CIA HISTORICAL STAFF

The Support Services Historical Series

AGENCY TRAINING

AUGUST 1949 - JULY 1951

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THE DDS HISTORICAL SERIES

OTR   4

AGENCY TRAINING
AUGUST 1949 - JULY 1951

by

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revised and updated by

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HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Foreword

In the development of training in the Central Intelligence Agency, the period from October of 1949 to July of 1951 was a period of transition, a period during which training practice and doctrine inherited from the Office of Strategic Services developed and changed and became responsive to the distinctive needs of CIA. From the beginning of CIA in 1947 until the Agency's second birthday in 1949, the OSS training patterns, both conceptual and organizational, continued. The brief passage through the interim Central Intelligence Group had left them unchanged, and it was not until CIA had established an identity and character of its own that the old patterns could be altered to meet the new needs.

The inheritance from OSS was, of course, entirely operational in orientation -- training related to clandestine activities; the people who directed and conducted the training were part of the inheritance and were themselves operational in orientation. It was only natural, then, that until the Agency developed its own training policy and identified the need for a broader spectrum of training, the operational orientation

-iii-

continued, and the training staffs continued to be components of the

clandestine services. It was not until July of 1951, when all Agency

training activities were consolidated within the Office of Training

under the command of the Director of Training, that the period of

transition was completed.

Preceding this period of transition, there was a period of transfer,

the period during which OSS training concepts and disciplines were

transferred from OSS, through CIG, to CIA. That period is described

in detail in SS Historical Paper No. OTR-2, History of the Office of

Training, 1945 - 1949. The present paper picks up the narrative of

Agency training development where that paper ends.

Perhaps it should be noted at this point that the segmentation of

the history of an institutional activity -- like that of the history of an

empire, of a nation, or of a great religious or cultural movement --

is often determined not alone on the basis of developmental phases but

also on the basis of leadership. Thus we find that identified with each

of the developmental phases of training in the Agency there is a man,

or a group of men, who gave direction to events and character to

SECRET

achievements.   The period covered by this paper, then, is not only

one of transition; it is also one during which a small group of men led

by [   ] helped to shape the future of Agency training.

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-v-

SECRET

Contents

SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

AGENCY TRAINING, OCTOBER 1949 - JULY 1951

Chapter I

Development of the Training Division

A. Background

On 5 August 1949, [   ] USA, was appointed   (b)(3)

Chief of the Training Staff of the Office of Special Operations (OSO). *

On 14 September of that year, by agreement between OSO and the Office

of Policy Coordination (OPC), [   ] was formally named Chief   (b)(3)

of OPC training ** and thus the training elements of the two operational

Offices were combined. On 17 October, the Deputy Assistant Director

of OSO addressed a memorandum to [   ] as "Chief of the Train-   (b)(3)

ing Division, OSO/OPC." Thereafter the unit that [   ] headed   (b)(3)

was referred to officially as TRD -- organizationally attached to OSO

but serving the training needs of both OSO and OPC. From that time

until [   ] left the Agency to return to the Army, in April of 1951,   (b)(3)

his task was to consolidate the existing training activities of OSO and

OPC and to develop new programs to meet the operational needs of the

Agency. The problem of first priority was that of establishing the kind

of administrative framework within which TRD could function most

effectively.

_____

* [   ] 5 August 1949, SECRET

** [   ] September 1949, SECRET   (b)(3)

SECRET

B.   Administration

The problem of TRD administrative relationships was a natural consequence of the merging of two units which, although devoted to a common mission, had different origins, different loyalties, and different objectives.   Inherent in the situation were problems of command channels, financial management, personnel actions, and liaison activities.

1.   <u>Command.</u>   Before the formal merger of the OSO and OPC training units, the skeletal training branch of OPC had relied upon OSO facilities for many of its training requirements, and coordination had been achieved through a Joint Training Committee made up of representatives from OSO and OPC.   When TRD was created, a decision concerning a single command channel had not yet been made, and the Joint Training Committee -- at that time composed of the Chief of TRD, the Executive Officer of OSO, and the Chief of Support of OPC -- continued to provide command guidance.   For organizational convenience, TRD was considered a component of OSO.   In a memorandum dated 16 December 1949, addressed to the CIA Management Officer, the Executive Officer of the Agency stated that the Director of Central Intelligence wished to delay action on the determination of a single

SECRET

SECRET

command channel for TRD until the National Security Council had made a decision regarding an amalgamation of OSO and OPC. The memorandum further stated that the "current combined committee-type of control" was temporarily authorized, with TRD being responsible to both the Assistant Director for Special Operations (AD/SO) and the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination (AD/PC).

The Joint Training Committee, then, continued to control the activities of TRD; and TRD continued to be charted as a component of OSO. The OPC personnel serving as members of TRD were considered to be in an on-loan status. This "temporary" command structure made it possible for TRD to function as a training unit serving the needs of both OSO and OPC, but it created a number of sticky administrative problems, the most difficult of which was the structure and management of the TRD budget.

2. Budget. When TRD was established, in October of 1949, it was decided by the Joint Training Committee that budgetary matters would continue to be handled on an ad hoc basis -- as they had been since 17 September -- until command channels had been established. The December 1949 decision of the DCI to defer determination of command channels made it necessary for the Committee to face the

-3-

SECRET

budgetary problem and try to find a solution. In a meeting on 4 January of 1950, the Committee did face the problem and considered possible solutions. None of the alternatives, however, appeared to be workable, and the Committee decided to continue the ad hoc approach.

In February of 1950 the OSO funds available for training appeared to be running out, and in March the Committee met with the finance officers of OSO and OPC to work out a course of action. In that meeting it was agreed that when OSO training funds were completely spent, OPC would provide -- from existing accounts -- the money to support TRD activities for the rest of the 1950 fiscal year. At this time, the Committee, with the concurrence of the OSO and OPC finance officers, recommended that the two Offices contribute equally to the TRD budget for the 1951 fiscal year. This recommendation was never officially approved, but it became the basis for continuation of the ad hoc approach to TRD budget problems, an approach that kept TRD in business until it found a secure budgetary home in the Office of Training in July of 1951.

3. Personnel. The lack of clearly defined command channels during the 1949-51 period made personnel actions just as hard to handle

-4-

as budgetary matters.   The Chief of TRD was responsible for the ad-

ministrative supervision of all personnel in the Division, but control

of the table of organization, position classification, and candidate

qualifications was exercised by the Office of Personnel; and personnel

actions proposed by the Chief of TRD had to be approved and authorized

by either the Executive Officer of OSO or the Chief of Staff II of OPC,

depending upon the parent Office of the person involved in the action.

In effect, then, the Chief of TRD carried the responsibility for per-

sonnel administration in the Division but had no authority to make

decisions.

In January of 1950, the Joint Training Committee worked

out an agreement with OSO and OPC whereby all promotion actions

for people assigned to TRD were to be approved by the Committee,

and all travel requests and travel vouchers were to be approved by

the Executive Officer of OSO only -- regardless of the parent Office

of the person affected.   This arrangement proved to be workable, and

at least one of the administrative problems of the Chief of TRD was

solved.

4.　Training Liaison.　As early as 1948 the Training Staff of

OSO had established liaison with the other units of OSO through Train-

ing Liaison Officers (TLO's), officers who, in addition to their major

duties with their units, served as points of contact on training matters.

These TLO's met frequently with members of the Training Staff for

discussion of mutual problems.　As the OPC Training Branch began

to develop, late in 1948, it became apparent that a similar TLO

arrangement was needed in OPC; but it was not until August of 1949

that an effort was made to establish systematic procedures for desig-

nating OPC TLO's.　The minutes of the 3 August meeting of the Joint

Training Committee record the recommendation that OPC designate

operations and planning officers to act as TLO's.

Apparently implementation of the recommendation was slow

in coming.　On 4 October of 1949, after [REDACTED] had taken over as   (b)(3)

Chief of both OSO and OPC training, OPC had not yet come up with a

list of operations and planning officers who would serve as TLO's.

The minutes of the Committee meeting held on that date record that

the list would be forthcoming soon.　Those minutes also record that

[REDACTED] stressed the urgent need for orienting all TLO's to train-   (b)(3)

ing procedures and recommended that at the next meeting of TLO's

-6-

SECRET

with TRD officers, Division Chiefs of both OSO and OPC be present.

There is evidence, however, that the TLO problem was slow in so-

lution.

At a meeting of all TLO's on 10 February 1950, [   ]   (b)(3)

distributed a "Training Liaison Officers Guide," outlining general

procedures to be followed, delineating TLO functions, and describing

the activities of TRD.   Apparently the Guide failed to accomplish its

mission, at least in OPC, for in May of 1950 [   ] issued a   (b)(3)

long memorandum describing procedures for handling OPC students

in training.   This was followed, on 1 July, by a revised TLO's Guide

and by another memorandum explaining in greater detail the proper

procedures for enrolling OPC personnel in training courses and fol-

lowing them through to the completion of the training.   It appears

that a part of the problem with OPC personnel in training was the

frequent use of pseudonyms and aliases, which created almost endless

confusion; other factors -- as [   ] pointed out to his staff --   (b)(3)

were lack of planning for OPC training and failure of the TLO's to

study the various guides that had been prepared for them.

At a meeting of the Joint Training Committee in December

of 1950, the TLO problem was being discussed, and Mr. William

SECRET

[   ] -- the OSO representative on the Committee -- suggested   (b)(3)

that a partial solution of the problem might be the appointment of a

full-time TLO in each of the Offices. [   ] agreed with the   (b)(3)

idea and went ahead with the paper work necessary to implement it.

In February of 1951, [   ] who had been in agent training   (b)(3)

since OSS days, was appointed OSO Training Officer. Similar action

was not taken by OPC, but the appointment of [   ] marked the   (b)(3)

beginning of the senior training officer system that is still in effect

in the Agency.**

C. Training Requirements

One of the major problems that [   ] inherited when he be-   (b)(3)

came Chief of TRD in October of 1949 was the identification of train-

ing requirements. Before the merger of the Training Staff of OSO

and the Training Branch of OPC, no systematic attempt had been

made to re-define the old OSS training requirements in terms of the

needs of CIA -- probably because those needs had not themselves

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* For identification of positions held by major OSO, OPC, and DDP
officers, see Appendix A.

** [   ] real name, [   ] is used in official   (b)(3)
Agency records.

-8-

SECRET

been clearly defined. In facing the overall problem of training require-

ments, [   ] found that concise statements of training missions   (b)(3)

and functions depended on agreed conclusions concerning training

objectives, that training objectives could be defined only in terms of

operations doctrine, and that training requirements could be determined

only after doctrine had established objectives and objectives had clari-

fied missions and functions.

1. <u>Mission and Function.</u> On 25 July 1950, [   ] sent to   (b)(3)

the AD/SO and the AD/PC a memorandum on "The Mission of the

Training Division." The memorandum was a statement of the mission

and functions of TRD as [   ] saw them at the time. Approval   (b)(3)

was not requested, and the statement of mission and functions was not

issued as an official TRD document. Actually, [   ] memoran-   (b)(3)

dum was unofficially approved by both AD/SO and AD/PC, and sub-

sequently it was used as a major guideline in instructor training

courses.

The statement placed heavy stress on training requirements.

