under question was LSD? I call your attention to a cable --

Why don't you let me read it? Dr. Gottlieb. I would draw that conclusion.

Is it your testimony that you had no Mr. Maxwell.

knowledge at the time of this DoD testing in Europe?

Dr. Gottlieb. I did not have any knowledge of it.

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Mr. Maxwell. Subsequent to the discovery that it was in fact LSD, did you have occasion to discuss with DoD representatives the testing program?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't remember that. I remember reading this file before and thinking, now, was there some coordination later. And I just don't remember.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall any coordination between DoD and CIA in regard to earlier tests of LSD?

Dr. Gottlieb. I do not.

Nr. Maxwell. Do you recall learning at any time of test-!

(Discussion off the record.)

Dr. Gottlieb. Back on the record.

Repeat your question. Apparently I am not making it as inclusive as I should.

Mr. Naxwell. We will do it in scries.

Do you recall coordination with Edgewood Arsenal in regard to experiments with LSD?

Dr. Gottlieb. I wouldn't call it coordination. As I deposed in a prepared statement, the origin of our LSD program came out of information made available to us in conversations with people at Edgewood Arsenal. The subsequent activities which they engage in in respect to LSD -- I don't remember whether or not there was a close coordination or whether we had an awareness of them -- I mean I would assume

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we did, but I am speaking now about what my specific recollec-

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall going over a document in an tions are. earlier deposition which indicated that the Army Chemical Corps was involved with research on LSD using Air Force personnel? Yes, I do remember that.

Dr. Gottlieb.

Do you recall learning in 1955 of DoD experiments utilizing human subjects on LSD conducted at Edge-

I don't have a specific recollection of wood Arsenal?

that. There was always somebody in TSD that had a liaison function in the chemical branch with Edgewood, in addition to the liaison we had with Detrick.

Mr. Maxwell. Who would that have been?

I just don't remember. It would be one of the people to whom I had referred. In time it would • • • be a series of people, it would be Lashbrook, Bortner, 20

Treichler, and Gordon. And it would have been one of those,

and possibly some others that I don't remember. rould

Mr. Maxwell.

have been one of tho

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had a role of a consulta individuals. lie may have actually been a full time employee for a while But I don't think so. But anyway, yes, he definitely wo have been one of the individuals.

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Dr. Gottlieb.

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Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall learning of a program conducted by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps volunteer program which undertook experiments using human subjects and LSD and supervised by the U.S. Army intelligence center?

This would have been at approximately 1958 to 1960.

It is very hard for me to testify about !

my independent recollection of that, because I read a great deal of newspaper material on that field since then. I think had I not seen that my answer would, not specifically, I don't have a specific remembrance of that.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall while you were with TSD discussing with any individual at CIA, or any DoD representative, a series of tests that were conducted utilizing LSD and involving a simulated social reception during which drugs could be administered surreptitiously to subjects?

Dr. Gottlieb. If I can rephrase the question so that I can answer it as precisely as I know how in the following way, was I aware of any unwitting experiments with LSD by the military. My answer is, I have no present recollection of them.

Mr. Maxwell. In addition to the DoD operation in Europe, there apparently was a DoD operation in the Far East utilizing LSD, and denominated Third Chance:

Dr. Gottlieb. Could you give me the time period? . Mr. Maxwell. I am sorry, it is not denominated Third

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	Chance, it is denominated to November of 1962.	7.1
_	Chance, it is denominated Derby Hat. This was Chance, it is denominated Derby Hat. This was Do you recall learning of From August to November of 1962. This was	
	when you mention	
	that test? Or. Gottlieb. Well, I can say when you mention Derby Dr. Gottlieb. Well, I can say when you mention Derby Well, I can say when you mention Derby that test? I lat a dim bulb lights up with no aura around it, the name. Sometimes are gone any further I would have associated that	
	Dr. Gottlieb. 10 11 11 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 18 19 19 10 10 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10 11 10	
1	would have associated with the bulb lights up with	1
1	I Hat a dim bet gone any further I that is all.	
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	Ilat a dim bulb 129 Nand had you not gone any further I would Nand had you not gone any further I would Nath the Vietnam War instead of FE. But that is all. Nath the Vietnam War instead of FE. But that is all. No you have any recollection.	
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	Hr. Maxwell you had heard	
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	aside from the award about that? before, of any details about that? before, of any details about that?	
- 1	before, of any detains No, I do not.	
1	before, of any do not. Dr. Gottlieb. Do you have any recollection of a polynomial.	
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	project called Third Chance? Dr. Gottlieb.That name recalls nothing for me. Dr. Gottlieb.That name recalls nothing for me. Dr. Gottlieb.That name recalls nothing for me. Dr. Harwell. Apparently this was the DoD reference to the second s	ነተ.
	Gottlieb. That has was the Dod released	١.
	Or. Gottlieb. That the Dob letter of the Dob letter of 196 Mr. Maxwell. Apparently this was the Dob letter of 196 Mr. Maxwell. Apparently this was the Dob letter of 196 European tests which were conducted from May to August of 196 European tests which were conducted from May tests which were conducted from May tests which were conducted fr	
	European tests which were conducted from May to Would it be fair to summarize your testimony as saying Would it be fair to summarize your testimony as	
	European tests which were European tests which were Would it be fair to summarize your testimon; Would it be fa	
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	have no recollection subjects?	•
	bob with LSD on and enlarge that ques	
	you have no recollection of learn you have no recollection of learn you have no recollection of learn the part of DoD with LSD on human subjects? the part of DoD with LSD on human subjects? If you would enlarge that question of learn or Gottlieb. If you want to enlarge it that was the DoD, if you want to enlarge it that was thing, and that is that during the Vietnam Washing, and that is that during the Vietnam Washing and that is that during the Vietnam Washing washing washing the Vietnam Washing wash	
	Dr. Gottlicb.	a s
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	LSD activity in the LSD activity in the and that is that during. I can add one thing, and that is that during. I can add one thing, and that is that during. I can add one thing, and that is that during. I can add one thing, and that is that during. I can add one thing, and that is that during. I can add one thing, and that is that during. I can add one thing, and that is that during. I can add one thing, and that is that during. I can add one thing, and that is that during.	o f
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Chance, it is denominated Derby Hat. This was undertaken from August to November of 1962. Do you recall learning of that test?

Dr. Gottlieb. Well, I can say when you mention Derby Hat a dim bulb lights up with no aura around it, the name.

And had you not gone any further I would have associated that with the Vietnam War instead of FE. But that is all.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection,
aside from the awareness that you had heard of that sometime
before, of any details about that?

Dr. Gottlieb. No, I do not.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection of a project called Third Chance?

Dr. Gottlieb.That name recalls nothing for me.

Mr. Maxwell. Apparently this was the DoD reference to the European tests which were conducted from May to August of 1961.

Would it be fair to summarize your testimony as saying you have no recollection of learning of unwitting testing on the part of DoD with LSD on human subjects?

Dr. Gottlieb. If you would enlarge that question of LSD activity in the DoD, if you want to enlarge it that way, I can add one thing, and that is that during the Vietnam Was I remember the military considering the use of LSD on a fairly large scale -- and by fairly large scale I am talking about in an interrogation sense, interrogating a number of

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prisoners -- and that we were asked to come on that. And I

forget what the occasion was, and I forget who was there.

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But I remember being there at least once with Mr. FitzGerald when he was DDP. And we recommended very much again that based on our experience. And my remembrance is that it was killed, nothing went forward. What were the reasons for recommending Mr. Maxwell.

against interrogation?

Dr. Gottlieb. Well, by that time -- and I have trouble putting a date on it -- I forget when Mr. FitzGerald died actually, but that would put a certain limit on when this happened -- but our experience with LSD, as you know from the paucity of information after 1960 or so, was that in fact it was an uncertain -- the results of the P-1 interrogation were uncertain. We had, I forget what the statistics were, as many failures as successes. And we were very concerned about the military getting into some standardized use of it which we felt was on those grounds, that they wouldn't be able to discriminate, being such a large organization, and handling possibly a large number of prisoners, that we felt. it just simply wasn't a good technique to use under those hat you really had to select each case carefully, and a lot of individual attention, and we felt this was kind of an indication of some mass use of it that we didn't think was wise or would work well.

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Mr. Maxwell. You indicated in your testimony that you felt the reactions were mixed in regard to the experience that the Agency had had.

Mr. Lenzner. The results.

Mr. Maxwell. The results were mixed, as many failures and successes, I think.

Dr. Gottlieb. That is my reaction to it, saying how we felt in the middle sixties.

Mr. Maxwell. In the material that you have gone over there is no indication of an operation being labeled as a failure, a use of the material as a failure. And I was wondering if you have any recollection of instances where LSD was used and considered to have failed?

Dr. Gottlieb. Ny reaction to that would have been, I have no specific recollection of P-1 operations that failed. If I had, I would have brought them up when you said were there any others.

But I think you have to take the evaluation of like a cable or a dispatch from that you have seen with a grain of salt -- not that the people falsified anything but that they were very close to the situation in their evaluation of how much the national interest was served by information that they got from their interrogation would be a judgment that they couldn't make, but that somebody at headquarters couldn't make, but the souldn't make, but the souldn't

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And I remember many discussions of thatkind that led us to believe that really what looked like a big success locally didn't really seem that way, that there wasn't so much significance — that doesn't mean that we didn't have some successes when we total it all up.

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you are referring to said that

The 1956 in the said that there had been a greater reward in regard to your learning about the technical aspects of LSP than the field thought that it had gained

Dr. Gottlieb. I think that is compatible with what I was trying to say. What I was trying to say is that the experience by the middle sixties, or the end of the sixties, which is a period I am trying to refer to in this Vietnam case, told us that in terms of value to the Agency, or value to the national interest in terms of intelligence required, the value of P-1 interrogations, while not nil, when you struck a balance didn't seem to warrant it.

Mr. Maxwell. Can you recall when you first began to believe that P-l interrogations didn't warrant this kind of effort?

Dr. Gottlieb. It would be very hard for me to put a year on that. But let's say the middle sixties.

but the middle sixties, meaning 1963?

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Dr. Gottlieb. 1964, 1965.

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Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall any events that triggered that?

ward look and summation of the whole program. Again, I don't want to give the impression that anybody felt that the program was a failure, that there was no use to P-l interrogations; that there might not be some special circumstances in which this would be useful. But the results of everything told us that the money expended, the effort expended, the security risk involved, when you add everything up, it probably was not -- I am searching for the right expression here--it was probably not a high pay-off program.

Mr. Naxwell. Does this include -- was this limited to P-l interrogations, or did it include operational use of LSD to disorient a speaker or to possibly use it as a disabling agent.

Dr. Gottlieb. I think so, I think it would have included the whole thing. And I think that had a lot to do with later events, at least as far as I was concerned of my urgin; us to get out of the program totally.

Now this would be in the 1969-70 period of a research program that was expensive, and so on. By that time it was practically nil anyway.

Mr. Maxwell. Which particular research program are you



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Dr. Gottlieb. I am talking about the whole series of projects that started in 1952 and continued through the middle sixties.

Mr. Maxwell. Are you differentiating the MKNAOMI series from those things funded through MKULTRA, or --

Dr. Gottlieb. The remarks I made happen to include both.

But we are now talking about the LSD Meretran related research.

Mr. Maxwell. And your testimony is, there is no specific occurrence which led you to do that, but simply an attempt to evaluate --

Dr. Gottlieb. An attempt to look back and evaluate the money spent, the people involved, the effort, and the operational trials, you know, the cost effectiveness. It wasn't that precise, and it wasn't labeled that. But it was that sort of a review.

Mr. Maxwell. One last question in regard to the DoD testing. And that is, newspaper reports have described the death of a gentleman named Mr. Blauer at the New York Psychiatric Institute, apparently resulting from the ingestion of mescaline as part of a program of research on psychochemicals conducted under the auspices of the Department of Defense.

Did you become aware at any time prior to the newspaper articles about the fact of Mr. Blauer's death or the circumstances of Mr. Blauer's death?

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Dr. Gottlieb. I have no remembrance of having any prior knowledge of that.

Mr. Maxwell. Let us go on to the next file.

Dr. Gottlieb. I haven't finished looking at everything in this one yet.

Off the record.

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(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

Dr. Gottlieb. Reading this file, which is entitled interiogation 1962 to 1969 before I. read this file I think, had you asked me do I remember whether there was an interrogation. Other than the two we have talked about, I would have said, I remember, there 14 was another one wasn't present at. But certainly I wouldn't have had a lot of specific information about who was interrogated, exactly who was there, and who the SD officer present was.

But reading this, I now remember that such a series of activities took place, that was the TSD person there, that I wasn't there, I wasn't involved in this one, and that this one was again considered in the context of our last conversation as a something suggested

I sort of want to keep this one out to refer to our last conversation.

Shall I talk about it?

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There is an interesting memorandum in this file

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dated 1 April 1963 to the Chief of FE Division from the Chief of the International Communism group on the CI staff. And the memo seems to comment on the value that was gotten from an agency point of view from this interrogation. It doesn't mention the fact that it was a special interrogation. But I bring it up here to give the difference between a staff group's sober evaluation of the value of the interrogations evaluation, which was far more modest. and the

And it was this kind of a thing, even on a broader scale, that made us scale down some of the enthusiasm later when we were reviewing all of this, as contrasted to the first-hand reports we got.

I think it is worth mentioning, you referred to the possible relative value of the discrediting, disabling aspect of P-1, as contrasted to the interrogative value. And the point was made a couple of times that individuals under P-1 acted in a manner that could be used to discredit them in the eyes of individuals.

I think one of the previous

that as part of it. And there were two points to be made of that jogging my memory. One is that that way to use P-1 is relatively easy and surefire, I mean you are almost sure to get some peculiar behavior on the part of an individual.

had

to the extent that that was useful in Agency operations, it is

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an effective use of P-1.

But our experience was, based on the meager number of requests for that kind of thing, that it didn't seem to be an operationally useful Agency goal.

And this is an example, for instance, of what looked like If you read the local record, you remember they ausccess. were quite enthusiastic about what happened. And in fact, that kind of a use of P-1 was never picked up in any broad sense.

Mr. Maxwell. As far as you know, the mention in this in 1962 particular file in regard to , were those the and in regard to the only two uses of LSD to discredit individuals?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have thought about that. There certainly was talk of others, there certainly was talk of others, specifically of fairly senior officials overseas that they wanted to discredit. And I don't remember specifically whether or not any of them were used. I do remember the constant negative factor was the uncontrollability.

After all, you take a senior official, and you give him someof this to discredit him, you have no way of knowing what the specific disorientation is, or what he might say. might say something that is wrong from the point of view of our interest. From the point of view of the specifics of the reaction I remember it was all the negative side.

But not to avoid the specific question you asked, I have

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a remembrance of several discussions of this kind of use of P-1. And I think it was probably used several times. But I don't remember the specifics of the times it was used. I don't remember a big flap ever.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall the specific individuals who were discussed as possible targets of a P-1 discrediting operation?

Dr. Gottlieb. Let me talk to my counsel. It is a question about how far we feel I ought to speculate on it.

(Confers with counsel.)

Mr. Lenzner. The problem is that he has some recollection of an individual, but he is not absolutely sure that it relates to this specific area. And I am a little bit worried that we are going to put something on the record that may not be fair to the people involved, or that may be embarrassing to --

Dr. Gottlieb. And further, that it may link my name again to something that may come out when I am not sure it really happened.

Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Lenzner. On the record.

22 Let me say two things.

First, I want to correct what I think is a misperception. My reading of the cables suggests that there was euphoria in one of these files over the disorientation of an interrogeo

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as a byproduct of interrogation, but it didn't indicate necessarily that P-1 was administered for the specific purpose of disorientation. And I think both the witness and this interrogator have made that assumption. And I don't think that is accurate.

Mr. Maxwell. Speaking for myself, I have made the assumption that these cases reflected in the materials that we have that the discrediting of the individual was the prime motive.

But I also have not made the assumption that there weren't operations using LSD where that was in fact the motive.

Mr. Lenzner. The cable certainly doesn't reflect the latter. Dr. Gottlieb. My statement, just to be careful, was that I remember discussions. I have no specific remembrance of it being used.

Mr. Maxwell. I think the record is clear on that.

Mr. Lenzner. The witness at this point can recall discussions relating to the possibility of use against

of this material. And he is quite certain that

none of those discussions as far as he knows ever bore fruit in

terms of the actual attempt to disorient

Mr. Maxwell. Was there more than one discussion of this

1.3(a)(4)(5) possibility, to the best of your recollection?

-Dr. Gottlieb. To the best of my recollection --



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	Mone (Ares 202) 544.6000	1	Mr. Lenzner. With regard to this one figure, or sug-
	(Area 2	2	sequently?
	Prore	3	Mr. Maxwell. With regard to this one figure.
		4	Dr. Gottlieb. To the best of my recollection, there is
		5	only one discussion that I recollect.
		6	Mr. Maxwell. Who are the other participants in the dis-
	——————————————————————————————————————	7	cussion?
,		8	Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't remember. And furthermore,
, ,		9	I don't remember the country involved. I just
۲۰.		10	remember the level of the person.
٠.	ر	11	off the record.
() { •	10	(Discussion off the record.)
•	0 * *	13 1	Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.
(.		14	To the best of your recollection, yourcannot remember
1.3	8445,	35	the particular the was discussed in this con-
	<i>C</i>	10	text?
		17	Mr. Lenzner.
	~	100	Dr. Gottlieb. No.
	2000	19	Mr. Maxwell. To the best of your recollection, #did -
	Pers. 0.6	a	you discuss subsequent to this conversation whether anything
	, semen	21	came of it, or did you learn at any time of any actions taken
1,3A	45	23	in conjunction with such an operation against
•	ن الم	23	Dr. Gottlieb. No. That would be another discussion
	316 5	23	relating to the situation.
		2:	Mr. Maxwell. So to the best of Your recollection these
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versations or discussions in which Dr. Gottlieb was not involved. I am focussing solely on Dr. Gottlieb's recollection of such conversation in order to determine whether in fact the conversation that you have some recollection of was unusual, o: the reasons why you might recall it now.

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Mr. Lenzner. I say only in the context of the prior testimony. I wouldn't think a discussion of this nature would

be terribly unusual. Dr. Gottlieb. And I am thinking now, if I testify-off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

Dr. Gottlieb. I want to be sure that you understand t my mentioning a number like ten such discussions is the sofist kind of recollection, because this subject could be brought up in any briefing or anything like that. The peop seem to have a morbid fascination about it, and I am sure it could have come up more times than that as a general subject discussion.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. On the record.

One last question Dr. Gottlieb, on your recollection

the discussion involving the possible use of ISD on the

Do you have any recollection of the date of the conve

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_	Mone (Aves 202) \$44-6000	tion?
	2023	Dr. Gottlieb. I have none whatsoever.
	one (Ae	Mr. Maxwell. Can you place it in the sixties versus
	ć.	the fifties?
	5	Dr. Gottlieb. I am afraid if I answer that it will just
	6	put me in the same position that I was when I first brought it
	7	up. And I think my answer to that is no. By that I mean, if
	S	you said, would it be rather the fifties or the sixties, I would
: ~~	9	say the sixties. But with the added statement that I am not
7	10	sure.
	1:	Mr. Maxwell. Dr. Gottlieb, in regard to the 1962
4 1	; ; 1::	interrogation (₹
	13	dated May 14 uses the term "technical interrogation".
	3 A3, 4,5	
(. G \	C 15	the use in interrogation of $\Lambda-2/P-1$?
L,	16	Dr. Gottlieb. It could have been. But I think it could
r	17	have also been used to refer to an Artichoke interrogation.
	1 es	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	technical aids were used:
	0.00	Mr. Maxwell. There is a cab. 6 the Director.
	7 C	edated Hay IP which includes In putting de to the second
	2 X S	of a cante gareness who elitar
	(1348, 4, 5)	Could you indicate what NKDELTA refers to?
	, mar i u	To gettlich To do this accurately, I would have to
	- - - · · · ·	refer to that memorandum, the CSI, that you have there. And
		TOP SECRET

the date of this was 1962 or 1963, was it?

Mr. Maxwell. The date of that was 1962, I believe.

Dr. Gottlieb. I think the most accurate way of responding to that is just to read this.

"And MKDELTA materials are certain chemical and biological materials capable of producing human behaviorial or physiological changes."

Why would this be used as a cable Mr. Maxwell. indicator?

Dr. Gottlieb. Well, I mentioned several times that it wasn't uncommon at all for people to put the wrong things in it, and to misstate a designator that wasn't meant as a cable indicator, but covered some aspect of the operation, instead of a cable indicator. That was a constant error that lb was made, not only with these indicators you are talking about, 16 but any of them. And when you say, why was it used, some-17 body made a mistake, I think.

Mr. Maxwell. There is a cable to the Director

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Would NKDELTA materials be available outside of headquarters, for instance,

Dr. Gottlieb. Well, I can't recollect, but I think at thin

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And in that context I would:

think it quite possible that a supply of at least P-1 and Λ -2 would be kept there, and possibly other materials.

Mr. Maxwell. The description of the interrogation is included in the 25 June 1962 cable to the Director And I was wondering if you could comment as to whether this description would reflect in general the procedure used in λ -2 and P-l interrogations. It read as follows:

"Buildup included two sleepless nights due Λ -2. On third day senior person intensely feared by subject talked two hours with subject. P-1 ingested 30 minutes following interview and 30 minutes prior evening meal. Ate heartily in spite obvious nervousness. Immediately following meal had violent dry heaves and first claimed food poisoning. And then in panic began to claim senior interrogator had poisoned This followed by clearcut paranoid panic reaction similar him. to subject 2 episode observed by

The cable then goes on:

"After repeated requests for medic, 1

1.3(a)(4)(5) doctor called to listen patiently to subject complaints."

Dr. Gottlieb. My answer to that would be no, that would not be a typical or routine thing. Each case was judged on its own merits, and that is the particular sequence of events in this one. But I wouldn't say that is the standard sequence of events.

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Mr. Maxwell. Would it be normal in the Λ -2 or P-1 interrogations to attempt to build in this way some form of strees through lack of sleep or physical stress?

Dr. Gottlieb. That was characteristic of some of them.

But others I think they found that they got more from a

completely supportive approach. I tried to say before earlier

in my testimony that LSD seems to behave in a manner that in

some way produces a caricature of a person's personality traits

and trends. And how you exploit it in this sense would be a

function of that.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall any other interrogations which were denominated MKDELTA interrogations, aside from this file which refers to them?

Dr. Gottlieb. You are referring to the cable indicator now, or some other material used here?

Mr. Maxwell. Well, there are references throughout this file to this being MKDELTA.

Dr. Gottlieb. Could you restate the question?

Mr. Maxwell. Aside from this interrogation, and the other interrogations which you have seen papers on during the deposition, do you recall any other interrogations that were denominated MKDELTA interrogations?

Dr. Gottlieb. My answer to your question is, no, not to my remembrance. But I assume that question includes or infers, were there any other interrogations that I can

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of drugs over the long term, or the desirability of continuing research in drugs over a long period of time, is that correct?

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Dr. Gottlieb. If you are saying that that a great advantage, I think as it was evaluated in headquarters, it would be downgraded.

Mr. Maxwell. When you looked back at the end of the 1960's over the period of time in which there had been drug experimentation, did you call together the files that contained information on the use of drugs over time in order to review them to make the determination that it would be phased out?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think that I had already done that in that report in 1963 that you referred to, or '60 or '61. You remember, you referred to a report I wrote on evaluation, or something, of psychochemicals and there had been so little activities in the interim, I don't think I would have done 17 that.

Mr. Maxwell. In line with that, let me read a portion of the CIA Inspector General's report that describes that report, and how the Inspector General interpreted it:

"The author opens discussion with the question of what the operational returns had been from an eight-year program involving a large investment. He observed that the clandestine services CS had encouraged TSD on various occasions to develop and maintain the operational capability in special

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•drups and chemicals. But that TSD had received little or no guidance in directing the work, and that the clandestine services had up to that time shown little inclination to use the end product operationally. He indicated that there had been, 'many' operations over the eight years employing harassment + materials (not controlled under the MKDELTA regulations) and \sim only 'few' operations employing disabling drugs (in B: twothirds of these involved the use of drugs in interrogations). No use of local substances was reported."

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

Dr. Gottlieb, can you recall any operation using disabling drugs as you described them in your report under the MEDELTA series?

Dr. Gottlieb. I cannot.

Mr. Maxwell. Can you describe again using your report and your reollections of your report as the focus any other MKDELTA interrogation than the ones that we have gone over?

Dr. Gottlieb. No. We have gone over three of them,

hasn't it been?

Mr. Maxwell. the difficulty in determining whether three three were done under the MKDELTA series is that in only one of them is the term used.

I would be inclined not to worry about Dr. Cottlicb.

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that because of the confusion of theme terms. assume, hearing this, that the term MKDELTA interrogation meant $P-1/\Lambda-2$ interrogation.

Mr. Maxwell. The other difficulty is that at least one postdated that of them, report.

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

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Well, it is hard to tell whether they talked about the number of cases -- I just can't help you on that.

Mr. Maxwell. So you have no independent recollection, using the circumstances of your preparation of that report as a way of recalling other operations or interrogations? Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any idea, using the preparation of that report, of how the disabling drugs might have been used' in operations other than the possibility of cusing Pal to disorie: lor discredit an individual?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not in any specific sense. I tried to re-19 call that when I was testifying in front of the Senators, and mentioned several kinds of things we had that we would have considered harassing agents. But I couldn't tie them in them, and I can't tie them in now to specific operations.

Mr. Maxwell. Would it have been possible for you to have counted

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TOP SECKET Dr. Gottlieb. I guess to, yes. Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall -Mr. Lenzner. That predated this report. Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall receiving any information in 5 the contact of preparing the report of Dr. Gottlieb. I do not. Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall in the process of preparing ú: your report 1.0 11 12 I might have. Dr. Gottlieb. 13 Mr. Lenzner. Now that we are referring specifically to Dr. Gottlieb's prior testimony involving Dr. Gottlieb. I would like to expand that answer. might have, but I don't have a specific recollection of it. 2 ... Mr. Maxwell. In going over the materials that you have been shown throughout the period of time that you have testified) ; before the separate Select Committee, can you think of any other operations which predated that report which might have fit the category as you describe it of operations using dis abling drugs in the report you prepared as the scientific advi sor to the DDP?

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Dr. Gottlieb. My answer to that is, not that I can red

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now.

My counsel reminds me of some prior testimony about the use of a diarrhea-inducing material, I think it was phenolphthalein, as being a diarrhea-inducing material. And I remember it being used, but I couldn't recall then, and I can't recall now, it being a specific operation. That might have been one of those included.

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Mr. Maxwell. Would this be considered in your definition a disabling drug?

Dr. Gottlieb. Oh, yes.

Mr. Maxwell. One last question in regard to the 1962

the LSD did not cause the reaction but merely brought out symptoms that were present prior to the interrogation. Based on the work that you knew about on LSD, and the experiments that you were involved in, would that be an accurate description of what might occur should LSD be given to an individual who has latent symptoms such as is claimed about the subject of the interrogation?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think so.

Mr. Maxwell. If you had known about such symptoms, or were in a situation whereyou knew about such symptoms, would you have proceeded with such an interrogation?

Dr. Gottlieb. I find it a difficult question to answer, because in the first place it is hypothetical, and there were

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so many factors involved as to what you would do in a specific case. Surely we would have alerted the operators who were related to the case about the possibility of this happening. We would have been concerned about it. I think this was at least one case where you remember we recommended against using any special technique because somebody was meantally disturbed. I just can't think of a standard reaction.

Mr. Lanzner. I think we find those questions difficult, because I take it -- and I am not an expert in this -- that there are so many variables in that kind of medical judgment that it would be hard to standardize a determination.

Mr. Maxwell. Let's go on to

Dr. Gottlieb. This file is entitled:

Reading this file does recall for me the use of what I am almost sure was a two in one or two cases with this asset of the clandestine services in an attempt to elicit more information than the person dealing with the Agent was able to elicit.

Mr. Maxwell. Did you participate in the authorization of these, or the analysis that suggested these?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really can't remember. I sort of being involved in this have a remembrance of specifically. And it was not a case, as I remember, of his going down to whatever this was and observing it, but rather

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1	counseling the case officer involved.
Mone (Area 202) 544-6000	Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall whether anyone at TSD partici-
Prone (X	pated in the actual interrogation?
4	Dr. Gottlieb. I don't recall that.
5	Mr. Maxwell. Doyou recall possible discussions in TSD
6	about it, and the fact that it did occur?
7	Dr. Gottlieb. I think so. What I am alsmot sure of is
8	that it didn't involve P-1.
9.	Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection of the
co r. 10	results of the interrogation or reports coming back to TSD
i. 11	about the first series and the series are the series and the series are the serie
C:. 3	Dr. Gottlieb. I have a general recollection of it having
0 0 1 1 1 1	been deemed successful of having been deemed helpful in at
16	least one case.
1: 6.	
	lection, more than one interrogation of the individual?
	Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't remember. The file here
	refers to one or two instances where it was used, and that is
20003	about may recollection, whether it was one or two or more I
0.00	don't remember.
	In general, was a result of an MKDELTA or

	cvaluating the technical results of the interrogation in orders
	EnatarsD would beakent@abreast.ofidevelopments?
	br. Gottlieb. What do you mean by the technical results

1 2

Mr. Maxwell. On set times, the kind of reaction.

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Dr. Gottlieb. We would try to get those kinds of results, yes.

4 5 operational use, there would be reports that would come through

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chemistry branch?

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Mr. Maxwell. Even if there weren't files kept about

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't know in what form they would be. They might be oral ones, where you would debrief the person involved. There was some attempt made to get that, obviously.

Mr. Maxwell. Would that attempt be centered in the

Dr. Gottlieb. No, it would probably be centered in this behavioral activities branch.

Mr. Maxwell. From the time of the branches on set, was it the branch principally responsible for this kind of activity?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think so.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection as to who authorized the use of a two against this asset?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember specifically, but it would have had to have been the DDP.

Mr. Maxwell. You say it would have been, to have been the DDP?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. Because that is my remrmbrance of the procedure used, it wouldn't have been issued or approved or

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anything like that.

Mr. Maxwell. Focussing your attention on this individual, perhaps you could take me through what would have had to have happened for the material to have been released to the individual performing the interrogation?

that accommodates the fact that I don't specifically remember in this instance, what I would envision happening was that the cognizant operational unit involved, be that a branch chief or a division chief or even an individual who was seized with this problem, would have come to TSD to discuss this, and determined that there was some feasibility to the proposal.