Indeed, the first of the functions listed by [   ] was "to ascertain   (b)(3)

the training requirements of OSO and OPC," and the entire text of

SECRET

the statement makes it clear that training missions and functions

remain intangible until requirements are determined. * Implicit in

the statement was the conclusion that the first step in the determina-

tion of requirements was the definition of objectives -- both quantita-

tive and substantive.

2.   Objectives.   The TRD effort to determine realistic and spe-

cific training objectives was a continuing one.   It began informally

when [   ] became Chief of TRD; it was, in effect, formalized   (b)(3)

by the 25 July memorandum; and as late as March of 1951 the Joint

Training Committee was urging OSO and OPC to give TRD more

specific requirements.   The Committee pointed out that identifying

the general needs of the operating Offices was not enough; TRD had

to have a breakdown of the training load in terms of the courses that

were given.   TRD had found, for example, that it was not getting as

many students for "area" training as had been estimated; if this short-

age should continue, TRD would have to move some "area" instructors

to staff training or covert training in order to meet the demands of

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*   The text of [   ] statement on TRD mission and functions is   (b)(3)
given in Appendix B.

SECRET

SECRET

those activities. [   ] said that TRD needed not only a specific   (b)(3)

statement of the long-range requirements, but also a general state-

ment forecasting the trends to be expected for various types of train-

ing. This forecast was needed immediately so that TRD could plan

properly. These needs were never really met, and consequently

TRD was drawn into preparing for requirements that never material-

ized.*

On 14 November 1949, OPC had circulated throughout the

Agency a memorandum asking for comments on the effectiveness of

OPC's existing structure. The comments were for the use of a com-

mittee that had been assigned to study the organization and function of

OPC. On 15 November [   ] responded with a memorandum   (b)(3)

that listed a number of difficulties that TRD had experienced with

OPC because of its organizational structure. He noted that the person-

nel of the Planning Division and those of the Operations Division dif-

fered widely in their understanding of training objectives. He said

that he had observed that some officers of the Planning Division did

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* See the discussions of [   ] and ZRELOPE,   (b)(1)
pp. 84 - 88 below.   (b)(3)

not feel that they should take the same training courses given to the

Operations personnel. In trying to get substantive training objectives

from the two Divisions, TRD had found wide discrepancies in the

viewpoints of the planners and the operators. As a result, TRD

could not design courses that met the requirements of both Divisions.

In his memorandum [   ] also noted that the planners repre-   (b)(3)

sented certain <u>activities</u> and the operators represented certain <u>areas</u>;

in his view, this difference constituted a basic flaw in the structure

of OPC.

OPC also had some complaints about TRD at this time. In

December of 1949, [   ] reported to his staff that the AD/PC   (b)(3)

felt that the Intelligence Orientation Course was too strongly weighted

in favor of OSO activities. It was then decided that some effort should

be made to revise the course to reflect a more nearly even distribu-

tion of coverage of OSO and OPC -- an example of the kind of make-

shift compromise necessitated by the lack of clearly defined objectives.

3. <u>Doctrine.</u> It is interesting that in none of the documents

recording TRD efforts to identify training requirements and formulate

training objectives is there a definition of the word "doctrine" or a

SECRET

clarification of the relationship of doctrine to objectives. It must be
assumed that before the appearance of OPC there was no real need to
define either the word or the relationship. The OSS concept of
"doctrine" being operational -- the accepted and organizationally ap-
proved principles that govern methods and techniques of operational
activities -- and "objectives" being the specific training goals to pro-
vide the capabilities to apply the doctrine, had been carried over;
and the Training Staff of OSO had no major problem of defining ob-
jectives consistent with doctrine. With the advent of OPC, however,
and the merging of the OSO and OPC training units, new and different
operational activities were introduced; doctrine for them evolved
slowly, and training objectives could not be formulated in the absence
of doctrine.

⬚ recognized this problem soon after he became   (b)(3)
Chief of TRD, and in December of 1949 he made an organized effort
to solve it. At that time it had been decided -- there is no record of
how or by whom -- that OPC required training courses in resistance
force operations, sabotage, psychological warfare, economic war-
fare, and political warfare. At a staff meeting on 14 December,
⬚ announced that each of the TRD instructors assigned to   (b)(3)

-13-

SECRET

SECRET

the development of one of these courses would be responsible for the

writing of a training manual for his course.   Deadlines of from three

to six months -- varying with the different courses -- were set, and

the instructors were told to develop the doctrine upon which the manu-

als would be based.

By June of 1950, [   ] had concluded that TRD should   (b)(3)

not and could not be responsible for the development of doctrine, and

in a meeting of the Joint Training Committee on 15 June he so informed

the OPC member of the Committee.   It was then agreed that OPC

itself would take on the task of preparing the manuals, working from

topical outlines supplied by TRD.

Staff I of OPC was assigned the job of developing the doc-

trine and preparing the manuals.   In October of 1950 the OPC member

of the Committee reported that Staff I had set March of 1951 as the

earliest possible completion date for the manuals.   The major

reason for the slow progress, according to Staff I, was the extreme

difficulty in reaching agreement on doctrine.   In early April of 1951

the draft of the first of the manuals -- on economic warfare -- was

submitted to TRD and was found wanting; TRD instructors felt that

it failed to identify doctrine and it needed considerable revision

SECRET

before it could be useful in training. Progress continued to be slow, and as late as December of 1951 TRD was finding the manuals being prepared in OPC to be of variable usefulness. The manuals on covert political warfare and covert economic warfare, for example, were almost useless in giving instruction in clandestine operations; they merely presented general surveys of overt methods of operations. Although the covert psychological warfare manual and the escape and evasion manual were weak on doctrine, they were of considerable use as far as the definitions and general policy were concerned.

This dragging out of the writing of manuals by OPC finally led TRD to take the initiative in setting up a more orderly approach. On 7 April 1951, [   ] who had been an instructor in TRS and TRD since 1948, submitted a memorandum to the Chief of TRD on the subject of the development of doctrine. [   ] took the position that although the responsibility of TRD in the development of doctrine was not openly recognized in the operating Offices, the tendency to depend on TRD had become increasingly apparent. He suggested a priority emergency program aimed at determining and identifying the doctrinal material that was being used in training at that time. He suggested a second emergency program aimed at putting

(b)(3)

(b)(3)

SECRET

on paper the doctrinal fundamentals of each of the specialized fields

of clandestine activity. These programs as he saw then could be

carried out by small numbers of qualified people working as task

forces in TRD for three or four months. [   ] also recommended a   (b)(3)

third, long-range program aimed at the orderly and continuous review

of basic doctrine and of its relevance to operational experience; this

program would require an adequately staffed and supported "doctrine

development" group.

On 23 July 1951, Mr. Rolfe Kingsley (Acting Chief of TRD

after [   ] departure) set up a Doctrine Development Staff   (b)(3)

along the lines suggested by [   ] The job of the Staff was to   (b)(3)

insure that the content of all instruction in TRD would be operationally

sound and consistent with the policies of OSO and OPC. TRD Adminis-

trative Instruction 70-3 set up a procedure for the Doctrine Develop-

ment Staff to follow in reviewing regularly all lesson plans, lecture

outlines, problems, and study material used in all courses.

Actually, the Doctrine Development Staff was an outgrowth

of a committee that [   ] had established in June of 1950 -- the   (b)(3)

"Training Review Committee." The members of this group were

[   ] Deputy Chief of TRD; [   ] and [   ]   (b)(b)(3)

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SECRET

[_____] TRD instructors; William Wheeler of OSO; and [_____]   (b)(3)

[_____] of OPC.   Although the task assigned the Committee was a   (b)(3)

broad one -- to review the mission, the instruction, and the existing

procedures of TRD and make recommendations for improvement --

the major problem the Committee was concerned with was the develop-

ment of doctrine.   The Committee held its last meeting on 19 June

1950, and its final report was commended highly by [_____] *   (b)(3)

Although the Committee did not, as we have seen, solve the doctrinal

problems of TRD, it made a major contribution to the rapport of TRD

with both OSO and OPC.   In a 30 August 1950 memorandum addressed

to the Chief of TRD, the AD/PC, Mr. Frank Wisner, praised the work

of the Committee and commended the Chief of TRD for his proposals

of action based on the Committee's recommendations; and on 25 Octo-

ber 1950 Col. Schow, AD/SO, addressed a similar memorandum to

the Chief of TRD.

When [_____] left the Agency in April of 1951, the prob-   (b)(3)

lems of identifying training requirements had not been completely

_____

*   A summary of [_____] remarks to the members of the Com-   (b)(3)
mittee appears in Appendix C.

SECRET

solved, but measurable progress had been made. The need for defined operational doctrine as a necessary basis for training objectives had been clearly established, missions and functions of TRD had been clarified and specified, and training requirements could be identified with some assurance that they would be responsive to the needs of the operating Offices.

D.   Overseas Training

Closely related to the problem of identifying OSO and OPC training requirements at Headquarters was the problem of TRD support for Agency training activities overseas. During World War II, the OSS Training Unit had had no direct responsibility for the content of the training given in overseas areas, but it did support those activities by training instructors and providing training materials. When CIA was created in 1947, this relationship was easily transferred to the Training Staff of OSO, along with other OSS practices and procedures, and no major problem developed until OPC was formed on 1 September of 1948. OPC initiated a number of projects that involved the training of foreign nationals in overseas areas. In the early stages, these projects were supported by the Training Branch of OPC;

and when the OSO and OPC training units were merged in September

of 1949, TRD became responsible for the support of OPC overseas

training activities as well as those of OSO.

As these overseas training programs developed, it became ap-

parent that TRD could not give them adequate support by treating

them as peripheral activities. By August of 1950 the requirement for

sending training materials to overseas activities had grown to the

point where it was necessary for the Joint Training Committee to

establish an Overseas Training Materials Review Committee, a three-

man group with OSO, OPC, and TRD representation. The task of

the Review Committee was to examine all training materials to be

sent overseas and ensure their appropriateness. This function solved

a part of the problem only, and in November of 1950,   (b)(3)

established a Special Projects Staff composed of four TRD instructors;

this Staff was charged with the responsibility for preparing complete

plans for all non-Headquarters training projects, both in the United

States and abroad. Such plans included cover and security arrange-

ments, the selection of safe training sites, the provision of special

training aids, and substantive course outlines. The Staff was also

-19-

SECRET

responsible for the coordination of the special programs with the operating units of OSO and OPC.

The work of the Review Committee and the Special Projects Staff gave TRD the capability of muddling through the overseas training problem, but it was obvious that a greater effort was needed. A 4 May 1951 report of the Review Committee, for example, stated that the bulk of the training materials needed overseas was much too great for the Committee to handle properly and that some of the operating units of OSO and OPC were bypassing the Review Committee and independently preparing training materials for overseas use. The report concluded with the statement that TRD needed a fully manned, full-time unit with the responsibility for preparing and adapting training materials for overseas use. TRD did not at that time have the personnel to assign to such a unit, and the make-shift treatment of the overseas training problem continued until the establishment of the Overseas Training Branch in the Office of Training in 1955.*

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* See SS Historical Paper No. OTR-5, History of the Office of Training, 1951-1966. SECRET.