And then the area operational people involved would have either in writing or orally gone to the DDP and explained the situation, gotten his approval, and then in some manner indicated to us, in a manner that satisfied us, that it was approved, that they had gotten it approved, and then we could go ahead of it.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection at that time of there being an analogue of either the health alteration committee or the drug committee or the Ad Hoc Committee as a result?

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Dr. Gottlieb. I don't think therewas any such.

Mr.Lenzher. You mean in 1970 when this



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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

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Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

3 |

Mr. Maxwell. What would be the appropriate method of indicating to you that the DDP had in fact approved the program?

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Dr. Gottlieb. Either a piece of paper with his signature

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or a personal phone call from somebody, or a visit to him.

6

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall any of that in connection --

7

Dr. Gottlieb. Not specifically.

8

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall that in connection with any

9

of the other interrogations that we have discussed?

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Dr. Gottlieb. Oh, yes. I saw it in the cable traffic a

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couple of times.

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Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

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(Discussion off the record.)

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Mr. Maxwell. On the record.

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Dr. Gottlieb. Ask the question.

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Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall any of that happening in any

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of the interrogations or operations that we have discussed?

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Mr. Gottlieb. I remember having read, approved by the

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Chief of Operations. And I would have assumed that he was

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speaking for the DDP.

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Mr. Maxwell. But you have no recollection of the DDP indicating to you specifically or other individual indicating

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to you that the DDP had personally approved?

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Dr. Gottlieb. I have no specific recollection of that,

no.

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000		91
2) 544.6	1	Mr. Maxwell. Two last questions in regard to operation
7. S C	2	use.
7,000	3	(Discussion off the record.)
	4	Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.
	5	Dr. Gottlieb,
	6	
ابيام 1.3	7	
	8	To the best of your knowledge,
€ 6	9	
<i>r</i> -	10	did you ever see this memorandum? Dr. Gottlieb. I have never seen the memorandum, nor
	11	i institution
	1	manalanting what spever that
;	14	or even seriously discussed a
J1344	15	rascd?
Ŀ:	16	wher any discussion of
1.	17	# •
	125	Mr. Maxwell. Dr. Gottlieb, I would also like to show yo
rano (1.1	one other memorandum, which again does not indicate that it
9.6 July	:::	was either addressed to you, written by you or shown to you
. Wakma Yun, D.C. 7000J	2:	listing materials that had been held as part of the Artichoke
	2:-	program in the Office of Security, and which were being trans
22 July 104	27	ferred to Dr. Gunn for disposition as he saw fit. I would lib
	:,	-your reaction as to whether any of the agents, with the
	£:	exception of LSD, sodium amytol, sodium pentathol, amytal so

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S.F., Washington, D.C. 20003

or pentathol sodium, or chloral hydrate, or desoxyn were ever used in interrogations or in operations to disable or discordinate.

, Dr. Gottlieb. I would first depose that the date of this memorandum covers a period of time that I was not in headquarters.

And secondly, I would say that my answer to your question is no, I have no awareness of the use of any of those materials.

Mr. Maxwell. Dr. Gottlieb, I would like to turn to another subject which is the relationship between the CIA and the Bureau of Narcotics. The copy of the opening statement which was shown to me reads as follows in regard to that relationship:

"We developed a liaison with the Bureau of Narcotics whereby we would share information on LSD or any other drugs within. The mechanism for this liaison was our funding of two safe houses at different times for the Bureau of Narcotics which the Bureau would use for meeting informants and pursuing their own business, and which premises we would occasionally use for our own meetings. As I remember it, some of the experiments we did on self-administration of drugs took place in one of these apartments."

Do you recall having made that statement for the record?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, minus the grammatical problem.

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Mr. Maxwell. Can you expand on the relationship with the Bureau of Narcotics as you have described it there?

Dr. Gottlieb. I became aware sometime during the period I alluded to in the prepared statement that an individual who worked for the Bureau of Narcotics named George White had had some prior experience with OSS during World War II in using marijuana-related material in interrogations.

And that was during a period when I was looking for this kind of knowledgeable individual specialist in an operational sense. And I forget how, but I manged to identify Hr. White and find out where he was, and I had several converstation: with him.

As a result of that, an arrangement was finally worked out where he would get supplies of LSD from us, and use them in circumstances that he felt were of relevancy to his work of dealing with informants and working in the general field of narcotics enforcement, and that we would be made privy, at least in a general way, to the results and effectiveness of these activities, in return for which we would financial: support the maintenance of these pads or safe houses which the Bureau of Narcotics, as I remember, badly needed for operations, but had financial problems as to.

And that was the general nature of the arrangement.

TMr. Maxwell. Do you recall with more specificity when

arrangement began?

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	09-44	1	The sale of the sa
	202) 5	1	Dr. Gottlieb. I really can't. All I can say is that it
	(Area	2	was back in the 1952-53 days.
	Phane (Ares 202) 544-6000	- 5 f	Mr. Maxwell. It was prior to the report on MKULTRA
	,		that I showed you which was dated chruary 10;
i	3Al	5	1954, was it not?
,		6	Dr. Gottlieb. Can you identify that memo for me a littl
		7	better?
		8	Your question was what, that some arrangement like this
L.7		9	had been made?
7		10	Mr. Maxwell. That given thatmemo, is it fair to assume
j		12	that the arrangement was made prior to February 19, 1954?
€7 —	, ,	10	Dr. Gottlieb. I really can't testify specifically just
	0 : 4 2	13 (when the actual activity started or when the first safe house
	,	1.1	was rented, I honestly can't. I can't relate the dates. All
C:.		15	I can talk about is the general period of time that that was
5. I\		10	done.
		; ; ;	For instance, I don't remember whether some LSD
		:	was given to Mr. White and he used it before these safe houses
	(000;	:.•	were set up and a formal arrangement made or not.
	ئ و د	£.	Mr. Maxwell. Among the memoranda that you were shown,
	S. Prince of S.	175 1 Au 1	however, the memorandum in regard to the conversation with
	<u></u> 1.3	3(a)(4	
	1.5 The first street S.C., Waxnestern	C	prior to that date, that memorandum dated is December 1953?
6	5 4 4	:,.:	Dr. Gottlieb. I would have to say that it is possible he
	-	28	the position of my calling back in
-			the same of the sa

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some years for memory of that. And I notice it says here in paragraph 5 of the December 1953 memo that CIA distributed a limited quantity of LSD to George White, and I suppose Dr. Gibbons got that information from me, and it is probably true. And I am simply saying, from this far back I don't have a clear recollection of the chronological situation.

Mr. Maxwell. You have discussed previously the general arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics.

Can you be more specific in regard to the arrangements? What arrangements, if any, weremade for the reporting of information by Mr. White to you?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember that. You mean in what form did reports come, or what?

Mr. Maxwell. Let's start with what form reports came in.

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember that.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you remember whether reports were written?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't even remember that.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you remember roughly how often you met with Mr. White, if at all?

Dr. Gottlieb. I certainly met with him.

Mr. Maxwell. Would you meet once a year?

Dr. Gottlich. We would meet more frequently than once a year. I would guess we would meet three to four times a year.

Mr. Maxwell. At that time would be report the results :

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_	2) 544.6000		the testing to you?
	VIE 20	2	Dr. Gottlieb. He would report to me. And I don't re-
	Phone (Area 202)	5	member whether it was either oral or in writing what the re-
	ŭ	a.	sults were.
		5	Mr. Maxwell. For the record, could be have reported to
		6	you by telephone rather than meeting?
		7	Dr. Gottlieb. I could have, but I don't remember that
		8	specifically.
1		9	Mr. Maxwell. In regard to the substance of the reports,
6 .		10	did he describe the individuals who were the subject of the
C.		11	test?
1.7	, ,	3.11	Dr. Gottlieb. He certainly identified them by name.
	4 0 2 <	3 %	Mr. Maxwell.What information might he have given about
C)	;	1.4	them?
ت.		1:	Dr. Gottlieb. He might have said, we have an informant
ter n		20	who is a male or a female aged about 35 that was given this
'``		17	material, and he behaved in such and such a way.
		3 ==	Mr. Maxwell. To the best of your recollection, did the
	, 2000 1	111	reports that Mr. White gave you describe the extent of his
	ن	le.	observation, for instance, I was with the individual for the
	υ, ۱۳۰۰, ۱۳۰۰, ۱	ž:	following five-hour period following the time I gave the indivi-
	3. 3.	22	dual LSD?
	Armon.	:. ·	Dr. Gottlieb. What was your question?
A	10.1	:.4	Mr. Maxwell. Did he describe the extent of his oppor-
	4	21	tunity to observe
		Application of the second	TOP STERET
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Dr. Gottlieb. I can't say now that he did that every time. But it is probable that he had some comments in that area.

Mr. Maxwell. Did he describe the process of cultivation of the subject? Did he describe how he came upon the individual or the relationship he had with the individual which enabled him to administer LSD to the individual?

Dr. Gottlieb. I can't comment on that, because I don't remember whether that was part of his reporting to me.

Mr. Maxwell. Did you have other means of ascertaining that?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my remembrance. I didn't know these individuals.

Mr. Maxwell. Did he describe to you the method by which he administered LSD.

Dr. Gottlieb. I think he probably did, but I don't remember what those were, except that they were usually in drinks. I think he probably did, but I don't remember what those were, except that they were usually in drinks. My perception of what he was doing was trying to use this material as close to the manner in which we at that time thought we might find some use of operationally, namely, to see whether we could elicit more information from informants and other people he was dealing with.

Mr. Maxwell. Is it your understanding that all of the administration was done covertly, that is, the individual subject

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were not to know that they had been given LSD?

Dr. Gottlieb. That was my understanding.

Mr. Maxwell. Did you ever at any time explore with Mr. White his prior experiences before this arrangement was made with LSD?

Mr. Lenzner. If any.

Dr. Gottlieb. I can't remember that well enough to say yes or no.

Mr. Maxwell. Did you discuss with Mr. White his own background which would enable him to make a determination of the appropriateness of a subject or his desire to obtain medical attention should the situation arise?

Dr. Gottlieb. The only information that I can bring up that might help and that is, I did discuss with him, of course, his World War II experience in this interrogation field.

My general remembrance is that I shared with him whatever information I had on this subject at the time on LSD and whatever was coming out of other parts of our research program.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection as to the number of individuals who were tested by Mr. White between the time in 1953 and 1964?

Dr. Gottlieb. I could only make the most general guess, and I wouldn't think it would be accurate, because I just don't remember, because as far as I know I didn't keep a running total of it.

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Mr. Lenzner. Do you want a guess?

Mr. Maxwell. I would like your best guess.

Dr. Gottlieb. I would guess between 20 and 25 in the whole period.

Mr. Maxwell. In the roughly ten-year period?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

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Mr. Maxwell. That would indicate an average of three a year?

Dr. Gottlieb. If you want to put it that way. I am not sure that is the way they came, or whether they were clumped a lot in one year and none in the next.

Mr. Maxwell. What I am trying to get is some idea of the number of people involved. If you were meeting three or four times a year with Mr. White, did the frequency of those meetings continue between 1953 and 1964, with the exception of the time that you were --

Dr. Gottlieb. They changed very much. Toward the latter part of the time you are talking about I probably didn't meet with them more than once a year or twice a year. I don't remember there being a standard time ofmeeting him all through that whole period.

Mr. Maxwell. So you would guess between 25 and 30 people over that period of time?

Mr. Lenzner. I think it ought to be said for the record, so that it is put in the proper context, that as

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know, an agent who is involved with informants in the narcotics area does not have the substantial numbers of informants that he is running or operating with at one period of time. You are operating as one agent with a relatively small number of people trying to make significant cases in the narcotics area.

So, I am not surprised by that.

Does that help?

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Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.

Would it be likely that the number of people who were involved in the testing was greater in the early years of the project than in the latter years of the project?

Dr. Gottlieb. I would think that is possible or even probable.

Mr. Maxwell. How would you describe the information that Mr. White was providing to you? Was it useful to you operationally?

Dr. Gottlieb. I want to preface my answer to this question, because it includes some of the other information I have given, that this activity was a part, and a diminishing small part, of things I was doing over this whole period you are talking about, is the reason I can't be more precise in the answers I am giving you. But in response to your question, :

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1 would say, yes, they were very useful operationally. It was 2 practically the only information we had that was relevant to an operational situation or something near it.

Mr. Maxwell. With the exception, I would take it, of the interrogations that were being performed overseas by the Agency Dr. Gottlieb. Right.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall at any time asking how the subjects were selected?

Dr. Gottlieb. How they were selected? I don't remember asking that question.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you remember at any time asking about the prior history of the subject, medical or psychological?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't have any specific recollection of li : that.

Your question was whether I recalled discussions with 16 | White about the prior medical history and the mental state of 17 i the individuals.

I don't remember that specifically. I can't recall it. but I do remember in general sharing with Mr. White any information I had on hazards of this material, as I did with any other information about it.

Mr. Maxwell. Did you tell Mr. White about Mr. Olsen's death?

Dr. Gottlieb. I thinkI told him about it in non-specific 25 terms. I am sure I didn't identify the individual, or probably

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even the specific circumstances, but the fact that there had been that kind of an incident that happened. And I can't specifically recollect, but I probably did.

Mr. Maxwell. Given that episode, was there any interruption -- the episode referring to Mr. Olsen's death -- any interruption in the provision of LSD to Mr. White that you can recall?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't remember that.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall discussing with Mr. White the reactions that the materials we reviewed in regard to the operational use of drugs reveal about the possible consequences of ingestion of LSD or Λ -2?

Dr. Gottlieb. Which material are you referring to now?

Mr. Maxwell. The material we have been reviewing.

Dr. Gottlieb. The operational material? I think in general I shared that with them without reference to snecific operations.

(Confers with counsel.)

Mr. Maxwell. Were you the only individual having contact with Mr. White?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't remember that. It would depend upon the period you are talking about. I clearly was not in touch with him at the time I was in Europe. And I really don't have a good remembrance of that. In fact, I don't even remember now whether the whole project was put in abeyance when

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Dr. Gottlieb. I do not, except that he obviously approved it in some manner, or we couldn't have gone ahead with it.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any information or recollection as to whether he later went to his superiors at the Agency to seek approval?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really have no recollection of that.

Most of my remembrance of those events comes from my reading --: I think you gave us this I.G. material. And that led me to think that the matter was specifically approved right up the chain. There was something in there. And if you want me to dig into that more, if I could see it, I would try to do that.

Mr. Maxwell. Did you work with any other individual in regard to the Bureau of Narcotics activity?

Dr. Gottlieb. You mean besides Mr. White?

I don't remember any. I met Mr. Anslinger in connection with my activity with Mr. White.

Mr. Maxwell. Could you describe that meeting?

Dr. Gottlich. Not specifically, no. I remember being in a building they had down here on 13th Street. And Mr. White introducing me to Mr. Anslinger. As I remember it, there wasn't -- I was going to say, my best recollection is that wasn't a specific discussion of this project, because my understanding was that -- I am just having trouble now, I am fultering, because I don't have a specific remembrance of this.

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I remember meeting Mr. Anslinger and having the general feelin that he was aware of this. And more than that, I am having trouble remembering.

Mr. Maxwell. WAs there anyone else at the meeting aside from you and Mr. Anslinger and Mr. White?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not that I can remember.