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E.   The Director of Training

On 15 November 1950, the appointment of Col. Matthew Baird as CIA Director of Training was announced. * The announcement was transmitted to the Deputy Directors by the CIA Executive, Mr. Murray McConnel, with an explanatory memorandum stating that Col. Baird's staff would be a "division" of the Executive's administrative group, that as of 1 January 1951 Col. Baird's "division" would begin the development of a Career Training program, and that at a "later date" Col. Baird would coordinate and supervise all Agency training. **

Neither the document appointing Col. Baird nor the Executive's memorandum transmitting the document clarified the relationship of Col. Baird's "division" to TRD, and the "later date" reference in the memorandum was ambiguous, at best.   The ambiguity was partly resolved by a 30 November 1950 memorandum from Col. Baird to

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*   SECRET   (b)(3)

**   For a detailed discussion of the circumstances of Col. Baird's appointment and the organizational status of his "division," see the CIA Historical Staff paper, Organizational History of [the] Central Intelligence Agency, 1950-1953, SECRET,   Chap-   (b)(3)
ter X, "The Conduct of Agency Business," p. 75 ff.

-21-

requesting a report on the functions and long-term per-

sonnel needs of TRD. The requested report was completed and sent

to Col. Baird on 5 December. In considerable detail it described

the organization and functions of TRD and assured the Director of

Training that TRD wanted his cooperation "as regards the continued

implementation of an intimate coordination and compatibility between

it [presumably TRD] and the covert offices. Such a liaison is of

utmost importance for the maintenance of the present caliber of train-

ing for operational personnel." The report also stated that "the train-

ing establishment must have free access to and the closest coordina-

tion and cooperation with the planning, operational, and administrative

elements of the covert offices."

On 6 December 1950, Col. Baird and _____ met in the office

of _____ the Executive Officer of OSO, for a general

discussion of problems. According to _____ memorandum

recording the meeting, Col. Baird stated that as new Chief of Train-

ing for CIA, he had no intentions of taking over the functions of TRD

at that time and, as a matter of fact, he did not know whether he

would ever concern himself with taking over that activity. Col.

Baird also stated that his staff had been established primarily to

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plan for career management and the development of personnel; he
wanted to make it clear, however, that if he could be of any assistance
whatever to the TRD program, he would be at the disposal of the
Chief of TRD.

Col. Baird's denial of any intent to take over the functions of
TRD re-cast the shroud of ambiguity over the "later date" reference
in the CIA Executive's memorandum of 15 November, and [   ]   (b)(3)
was left in confusion and concern. On 13 December [   ]   (b)(3)
wrote a memorandum to the AD/SO and the AD/PC on the status of
TRD. He said that he feared that the pending reorganization plan for
the Agency might remove TRD from the direction and control of the
two covert Offices and make it a part of CIA Administrative Services.
He felt that such a step would fail to recognize that training for OSO
and OPC was really operational support. He further felt that the
move would be detrimental to OSO and OPC in that it would reduce
the effectiveness of the training for their operations. He pointed out
that experience had demonstrated that training is more effective when
it is close to operations. He also felt that such a change would lead
to the weakening of operational security and of the overall effective-
ness of TRD because the rotation of instructors would become

SECRET

impracticable and thus the flow of information about current opera-
tional techniques would be curtailed. He felt that for policy guidance
and operational direction, it was imperative that TRD continue under
the control of OSO and OPC.

In this paper [   ] was restating the position that had been   (b)(3)

taken by his predecessor, [   ] in January of 1949   (b)(3)

when the OSO training unit was faced with the possibility of being
taken over by the Office of Personnel. * The conviction that training
activity was an integral part of clandestine operations was deeply
felt by the training officers who had strong ties to OSO, and they
viewed the advent of the new Director of Training with suspicion and
misgivings.

Although CIA REGULATION [   ] dated 1 December 1950, made   (b)(3)

it clear that the newly established Training Division had functions
different from those of TRD, and although OSO REGULATION No. [   ]   (b)(3)

dated 30 December 1950, referred to TRD as part of the OSO structure,
with [   ] as Chief and Rolfe Kingsley as his deputy, there   (b)(3)

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* See SS Historical Paper No. OTR-2, History of the Office of Train-
ing, 1945-1949, pp. 39-40. SECRET.

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continued to be considerable uneasiness in TRD, OSO, and OPC

about the role of Col. Matthew Baird and its relationship to opera-

tional training.   This problem was the subject of frequent discussion

in the meetings of the Joint Training Committee in January and for

some time thereafter.

On 25 January 1951, Murray McConnel, then the Deputy Director

for Administration, addressed a memorandum to the AD/SO asking

him to authorize   to discuss training programs freely   (b)(3)

with Col. Baird.   McConnel stated that he felt that Baird and   (b)(3)

could be of great help to each other and he wanted   to   (b)(3)

know that he had the AD/SO's authority to discuss his operations.   A

few days later the AD/SO, Col. Schow, authorized the Chief of TRD

to discuss all training programs and operations under his direction

with the Director of Training, Col. Baird.

Although confusion about Col. Baird's position had persisted for

some time, there was none in the mind of the DCI, General Walter B.

Smith.   In a characteristic memorandum dated 22 March 1951 and

addressed to Mr. McConnel, the DD/A; Mr. Wisner, the AD/PC;

Gen. W. G. Wyman, the AD/SO*; and Col. Baird, the DCI said:

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* General Wyman replaced Col. Schow as AD/So on 14 February
1951 by CIA GENERAL   ECRET   (b)(3)

When I established the office of the Director of Training, it was my intention that he should plan, direct, and supervise the basic training for operational personnel of the Agency. Accordingly, the function of the Assistant Directors in charge of SO and PC operations would be to establish minimum specifications for the basic training of their personnel, to observe, correct, suggest to, and assist Col. Baird in carrying out this service for the Agency at large. Thus, as my representative for training, Col. Baird would proceed to produce basically trained personnel for Agency operations in accordance with the specifications furnished him by the Assistant Directors concerned. I do not want the basic training compartmented, and I see no difficulty in handling it under centralized direction.

If you perceive serious objection, please see me personally.

The DCI's position was further clarified on 18 April 1951 with the issuance of CIA Regulation [   ] which transferred the Office of Training from the DDA area to the Office of the DCI and gave Col. Baird the authority to "Supervise all Agency training programs and conduct such general training programs as may be required to meet Agency needs."

(b)(3)

-26-

(b)(3)

[   ] left the Agency in April of 1951 to return to the

Army, and Mr. Rolfe Kingsley was appointed Acting Chief of TRD.

On 23 April 1951 in a memorandum addressed to the AD/SO and the

AD/PC, Col. Baird clarified his relationship to TRD and the covert

Offices, as he understood that relationship. He said that he wished

to confirm certain procedures that would enable TRD to continue to

discharge its responsibilities in an efficient and secure manner.

These procedures were:

    a. The Director of Training proposed to furnish to TRD

such staff supervision, guidance, and policy coordination as

might be necessary to insure that the desires of the DCI

were met. The DTR would give all possible assistance in

the maintenance of effective training support.

    b. The AD/SO and the AD/PC would continue to pro-

vide to TRD, through the Joint Training Committee, their

training requirements, including the measures necessary

to protect the security of their operations and personnel.

    c. The DTR and the Assistant Deputy Director for

Administration (Special) would join the Joint Training

Committee so that the DCI might be fully informed of the

SECRET

Training Division's problems and to insure that TRD

received the Agency support that it would need.

Col. Baird actually initiated these procedures at once. The minutes

of the Joint Training Committee show that he began to attend the

Committee meetings at the end of April.

TRD had always been shown on the organization chart of OSO.

It is obvious that there had always been a strong feeling that "covert"

training should remain under OSO, and the establishment of the office

of the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P)* did not change the belief

that the Training Division should continue to be under the control of

the covert side of the Agency. On 26 June 1951, the DD/P notified

the AD/SO and the AD/PC that TRD would be detached from OSO as

of 1 July and established under the DD/P, with Rolfe Kingsley as

Acting Chief. This arrangement was evidently not acceptable to the

DCI, to whom Col. Baird was reporting directly. In early July the

DCI issued a directive (later issued as CIA REGULATION [   ]   (b)(3)

and dated 1 July 1951) assigning "Training (Covert)" -- as TRD

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* By CIA GENERAL ORDER [   ] dated 4 January 1951, SECRET   (b)(3)
Mr. Allen W. Dulles was the first DD/P.

SECRET

was re-named -- organizationally to the Director of Training. At

the same time, [   ] USA, was designated Assistant   (b)(3)

Director of Training (Covert), and [   ] USN, was   (b)(3)

designated Assistant Director of Training (Overt). The organization

chart included in CIA REGULATION [   ] showed "Covert Training"   (b)(3)

as a block in dotted lines under the DD/P. In a memorandum of 28

September 1951, the Executive Officer of DD/P explained this as show-

ing that although the Director of Training was responsible for directing

and coordinating covert training in the United States, the DD/P had

retained responsibility for similar activity overseas. The DTR was

to coordinate with the DD/P on overall policies and programs and was

to provide staff supervision when requested. This information was

published as supplemental to the regulation.

In effect, then, although the covert training unit was nominally

under the DTR it was still being directed by the DD/P; and as late as

January of 1952, * the Office of Training, with Col. Baird as Chief,

was still being shown on DD/P organization charts as reporting to

the DD/P. CIA NOTICE [   ] of 13 February   (b)(3)

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* Although the information given here goes beyond the time-span of
this paper, it is provided to complete the narrative of the transfer
of TRD to the Office of Training.

SECRET

1952, however, described the organization of the Office of Training

and stated specifically that the Office was within the office of the

Director of Central Intelligence and that the Director of Training

reported to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. A 15 July

1952 memorandum from the DCI described the organization of the

Clandestine Services, to become effective on 1 August 1952, and

stated that a responsibility of the Director of Training was to pro-

vide to the DD/P adequate support for all clandestine activities, and

that continuous liaison between the Director of Training and the Chief

of Administration for the Deputy Director for Plans was to be main-

tained. Thereafter, a training organization did not appear on the

organization chart of the Clandestine Services.

After it was established in July of 1951 that the former TRD was

indeed under the organizational jurisdiction of the Director of Train-

ing, Col. Baird proceeded cautiously in the establishment of a rela-

tionship. Most of the people in the covert training organization did

not know him or understand his function. He was first introduced to

the Training (Covert) [TR(C)] people at a meeting of all TR(C) person-

nel on 31 October 1951, held in the auditorium of the Recreation and

SECRET

SECRET

Services Building. The meeting was called by [redacted] to acquaint   (b)(3)

all Office of Training people with the developments and progress of

TR(C).

Col. Baird proceeded at once to study the organization and manage-

ment of the unwieldy component that had been added to the Office of

Training. On 11 July 1951, he addressed a memorandum to the

Deputy Director for Administration (DD/A) requesting a management

survey of what had been TRD and of the whole Office of Training. He

asked that, in view of the organizational change that had transferred

TRD to OTR, the survey be made as soon as possible. He noted that

the transfer had raised certain administrative problems, and he

sought guidance on the organization of OTR, on the allocation of funds,

on space requirements, and on the security protection of covert opera-

tional training. On 21 July 1951, Col. Baird wrote to the Agency

Advisor for Management and stated that his primary consideration in

requesting the survey was the hope that a new plan would ensure the

utmost security protection for covert operational training, protection

that was a part of the Director of Training's responsibility for all

Agency training. He said that he felt that covert operational training

should be compartmented within OTR and be granted the autonomy of

action necessary in the interests of security.

SECRET

SECRET

Chapter II

The Expansion of the Training Division

Chapter I of this paper has discussed the development of TRD within the framework of its relationships with other components of the Agency -- primarily with OSO and OPC and finally with the component headed by the Director of Training. Chapter II is concerned with the internal development and expansion of TRD and covers the component structure of the Division, the staffing and space problems attendant upon the growth of these components, and the development of training courses initiated within these components to meet the ever-increasing requirement levied upon TRD.

A. Organizational Structure

When the training units of OSO and OPC were merged on 17 September 1949 to form TRD, one of the first problems that faced Col. _____ was that of setting up an organizational structure. It seemed apparent at the time that the missions of TRD could be classified in three categories: training in covert operational techniques (trade-craft); training in covert unconventional warfare activities; and

(b)(3)

-32-

SECRET

SECRET

training of non-staff covert personnel -- mostly foreign nationals.

Consequently, TRD's first organizational structure was composed of

three units: Staff Training, Paramilitary Training, and Covert Train-

ing. It soon became obvious that the assessment and evaluation func-

tion could not be handled satisfactorily as a peripheral part of the

instructor's job, and an Assessment and Evaluation Unit was created.

When TRD was given the responsibility for the "holding" operation --

the unclassified training of provisionally cleared employees -- a

Branch was established for that activity. * Naturally the support

structure grew along with the instructional units, and by June of 1951

the Support Branch included a Records and Registration Staff, a Doc-

trine Development Staff, a Planning Staff, and a Training Materials

Staff; there were also in the Support Branch an Administrative Officer

and Commanding Officers of the field training installations. In October

of 1949, when [   ] was appointed Chief of TRD, the Table of   (b)(3)

Organization (T/O) of the Division authorized [ ] positions; in April of   (b)(3)

1951, when [   ] left the Agency, TRD had an authorized T/O   (b)(3)

of [ ] positions.   (b)(3)

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* See below, p. 55.

At the time that TRD officially -- if only nominally -- became a part of the Office of Training in July of 1951, it was operating with an organizational structure that had been authorized by the Assistant Deputy Director for Administration on 7 March 1951. The Staff Training Section was offering three principal courses -- Staff Orientation, Operations, and Advanced Operations. There was an Advanced Specialized Training Section that was developing courses in Espionage, Counter-Espionage, Psychological Warfare, Political Action, Sabotage Operations, Economic Warfare, Resistance Operations, Evasion and Escape, and Communist Party Operations. The Area Training Section* was composed of the Air Training Branch, the Maritime Training Branch, ** and the Paramilitary Training Branch. The Covert Training Section had three Branches -- one for the training of U.S. citizens in a deep-cover status, one for the covert training of foreign nationals, and one

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* The term "Area Training" was at that time used to cover training conducted in a restricted compound or "area." This training was related to resistance force activities and other subjects of a paramilitary nature; it was not concerned with the study of world areas.

** Maritime training conducted by TRD and the Office of Training is fully covered in SS Historical Paper No. OTR-3, History of the Office of Training, Maritime Training, 1949-1954, SECRET May 1969.

-34-

SECRET

for training related to special projects. * The Assessment and Evalu-
ation Unit had three parts -- Psychological Assessment Branch, a
Research and Validation Branch, and a Training Evaluation Branch.
The Support structure of TRD remained as it is described above.

B. Staffing Problems

During the rapid expansion of TRD, the problem of finding quali-
fied instructors to fill the authorized T/O was a major one. In
February of 1950, [   ] told the Joint Training Committee that
(b)(3)
instructors were urgently needed for both the Operations Course and
the Advanced Operations Course and that 40 percent of the authorized
positions in TRD were vacant. The OSO representative on the Com-
mittee said that OSO would screen the lists of returning field person-
nel to see if any qualified instructors could be made available.

In March of 1950 [   ] again pointed out the great need
(b)(3)
for instructors; at that time there were 26 vacancies. He reported
that the operational branches of OSO and OPC had been approached in
an effort to find personnel to man the Operations Course and the

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* See below, p. 83.

SECRET

Advanced Operations Course, in both of which the need was particularly critical. In addition, he stated, TRD was trying to locate possible instructors in other Government Agencies -- CIC and FBI, for example. The OSO representative said that the rotation policy of OSO might make a few individuals available to TRD in the near future. In July of 1950, ⬚⬚⬚⬚⬚⬚⬚ issued a memorandum to all TRD instructors   (b)(3)

pointing out the pressing need in all Branches and asking them to prepare lists of names of possible candidates whom they might know personally.

At a meeting of the Joint Training Committee in October of 1950, ⬚⬚⬚⬚⬚⬚⬚ showed that the new T/O then awaiting approval would   (b)(3)

have a total of 73 vacancies in instructor positions. He did not see how TRD could meet the training requirements unless operationally qualified instructors were secured. The OSO and OPC representatives on the Committee stated that it was impossible to release personnel from OSO or OPC for assignment to TRD at that time. Again, in November of 1950, the personnel needs of TRD were called to the attention of the Committee, but it was concluded that nothing more could be done to recruit instructors, and the hope was expressed

SECRET

that the new DCI might make changes in the personnel procurement

procedures to improve the situation for the Agency as a whole.

As of 7 December 1950, TRD had an authorized T/O of ☐ it   (b)(3)

included ☐ positions for Staff Training, ☐ for Area Training and ☐   (b)(3)

for the so-called "Mobilization Training."* Of ☐ instructors author-   (b)(3)

ized for Staff Training -- ☐ of the total Staff Training positions were   (b)(3)

clerical ones -- only ☐ were on duty; Area Training had all ☐ of its   (b)(3)

instructor positions filled; Mobilization Training had only ☐   (b)(3)

instructor positions filled out of the ☐ authorized.   (b)(3)

Actually, the shortage was not critical as the statistics might

indicate. In May of 1951, the Chief of the Agency's Personnel Divi-

sion pointed out that TRD had a total of 267 vacancies against which

only 126 recruitment requests had been submitted. Fifty six of the

vacancies were slotted for the ZRELOPE project, ** not yet actually

launched. More than 100 of the total TRD vacancies on the T/O were

for maintenance and support positions at the proposed field training

site (plumbers, electricians, painters, and laborers). These

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* See below, p. 76.

** See below, p. 84.

positions could not be filled until the new training area had been pro-
cured, and many of them were low-level jobs for which it would be
preferable to recruit locally. In spite of these facts, TRD was still
hard pressed to find qualified instructors for critical courses.

Clerical personnel also were in short supply during this expand-
ing period. On 27 September 1951, for example, Training (Covert) --
then an element of the Office of Training -- had a T/O that approved
90 clerical positions, and only 36 of them were filled. On 6 Novem-
ber the situation was unchanged.

The really critical problem, however, continued to be the pro-
curement of instructors. The generation of a large requirement for
handling trainees in paramilitary courses at field training sites was
the principal cause of this pressure for additional instructors. In
January of 1951, for example, a large training organization was being
planned to cope with 300 trainees a month, * half of whom would go
into paramilitary courses and half of whom would go into staff train-
ing courses. It was planned that this operation would begin in the
summer of 1951.

_____

* See below, p. 77.

Writing to the Agency Advisor for Management regarding the

instructor procurement situation, Col. Baird, on 21 July 1951, *

noted that the T/O of Training (Covert) was only about 40 percent full

in spite of the high priority given it by Personnel Procurement. He

felt that one of the explanations was the low salary level: good

instructors could not be procured at the GS-09 to GS-11 level. He

pointed out that OSS alumni could not be induced to come back by the

offer of a GS-11 and said that after two months of effort he had been

unable to recruit a single qualified language and linguistics instructor

at the salary level that he could offer. He stressed that if the Office

of Training was to meet the training commitments it had accepted, it

would have to be able to offer instructors a salary they could accept.

He felt that the practice of classifying instructors according to what

they taught was unfortunate in that it put the classification people in a

position of having to judge the relative merits of the subjects taught.

He asked, for example, what are the relative values of an instructor

in the Russian language and an instructor in Advanced Operations?

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* Here again the information given goes beyond the time-span of
this paper; it is provided to complete the account of the staffing
problem.

SECRET

Col. Baird said that he would prefer to have an Office of Training "Faculty" T/O on an Office-wide basis and be able to use that faculty where he needed to, depending on the versatility of the individual and the training needs at a particular time. He pointed out that the then-current OTR procedure of unit slotting necessitated a juggling of slots and grades that was not always honest and often required subject-matter comparisons that were invidious. He also pointed out the need for sufficient numbers of GS-14 and GS-15 slots to enable the Office of Training to recruit and hold the personnel it needed, and he stressed the point that the reorganized Office of Training would have a T/O in excess of [   ] persons, would train thousands of people a year, and would spend millions of dollars a year. To all intents and purposes, the Office of Training had Office status under the DCI, and such status, he felt, should be recognized officially by appropriate grade ratings.

(b)(3)

C. The Rotation Problem

During this 1949-51 period, the staffing problem was compounded -- as it had been for years and would continue to be -- by a policy that called for the rotation of instructors. In a 1948 planning paper, [   ] Chief of the OSO Training Staff before TRD was

(b)(3)

formed, had emphatically urged continuation of the policy of regular

rotation of instructors to operational assignments in order to keep the

instruction up-to-date and consistent with recent field experience.

[   ] actually prepared a complete rotation plan for each of the 32   (b)(3)

people on duty with his Staff in December of 1948, but he could not

carry it out.   In April of 1949, he again raised the question of the

orderly rotation of personnel and submitted a plan for an OSO "Per-

sonnel Board." In that planning paper he stated, "I sincerely believe

that we should have within OSO a top-level board approach to one of

the most important parts of our period of growth -- the proper selec-

tion, placement, and rotation of personnel."   (b)(3)

[   ] supported [   ] views on rotation policy.   At a   (b)(3)

meeting of the Joint Training Committee on 13 April 1950, the ques-

tion of rotation of TRD personnel was considered, and it was generally

agreed that those persons who had been in training for a number of

years should be reassigned, even though TRD was short of instructors.

The implementation of the agreement, however, proved to be very

difficult. At another meeting, on 5 September 1950, the Committee

reaffirmed the policy that to the greatest extent possible, TRD people

who had served the allotted time as instructors should be reassigned

-41-

SECRET

to operational divisions. It was recognized, however, that in order

to effect such a policy, TRD would have to have qualified replacements,

and at that time TRD was losing more people than were being replaced.

In October of 1951 -- some months after the departure of [   ]

[   ] -- the policy on rotation was reaffirmed in a paper submitted   (b)(3)

to the Director of Training by [   ] Chief of Training (Covert).   (b)(3)

This paper provided a comprehensive plan for the orderly rotation of

TR(C) instructors. In a later supplement to his paper, [   ] set   (b)(3)

forth the basic premise that the Agency would be best served by con-

tinuing rotation of personnel from the operating offices to TR(C) and

from TR(C) to the operating offices, and that the length of a tour as

instructor should be two years. He further stated that certain key per-

sonnel in executive and administrative posts should not be subject to

this general policy of rotation.

On 10 December 1951, [   ] showed his concern and frustra-   (b)(3)

tion by addressing to the Director of Central Intelligence a memoran-

dum on the subject of the staffing of covert training, describing the

instructor situation as extremely critical, with the number of students

rising and the staff overdue for rotation to other assignments. He

believed that the only adequate solution was for OSO and OPC to supply

-42-

TR(C) with personnel in substantial numbers at once. As they were

not doing so, he proposed as an emergency measure the rotation of

the most deserving of the TR(C) staff members no later than 1 April

1952, even though it might mean either a curtailment of the training

program or a lowering of the number of trainees. This proposal was

not acceptable to the DCI, and it was not adopted. In January of

1952, [   ] was transferred to a staff position in OSO.   (b)(3)

During the period before July of 1951, TRD was acquiring a repu-

tation as a unit that would not release its people for other assignments.