Mr. Maxwell. The Inspector General's report indicates that the program started out on the West Coast in 1955, and on the East Coast in 1961.

Dr. Gottlieb. That sounds wrong to me.

Mr. Maxwell. How would you --

Dr. Gottlieb. I would say it started on the East Coast in 1952 to 1955, and sometime in that period -- if I remember correctly, it moved to the West Coast when Mr. White was assigned there, which was later.

Mr. Maxwell. The Inspector General's report indicates that in 1955 -- off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. On the record.

Mr. Lenzner. What was the question?

Hr. Maxwell. The question was, the Inspector General's report notes that the "initial arrangement to obtain the services of a senior representative of the 'organization', and one of his assistants on the West Coast. A parallel arrangement was established on the East Coast in 1961."

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Inspector General about the Bureau of Narcotics testing program Dr. Gottlieb. You mean in this inspection in 1963?

Mr. Lenzner. Did he? 13

I really don't remember that.

Dr. Gottlieb. I assume that I did.

You are asking me for specific recollections. And 1 don't have a specific recollection.

Mr. Maxwell. I am sorry. The record indicates that he

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> Mr. Lenzner. They obviously didn't record his recollec-20 tion accurately.

Dr. Gottlieb. I see. You mean whether I told this East Coast 1961 thing? I will tell you, can I go off the record for a minute, and tell you what I think this confusion is?

Mr. Maxwell. Why don't you do it on the record? Because this material is available, and it would be useful if you can

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Dr. Gottlieb. My recollections of East-West Coast and what arrangements were made is that we made an arrangement with Mr. White that had no safe house connected with it. And he was working on the East Coast. And the facilities he used and how I don't remember.

Then when he moved to the West Coast — that is not quite true. There was something set up on the East Coast when he was there. And I don't remember the details of where that was or what it was or how much it cost. And then he moved to the West Coast. And my recollection is, the project followed him, and I don't have a remembrance of any East Coast anything until a good deal later. And my recollection is that I was not personally involved in this, but a safe house was set up in connection with the Bureau of Marcotics having nothing to do with White and having nothing to do with the unwitting administration of these drugs, but simply in a continuing effort to exchange information with them.

Mr. Maxwell. You are referring to what would apparently be a reference to the East Coast in 1961?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have trouble dating just when it was.
But that is about all I can dredge up as to where these sale
houses were and when they were.

of Mr. Maxwell. Doyou have any awareness of the involvement of Mr. White's assistant?

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Dr. Gottlieb. In arrangements like this with us?

Mr. Maxwell. The only individual you either dealt with or knew about as participating in the Bureau of Narcotics was Mr. White?

Dr. Gottlieb. I was aware that Mr. White might be dealing with one of his assistants. But I wasn't.

Mr. Naxwell. Do you know the name of the assistant he might have been dealing with, or that you had been aware that he might have been dealing with?

Mr. Lenzner. He was asked that question before, and he said he didn't.

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't have a good recollection of that.

I remember somebody when I first met White on the East Coast that drove him around and was his assistant. And whether that was the individual or not I don't know. And I don't remember his name.

Mr. Maxwell. Is his name Mr. George Gaffney, does that ring a bell?

Dr. Gottlieb. The name Mr. Gaffney certainly rings a bell, but not in this connection whatsoever.

Let me make that clear. Caffney in my mind brings up somebody that worked at Narcotics whom White knew, but to my knowledge now had nothing to do with this program.

Mr. Maxwell. The only person you can identify as knowledgeable about the program -- the only person -- would be

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	544-6000	1	Mr. White and Mr. Anslinger. When Mr. Anslinger retired did
	fmone (Area 202)	S	you meet with his successor?
	00 6 (A		Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember that.
	£	4	Mr. Maxwell. Other than the conversation recorded in
		5	your memo of conversation in 1967?
		6	Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember that, but it would be
		7	helpful to me if you would remind me when Mr. Anslinger retired.
		 8	Hr. Maxwell. I think it was in 1962.
		9	Dr. Gottlieb. Was it that early? I really I don't
C		10	think I had a conversation with his successor. If his successor
		1.1	that who his successor was? I remem-
رت د	2	3::	but not in connection with any
	· 0:	3.7	of this.
\bigcirc	3	1.:	Hr. Maxwell. I would like to correct myself. It was
;		1:	not as early as 1962, it was 1964 or 1965.
e. O		1.	Do you recall approximately how much money this pro-
v.		: '	recting the Agency during the period of time in
15		;	which you were involved?
	1 000	;	or. Gottlieb. I don't remember the exact amount.
	. n.c. 2000 1	2	and duess. I will just take a guess, if I may, an and a
	Anthony Services 1.15	:	estimate of about \$10,000 a year.
	*. •	::	Mr. Maxwell. 1 think the material I have shown you
	s, travet,	:	reflects that figure as a startup figure.
<u> </u>)	٠:	Dr. Gottlieb. I see. Maybe that is what I am thinking
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Mr. Maxwell. It does reflect, however, an expenditure in 1963, the only year at that point that we have specific figures on, of \$30,000 a year.

would that figure be -- can you provide any interpretation of the reason why that figure would be substantially greater in that year when according to your recollection the number of tests might well have been less and the CIA's interest might --

Dr. Gottlieb. Sure. In fact the imperfect recollection I have of the two safe houses rather than one should double the amount, because the amount, as I remember it, had to do with simply the costs both for rent and expenses and that sort of thing. Whatever expenses they had incidental to the operations they were using the apartment for, they were fixed, they were not dependent on the things they did.

Mr. Maxwell. If in fact there were two safe houses being maintained, one on the West Coast and one on the East Coast, would it be likely that there were similar forms of testing taking place in both, or to the best of your recollection, was the only person whowas administering LSD covertly to the best of your knowledge Mr. White?

Dr. Gottlieb. To the best of my knowledge, it was Ar.

White. I don't remember -- I am speaking from perhaps a faulty
recollection, but I don't remember covert testing being
done in this latest East Coast safe house.

2: Nr. Maxwell. Is ityour recollection that after Mr. White

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returned from the West Coast there was no covert testing going on in the East Coast?

Dr. Gottlieb. I am not aware that he returned from the West Coast. I am mixed up by what you mean by that. I think Mr. White finally retired on the West Coast, he never came back to the East Coast to my knowledge.

Mr. Naxwell. Then perhaps you can clarify something. The report reads:

"The initial arrangement to obtain the services of a senior representative of the organization and one of his assistants on the West Coast, a parallel arrangement was established on the East Coast in 1961."

The parallel establishment might have included the opening of a safe house in 1961 on the East Coast. But it clearly would treflect the services of a senior representative and his assistant on the East Coast.

Dr. Gottlieb. I can't clarify that much, except to repeat that my remembrance is that the East Coast safe house was established by somebody else, not me. I didn't do it personally. And it was not a center for covert testime.

Mr. Maxwell. I call your attention to the last line of that paragraph, page 11:

"A sum of money had been provided annually to each of the two projects to cover costs of cultivation of targets and of maintenance of a safe house in each area for the observa-

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			112
	0003		
	3, 544-6	1	tion of effect of substances on selected test individuals."
	102 503	2	Dr. Gottlieb. I am reading that now, and I can't
	hone (A	ō	I am just having trouble with my memory and pinning down and
	-	7.	giving you my best recollection.
		5	Again, I could speculate that somehow by this time they
		6	had hoped to test individuals, but they didn't on the East
		7	Coast, if that is what they were doing.
		8	But anyway, I don't have a remembrance of tests being run
を 16		û	there.
175).O	Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.
_		13	(Discussion off the record.)
	5 5	12	Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.
10	2 C =	13	It is your recollection that you had no contact with
C.	3	3.4	the safe house project for any covert testing if it went on
		3 :.	on the EAst Coast?
		3.6	Dr. Gottlieb. That is my recollection.
		17	Mr. Lenzner. After a certain period?
	•	10	Mr. Maxwell. After 1961.
7	10001	21:	Dr. Gottlieb. Right.
	ن	2:	·
	wasnington, D	z:	been connected with this project?
	S.E.: W.	22	Dr. Gottlieb. I can only think of other people in TSD,
	Street.	2.	not me.
	<u>.</u>	£.	Mr. Maxwell. Who would the logical person in TSD have be
		2	in connection with this?
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Dr. Gottlieb. One of three, I would think, to the best of my recollection.

Again, I may be forgetting another individual in there.
But I don't think so.

Mr. Maxwell. The evidence that we have indicates that the DCI and the DDP were briefed annually on the MKULTRA program.

Did you organize these briefings?

Dr. Gottlieb. What period are we talking about now, the period prior to 1963 again?

Mr. Maxwell. Prior to 1963.

Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't remember whether I personally 12 " gave those briefings, whether I organized them, and Dec.

14 paints gave them, or whoever the Chief of TSD was. I don't have that specific recollection of that. Whereas later on 1 remains member very clearly that there are written reports on MKULTRA that went up semi-annually or annually after the

Mr. Maxwell. The Inspector General's report indicates that the MKULTRA program director has, in fact, provided close supervision of the testing program from the beginning,

and makes periodic visits to the sites.

Who would that individual be?

Dr.Gottlieb:

Inspector General's report.

Mr. Maxwell. The I.G.'s report also indicates that you'

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had stated that "the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics has stated that the Director of the Bureau of Narcotics would disclaim all knowledge and responsibility in the event of compromise."

The quote ends there.

A later memorandum from Mr. Helms indicates that that was confused in that he would disclaim responsibility if asked

8 by the Agency.

Dr. Gottlicb. Behave in a manner to protect our interests.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall discussing that with Mr.

ll ∮ Anslinger?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not specifically. My recollection of that is based almost entirely on the materials that you are referring to now.

Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. One of the criticisms which the Inspector General's report makes of the program is the inability of the observers to either make appropriate scientific comments on what they saw or in fact to make observations beyond the first hours of the test.

The Inspector General's report indicates that there was more than one agent observing. But whether or not this was, the same problems would seem to arise, both from the law of training of the person who was reporting in the context

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of an experiment, and the lack of opportunity in informant situations to observe over long periods of time.

Do you recall this criticism arising in the Inspector General's report?

Dr. Gottlieb. I vaguely recall it. Could I reread it?

Mr. Maxwell. It is page 12.

Dr. Cottlieb. I think my only comment from that is that I don't think this corner of the ULTRA project was looked upon as a scientific experiment, it was more of an operational, simulated operational test. And I don't think, as I remember it, that we were hoping to get what I would call scientific information from it.

What we were really after was how much operational good it did in the Bureau of Narcotics terms, were they able to get more information or not.

Any other information, of course, would be useful. that was the main purpose of it. And my remembrance is that although they might not have stuck with these subjects around the clock, they had repeated access to them, they could see them the next day, they could find out what happened.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall the hospitalization that resulted from one of the applications of LSD as referenced in the I.G. report?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't recall the specifics of it. When I read the report I remember that something like that

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Mr. Maxwell. Did you initiate or the CIA individuals initiate the contact with George White, or did you wait for him to contact you?

Dr. Gottlieb. No, it was both ways, I am sure.

Mr. Maxwell. And do you recall in the context of your briefing or CIA's briefing of the DDP and the DCI specifically describing this relationship with the Bureau of Narcotics?

Dr. Gottlich. Would you say that again, please?

Mr. Maxwell. If you did the briefings for the DDP or the DCI do you recall whether you specifically brought up the question of the relationship to the Bureau of Narcotics prior to 1963?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't specifically remember that.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall being told that the person who did the briefing brought that up?

Dr. Gottlieb. No, I can only say I don't remember any instance of my feeling or discussing that it shouldn't be brought up.

Mr. Maxwell. The Inspector General's report states again as one of the potential weaknesses of the program was the risk of compromise. Was the security of the program an important consideration to CIA?

Dr. Gottlieb. Certainly.

Mr. Maxwell. The Inspector General's report indicates that medical consultation and assistance is obtained when

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	e (Ares 202) 544.6000		118
		1	appropriate through separate MKULTRA arrangements in order to
		2	protect the security which might be thretened if an individual
	Proof	3	went to a specialist who correctly diagnosed the illness as
		4	resulting the ingestion of LSD.
		5	Do you recall CIA making available medical consulta-
		6	tion and assistance to Mr. White or to any other individuals
		7	in the Bureau of Narcotics for this purpose?
	**************************************	8	Dr. Gottlieb. I remember us making available in at
<i>ن</i>		9	least two instances that I can remember medical individuals,
C		10	physicians who were doing work in this field, and were what you
`	J	11	might call expert in it, available to Mr. White for consulta-
11.	4 L	121	tion and information.
•	0 4 3	18 1	Nr. Lenzner. Off the record.
€.		1:	(Discussion off the record.)
⇔		3:	Mr. Maxwell. Back on the record.
:: ::-		16	To the best of your recollection, was the administration
		17	of LSD by !!r. White done in the context of his administering
	_	1.1	it to a single individual?
	2000	2.7	Dr. Gottlieb. I can answer that by saying, to the best
	ior, 0.6	½ .	of my recollection that was always done. To the best of my
	PH-12.27	* * 1.	recollection, those administrations were in the mode of a police:
	7.	233	enforcement officer to informant or informants they
	310 Luxi 'ared', N.J., Wavinighti, 0.6, 2000	27	may have had in the room at the time. That is what I mean.
		, : • 1	- Mr. Maxwell. Can you recall ever becoming aware of any
		£ŧ	incident where individuals having no connection with Mr. White
		;	TOD CE DET

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would gather together and had LSD administered covertly to them?

Dr. Gottlicb. Not to my recollection.

Mr. Maxwell. The inspector General's report describes one of the advantages of working with the Bureau of Narcotics on page 11 as follows:

"The particular advantage of these arrangements with the organization officials had been that test sugjects could be sought and cultivated within the setting of narcotics control. Some subjects have been informers or members of suspect criminal elements from whom the organization has obtained results of operational value through the tests.

On the other hand, the effectiveness of the substances on individuals at all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign, is of great significance, and testing has been performed on a variety of individuals within these categories."

Can you recall any instances whereby you become aware that Mr. White used LSD covertly against people he suspected of being involved in narcotics trade or of criminal activity in general rather than particularly with informants?

Dr. Gottlieb. Could you repeat that? I am really trying to get the distinction between informants -- you mean people who were either narcotics addicts --

Mr. Maxwell. Harcotics addicts or people he suspected of being involved in narcotics drug trafficking.

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Dr. Gottlieb. I guess my answer would be that I assume that he gave it to people like that, people from whom he miginget information, and not just an informant who comes and say: here is what I am telling you. It might have been some suspect My impression is that they were used that way. I can't bring up specific cases that I know like that.

Mr. Lenzner. As a practical matter I don't see how that can be done. But in any event, I won't belabor the record.

You can't have control over arrest or detention of a suspect unless he is an informant.

Dr. Gottlieb. I assume you are talking about having sombody up to this apartment and giving him a drink?

Mr. Maxwell. But your recollection is not that it was solely done with people who were in an informant relationship

Dr. Gottlieb. I am assuming that he did his work on a group of people that had connections with his narcotics enfoment work. And I am not restricting them to what we both undestand as informants.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection of becoming aware of any incident which involved his covertly testing LSD on people not in any way connected with his work in law enforcement.