This reputation, deserved or not, made both the acquisition of new

instructors and the reassignment of TRD instructors more difficult.

On their own initiative, some TRD instructors promoted -- or at least

negotiated -- reassignments for themselves. On 18 June of 1951,

Rolfe Kingsley, Acting Chief of TRD, issued a memorandum to all

TRD personnel regarding changes of assignments. He noted that in

the previous few weeks a number of cases had come up involving trans-

fer of people to the operating offices and that these transfers had been

made either without his knowledge or without proper clearance and,

consequently, had led to administrative confusion and personal

-43-

embarrassment. The response to the memorandum indicated that there had been misunderstandings about whether or not some people had gotten proper releases. He then put TRD personnel on notice that an orderly procedure would be followed in the future.

D. Space

Because of the rapid growth in personnel, courses, and students in 1950 and 1951, TRD needed additional classroom and office space to supplement that already in use in Buildings T30, T13, and T14. Building T31 was remodeled in the summer of 1950, and the Basic Orientation Course and the new rapid reading course moved into that building in the fall. In June of the same year, the Basic Orientation Course had moved from T13 to T30.

The Administrative and Operations Courses were being held in T30, which had a small auditorium, adequate library space, and a number of classrooms and offices of various sizes and shapes. Covert Training had been set up in L Building, the Basic and Interim Study course (the "pool")* was in Building 13, and the Assessment Unit was

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* See below, p. 55.

in Building 14. At this time steps were taken to procure space in the
so-called Recreation and Services (R&S) Building. ⬚ origi- (b)(3)
nally wanted to use the large gymnasium in R&S for the physical con-
ditioning of OSO and OPC personnel, but this could not be worked out,
and the gymnasium became a classroom.

The Office of Training continued to occupy T30, T31, and most of
R&S for many years. Pressure for additional classrooms and offices
in these early years led to the gradual occupation of space in a number
of other buildings also -- Central Building, Eye Building, Quarters
Eye, 1016 16th Street, and Alcott Hall. There were also a number of
training sites under cover -- the Covert Training safehouses and the
field training installations.

This scattering of personnel and activities did not make for effi-
ciency. Most of the buildings were old temporary structures that did
not provide satisfactory classroom space. For several years -- until
air conditioning was finally approved -- classes were subject to dis-
missal during very hot weather, when rooms often had temperatures in
the high 90's. Ventilation was poor at best, fans were noisy, and roofs
leaked. It is a considerable tribute to the students and to the staffs of

-45-

the Office of Training that they put up with the conditions with as much

patience and understanding as they did.

E. New Courses

During the period when [   ] was Chief of TRD, the staff   (b)(3)

was hard pressed to keep up with the demand for new courses to meet

the expanding requirements of OSO and OPC.   A number of problems

developed, in addition to those of finding instructors with the knowl-

edge and experience to handle sophisticated new subject matter and of

acquiring approved doctrine.   There was the matter of obtaining clear-

ance and approval for training materials that were developed.   In

August of 1950, the Chief of TRD insisted that although the proposed

Escape and Evasion course outline looked good to him, it was essential

that it be acceptable to all of the foreign Division Chiefs of OPC and be

coordinated with them to make sure that it incorporated techniques that

were applicable to their areas of operation.   In September of 1950, the

prospectus for the Escape and Evasion Course and those of three other

new TRD courses were submitted to the Joint Training Committee for

approval.   The approval was given quickly, but the coordination with

the OPC Division Chiefs was long in coming.

-46-

At the end of 1950, the Staff Training Branch of TRD was offering

three courses for the staff officers of OSO and OPC. The first was

the Staff Orientation Course (also variously known at the time as the

Basic Orientation Course and the Basic Intelligence Course). It intro-

duced basic tools and techniques, such as reporting and interviewing,

and included a week of study on Communism and the USSR. The

material used in this course was not highly classified. Students then

went into the Operations Course, which for the most part took up the

methods and techniques of clandestine operations (tradecraft). The

third course, the Advanced Operations Course, presented discussions

of the Agency's clandestine missions and of the major operational

tasks of OSO and OPC.

Between 1 December of 1949 and 30 November of 1950, 208 stu-

dents went through the Staff Orientation Course; 276 through the Opera-

tions Course; and 160 through the Advanced Operations Course. By

February of 1950, the training load had become such that the Staff

Orientation Course began to overlap successive runnings. For a while

the instructional staff in T31 was beginning a new four-week Staff Ori-

entation Course every two weeks, with a full classroom at each end of

the building. The Operations Course also tried the overlapping scheme,

and other expedients were tried. At one time the Operations Course

was given in the auditorium of T30 and consisted entirely of lectures,

a small group of students -- selected on the basis of projected assign-

ments -- staying on for an additional week of exercises and problems.

As early as December of 1949, the rush to training was on, and train-

ing requests so far exceeded the student capacities of the courses that

the requests were being sent to the Executive Officer of OSO and the

Chief of Support of OPC for decisions on the priority selection of

trainees. Beginning in December of 1949, new personnel were not

entered in formal training classes but were scheduled for "Basic and

Interim Study" so that they would be under TRD control from the day

of entrance on duty until they had completed all their training.

It was generally felt in OPC that much of the material in the Staff

Orientation, Operations, and Advanced Operations Courses was not

applicable to the work of many of their staff officers; and OPC requested

a concentrated indoctrination course as a single substitute for the three

courses. By the end of November of 1950, a short "Staff Indoctrination

Course" (SIC) was ready for presentation. It was aimed primarily at

giving the students an introduction to the missions, functions, and organ-

ization of OSO and OPC. During 1951, the class was split for many of

the lectures -- OPC people were not exposed to lectures on OSO activi-

ties and vice versa.   Until OSO and OPC were actually combined, stu-

dents from each Office were kept in the dark about the activities of the

other.   For a time the Staff Orientation Course even ran separate sec-

tions so that OSO people and OPC people would not meet each other.

During 1950 several advanced courses were developed by TRD:

Espionage, Counter-Espionage, USSR Operations, Communist Party

Operations, Evasion and Escape, and Sabotage Operations.   Later,

courses in Psychological Warfare, Stay-behind Operations, and War

Planning were added.   All of these courses depended to a great degree

on the participation of operational specialists from OSO and OPC, and

there were many course revisions and changes through the years.

In 1950 the Staff Training Section was presenting -- in addition to

the three major courses -- an Investigative Techniques Course and a

Basic Photography Course.   Staff Training was also responsible for the

"interim studies," which was designed to enable students to conduct

independent study and research during periods when they were awaiting

clearances or assignments.   In December of 1950, the Rapid Reading

Course began in Building T31.   The students spent one hour a day for

six weeks using various machines designed to increase the student's

-49-

SECRET

speed in the scanning of reading material. Because of the influx of new instructors, an Instructor Training Course was also offered by Staff Training. It met each morning for a week, and all TRD instructors were enrolled. The course covered the mission and functions of TRD, methods of instruction, and methods of testing and evaluation.

During 1950 the Administrative Training Course was completely revised. This course was designed primarily for junior administrative assistants, clerks, and typists from both OSO and OPC. The primary purpose of the course was to introduce the students to the pertinent administrative procedures of the two covert Offices. The course was concerned with both headquarters and field administrative problems, and it relied heavily on outside speakers. At this time -- during 1950 -- it was deemed necessary to section the class so that OSO employees heard only OSO material and OPC employees heard only OPC material.

Chapter III

Special Problems in Training

During the 1949-51 period when TRD was developing organiza-

tionally and expanding its activities to meet the many new require-

ments levied upon it, there arose a number of special problems --

problems that were peripheral, perhaps, to the major mission of TRD

but problems that had to be solved to permit the fulfillment of the

major missions. In this chapter a few of these problems are described.

A. Auditors

Because OSO and OPC followed no clear policy on enrollment in

full-time training courses, many new employees who were under pres-

sure to begin their jobs tried to get the required training by "auditing"

courses. This meant that either they attended classes without partici-

pating in exercises, quizzes, and discussions, or that they attended

lectures as time permitted and inclination moved them. For those

who wanted to avoid written evaluation of their performances in train-

ing, auditing provided an easy escape. The instructors were not

opposed to having available space occupied, and they rather welcomed

SECRET

the idea of an auditor category because in this way the classes could

be kept small -- the staging of class problems and the writing of evalu-

ations remained manageable; but when the Agency began to expand

rapidly, the situation became serious.

In January of 1949, the Basic Course had 13 full-time students

and five auditors; in August of 1949, there were 20 students and five

auditors. In January of 1949, the Advanced Course had 19 students

and 19 auditors; by August the class had 11 full-time students and 12

auditors. During the entire period between 1 August of 1948 and 31

July of 1949, OSO had 287 full-time students and 148 auditors; OPC

had 16 students and 31 auditors.

By September of 1950, the situation had become worse. In a

memorandum of 7 September 1950, the Chief of Staff Training pointed

out to the Chief of TRD that the number of people in courses was in-

creasing but those who were enrolled as auditors were attending no

more than two or three lectures. He said that some of these auditors

might later claim credit for "completing" the course on the flimsy

basis of having attended a few lectures.

In October of 1950, the problem of auditors was the subject of a

discussion in a meeting of the Joint Training Committee. Both the

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OSO and the OPC members stated their opposition to the practice, and

the Committee agreed to a policy that the auditing of courses was to be

strongly discouraged. In the future, approval would be granted only

after a very careful review of each case, and the Registrar of TRD

was instructed to consult the OSO or the OPC member of the Committee

when the number of auditors exceeded a "reasonable" number. It was

also agreed that the Committee should look at the problem again after

60 days.

The problem was gradually resolved as the number of students to

be trained became so large that every available seat was occupied by a

full-time student. In both OSO and OPC the realization grew that audit-

ing was no substitute for training; only in the case of high-ranking

officials was the practice really approved (for example, early in Col.

Baird's career, a program was drawn up to enable him to audit the

essential elements of all the courses then being presented.)*

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* See above, p. 26.

B.   Outside Lectures

The 1949-51 period saw the beginning of a new policy that has continued to the present time.   A memorandum of 26 July 1950 from the Executive Officer of OSO to the AD/SO reported a conversation between [   ] the OSO member of the Joint Training Committee, (b)(3) and [   ] in which they agreed that responsibility for arranging (b)(3) for Agency personnel to give lectures for various other governmental activities should be delegated to the Chief of TRD.   The AD/SO approved this delegation because he felt that TRD had more speakers readily available to meet outside requests than did the operating elements, and the use of instructors represented a minimum interruption of operational activities.

TRD then began to provide lecturers for other agencies of the government and to arrange for speakers from other parts of the Agency, as well.   For example, in December of 1950 Shane McCarthy, Paul Eckel, [   ] Kenneth Knowles, and [   ] lec- (b)(3) tured on intelligence subjects to the Strategic Intelligence School of the Army.   In 1951 [   ] of TRD was lecturing regularly on (b)(3) Russian espionage at the Office of Special Investigation Training School of the Air Force.