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't have any specific information o

Mr. Maxwell. The Inspector General report notes that

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	VEA 202) 544-6000	1	testing has been performed to a variety of individuals within
		2	these categories, these categories is being individuals at all
	mone (Ar	5	social levels high and low, native Americans and foreign.
		4	Would that refer to Mr. White's activities or other
		5	covert testing activities of the Agency?
		б	Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't know. It might refer
		7	to the overseas work, too. I just don't know.
		8	Mr. Maxwell. Have you any information on covert testing,
C C		9	which we have agreed, I:think, is testing without the knowledge
C1		10	of theindividual?
CC		13	Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.
: _	704)::	Mr. Maxwell. Outside of the covert testing which was
	0 : < ×	3 %	being performed by Mr. White using substances supplied by
	,	1:	CIN?
Ç.		15	Dr. Gottlieb. No.
c: tr.		14.	Mr. Maxwell. Were the substances supplied by CIA
1-		17	i limited to LSD?
		10	Dr. Gottlieb. To the best of my knowledge. Now, this
	.000.	3 : '	memorandum you remember discussed chloral hydrate and marijuana,
	nn, P.C. 2000.	2:	and I forget one other substance.
	r.k	:::	Mr. Maxwell. The other substance was tablets. I wanted to
	-	2:	ask you if you can recall that.
	though.	۲.	Dr. Gottlieb. I can't recall. I would say that it is
•		. : ·	
	-	::	lashing on at a tablet, tetrahydr -
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Dr. Gottlieb. I don't really recollect that being done,

or why it was done. I don't have a --

cannibis, I would say it might have been, but I don't have a remembrance of it.

Chloral hydrate is a substance anybody can get anywhere.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection of the relationships between CIA and FBI in this connection with regard to the possible covert application of LSD or other drugs?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have no recollection of that.

Mr. Maxwell. Did you ever discuss or did anyone to the best of your Knowledge in TSS discuss covert testing with the FBI?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my knowledge.

Let me remind you again, I wasn't around for two years when this work was boing on, and it could have happened then, but not to my knowledge.

Later on we had coordinated activities with the FBI in some fields of research and audio and photography, and we certainly dealt with them. But I don't remember this area ever being taken up with it.

Mr. Maxwell. Some of the office of Finance records with respect to MKULTRA indicate that Mr. White was paid certain of these funds in cash.

Do you have any recollection as to why that would be? He was also paid by check.

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Mr. Lenzher. What kind of amounts are we talking about?

Mr. Maxwell. \$300, \$500, cash apparently and consistently for about \$1500 a check. And the records are very scanty, because the Office of Finance records prior to 1960 have been destroyed.

Dr. Gottlieb. I can't answer that.

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York and California used for CIA operations at all?

Dr. Gottlieb. My memory is hazy on that, but I believe my answer to that is, certainly not for CIA operations.

They might have been used formcetings -- we are talking about research, and as I said, it could be right or wrong, that some of these meetings where we self-administered LSD early on were held there. But I certainly don't remember anything operationally, if by that you mean connected with Agency operations, I don't remember any of that, as distinct from activity TSD was involved in in their research program.

Mr. Maxwell. Mr. Helms described the relationship as using the Bureau of Marcotics as a "cutout".

What would be mean by using the Bureau as a cutout?

Dr. Gottlieb. Could I read or see the context in which he said that? I think I could answer that better. Where abouts would it be? Because I remember reading some of that and even feeling that it can be misunderstood.

Yr. Zarwell. Is that in the August memo, 19 Augus: ::

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Dr. Gottlieb. You mean just a step once removed from us to get this testing done?

Mr. Maxwell. How is the term "cutout" usually used?

Dr. Gottlieb. It is used in several ways. means to remove the CIA by one or two steps from the activity itself, whether that is funding, or -- in this case he says specifically testing.

Mr. Maxwell. It might be useful to go through some specific questions in regard to these memoranda which reflect the end of the covert testing program. I can ask specific questions about them. Mr. Helms described in the same memorandum, I believe, that the information is commensurate with the risks, which he described as real.

Were you involved in the preparation of the memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence?

I imagine that I was, sure. Dr. Cottlieb.

Mr. Maxwell . And it is your testimony that the reports were of substantial value or the information was of substantial value?

Dr. Gottlieb. Oh, yes.

Mr. Maxwell. Who would those reports have gone to, is in fact you were meeting with Mr. White, if you have forwarded copies of either written reports by him or memoranda for the record about the results to individuals outside of TSD?

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TOP SECRE 125 Dr. Gottlieb. I certainly wouldn't have done that. think they should have been aired with the individual who would work on the program within the TSD. Mr. Maxwell. And that would have been , and Dr. Lashbrook --Dr. Gottlieb. And later on I guens possibly Mr. Maxwell. There is a meeting on 29 November 1963 which discussed the "testing of certain drugs on unwitting U.S. \odot 10 citizens." I take it by your testimony that to the best of your 11 recollection it was only LSD rather than any other drugs? 1.2 Dr. Cottlieb. Right. I am not saying that these other drugs we talked about Ţ., might not have been used once or twice early on, but certainly the principal thrust was LSD and possibly Meretran was used here, too. I don't remember exactly when. 17 Mr. Maxwell. Were you present at this meeting? Dr. Gottlieb. It says I was. So,I assume I was. I don't have a specific recollection of it new. Mr. Maxwell. Mr. Earman indicated his belief that the facilities which were available for uncontrolled testing left : : much to be desired. Do you recall members of the Inspector General's staff . . . visiting those facilities, or do you recall briefing them on

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1	them?
ê î 2	Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember them visiting them.
Prove (Area 202) 544-6000	They were probably briefing them, but I don't remember it
٠	specifically.
5	Mr. Maxwell. And facilities were in the two safe houses?
6	Dr. Gottlieb. I imagine so.
7	Mr. Maxwell. Were there any other facilities that were
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;; 9	
C+ 16	Nr. Maxwell. Do you know if at any time medical
cc. 1	personnel were present at the tests conducted by Mr. White?
	Dr. Gottlieb. I doubt it very much.
4 : 1	Mr. Maxwell. One of the advantages which the Inspector
} ; 1	General's report noted for the arrangement with the Bureau of
	i ! Narcotics was that the Bureau had very strong and close
	in the strip in the strip is the strip in th
	in fact a flap that arose, the Bureau might be able to call when
	To the best of your knowledge, was there ever such a flap?
	Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my recollection.
n.v.	Mr. Maxwell. Or such a breach of security?
	Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember any flap of any pro-
\$ 5 cc 2 c	portion in connection with this program.
	Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall at any time the Bureau o:
V =	-1: Narcotics-going-to-local police in connection with this project
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	02) 54	1	or with any other project with which the CIA was engaged in
	Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000	2	a cooperative effort with them in order to minimize the secur-
	Prong	3	ity damage?
		4	Dr. Gottlieb. I have no recollection of that.
		5	Mr. Maxwell. Then to the best of your knowledge the
		6	comment in the I.G.'s report didn't reflect an actual incident
		7	where this occurred?
		8	Dr. Gottlieb. I think it was potential rather than an
c>		9	incident.
O		10	Mr. Maxwell. In December of 1963 Mr. Helms wrote
C	J	11	another memorandum for the DDCI on the subject of the testing
ت. ا	\ \ \	in "	of psychochemicals. He described the arrangement that we
	=	1%	had with the Bureau of Narcotics as eight years of close
•		14	collaboration.
en Ca		3 to ∫	Would that description appear accurate to you, given your
<u>.</u>		14	description of the program?
1 -		3.5 7	Dr. Gottlieb. That is a hard question for me to
	=	1.0	answer. Yes, I guess that would be accurate.
	£ 2000	3.14	Hr. Maxwell. He also goes on to say "Continued attention
	٠ - ا	200	to observation and control of the results of the
	VI JATANIA.	21	testing, as feasible, would be exercised."
	ast Steret, 5.1., Vastandrai, 6.6., 2000 i	28	Your testimony so far has provided relatively little in-
	7 () () () () () () () () () (1.7	formation about the questions of observation and control of
•	7 2 4	23	the results of the testing. And I was wondering if you might
		28 .	be able to expand about what Mr. Helms meant by that statement.

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going to be made aware of this project.

Was the Office of Security aware throughout the period of time that there was an arrangement with the Bureau of Narcotics that TSS, then TSD, had such an arrangement? Dr. Gottlieb. I think so.

Now, when you say the Office of Security, I want to be careful. There were several groups in that that would have different relationships to this. I don't know whether the Artichoke side had any awareness, but certainly the security side that had to do with security approvals and that sort of thing had an awareness.

Mr. Maxwell. Did you ever talk that you can recollect to any individual within the Office of Security about this?

Dr. Gottlieb. I have no specific recollection. But I believe I did, because the question of George White's clearance 10% and the purpose of it came up.

Mr. Maxwell. But subsequent to that discussion?

٠. ٢ Dr. Gottlieb. Subsequent to that I really don't have

a recollection.

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Mr. Maxwell. WAs there any reason why this was not presented to or reported to the Artichoke Committee?

Dr. Gottlieb. I imagine the only reason would have been a concern for broadening the awareness of its existence.

Mr. Maxwell. Dr. Gottlieb, you have testified that there was to the best of your knowledge no other covert testing

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program being run under CIA auspices other than the Bureau of Marcotics testing program?

Dr. Gottlieb. To my knowledge there wasn't.

Mr. Maxwell. There was, however, an extensive research program in regard to human experimentation on psychochemicals?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Mr. Maxwell. Was this all performed under the funding structure of MKULTRA, or was this funded separately?

Dr. Gottlieb. I am just thinking -- to the best of my recollection, it was all pulled together under ULTPA.

Mr. Maxwell. Was the Agency involved in designing the controls on the testing using human subjects and psychochemicals?

Dr. Gottlieb. I guess my answer to that would be to the extent that the project monitor for the particular project was dealing with the principal investigator in the design of the project, there would be that kind of involvement.

But certainly we would leave it to the institution or the investigator to do the design of the experiment.

Mr. Maxwell. Did CIA independently require the investigation of the medical or psychological state of the subjects of the test utilizing human volunteers and psychochemicals?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think we would leave that to the investigator and institution involved, whatever their normal practices were, that is what we would go along with.

Hr. Maxwell. Did the CIA ever independently require

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followup on the part of the instrumentalities who were with the research on subjects, human subjects, who had been tested with psychochemicals?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not that I can remember. We assumed that we are dealing with responsible, experienced investigators, and we went along with our own standards.

In other words, I am trying to make the point that in choosing the institutions that we did, our choice -- onece the criteria was how responsible they were, how thorough they were, and how careful they were.

Mr. Maxwell. To the best of your knowledge, have there been any deaths in connection with human use experiments that were conducted or supported directly or indirectly by CIA?

Dr. Gottlicb. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Mr. Maxwell. To the best of your knowledge have there been any injuries in connection with human use experiments that were connected or supported directly or indirectly by CIA?

Dr. Gottlieb. Injuries is a term -- someone who has had

LSD and fallen down, you know, or had a minor incident, and I

might not remember it. Any major incident like that I can't

remember. We are excluding Dr. Olsen.

Mr. Maxwell. Were there any incidents that required hospitalization to the best of your knowledge?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really can't testify as to that, because

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a lot of these things were done in hospitals and mental institutions. And when you say hospitalization, the people were already hospitalized.

Nr. Lenzner. He is asking as a result of any experiments or tests.

Dr. Gottlieb. I want to testify carefully on this point.

And if I said, not to my recollection, which I was inclined to say to that, because of a major injury as a result of an LSD experiment, I would say --

Mr. Maxwell. Let's use that as a definition.

Dr. Gottlieb. All right.

My answer is, not to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Maxwell. In order to make the record clear, how are you defining major injury?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't know what I can quantify that for you really. I am using it in a more qualitative sense, as something that required the kind of medical care that would be more than an oversight, something like that, because he was upset.

Mr. Maxwell. Were there incidents such as you just describe where people were kept in hospitals overnight because of their being upset?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember any such specific instances
But I am leaving that proviso that they might have been. I
think a major hospitalization I would be made aware of.

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Mr. Maxwell. As the person who was generally -would it be fair to describe yourself as the person who was
generally responsible for MXULTRA throughout its existence as
the I.G. report did?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't think that is quite accurate.

In the first place, I wasn't there for two years. And in the second place, there was a program director under me when I was Deputy Chief TSD and had many, many other responsibilities.

Mr. Maxwell. Prior to the time that you left for overseas assignment --

Dr. Gottlieb. I think that would be accurate.

Mr. Maxwell. Between the time that you returned to TSD and the time that you became Deputy Chief, would that be accurate?

Dr. Cottlieb. No, that would not be accurate, because for a long period there -- I don't know how long, a year or two -- I was Chief of the R&D program with many other responsibilities, and only one of the branches under that ran the ULTRA program.

Mr. Maxwell. Other than the incident that you described in your opening statement involving Dr. Olsen, and the incidents of self-administration, and the incidents of incident

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
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136 Phone (Aves 202) 544-6000 Dr. Gottlieb. I thinkI mentioned in my opening statement there was a period that I referred to as defensive pharmacology. Mr. Lenzer. Which you testified about already. 5 Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. Mr. Lenzner. People going abroad that could recognize 6 7 and identify. Dr. Gottlieb. That was done on CIA auspices with CIA 8 9 medics present. :·) Mr. Maxwell. You had mentioned yesterday in regard to 10 \subset the interrogations reported at the QKHILLTOP conference) } that QKHILLTOP had a domestic counterpart, or that part of its activities had domestic ramifications. Did that involve research on human subjects as part of 14) (· · · · it? Dr. Gottlieb. I am very confused about that. I am not 14 only confused about that, I am confused about your question in terms of -- let me talk about HILLTOP for a moment. 1 :-My remembrance of HILLTOP goes in two directions. One is 1: as I said several times, it seemed to be a name that followed the name of the Artichoke Coordinating Committee. For a while : : security and we and the medics would get together to talk 2: about this general field of influencing human behaviour. miso was and home with the of a face securi rater a TSD inherited to ject centered arou


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	202) 544	1	research facility in New York and being
	(۵، دع ع	2	organization.
	F	5	So, when you say, did it involve human experimentation,
	3A-4	4	
	" C	5	ut I can't remember that
		6	specifically.
		7	It is also quite possible, by the way, that what I am
		3	talking about as HILLTOP being some research activity up in
ပ		9	-New-York bunger an lindividual.
77) C3		1.0	I want to go off the record.
)		11	(Discussion off the record.)
t i)	1.0	Dr. Gottlieb. Included in these activities there were
	3	13	some human experimentation as an open medical research pro-
	,	14	ject involving LSD.
		15	Mr. Maxwell. To the best of your knowledge, were there
ι.		20	any deaths or injuries requireing hospitalization involved in
		17	that project?
		1 ::	Dr. Gottlieb. To the best of my knowledge, no.
	10605	19	Mr. Maxwell. There is a reference in an analysis of
	1.3(2	1)(4)	which indicate
	C	2:	that HILLTOP was transferred to TSD in 1953.
	S.C., W	2:/ :	Does that help you at all in recalling how it fits into
	in Fust Storet, S.C., Washing	27	the
•	<u>10</u> Fux	24	Dr. Cottligh. > I read that somewhere in the papers you
	7	25	gave me. Yes; it is helpful.
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Mr. Maxwell. Did you become aware of an investigation that was being conducted of Wallace Chan by the Office of Security?

Dr. Gottlieb. I do remember that. But I can't place it in time. And I don't remember it in detail or as a major thing, but I remember it as an event.

Mr. Maxwell. Can you provide any more detail on that? Dr. Gottlieb. I remember what you had. And that had really more detail than I independently know. And I don't remember what the end of it was.

Mr. Maxwell. Did you discuss the activities of MKULTRA and Wallace Chan with representatives of the Office of Security? Dr. Gottlieb. Could you remind me of what date that all

What time period? It is an important thing.

Mr. Maxwell. It is 1963-1964.

Dr. Gottlieb. I mention it, because as I remember it,

solely almost was involved in this. I was involved in it only in a supervisory sense. And that is my remembrance of it. I remember being tickled memory-wise by what I read, and I remember a period where

and those companies were around, when an investigation was going on. And I remember several crises in terms of whether we were going to pay. that sort of thing. But it is confusing. I remember that

was on top of it.

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2 **1.3**(a)(ā) Mr. Maxwell. Did you know that the Office of Security was preparing to request the tax returns of Dr. Treichler

Dr. Gottlieb. No, I did not know that.

Mr. Maxwell. Can you recall what TSD's response was to the allegations and how they were handled within your office?

if there were irregularities, and you now mentioning for the

Dr. Gottlieb. My only recollection was on my part that

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first time suspicion of personal irregularity on the part

of and neither of whom up

to now I would have thought might get involved in that sort of thing.

And I don't have a recollection of that. And the inference is that they were personally doing something with money that they shouldn't to benefit themselves.

I gather that is the inference, and this is the first intimation of that that I have had. I don't remember that.

Mr.Maxwell. What was the response when the allegations began to surface as they obviously did.

Dr. Gottlieb. I remember only that I wanted to play it absolutely straight and have it looked into and let the chips fall as they may.

Mr. Maxwell. Did TSD assist in the Office of Security investigation?

Dr. Gottlieb. I can't remember that.

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TOPSECRE 142 The paper apparently from the Office of Mr. Maxwell. Security mentions the special sensitivity of NASA. Dr. Gottlieb. The NASA type, by the way, was new to me. I hadn't remembered that at all. 4 Mr. Maxwell. The Office of Security notes indicate that this was a special sensitive, in quotes, of NASA and CIA 6 7 connections. Do you have any reason why there would be a special sen-8 1.2 sivity about that? ٠._-Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember any NASA-CIA connections 10 c, Mr. Maxwell. Might that have to do with overhead 11 ز.. ١. reconnaissance questions? 12 # Dr. Gottlieb. I gather from reading that that WASA had 13 biological oriented research research going on or contracted out to those companies, and that was how they came into it. C.. Mr. Maxwell. I think it was space-related biological ، نا 11: ī ... 17 research: Dr. Gottlieb. Space biology, yes. And I had no j .. recllection of that. And I had no recollection of our and TSD having any relationship with MASA. Mr. Maxwell. Do you have any recollection of what steps: 2: were followed in regard to the allegations that were made? Dr. Gottlieb. No. 2. Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall the recordkeeping of HKULTRA? 2:

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Dr. Gottlieb. It was done almost entirely by Dr.

, if you are talking about finances. I don't have a good recollection of that. All I know is that we had an administrative annex to the project that changed after the 1963 I.G. report, and that we followed that administrative annex.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall what the 1963 I.G. report said about the record keeping of MKULTRA?

Dr. Gottlieb. I recall what I read in thsse recent readings, that although some of the projects covered under ULTRA scemed to warrant this kind of special handling, there were some few that didn't, and he recommended that we take those out of ULTRA and handle them by more normal procedures, which we did, and that we utilize the facilities on the administrative side of the agency more than we were to help us administer this.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall the criticism of the record as being incomplete?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, I do recall that.

Mr. Maxwell. Did the peculiar circumstances of the record of MKULTRA and the waiver of normal Agency accounting procedures or formal Agency project procedures to the best of your recollection make it more difficult to conduct an invest: gation of the Chan case?

Dr. Gottlieb. I am sure they did.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall, prior to reading the Office

of Security notes, that the Office of Security had no information

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Dr. Gottlieb. I have no such recollection.

Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

(Discussion of the record.)

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		1	(Discussion off the record.)
	Ares 20	2	Dr. Gottlieb. Back on the record.
	Priore	3	I would guess that this one that is called referred
	sel	4	to a psychochemical -related research project.
	300	5	Project Artichoke I don't have to comment on. We have
		6	talked about that a lot.
		7	And I don't recognize the crypts of any of the others.
		8	Mr. Lenzner. Let the record reflect that the witness
		9	has been shown a typed list of 30 or 40 names, I haven't
۲.		10	counted them. And they are dated 1950, which was 27 years ago,
دء ت		11	to 1900, the latest date being 1961, which is some 14 years
1.7	7 4 4	1::	i ago.
•	4 0 : <	1 %	Dr. Gottlieb. Off the record, please.
 (3	14	(Discussion off the record.)
C:		15	Mr. Maxwell. The list is a list that is retyped from
b,		10	the document destruction list provided to the Senate
:		; ;	reflecting the documents that were
	•	; ·	destroyed in January of 1973.
	10002	2	Dr. Gottlieb. I was only referring to the number I have
	7. O.C.	::	seen in the Rockefeller Commission of 1972.
	Salvares	: .	Mr. daxwell. I think the number they use is 151, and the
	el, S.E., Washinipian, O.C. 2009)	2:	CIA has maintained that there were four, because they weren't
	Suret. S	:::	records of certain projects, or that things were double
•	116 1 011	: 4	counted.

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There are only a couple of other things I wanted to ask

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you about in regard to the particular project. There is an indication that project No. 63 of MKULTRA also involved the use of the assistance of a physician. And I would appreciate it if you could comment in general about the work that he was performing under MKULTRA.

Dr. Gottlieb is being shown an excerpt from the transcr tion of Office of Finance records for a year in the early sixt Dr. Gottlieb. Well, the individual to which you refer here, number three, was associated with the ULTRA research

program for a long time, long before the first date that you have here, and also in general was doing research on LSD.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you know the substance of the research Can you recall that?

Dr. Gottlieb. I can only recall that it generically involved doing research on LSD administration to human volunteers in a research setting. And it was not covert research, it was research that was open.

Mr. Maxwell. In particular in regard to this project, and in regard to all of the other psychochemical testing programs using human volunteers, do you have any recollection as to the kind of information which was given the volunteers which led to them being described as witting?

I don't have that specifically. You Dr. Gottlieb. asked me before a question that was related to this. In this 2: particular case I visited this project myself several times,

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and my remembrance is that there isn't any question that the material the individual was going to get was described to them quite carefully, the circumstance of the experimentation was described carefully, and they were given a medical checkup.

(Discussion off the record.)

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Dr. Gottlieb. In general my remembrance of this project was that it was a very carefully run project in which the volunteers were given a great deal of information.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you think it would be an exemplary experiment?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really couldn't comment on that based on my recollection of that long ago.

Mr. Maxwell. Would the person who is monitoring the individual product be aware of the description of the substance to be given which was provided to the volunteers?

Dr. Gottlieb. It would depend upon how carefully he monitored the project.

Mr. Maxwell. So it might vary from project to project?

Dr. Gottlieb. Right.

Mr. Maxwell. There was another individual, according to the Office of Finance records, who was provided funds in cash.

And I was wondering if you could look at that individual and the subject project number which is 113, and describe if you can --

Dr. Gottlieb. The individual name I can remember, but I

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don't remember what he did or where he did it, and I can't answer, I can't respond to your question, because I don't have a memory of what this fellow did.

And it happens to be a period, as you know, that I wasn't in TSD.

Mr.Maxwell. The Inspector General's report in 1963 indicates that the food and drug report was changing its regulations and there was some concern on the part of the Agency that that would interfere with the testing program that was going on under MKULTRA?

Dr. Gottlieb. I remember reading that.

Hr. Maxwell. Do you recall any changes in TSD procedures 13 \parallel that followed the change in FDA regulations?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember that. I think we would have depended upon the contractors we have to make the adjustments that they had to in that context. But I don't have any 17 specific remembrance of whether or not there were specific chang 13% that were either good or bad in relation to the program of this 10 : project.

Mr. Maxwell. The regulations, I believe, require the 21 " notification of the FDA of tests involving human subjects, and 22 focussed primarily on drugs certified for experimental use, but not for general distribution.

. Dr. Gottlieb. I don't think that would have bothered us, because most of the projects that were contracted out unde:

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ULTRA were expected to stand on their own, they were expected to publish, to exist in the open scientific community.

Mr. Maxwell. Can you recall which other ones, aside from the relationship with the Bureau of Narcotics, that were not expected to function that we -- the Bureau of Nartotics was not expected to function that way, excluding MKAPPLE?

Dr. Gottlieb. I remember what that is.

I think my response to that would be, I can't remember any specific ones that were excluded, except to say that where the investigators were running across information that they didn't feel should be published or whose publication would somethow prejudice some use we would have, or something like that, they would deal with us privately on it. I don't know if I made myself clear. In other words, if an investigator who was running a publishable project ran across information that he had any reason to think we wouldn't want published, he would tell us, and we would consult about how that could be published with no hazard to the Agency's goals.

Mr. Maxwell. But with the two project exceptions, the expectation was hat all the other MKULTRA projects would be publishable?

Dr. Gottlieb. Since I don't remember what they all were,
I hesitate to make that all-inclusive statement. But my impression was, yes.

Mr. Maxwell. To the best of your recollection, did the

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project approval mechanism for MKULTRA projects follow first in 1953 the mechanism described in the MKULTRA Project description and then later in 1964, '64-'64 the proposal found in the June 1964 memorandum revising the earlier project approval mechanism and description?

.Dr. Gottlieb. To the best of my membrance, those procedures were followed.

Mr. Naxwell. Dr. Gottlieb, according to statements by individuals who previously were with TSD, there was testing on human subjects in two facilities, one, a prison in California, and another a drug treatment facility in Kentucky.

Do you recall those experiments, or those projects in particular?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, I recall their existence. I probably wouldn't recall anything about them.

Mr. Maxwell. Can you recall what, if any, pre-screening was done in these two projects?

Dr. Gottlieb. By pre-screening you mean how the subjects were selected?

Mr. Maxwell. That is correct.

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't have a specific recollection

that.

Mr. Manwell. Do you recall what information was provided to the individuals at these institutions about the testing which they were going to undergo?

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	}	244-66	
		202)	Dr. Gottlieb. I don't recall that. But in the case of
		Phone (Ares 202)	the Kentucky one, I assumed we were dealing with an institu-
	:	ت 5 <u>ک</u>	tion that had a lot of experience with this situation,
		4	and I just assumed they were following proper procedures re-
		5	
	;	J	lated to the previous work they had done, not funded by us.
		6	Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall what followup, if any, was
		7	performed at those two institutions?
		8	Dr. Gottlieb. I don't recall that.
		1.3(a)(4)	Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall the project in
	ינתי	· C 10	the context of experiments involving human subjects?
	យ	11	Dr. Gottlieb. That word brings no memory of anything
	ά.	د د	l
		13	to me.
	୍ଦ	1%	Mr. Maxwell. And do you recall an organization inamed
	c.	1.3(a)(4)	
	C.	C 15	Dr. Gottlieb. I do not.
	0		
	u,	16	Would it be helpful for me to read that?
	1"~	3.7	Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall the medical explorations
		2.8	communications organization?
			Dr. Gottlieb. That doesn't recall anything to my mind.
		5 6 8	Off the record, please.
		25.	(Discussion off the record.)
		27 27	Mr. Maxwell. Dr. Gottlieb, in order to clarify your
		2 Street.	testimony, I believe you testified carlier that there was no
		10 Less 10 Les	overseas research performed for CIA?
		25	Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. I have reason to modify that a
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	Phone (Airs 202) 544.6000	1	little, based on something you showed me, which is that at one
	(Ares 2	2	period in the evolution of a human ecology society there were
	P1007	3	grants and by grants I mean there were amounts of money that
		C _t	were given and it was understood there wouldn't be a monitor-
		5	ing of the project, they were just given to have the work
		6	done, and there were two reasons for this. One was to validate
		7	the society, and as much as we could, to make the researches,
		8	open though they were, relevant to what some of our ends were.
		9	Now, I had forgotten that. I don't remember any of
o Lib		10	human testing or even with
cc.		11	but I don't remember
) }	13	
	0 =	13	described things, one known
· · · · ·	3	3.4	thing and the other known as the study.
	,	1.3(a)(4	Can you clarify those at all?
© -		C .	Dr. Gottlieb. Let me see the papers that refer to
l::		1.	Tromomber reading those two and getting
		3.7	percent but I don't think it was specific
	0.6. 20001		enough to help you.
			Off the record.
. as ==	,	::	
	And the state of t		Dr. Gottlieb. I think the study referred
		1.3(a)	to something that had undertaken us an array
			the pursued when I was in and either started or
	7	. ;	finished up before or after that when he came to headquarters,
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sociologically and psychologically in terms of what could one believe was uniquely true about this group. I don't remember any psychochemical or any other inference this had than for the operations officer who was working with to bridge this gap between his understanding of people and whatever was unique about the And I would only have to infer from that that the study was a similar project with

Mr. Maxwell. Dr. Gottlieb, that same report on page 6 describes something as cover grant funds.

Do you recall what that term referred to?

Dr. Gottlieb. I believe that it refers to funds that we released that might not be too closely tied into the specific goals of the DDP, but rather were necessary to validate the cover purposes of the human ecology fund.

As I said, as I remember it, the attempt was made to make those as relevant as they could be. But it was recognized that we would have to spend some money in that area.

Mr. Maxwell. The Inspector General's report in 1963 notes that over the ten-year life of the program many additional avenues to the control of human behavior have been designated by the TSD management as appropriate investigation under the MKULTRA charter, including radiation, electric shock, as well as various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, anthro-

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pology, graphology, harassment substances, and paramilitary devices and materials.

Can you recall any experiments involving the use of radiation which would involve the potential control of human behavior?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. I remember Dr. Maitland Baldwin at NIII doing some experiments on primates that were designed to just explore the effects of microwave radiation on human behavior.

Now, the general purpose of that was to provide us with information defensive or offensive in nature. They actually came in very handy because, you remember, of the big fuss that was stirred up with the Soviets. I don't know whether that was public knowledge or not. But anyway, the Soviet audio surveillance system or suspected surveillance system was flooding the U.S. Embassy in Moscow with micro-energy, and no one has yet figured out what the energy was, except that it was intense and can be measured. And there was great concern about how harmful this was. And I remember Maitland Baldwin's work was related to that. But we were also interested as to whether there were some behavior changes in these primates which might lead us to think you could make use of that.

I don't remember anything useful coming out of that work And there was probably some work by other people of similar nature, but I don't remember what it was.

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Mr. Maxwell. There are a couple of general questions
that I wanted to ask you about MKULTRA. And they are questions
that are essentially, do you know Y. or X, or do you know about Y,
but more speculative ones, and that is, can you describe now,
looking back over the period of time, what effect, if any, it
had on the institutions involved — and I am thinking particularly of private institutions — to have research going on
or activities going on supported by the CIA when only an
individual or a few individuals would know the source of the
support or the source of the interest for a particular project?

Dr. Gottlieb. What effect would it have in which

Mr. Lenzner. You are asking what impact this relationship with the CIA had on the institutions that were funded or supported for the research?