C.   The "Pool"

A memorandum of 30 September 1949 from [   ] of OPC   (b)(3)

to [   ] indicates that in OPC a procedure had been in effect   (b)(3)

since 26 July 1949, designed to keep "semi-covert" OPC operational

personnel "busy and under control" until such time as they could enter

formal training classes.   She pointed out that this procedure, an al-

ternative to assignment to the "uncleared pool" with its attendant

security risks, appeared unduly elaborate and cumbersome; most of

the individuals concerned, after being entered on duty quite covertly,

would eventually lose their covert status by taking courses in Agency

buildings.   A simpler procedure was then set up.   These students

became a separate section of the TRD Basic and Interim Study Courses

(BISC), and were given prepared research directives which in most

cases were related to area or operational problems of interest to the

staffs and divisions sponsoring the students' training.

In a memorandum to the AD/SO and the AD/PC on 9 February

1950, [   ] explained that the aim of the BISC was to develop in   (b)(3)

the students a background for the areas to which they would be assigned

and at the same time to implant a thorough security consciousness.

The research topics were on such subjects as "Strategic Aspects of China" and "International Politics of Greece;" for the most part, the research was done at the Library of Congress, using overt sources.

A list of topics being worked on in April of 1950 shows such subjects as "Refugee Groups in Germany," "Labor Problems of the Salonika Area," and "Oil in the Arab World." By October of 1951, the number of students in this program became so great that the load was becoming such that the one TRD man assigned to the program could not handle it, and plans were drawn up for a staff of four, with appropriate space and accommodations, to handle up to 100 students a month from both OSO and OPC. In January of 1952, plans had been made to include lectures, movies, and group discussions on such un-classified topics as "Understanding Foreign People" and "Formula-tion of Foreign Policy."

The history of this OSO-OPC "pool" is a complicated one. It is made even more confusing by the fact that a separate pool was estab-lished in April of 1951 for intelligence analysts and other "non-covert" employees -- this was the unit established by OTR, before TRD became a part of OTR, and named the "Unclassified Training Group A" (UTG/A).

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D. [   ]

(b)(3)
(b)(1)

(b)(3)
(b)(1)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

E.   Improvement of Quality

While he was Chief of TRD, [   ] pressed vigorously to   (b)(3)

improve the quality of the instruction.   His Training Review Commit-

tee has already been described. ** In 1950 he initiated an Instructor

Training Course.   In March of that year, a Training Aids Specialist

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*   In May of 1948, [   ] had visited Washington and had con-
ferred with [   ], then Chief of OSO's Training Staff.   (b)(3)

**   See above p. 16.

and a Projectionist were hired; and in expectation of their services,

[   ] assigned an Educational Specialist to audit all courses,   (b)(3)

to identify areas where training aids could be used, and to hold follow-

up conferences with the instructors and work out the exact nature of

the aids.

. In February of 1950, [   ] issued a comment sheet that was   (b)(3)

to be filled out by the trainees at the conclusion of their training; it

solicited student opinion on the quality of instruction and the quality

of course content, and it invited the students' ideas for improvement.

To encourage complete frankness and to ensure that the students'

comments would not adversely affect their grades in the courses, the

completed sheets were forwarded directly to the Chief of TRD in a

sealed envelope without being seen by the instructors.

In July of 1950, Course Chiefs were asked to submit a percentage

breakdown of how each instructor spent an average working day. The

Chief of the Advanced Operations Course was eventually excused from

this task when it turned out that during eight weeks of instruction car-

ried on without a break he could not find the time to perform the

analysis.

On many occasions [   ] clarified his philosophy of train-   (b)(3)

ing. On 28 August 1950, for example, he wrote the following on a

routing sheet:

> With the varying grade averages coming out of the Admin-
> istrative Course, it is essential at this time that some mean
> standards be established. There is too great a tendency for
> the grades to fluctuate from a very low average to a high aver-
> age and vice versa. As I visualize the situation, the instruc-
> tion in the Administrative Course, and any course for that
> matter, should entail first, presentation of the principle in
> form of lectures, conferences, etc.; application of techniques
> in the form of exercises, demonstrations and so on; and
> finally a test to evaluate the students' knowledge of the princi-
> ple and their ability to apply the techniques to a given prob-
> lem.

He followed the conduct of the training very closely, and he established

a practice of dropping in on classes from time to time and of walking

unannounced into an instructor's office, sitting down, and asking the

instructor about his problems.

When [   ] who had been an OSO officer, be-   (b)(3)

came [   ] Deputy in October of 1949, he was assigned a num-   (b)(3)

ber of responsibilities; among them were the maintenance of training

records, training evaluations, and instructor training. In April of

1950, [   ] spent a week at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he   (b)(3)

had been an instructor during the war. He was briefed on all aspects

of instructor training and guidance at the Command and General Staff College, and he came back to TRD with many ideas about the conduct of instruction, the maintenance of records, and the preparation of evaluations. He recommended -- and [   ] approved -- the   (b)(3)
TRD adoption of the Leavenworth method of instructor training. Col. [   ] called together all of the instructors to hear [   ] report   (b)(3)
and to see a staged demonstration that illustrated conference methods and techniques.

Perhaps the most far-reaching result of [   ] recommenda-   (b)(3)
tions was the requirement for lesson plans. A "Training Materials Officer" was appointed and directed to set up a folder for each presentation given in TRD courses (except covert training courses). This folder was to contain a presentation directive that had been coordinated with OSO and OPC; a bibliography, if appropriate; lecture outlines; and complete transcripts of the lectures. These folders were to be kept up to date by continual review and revision. Copies of charts and other handouts were also to be included. The lectures given by guest speakers were to be recorded, and T-30 was wired to make this possible.

Although this lesson-plan program accomplished a great deal in the way of making instructors organize their material and provided a measure of control over the general content, it did not really work very well. The instructors resisted because they were carrying heavy loads of teaching and had difficulty in finding the time to work their notes into suitable form. More seriously, much of the material given in lectures was subject to change from one class to the next, in some cases because of Agency reorganization and in others because of revised procedures and doctrine. On 8 May 1950, for example, the Chief Instructor of the Operations Course reported a list of 37 lectures for which there were either outlines of transcripts, but he made the point that most of the lectures were preliminary efforts which, although doing justice to the topic, were not final formats, either in content or in manner of presentation.

The lesson-plan system really broke down because there was not enough clerical help to transcribe and type the huge volume of material and there was not available enough expertise to set up a review procedure to make real use of the folders after they had been produced. On 15 June 1950, for example, it was reported that 107 dictaphone belts and eight wire recordings were waiting to be transcribed; about

SECRET

four hours were required for the transcription of each belt and each

recording. After [   ] left TRD in April of 1951, the program   (b)(3)

was gradually abandoned under the pressure of more immediate

demands on instructors and clerks.

One of [   ] greatest concerns was the control of guest lec-   (b)(3)

turers. TRD had necessarily relied from the beginning on knowledge-

able guest speakers from OSO and OPC. The Advanced Operations

Course in November of 1949, for example, included the following guest

lecturers: James Angleton, Rolfe Kingsley, W. Lloyd George, Herman

Horton, Franklin Lindsay, [   ] and Richard Helms. More   (b)(3)

than two-thirds of the lectures in all courses were given by guests.

Control of the content of their presentations was a continuing problem.

Because of repeated complaints about the low quality of the guest

lectures, [   ] issued orders in April of 1950 that an instructor   (b)(3)

had to be present during each lecture presentation, and that he should

analyze the lecture by means of a check sheet that would eventually be

forwarded to [   ] who would then present the results -- with   (b)(3)

suggestions for improvement -- to the Joint Training Committee. The

problem was not solved by this device, however, nor by other direc-

tives and procedures brought to bear after [   ] had left TRD.   (b)(3)

-64-

SECRET

Chapter IV

Paramilitary Training

The rapid expansion of training activities in 1950 and 1951 was the result of requirements projected by OPC and, to a lesser extent, by OSO as well -- requirements that were later to be described as "grandiose" by the Inspector General. * These requirements called for the establishment of large training facilities outside the Washington area. Such camps had been used by OSS, but they had been given up by the end of 1945 and were not considered again until the establishment of OPC. The following narrative is a summary of the activities of TRD during 1950 and 1951 in response to the requirements for expanded paramilitary training.

A.   Area Training

The term "area training" was used for many years to mean the training of students in resistance force activities and other paramilitary subjects at a restricted area or compound. The terms should not

_____

*   The Inspector General's report of the Survey of the Office of Training conducted late in 1953.

SECRET

SECRET

be confused with the term "area studies," which was being used at the same time to denote the study of the culture and the life of foreign areas or countries.

In February of 1949, the Chief of OPC Training, [   ]   (b)(3)

[   ] initiated action to procure an area where covert and semi-covert training in OPC activities could be carried on.   The area in which he was primarily interested was the so-called Chopawampsic Camp, a part of the Prince William Forest Park near Quantico.   This area had been used by OSS Training and was known at that time as Area A.   It consisted of rugged terrain with a number of austere buildings that had originally been built for a CCC camp during the depression of the mid-Thirties.   OPC did not take over this area, however, because upon inspection it was judged to be unsuitable.   No other area could be found that was any better.   Actually, the acqui-sition of a site was not urgent; there were no instructors to man it should one be found.   This manpower problem then led to proposals of working out a joint endeavor with the Army, using military personnel as instructors.   In August of 1949, a schedule of training was drawn

SECRET

up by [   ] office for presentation to Army representatives   (b)(3)

as a joint CIA/Army program to be conducted at one or more military

installations.

B. The Area Training Branch

With the arrival of [   ] in August of 1949 and the subsequent   (b)(3)

termination of the OPC Training Unit as an independent activity, the

planning for paramilitary training began to move forward. [   ]   (b)(3)

was experienced in paramilitary work and took great interest in the estab-

lishment of this training. In January of 1950, he organized the Area

Training Branch as a unit within TRD, with [   ] as the   (b)(3)

first chief of the Branch. By May of 1950, a staff and a group of

instructors had been assembled. The mission of the Branch was to

train groups of semi-covert students in all phases of resistence force

activities; to train selected military personnel in guerrilla operations;

and to supervise special training of OPC students in courses that

would be conducted primarily by branches of the Armed Forces.

Within this Branch, three sections were set up. A Paramilitary

Training Section had the responsibility for all safehouse training in

the Washington area. This training, which concentrated on tradecraft,

SECRET

was actually conducted at an installation [   ] (b)(1)
(b)(3)
[   ] An Army Area Section was set up to

conduct all joint CIA/Armed Forces field training in guerrilla warfare

at a military installation not yet identified. This instruction was to be

devoted primarily to paramilitary subjects, which were commonly

referred to at this time as "quasi-military." There would be a heavy

concentration on map work, demolitions and sabotage, weapons, and

parachute jumping. A Liaison Training Section was established to

arrange for the entrance of OPC employees into courses of instruction

conducted by the Strategic Air Command (survival, escape and evasion),

the U.S. Navy (maritime operations), and other training courses con-

ducted under military auspices.

C. Training Camp No. 1

1. Establishment. After considerable negotiation between CIA

and the Army, Training Camp No. 1, familiarly known as TC-1, was

set up at [   ] It was established on 21 June 1950 (b)(1)
(b)(3)

by official order of the Department of the Army. The order stated

that the Camp would be testing methods of instruction in infantry wea-

pons, in tactics, and in airborne techniques. The Camp was actually

SECRET

a former prisoner-of-war compound that was rehabilitated and fenced

in by a 12-foot barbed-wire fence. A group of instructors and staff

was gradually assembled under the command of [   ] . (b)(3)

[   ] U.S. Infantry, who had been assigned Unit Commander   (b)(3)

by the Commanding General of [   ]   (b)(1)
(b)(3)

   2. <u>The Classes</u>. The training plan called for a class to spend

12 weeks at TC-1; this was to be the second phase of a program that

would begin with five weeks at the Washington safehouse; a third phase,

of five weeks, would also be conducted at the safehouse.