Mr. Maxwell. Yes.

Dr. Gottlieb. Number one, the attempt was always made to make the research be relevant for the organization to be doing in respect to its normal field of interest and expertise. And my membrance is that most of the organizations we worked with were delighted with the arrangement because they could publish, they did need to be satisfied that there was downway of dealing with them that would keep their relationship with CIA confidential. But that being done, that was accomplished through the clearing of the necessary number of people that

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Mr. Maxwell. The I.G.'s report gives the impression of a few people at institutions being witting of the source of the support?

Dr. Gottlieb. Well, that has to be taken in a relative sense. I would say, for instance, that the ones that I get an awareness and remembrance of, there was never an organization of any size where there wasn't three to six people that knew what the source of funds was. I don't see how we could deal iwth them otherwise. If you are talking about -- I begin to sense what the thrust of your question is -- the effect on an organization of sort of being misled about the real purpose of the work they were doing, my response is that our feeling was that that was not a good way to proceed, that if the principal investigator, for instance, and perhaps several other people involved in the work, didn't know who they . 17 g were really working for and what the real problem was, we 18 weren't going to get very much.

Mr. Maxwell. The last general question is, do you re-20 g call any other governmental institution operating in the same 2: F way vis-a-vis the CIA as the Bureau of Narcotics was per-2: forming in regard to the drug testing.

Dr. Gottlieb. Do you mean that in terms of the kind of an arrangement that we had with them, or the kind of work that 25 : they were doing?

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Mr. Maxwell. You have answered the latter. The former?

Dr. Gottlieb. The institution you referred to in

Kentucky, I forget what the funding arrangement was, but it was

done through some sort of a cutout arrangement -- excuse me,

that wasn't true. Its parent organization. The money was

government agency to government agency transfer, that is right.

It was just some business that I forget now about making that

so that it wouldn't be too easily discernable. But my answer to your question is, no.

Mr. Maxwell. Why don't we move to the Olsen case.

Mr. Lenzner. I have no objection.

Dr. Gottlieb. I think I can stand that if it is the last one.

Mr. Maxwell. In the Inspector General's diary in regard to the Olsen material there is an indication that he spoke to Mr. Wisner.

Dr. Gottlieb. Is this the memo of 29 January 1975?

Mr. Naxwell. It is the one with the cryptic comments.

There is an indication of a meeting in May which Mr.

Helms had with the staff at which Colone's Drum and Dr. Gibbons

2: were present. It goes on to indicate that at the meeting

Helms had indicated "that the drug was dynamite, and that they

should be advised at all times" -- it is not clear whether it

24 was Thelms or Wisner.

Ur. Gottlieb. It says that Helms had held a meeting i::

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Mr. Maxwell. In regard to the self-administration that took place, do you recall whether you proposed this to your superiors at the Agency?

Dr. Gottlieb. Whether I proposed it or not I don't know.

Mr. Maxwell. The "they" referring to who?

Dr. Gottlieb. Colonel Drum and/omphischibbons.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall specifically informing either one of them?

Dr. Gottlieb. No, I do not. I have a general remembrance, though, that they were informed.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall whether they approached you about self-administration and encouraged you to do that, or whether you succeeded it to them?

Dr. Gottlieb. It was probably the latter.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall whether you submitted a written proposal to them in regard to such testing?

Dr. Gottlieb. I do not recall that.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall specifically -- apparently from the letters which came down, the letters which came down from the Director, Colone's Drum had approved the proposal.

Do you recall specifically his approval of the proposal?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't recall that. But my memory was stimulated by my reading of the Olsen file. And then I remember something about it.

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; Dr. Gottlieb. Not specifically.

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Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall DrewLashbrook being there?



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		2) 54	1	received the individual wouldn't know that he has gotten
2		(2021)	2	
	:	Phone (Are	_	it, but unwitting in this sense obviously meant that they
		ć Ç		knew they might get it sometime. And there were no time
		ů.	ا م !	
	:		4	periods, that this will be in the next month.
	:		5	Mr. Maxwell. So in fact the agreement was that at some
	!		į	Mr. Maxwell. So in fact the agreement was that at some
	:		6	point in the future it would be a good idea that they would
	,		7	
	·		,	do that, and it was agreed upon that it would be done?
	:		8	Dr. Cottlieb. Yes.
1	: 9			
			9	Mr. Maxwell. And it was agreed upon that it would not
	S	•	.10	be within a fixed period of time?
	\subset		il	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	Ċ	,	וו ב	Dr. Gottlicb. No, the latter I am just saying it was
	Ur	₹	1.0	not, I am talking about the absence of something, and not the
1	_	4	4	not, I am carking about the absence of something, and not the
		÷	13 }	presence, it was the absence of any time frame. The time
	C	,	1.4	
	C		J.**,	frame was not discussed at all.
	C.		. 15	Mr. Maxwell. How would you characterize, if you can,
	L::		-	
			10 "	the agreement?
	ī`-		1:	Did it seem fixed, did it seem ephemeral?
				bid it beem liked, did it beem eynemeral:
			10	Dr. Gottlieb. I had the impression, as I tried to state
		,000;	29.7	in my prepared statement, that we had the agreement of that
		9	1;	in my prepared statement, that we had the agreement of that
		c š	21	group at some time in the future to participate in that kind
		č		
	•	, Vistinauturi,	2!	of an experiment.
		J	22 '	Mr. Maxwell. By agreement you mean the consensus of the
		7	٠	·
		}	27	group? Was there any formal verification of that this was
		: :	• • • •	their attempt to take a vote on that.
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Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember. There certainly wasn't

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anything in writing.

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Mr. Maxwell. You don't remember the agreement coming at the time of the conference itself?

Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you remember the agreement coming within a week of the conference?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really can't testify as to that. That happened 22 years ago. I just can't recollect that kind of time in relationships.

Mr. Maxwell. Given the purposes which you have described for the experiment, which I take it was to determine the reaction in a meeting, if LSD was covertly administered, what was the value to be gained from experimenting with a group of people who knew that at some point they would be given LSD, and secondly, a group of people a number of whom had previously taken LSD?

on the subject of what would happen to a meeting where LSD was covertly administered, the prior agreement of the people would be to hope that they wouldn't remember that, at least for a while. And their reactions would indeed be innocent ones. The ones that had had it, there was an ancillary gain, would they recognize it or not. I am not proposing to say that was exactly the thinking we had 23 years ago, because I don't remember that specifically. But that is the way I would



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respond to your question:

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Mr. Lenzner. I think the witness has testified that he himself had unwittingly taken drugs for the purpose of seeing if he could identify them, which I take it was consistent with the later effort to allow or to administer drugs to employees who may be abroad so that they also would be able to identify

And this would be a preliminary preparatory step.

Mr. Maxwell. In regard to the latter comment by counsel, were the results of the meeting such that it was determined that an individual who had taken LSD prior to the experience courcecognize it?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't know whether at the time that this incident took place at that particular meeting that was established. But ultimately it was established that it would be very useful, if someone's aim was to be able to recognize when he had been covertly attacked by this chemical, we determined that it would be a great advantage to have had an experience !:k that.

Mr. Maxwell. Your statement indicates that there was an individual at the meeting who had a heart condition, and it was decided that that individual would not be given LSD.

Who decided that he would not be given LSD?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember that. It was either

myself-or Drawashboork, or

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Do you recall any discussion with either Mr. Maxwell.

or Dr. Lashbrook about who should be given LSD and who should not?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't specially remember that. But it must have taken place.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall in regard to that individual whether the individual was told that he would not be given LSD, or whether there was simply some method devised to avoid his receiving it?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember that.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you remember any discussions with Dr.

as to the method of presenting 1.3(a)(4) Lashbrook the JSD to the individual at the meeting?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't remember a discussion of it. my remembrance -- and I think it was stimulated by what I read -was that was administered in Cointreau, and that Dr. Lashbrook had prepared that earlier, and that it had about 60 gammas per whatever was considered a drink-sized amount of Cointreau.

Mr. Maxwell. You don't recall, though, whether the individual who had a heart condition was simply skipped in this round of drinks?

Dr. Gottlieb. I really don't remember what procedure was used._

Mr. Maxwell. Did you receive LSD that evening?

But my remember. Dr. Gottlieb. As I remember it, yes.

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Dr. Gottlieb. Yes, I think so. I think he had been doing some work on the psychiatric use of LSD in psychiatric interviews. Because before we contacted him he was interested in and believe there was some promise in it.

Mr. Maxwell. His relationship to the CIA would be

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(Are. 202) \$44-6000	1	described how?
30 3	2	Dr. Gottlieb. I can't remember whether we were actually
Phone (Are	5	funding research he was doing the chances are we weren't
<u>د</u> :	4	I just can't remember, but at least he was a consultant,
· : :	5	somebody we went to for advice and information.
; ;	6	Mr. Maxwell. Was he in fact a psychiatrist?
:	7	Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.
	-8-	Mr. Maxwell. Was he an M.D.?
C.	9	Dr. Gottlieb. He was an M.D., he was an allergist,he
	10	was a psychiatrist. He had had an interesting background, because
	1).	he had formerly worked in the Chemical Corps as a physicist, l
1.	18	think as a physical chemist, before he became an H.D.
	1.3	Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall his training in psychiatry?
c ;	1.4	Dr. Gottlieb. I remember that he was an accredited psy-
C] :	chiatrist, that that was his specialty. He had psychiatric
	16	patients and he had a psychiatric practice in New York.
<i>(-</i> ,	3.3	Mr. Maxwell. Did you leave DrowAbramson prior to
	1::	Dr. Olsen's arriving in New York?
,000°	12	Dr. Gottlieb. Did I personally? I really don't remem-
۸, ٥.٠	2.	ber whether I did it or Dr. Lashbrook did it.
D (BANNAYA	21	Mr. Maxwell. Had you been in touch with
5, F., W.	27	before was it Dramson who provided the LSD to George
11 f. ast Sarvet, S.C., Waxmanton, O.C. 20003	1.7	
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	21	fact, I don't remember anything about the procurement of LSE.

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where it originally came from, or whether through Dr. Abramson or somebody else.

Mr. Maxwell. As you might recall, Dr. Olsen was referred to a sanitarium, and was to head there.

Dr. Gottlieb. He was on his way.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall whether the CIA had any connection with that institution?

Dr. Gottlieb. None whatsoever. I remember which institution it was after reading something, was Shephord on Pratt . Place in Baltimore, I think -- I think that is what it was.

Mr. Maxwell. And there is no indication in your memory that CIA had any relationship with it?

Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Mr. Maxwell. Did you ever talk to neverbisson about any pre-existing conditions which Dr. Olsen might have had which might have resulted in his --

Dr. Gottlieb. Are you saying before or after the incident?

Mr. Maxwell. After the incident.

Dr. Gottlich. After the incident.

I remember that I became aware of Dr. Olsen's -- about some problems he had had before this meeting. I can't remember now whether that was relayed to me from Dr. Lashbido who heard it from him horamson or whether I hread it from some of the Camp Detrick people who had been associated with Dr.

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Olsen before -- I heard it after the incident. I assume that

is what you were talking about.

Mr. Lenzner. I have one question.

Does the Committee have any ground rules or policy as to who has access to this transcript,or what will be done with it?

Mr. Maxwell. All of the transcripts --

Nr. Lenzner. A specific question is, can a private party in a lawsuit obtain this by subpoena or otherwise?

Mr. Maxwell. I don't believe that that is possible.

The Committee rules I don't think address the point specifically.

But I don't think that a private party in a lawsuit can obtain executive session testimony or hearings of a Congressional Committee.

Dr. Çottlieb. The Freedom of Information Λct does not affect it?

Mr. Maxwell. It does not apply.

In order to clarify the record, you heard after the test ---

Dr. Gottlieb. I can make that more specific. We had more awareness of any prior problems in Dr. Olsen's case before the incident.

Mr. Maxwell. ** Thishbrook is quoted in the Washington
Post as saying that the suicide of Dr. Olsen only confirmed
the Agency fears of the potential of LSD. Do you recall at
that time prior to the experiment of Agency concern about the

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Dr. Gottlieb. I think I described the Agency concern as a concern about a drug this bizarre and active in this small quantities, that it didn't know what the effects would be. And I don't know how to interpret Dr. Lashbrook's statement as to worse fears.

(Confers with counsel.)

My counsel reminds me that I have testified in my prepared statement that up to this time, given the information we knew up to this time, and based a lot on our self-administration, we thought it was a fairly benign substance in terms of potential harm.

Mr. Maxwell. Given the response of Dr.Olsen to the experiment, and given what appears from the Agency records to be a substantial concern in the Agency about the event, both in human terms and institutional terms for the security of the Agency and for the individual involved, could you explain for the record the continuation of a -either the continuation or the institution of a testing program involving covert testing under no medical supervision without continuous observation as manifested in the Bureau of Harcotics testing program.

(Witness confers with counsel.)

Mr. Lenzner. Let me state for the record, so that whoever reads this transcript will realize that we are pausing

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at approximately six b'clock this evening, having been here since approximately ten this morning, to review this question, which we think is a most difficult one, and a significant one for the Committee to review.

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And on behalf of the witness I should say it might be difficult to articulate at this late hour an adequate answer. But why don't we go ahead and try. And I will fill in the gaps Dr. Gottlieb. I think that, number one, the feeling was that had we been able to institutionalize Dr. Olsen in time, the tragedy wouldn't have happened. That we tried to make aware to the Bureau of Narcotics mechanism the fact of thi happening. That we were laboring at the time under a sense of tremendous urgency about getting on with this thing, be-14 | cause we didn't feel that the option of doing no work on it at 15 all was an acceptable one in terms of trying to get information about the unwitting administration.

Our feeling at the time was certainly changed in hindsight when you look at it 20 years later, that it was quite possible that this material was being used against us or against Americans overseas at the time, and that the importance of getting this kind of information outweighed what was then perceived as the hazards.

I could take the kind of look that says, we probably shouldn't have done that. But that includes a great deal of hindsight, or that it might have been an unwise decision to m.

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Just to add to that, it is my recollection that the report indicates that an effort was made to institutionalize Mr. Olsen, and that that was sidetracked. I don't remember exactly why, but unfortunately and tragically it was.

I think the fact was that he was on his Dr. Gottlieb. way to that institution.

Isn't that your recollection of that?

Mr. Maxwell. That he was being institutionalized, and he was going on his way back to Washington. There had been no earlier proposal that he be institutionalized.

Mr. Lenzner. And second of all, I would say it is hard to recreate, I suppose, for some of us that aren't involved in it, the kind of problems and pressures that perhaps existed in a period of time when the Korean War was going on.

Dr. Gottlieb. There was a later period where it was possible, as a result of the information that was developed in this whole program, to brief the President's physician several times about the hazards that this might represent, and what to do about it.

Mr. Lenzner. And I take it that the covert application of these materials posed to the highest authorities in the CIA potential threats which they would feel the Agency's mandate would have been sorely neglected had they not pursued 25 this effort.

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That was their perception at the time. And I think it is perhaps best reflected in a memorandum, the date of which I forget, about Mr. Helms, in which he discussed th. process, consequence, strengths and weaknesses of the continuation of the unwitting application of these drugs. I don't kno the date of that.

Dr. Gottlieb. 1964, I think.

Mr. Lenzner. It was substantially later than that.

Dr. Gottlieb. That was when the statement in the I.G. report that we talked about later came up.