   In the original planning for the paramilitary classes, the

capacity of the Washington safehouse was set at [ ] students per class.   (b)(3)

When these students went to TC-1 they were to be joined by 20 officers

provided by the military services -- 10 from the Army, five from the

Air Force, and five from the Navy. Even before the first class con-

vened, pressures were developing to increase the number of students,

both civilian and military, in the classes. These pressures eventually

led to the establishment of [   ]   (b)(1)
(b)(3)

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* See below, p. 81.

The first paramilitary class began training at the safehouse in the Washington area on 21 August 1950. This phase was completed on 22 September, and the group went to TC-1, where they were joined in the 12-week program by a number of students from the military establishment. In January of 1951, the class returned to the Washington safehouse for the third phase of training, which consisted of additional work in clandestine subject matter. The second paramilitary class entered TC-1 on 8 January 1951 and other classes followed in April, July, and December of 1951.*

3. <u>Problems on the Post.</u> From the beginning, TC-1 posed many difficult problems. Some of these were the normal problems of civilians working with a military establishment on a military post; others were the usual problems of field-headquarters relationships (communication, control, and division of responsibility); others were the problems common in any new training program (clarification of objectives, procurement of competent instructors, and effective training materials and aids).

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* The final group started in April of 1952, and by July of 1952 the Agency had withdrawn from participation in the training conducted at TC-1.

The establishment and maintenance of a restricted compound on a military post generated a number of supply and housekeeping problems. Motor transportation continued to be a problem for many months. At the beginning of the TC-1 program, the Commanding Officer was not allowed to hire maintenance people directly, and there was a constant turnover in this particular group. The delivery of trainee mail was extremely slow for a time, and morale sagged when personal air-mail letters were delivered 30 days after they had been posted. On 25 November 1950, the water supply failed, and there was no heat for several days in freezing weather. In December word was received that there would be no telephone service until the following March.

The greatest difficulty, however, lay in the area of security and the concealment of the Agency's participation in TC-1. As late as October of 1951, more than a year after the camp was set up, an investigation showed that there were numerous weaknesses in the security practices and inadequate control of student identities and sponsorship. The problem was compounded at Headquarters by a lack of agreement regarding the need for security. One high-placed visitor

SECRET

from OPC noted, shortly after the Camp had opened, that there was an exaggerated idea of security requirements and a failure to give the Commanding Officer authority commensurate with his responsibility.

4. <u>Field-Headquarters Relationships</u>. Although there was much traveling back and forth between TC-1 and Washington and extensive correspondence between the officials of TRD and the officials in charge of TC-1, misunderstandings were bound to arise over such matters as the use of, and proper accounting for, the expenditure of funds and the exercise of responsibility in the control of the students. The Commanding Officer of TC-1 was a believer in discipline and firm control. He described the Agency students of class No. 5 as an "undisciplined rabble," reluctant to conform to regulations and to comport themselves as mature and responsible gentlemen. He attributed this trouble to the presence of a few troublemakers, to the failure of the students to grasp the seriousness of their jobs, and to the natural reluctance of civilians to accept the restrictions of military control. At Headquarters, TRD took the position that the problem of discipline was bound to be a thorny one but that the students were civilians and it was neither possible nor desirable to apply the lowest common denominator of strict military discipline in their handling; they would be

-72-

SECRET

largely on their own in operational situations and should therefore be treated as individuals. The Commanding Officer was instructed to send students back to Headquarters if disciplinary measures became really necessary. As a result of this instruction, three civilian students who refused to take part in the parachute jump training were returned to Washington.

A serious area of contention between Washington Headquarters and TC-1 lay in the relationship to _____ The (b)(1) (b)(3) Commander of this unit and the Commanding Officer of TC-1 appeared to believe in full cooperation, including the conduct of joint exercises. Although there was some feeling in OPC that this was appropriate, TRD took the position that contact between TC-1 and unauthorized outsiders should be kept to the minimum possible; security was only one of a number of reasons for this. At the same time it was recognized that it was necessary to maintain good relations with the Army officers at _____ while maintaining security -- a difficult and (b)(1) (b)(3) a delicate job for the Commanding Officer of TC-1. Correspondence of this period indicates that TRD in Washington and the field unit at TC-1 had difficulty in arriving at a common understanding. In April of 1951, after the arrival of the third class, _____ wrote (b)(3)

that he had never received any training objectives or training missions

for the course.   Almost at the same time, [   ] wrote a   (b)(3)

letter to [   ] saying that it had come to his attention that the   (b)(3)

course instructors were referring to the guerrillas with whom the

OPC people would be working as "gooks" or "hoods." He pointed out

the necessity for inculcating in the students an honestly sympathetic

attitude toward the individuals with whom they would be working; in

many cases the OPC officers would not be able to depend on military

authority to accomplish their ends.   A considerable amount of travel

between Headquarters and TC-1 evidenced a desire to arrive at a

common understanding and to reach solutions to the many problems.

Visitors at TC-1 included not only TRD personnel, but also Frank

Wisner, AD/OPC; Matthew Baird, Director of Training; and even

General Maxwell Taylor, then G-3 of the Army.

5.   Problems with Trainees.   Thirteen of the students of the

first class at TC-1, when they were debriefed, were critical of much

of the instruction and suggested the need for a greater number of

practical exercises.   At least three of these men seemed to be impro-

perly motivated for paramilitary work.   An effort was made to cast

the work in more practical terms and to improve the instruction

-74-

SECRET

generally. TRD also tried to establish an evaluation system that would

identify students who were not qualified or motivated for the training.

When the members of class No. 3 performed very poorly in training

and did not live up to the abilities indicated by their background and

their test scores, an investigation was called for. In August of 1951,

the Chief of the Training Evaluations Section of TRD compiled a report

based on interviews with members of the class; he had investigated

the reasons for the abnormally low training records, the low morale,

the apathetic attitude, and the marked resentment and bitterness about

their Agency jobs and the training they had received. He noted that 17

out of 18 students had performed worse in the third phase than they

had in the first. Seven students had resigned from the program during

training, one had been asked to leave, two had resigned upon comple-

tion of training, and one was in the process of resigning. Among the

causes for this state of affairs he identified:

(1) inadequate briefing of the candidates on their pro-

jected assignments at the time of original recruitment;

(2) inadequate, inconsiderate, and poorly planned

administrative handling of students by OPC prior to, during,

and after training;

SECRET

SECRET

(3)   inadequate protection of cover during the training;

(4)   ineffective training techniques at TC-1;

(5)   overemphasis on the importance and the danger of

jump training; and

(6)   lack of comprehension by OPC desk officers of the

kind of training the students received (they were commonly

identified in OPC as muscle-men).

Although as a result of this investigation steps were taken to cure the

deficiencies in the program, the handling of the trainees at TC-1 con-

tinued to be a touchy problem to the end; at that stage of the develop-

ment of TRD and of OPC, some of the causes were beyond remedy.

D.   Mobilization Training Program

At some time in early 1950, OPC submitted to TRD its training

requirements in the event of mobilization. * This project called for

establishing a program of paramilitary instruction and training at a

_____

*   There appears to be no documentary record of the actual submittal
of the OPC requirements to TRD. The first record of a discussion of
the requirements, and of TRD's plan to meet them, appears in the
minutes of a meeting of the Joint Training Committee on 20 July
1950.

-76-

SECRET

site with facilities for the simultaneous handling of _____ people.   (b)(3)

TRD then prepared a mobilization training program that called for a

Mobilization Training Branch with a cadre of ___ positions.   This   (b)(3)

created an additional requirement for instructors, and recruiting

began; as of 1 December 1950, however, the Mobilization Training

Branch consisted of one administrative officer and _____ instructors.   (b)(3)

The search for facilities also went slowly.

It was generally recognized that the TC-1 facility at _____   (b)(1)
                                                                                      (b)(3)
would not be suitable for mobilization training, particularly in view

of the possibility that it might be lost in an emergency.   The Chopa-

wamsic site was suggested by _____ Chief of Staff II of OPC,   (b)(3)

in August of 1950.   He felt that it should be re-investigated even

though when it had been inspected the year before it had seemed unsuit-

able and it had appeared that rehabilitation would cost about a million

dollars.   By early September of 1950, TRD officials had explored the

Chopawamsic possibility, and there seemed to be no reason to expect

difficulty in procuring the area.   It appeared at this time that any OSO

mobilization training requirements could be handled in available TRD

facilities.   By the end of 1950, the Executive of the Agency had approved

in principle the acquisition of 10,000 acres at Chopawamsic for the

establishment of a training facility for mobilization expansion and had

authorized an engineering survey.   As of 24 February 1951, OSO and

OPC had set aside [   ] to establish the training site at Prince   (b)(3)

William Forest Park.

By February of 1951, the paramilitary portion of the mobilization

training picture appeared to be somewhat as follows.   A basic course

of approximately one month would be established by the Staff Training

Branch to accommodate approximately [   ] students in each class   (b)(3)

[   ] each from OSO and OPC).   It was expected that this training   (b)(3)

would be given at Chopawamsic.   The [   ] OPC students from the basic   (b)(3)

course would then enter regular paramilitary training of three months

at different facilities in the same general area.   This training would

be conducted by TRD.   The PM training facilities would have to accom-

modate [   ] students at one time; the majority of the instructors would   (b)(3)

be moved from TC-1 to this new area.   At monthly intervals the [   ]   (b)(3)

students completing regular paramilitary training would move to TC-1

for a final month of training, including parachute problems and range

firing.   TRD expected that a move could be made to Chopawamsic in

the near future and that the safehouse section of the Area Training

Branch would also be shifted to Chopawamsic.   The other 150 trainees,

representing the OSO mobilization requirement, would receive

advanced training at other facilities.

By March of 1951, TRD realized that to meet the new and expanding

requirements, it must reorganize.   In a Joint Training Committee meet-

ing on 15 March 1951,   pointed out that TRD must plan to   (b)(3)

recruit and train instructors immediately to be ready for the increased

training demands.   The revised T/O submitted to the Committee by

                   was based on providing training to   OSO and OPC staff   (b)(3)

personnel per month, a total of   annually.   Although John O'Gara,   (b)(3)

the Assistant DD/P for Administration, pointed out to the Committee

that regardless of training estimates, TRD must base its organization

realistically on the capabilities of Security to clear prospective employ-

·ees, it was agreed that in any event TRD must realign its organization

to fit the acquisition and utilization of the Chopawamsic area.