Mr. Lanzner. And it is my recollection that the final conclusion of the DDP was that having reassessed all these problems, including this great tragedy, that was still incumbent upon the Agency to continue to persevere in this area.

Now, I should also say that I think it is fair -- and this may not be currently, important, but for the record -that Mr. White was dealing, I take it, with a test population that was substantially different in quality from the people that we were talking about in this other matter. That is to say, if White was administering this drug unwittingly to narcotics-addicted individuals already, the reaction to the may be, I don't know, somewhat less of a problem than it wou have been to somebody who hadn't been addicted.

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't think you are trying to say thi -you place less value on it?

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Mr. Lenzner. No. But their tolerance. It might give them a higher tolerance. That is an uneducated opinion.

Mr. Maxwell. Certainly neither counsel nor I have any evidence whatsoever that drug-addicted individuals have a different tolerance for an entirely different drug.

I take it because LSD is not an addictive drug in itself, that they would not necessarily have any different tolerance, nor that one could argue --

Mr. Lenzner. I think that is an issue the Committee ought to look into.

Dr. Gottlieb. I would say that the only influence that particular factor might have is that people who are what I call drug-wise generally might be able to handle bizarre reactions that come from drugs, hallucinatory reactions, and so forth, better than those who are not familiar with it.

Mr. Maxwell. I think that it can also be easily said that the people who are drug-addicted in the terms counsel used are by definition disturbed, according to the norm of the general population.

Mr. Lenzner. I am not so sure I could use that word.

We could probably argue about this for another eight hours. But it hours. But it seems to me that if the Committee is going to make black and white judgments on the question that Mr. Maxwell just asked, that might be a factor that they might want to look into.

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電I think it is also important that the Mr. Maxwell. Committee be able to determine the response of the Central Intelligence Agency in general, and not only Dr. Gottlieb, an indent such as this, and the question of whether a program which had been going on, if at all, only a short tir involving the Bureau of Narcotics should be continued, for if it has not yet begun, not initiated.

Mr. Maxwell. And it was reported on the same day, February 10, that Dr. Gottlieb and others received letters f the Director of Central Intelligence on a crucial issue in determining the response of the Agency to matters of the mos profound importance.

I would like to go on with a couple of more question: to Dr. Gottlieb.

One concerns the letters which you did in fact receiv from the Director of Central Intelligence. My understanding of the letters was that they were specifically not reprimar letters, is that correct?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't know how to answer that.

I felt very bad when I got that letter, and whatever call it, whatever its title is, I felt that I was being to that I had done something I shouldn't have done.

Mr. Maxwell. Was this a normal designation, a nor category of communication in the Agency, or in personnel

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matters that would be designated reprimands which would have effect in regard to promotion and --

Dr. Gottlieb. I am not aware of that now, and I don't think was aware of it then, whether there was or wasn't.

Mr. Maxwell. Can you explain having seen the term made available to the Olsen family and to the Committee and seen the notation that this was not a "reprimand letter", can you explain what that might have meant?

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Dr. Gottlieb. At this distance in time I can't. I can only testify that the letters made me feel bad.

Mr. Maxwell. I would like to call your attention to a memorandum that the General Counsel, Mr. Huston, wrote about the incident. I think you have that.

Mr. Lenzner. I think you took it back.

Mr. Maxwell. I hand it to you.

It is a memorandum to the Inspector General.

Mr. Lenzner. Do you have a page number on that?

Mr. Maxwell. Before we go on to that, let me note that the memorandum which I referred to previously was a hand-written memorandum to Mr. Helms dated 10 February which notes the following:

"Please hand carry to Tibbons-Drum-Gottlieb, have them note having read and return to for eyes only file. These are not" -- "not" is underlined -- "reprimands, and no personal file notation being made."

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TOPSECRE 1 And it is initialed CPC. 2 The contents of the letter --3 Mr. Lenzner. I have no objection to your doing this ſ, But I don't understand the purpose of it. The letter speak 5 for itself. You are just taking up a lot of time. The let 6 are in the file. I don't see why we have to read everything 7 the record. 8 I would like to have it in the record. Mr. Maxwell. õ The letters from the Office of the Director are marked 10 personal, from the Office of the Director, dated February 1 11 to Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief, Chemical Division, Technical Ċ. 10 Services Staff. 13 "Dear Dr. Gottlieb: I personally reviewed the files (your office concerning the use of a drug on an unwitting grd 15 of individuals. In recommending the unwitting application 10 of the drug to your superior you apparently did not give 17 sufficient emphasis on the necessity for medical collaborat and for proper consideration of the rights of the individu 18 to whom it was being administered. This is to inform you 19 that in my opinion you exercised poor judgment in this case "Sincerely" -- signed -- "Alan W. Dulles, Director." 2: 22 Mr. Lenzner. What are we lookg for now?

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is that the memo from Mr. Muston indicates his belief tha

Subject, Frank R. Olsen, dated 4 January 1954.

Mr. Maxwell. The memorandum for the Inspector Gener

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Mr. Lenzner. I just want to comment here that the

specific language of this sentence is actually subsequent to

Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services were responsible for this form of experimentation.

Can you give any indication as to why he would believe that these were the responsible branches in CIA for this form of experimentation rather than the Technical Services staff?

Dr. Gottlieb. Say that once more.

believe when he wrote that memorandum that these offices were responsible for the test rather than TSS?

Mr. Lenzner. I think the qustion is, why did Huston

Is the substance of it?

Dr. Gottlieb. It could also mean why we didn't refer Dr. Olsen to them rather than Dr. Abramson.

Mr. Lanzner. As a result of the incident?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes. And you are asking me what Huston

had in his mind when he wrote that?

Mr. Maxwell. Or any explanation you could provide as to why he would say that.

Dr. Gottlieb. I can't comment on that. I don't know what to say.

Mr. Maxwell. Is a possible explanation that he believed that such testing was all done under the Artichoke group, which involved the Office of Security and the CIA medical staff rather than TSS?

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the sentence:

"The actions of the various individuals concerned, when the effects of the experiment on Dr. Olsen became manifest, will reveal the failure to observe normal and reasonable precautions."

Then it says:

"The officers of the Agency charged with responsibilities for matters of this sort, particularly the security office and the medical staff, were not involved", et cetera.

When I read that I can only speculate that when a tragedy of this kind occurs, why isn't it referred, he is asking to Medical and Security rather than simply handled by TSS, if in fact that is what it says.

Am I wrong in saying that is an alternative way to read it.

Mr. Maxwell. It involves difficulty because the Office of Security was immediately informed.

Mr. Lenzner. That is why it sounds like he doesn't have the right facts regarding this incident, if that is what he is En : referring to.

> Mr. Maxwell. That is why I am attempting to understand Mr. Lenzner. But you agree with me that you can inter

pret it that way?

Mr. Maxwell. If you interpret the incident to mean Or. Olsen behaving in an unusual manner, then it would be

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consistent for him to take the position that the Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services should be alerted at that point rather than after his death.

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Mr. Lenzner. The subject of the memo is Frank R. Olsen. The subject of the memo is not the proper organizational responsibility of the drug testing.

Dr. Gottlieb. Anyway, my response to the question is, I don't know what to say in terms of what Huston had in mind.

Mr. Maxwell. Just one more question on this, not to the memo, but in regard to the followup by the Agency.

And that is, in the letter that the Director sent to Dr. Gibbons he referred to future experiments which would be conducted by TSS. The letter advises Dr. Gibbons to take all appropriate steps to insure a thorough and careful review within TSS of all experiments. The Deputy Director, Plans, has been instructed to constitute a review board composed of the appropriate officials from within the AGency periodically to review TSS research and experiments.

To the best of your recollection, prior to 1963 did sucy a board review the Bureau of Narcotics testing program?

Dr. Gottlieb. To the best of my knowledge, they did not.

Mr. Maxwell. To the best of your knowledge, was a review done of the Bureau of Marcotics testing program subsequent to February 10, 1953, but prior to 1963?

Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my recollection.



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(Witness confers with counsel.)

I want to sumit that the Bureau of Narcotics project was submitted to the chain of command in the DDP for the annual approval of project MKULTRA

Mr. Lenzner. Out of curiosity, what does Mr. Huston Because it is rather ambiguous. say he meant by that language?

Mr. Maxwell. He does not recall. That is on Mr. Olsen's death.

And I appreciate your efforts to go over something which I know from your opening statement is a painful subject after the amount of time that we have spent over the last few days in taking testimony and the amount of time we spent today.

I appreciate your assistance.

Dr. Gottlieb. Thank you.

Mr. Maxwell. There were two questions that I owe to Mr. Wides to try to get quickly.

One is that memo which I am not sure you have seen before. Dr. Gottlieb. He mentioned it to me. I don't see that

19 there was any more comment on that. Because this was not one that I thought he was going to show me. It was another one on the FBI.

Mr. Lenzner. Do you want us to look at that first?

Mr. Maxwell. Why don't you look at that. It is a memo for Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Chief, Technical Services Division,

from Richard Ober, Chief, Special Operations CI Staff, dated

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16 February 1970, subject, accommodation for TSD support.

Do you recall the particular audio operation against a target of "considerable priority that is referenced in that memo".

Dr. Gottlieb. I do not.

Mr. Maxwell. You have no recollection at all about that?

Dr. Gottlieb. No, not about where it was or who it was against.

Obviously coming this way it had to be an operation connected with the MKCHAOS program.

Mr. Lenzner. That is an assumption, and I wonder if it is accurate. See if you can remember your results, because this second paragraph indicates that the results were disseminated at the highest level of the intelligence community. I don't know a lot about CNAOS except what I have read in the press, but I am not sure the information they were obtaining necessarily was important for the highest level of the intelligence community.

Dr. Gottlieb. I said what I did only because Ober was involved in MKCHAOS.

Mr.Lenzner. Was he involved in other things, too? Dr. Gottlieb. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Lenzner. That takes care of that.

Mr. Maxwell. For the record, some reports which were obtained through CHAOS did go through the highest levels not only of the intelligence but the government. The other memo that

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he referred to includes a reference which included the provision of equipment to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. And the document which Dr. Gottlieb is looking at is attached to a cover sheet dated 8 May 1973. And it is from Sidney Gottlieb.

And the cover sheet says:

"Attached herewith are additional explanations of TSD's support to other U.S. Government agencies".

Dr. Gottlieb. You are specifically talking about Item G?

Mr. Maxwell. Item G, which states that TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute an O-V-shelf capability to engage in photo and audio surveillance operations which might not be known to the Agency.

In one case it is known that a relatively unsophisticated device was used against domestic targets. It is attached to an 8 May 1973 cover sheet from Dr. Gottlieb.

Do you recall that memo?

Dr. Gottlicb. Reading it, yes, now that I see it.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall writing it?

Dr. Gottlich. Yes. I recall issuing it, let's say. I don't know whether I wrote it. The chances are the Audio Operations Branch would have written it for me.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall the device which is mentioned in Section G?

is with some unmarked transmitters that we probably furnished

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the FBI sometime ago, because we had no use for them any more.

Mr. Maxwell. Unmarked would mean -

Dr. Gottlieb. Unsophisticated so that they could be intercepted by almost any kind of receiver.

Mr. Lanzner. Would it be helpful to ask what does the phrase domestic target mean?

Mr. Maxwell. Does the phrase domestic target in Section of add anything to your recollection?

Dr. Gottlieb. It could mean an intelligence target referring to an foreign operation, but done in this country
domestically, or it could mean a domestic problem that the
FBI has.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall learning of a specific domestic operation which would be indicated in a paragraph like that?

Dr. Gottlieb. I can't tie it into a specific place or time or incident.

Mr. Maxwell. But this could be either against American citizens or against foreigners on American soil?

Dr. Gottlieb. Yes.

Mr. Lenzner. It is my recollection that the witness has testified previously that there was an effort made to not have TSD technicians know what the targets were at the time, although I guess they did learn what some of them were, for audio surveillance.

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Mr. Haxwell. The last question that I would ask has to do with a memorandum for Mr. Colby from Identity 71 dated 8 Mny 1973, which reads:

"Carl Duckett brought this up. Said he is very uncomfortable with what Sid Gottlieb is reporting, and things the
Director will be ill-advised to say he is acquainted with this
program. Duckett plans to scrub it down with Gottlieb, but
obviously cannot do it this afternoon."

This is dated 8 May, which was the day prior to Dr.

Schlasinger's request for reports from Agency personnel about

questionable activities.

Do you recall a submission made to Carl Duckett in response to the general request for activities which the Director should know about?

Dr. Gottlieb. I am a little confused, because this was during the period when the jurisdiction of what was TSD was passing over to the DDS and T, and — I can't remember dates and so on, but apparently Duckett was heading — he was trying to pull together answers to this kind of question. And your question was, do I remember the momo?

Mr. Maxwell. Do you remember submitting a memo to Hr.

2) Duckott?

Dr. Gottlieb. I think if I hadn't rend this and seen it,
I wouldn't have remembered that.

Mr. Maxwell. Do you recall discussing with Mr. Duckatt

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the memo after its submission prior to revising it?

Dr. Gottlieb. Do I recall discussing it with Duckett?

Mr. Maxwell. Yes.

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Dr. Gottlieb. No, I do not. I don't remember revising it either.

Mr.Maxwell. Do you recall providing additional information for either the Director or Mr. Duckett?

Dr. Gottlieb. After this memo, is that what you mean?

Mr. Maxwell. That is correct.

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't recall it.

Mr. Lenzner. Is that memo different from this memo?

That is the question, I suppose.

Dr. Gottlieb. Additional explanations.

Mr. Maxwell. I assume so, because of that notation on the routing slip.

Dr. Gottlieb. I really can't connect these two. They may be.

Mr. Maxwell. The sequence --

Dr. Gottlieb. They are both dated the same day.

2. Mr. Lenzner. I don't understand what Duckett says when
2. he says Colby will be ill-advised to say he was acquainted with
2. this program.

What does that mean? That doesn't have anything to do with-additional information necessarily.

Mr. Maxwell. The only explanation presently available 15

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that Duckett believed that until there was complete information on the kind of support which were being provided by TSD to other organizations, that the Director should not respond that he is knowledgeable about that kind of support until it has been cleared that all of those operations were understood and approved, that he shouldn't claim knowledge until he knew all the facts, but that -- it is not a particularly satisfying explanation. That is why I would like to try if we can to understand whether in fact --

Dr. Gottlieb. I would only interpret that by saying that Carl Duckett was trying in some way to project the Director here. But exactly how and what the details are I don't know. As far as I was concerned, I was simply trying to come up with the information that Duckett apparently asked me for.

Mr. Maxwell. But you do not recall meeting with Duckett to go over the submission?

Dr. Gottlieb. I don't even recall independently the submission itself.

Mr. Maxwell. You don't recall preparing a second submission?

Dr. Gottlieb. No.

Mr. Maxwell. I have no further questions.

"I appreciate the cooperation and assistance of Dr. Gottlieb in this trying day. The Committee appreciates Dr. Gottlieb's desire to be able to begin resettling, and hopefull; . 1

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will not require his presence again. The Committee has attempted to complete any necessary inquiries during this perio of time, with the result that Dr. Gottlieb has spent an extende amount of time with members of the Committee Staff over the last couple of days and the Committee would like to indicate its appreciation for that time and cooperation.

Mr. Lenzner. We appreciate those remarks and also allowing us to finish up in this time period.

(Whereupon, at 7:40 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

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