This was a period of somewhat frantic planning of courses, organi-

zation, and facilities.   On 2 March 1951,   submitted a T/O   (b)(3)

to the ADD/A calling for the approval of   positions at once and the   (b)(3)

approval in principle of a planned T/O of   .On 7 March the   (b)(3)

ADD/A approved the increase from ☐ to ☐ TRD positions.   The   (b)(3)

Staff Training allocation went from ☐ to ☐ the A&E Staff was   (b)(3)

increased from ☐ to ☐ Chopawamsic would get ☐ positions.   Two   (b)(3)

new activities -- maritime training and air training -- would get ☐   (b)(3)

positions.   The revised organization and the key personnel assign-

ments were announced in Administrative Instruction No. 70-2, signed

on 9 March 1951 by Rolfe Kingsley, who became Acting Chief of TRD

at this critical point when ☐ was called back to the Army.   (b)(3)

Arrangements for setting up the Chopawamsic training site in

Prince William Forest Park were almost completed in March of 1951

when a Washington newspaper published a story to the effect that a

"hush-hush" Agency was taking over the area for some undisclosed

purpose, and that this would result in closing the summer camp which

had been used for years to give underprivileged children an outing.

The story put an end to the consideration of the Chopawamsic area

and started a search for another training site. *

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* This information is based on a statement made by Robert B. Shaffer,
at that time a TRD officer involved in the planning for the Chopawam-
sic site.   Intensive search has not located the newspaper story nor
identified the exact date it appeared.

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E. [   ]   (b)(1)
                                                                             (b)(3)
                                                                               (b)(1)
    The AD/SO took a strong personal interest in the location of a   (b)(3)

site. [   ]

-81-

SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

As soon as the site location was settled, the Acting Chief of TRD, Mr. Kingsley, set up a number of committees within TRD so that planning could proceed at once. The remainder of 1951 was a very busy time for most of the TRD officers and instructors; the site was to be ready to accept 900 trainees by 1 January 1952.

The planning for the phasing out of TC-1 at _____ and the (b)(1) (b)(3) gradual shift of paramilitary training to the new site was particularly complex. In a memorandum of 5 May 1951 to the Chief of TRD, _____ _____ the Chief of the Area Training Branch, indicated that he (b)(3) was planning on the assumption that TC-1 would close at the end of December of 1951 and that the new training area -- _____ -- (b)(1) (b)(3) would be in operation by 1 November 1951, with ___ paramilitary stu- (b)(3) dents entering each month until March of 1952, when ___ would enter (b)(3) each month. On 6 August 1951, _____ stated in another memo- (b)(3) randum to _____ that it might be necessary to continue some (b)(3) training at TC-1 until June of 1952, the limited number of instructors being divided between the two sites; it had become obvious that the

-82-

SECRET

new base would not be ready by the end of 1951. The final class at

TC-1 (No. 6) began on 21 April 1952, and by 1 July TC-1 had been

deactivated and the Agency connection with [   ] had been   (b)(1)
                                                                          (b)(3)

severed. By the end of August of 1951, the location and the detailed

architectural requirements of the buildings at [   ] had been   (b)(1)
                                                                          (b)(3)

determined, a local labor analysis had been conducted, and tables of

necessary equipment had been drawn up. Actual construction started

in November of 1951, and the troublesome problem of finding an

adequate site for paramilitary training was well on the way toward

solution.

F.   Special Projects

Closely related to TRD's problems of providing paramilitary

training and securing the sites in which to give it were a number of

special projects initiated by OPC and assigned to TRD for execution.

For the most part, these projects were developed and completed --

or abandoned -- after July of 1951, when TRD nominally became a part

of the Office of Training; but because they were initiated when TRD was

still a component of the clandestine services, their early stages are

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described here.   These projects were designated ZRELOPE, [_____]   (b)(1)
(b)(3)
[_____] KMKIMONO, and [_____] *   (b)(1)
(b)(3)

1.   ZRELOPE.   In the spring of 1950, an OPC committee called

Task Group Boulder (TGBOULDER) began to work on a plan to bring

to the United States -- or to some area close to the United States --

over a three-year period about [_____]   (b)(1)
(b)(3)

[_____] and give them intensive training in political war-

fare and resistance techniques.   The plan was called Project ZRE-

LOPE.   TGBOULDER was to coordinate the project with all Agency

components concerned and was to manage the selection and recruit-

ing of the foreign nationals.   The actual training was to be done by TRD.

In October of 1950, [_____] Chief of Staff II of OPC,   (b)(3)

told [_____] that the project was about to be initiated and suggested   (b)(3)

that TRD begin to make plans to handle the training.   ZRELOPE was

not finally approved until 20 December 1950, but in November [_____]

[_____] organized a TRD Special Projects Staff to begin the necessary   (b)(3)

planning and preparation.   The first task that the staff faced was the

---

* For complete coverage of these projects, see SS Historical Paper
No. OTR-5, History of the Office of Training, 1951-1966.   SECRET.

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SECRET

procurement of a suitable site. More than seventy possible sites were investigated, most of them surplus Defense Department installations but a few of them commercial or industrial properties. While the search for the site went on, the Special Projects Staff attacked the problem of manning the project, and at a meeting on 13 January 1951 the staff submitted to the Joint Training Committee a detailed plan for the T/O to handle the training. This 13 January meeting of the Committee generated some heat about the propriety of TRD's involvement in ZRELOPE. According to the minutes of the meeting, the OSO representative on the Committee felt strongly that because the project was an OPC operation, such a large part of the TRD assets should not be used to carry it out. The OPC representative countered with the statement that TRD would be expected to provide only broad general guidance, and the details would be handled by people recruited for the purpose. He also said that the T/O proposed by the TRD Special Projects Staff represented an accurate estimate of the requirements. Apparently the OPC point of view prevailed, for within a few days after the 13 January meeting the AD/SO approved TRD's participation.

2.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

3.   KMKIMONO.

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SECRET

SECRET

4.

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SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

SECRET

SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

---

*   See SS Historical Paper No. OTR-5, <u>History of the Office of Train-ing, 1951-1966</u>. SECRET.

SECRET

Chapter V

Summary and Conclusion

The preceding chapters have recorded the problems and major
activities of TRD during the 1949-51 period when the Division went
through a transitional development from a relatively small staff,
functioning in consonance with the traditions and practices inherited
from OSS, to a large, complex training organization capable of meet-
ing the ever-growing requirements for training in the clandestine activi-
ties that became distinctly those of the Central Intelligence Agency.
This chapter places the 1949-51 period within the context of the time,
summarizes significant problems and accomplishments, and capsul-
izes in chronological order the major developments of the period.

A.   The Temper of the Times

The 1949-51 period when _____ was Chief of TRD was a time   (b)(3)
when there was widespread belief that the cold war was about to turn
hot and that general mobilization was more than a possibility. Indeed,
the advent of the Korean War in 1950 not only gave credence to this
belief but also brought to bear upon the Agency tremendous pressure

to meet the intelligence support requirements of the Korean War and
to prepare for whatever wider conflagration might next be generated.

It was within this climate of tension and urgency that TRD --
without a solid administrative structure, without firm guidance in
operational doctrine, and without enough manpower to do the basic
jobs that had to be done -- was asked to train thousands of people in
hundreds of operations skills.   The fact that these thousands of people
never materialized is irrelevant to the tensions of the time.   When
projects ZRELOPE, KMKIMONO, and the Mobilization Training
Program were launched, for example, there was every reason to be-
lieve that they were essential to the security of the nation.   The pres-
sures were real and present, and the fact that TRD responded to them
with practicable programs is in itself a high tribute to [   ] and   (b)(3)
the men and women who worked with him in TRD.

B.   Summary

1.   Development of TRD.   Even if the 1949-51 period had not
been one with a climate of threatening hot war and the consequent
tensions and pressures, the task of developing the newly created Train-
ing Division to the point where it was fully capable of meeting the

Agency's training requirements was a formidable one. To begin with,
there were for TRD no clearly defined channels of command, no sys-
tematic budget and finance procedures, no proper method of handling
personnel, and no system of liaison between TRD and the operating
Offices. All of these problems had to be attacked, and solutions --
or partial solutions -- of them had to be found.

Equally troublesome was the problem of determining training
requirements and designing courses to meet them -- particularly in
the absence of clearly defined training objectives and agreed opera-
tional doctrine upon which objectives had to be based. Although the
requirements-objectives-doctrine problem was not solved during the
1949-51 period, a start was made and the solving machinery was set
in motion.

At the same time that TRD was plagued by problems of admin-
istration and training requirements, it was confronted with questions
of jurisdictional responsibility -- first in the matter of support of
overseas training, and later in the relationship of TRD to the newly
created Director of Training. By the time [   ] left the Agency   (b)(3)
in April of 1951, TRD had assumed major responsibility for the support

SECRET

of overseas training.

2. Expansion of TRD. The developmental problems of TRD could not, of course, claim the undivided efforts of [   ] and   (b)(3)

his staff. At the same time that these problems were pressing for solution, TRD was being forced to expand its services to the operating Offices, to provide more training for more people and to develop the capability of offering new courses in virtually every phase of operational activity. To meet these demands it was necessary to develop a workable internal organizational structure so that responsibilities could be assigned and authority delegated. The basic pattern first established by [   ] was a three-unit organization -- a Staff   (b)(3)

Training Unit, a Paramilitary Training Unit, and a Covert Training Unit. As requirements expanded, additional units were created to meet them -- an Assessment and Evaluation Unit and a Support Branch, for example -- and additional people were required to man the units.

In October of 1949, when [   ] unit was officially designated TRD,   (b)(3)

the Division TO authorized [   ] positions; in April of 1951, when Col.   (b)(3)

[   ] left the Agency, TRD had an authorized TO of [   ] positions.   (b)(3)

(b)(3)

SECRET

SECRET

The rapid expansion of TRD activities and personnel strength naturally created staffing problems. It was almost impossible to fill all of the authorized slots with qualified people. Field operational activities got first priority, and there were not enough operationally qualified people available for assignment to instructor slots. Complicating the staffing problem was the policy of rotational assignment of personnel -- both out of TRD to operational jobs and from operational jobs into TRD. This phase of the staffing problem was a critical one throughout [   ] tenure, and it has continued, in some degree,   (b)(3) up to the present time.

Along with the expansion of TRD's activities there came pressing requirements for additional course offerings and for additional space for training programs. New courses were developed and coordinated with the operating Offices, and additional space -- often makeshift and inadequate -- was found.

3. <u>Special Problems</u>. Concurrent with the problems inherent in the development and expansion of TRD, there arose a number of related special problems. For example, the number of OSO and OPC officers who preferred to "audit" courses instead of "take" them became so great that a system of limiting auditors had to be devised.

SECRET

Also, the responsibility of providing Agency speakers for other govern-

ment activities fell to TRD and required manpower and time that were

needed in Agency training activities. TRD was given the responsibility

of maintaining a "pool" for provisionally cleared personnel, an activity

designed to keep people profitably employed while awaiting final clear-

ance. Still another special problem arose with TRD's effort to [   ]

[   ] Perhaps the most   (b)(1)
                                                                                        (b)(3)

important of the special problems was the need for systematic improve-

ment of the quality of training, a problem to which [   ] devoted   (b)(3)

a considerable part of his total time and effort.

    4. <u>Paramilitary Training</u>. A major reason for the rapid expan-

sion of TRD during the 1949-51 period was the urgent requirement for

large-scale paramilitary training, primarily for OPC personnel. In

response to this, TRD created an Area Training Branch to work with

OPC in the procurement of sites -- "areas" as they were called -- and

the design of training programs. The first of these paramilitary pro-

grams was conducted at Training Camp No. 1, a secure area within

the confines of [   ] At about the same time that   (b)(1)
                                                                                     (b)(3)

Training Camp No. 1 was being developed, there arose a requirement

for a Mobilization Training Program -- a major effort initiated by

OPC to prepare large numbers of men for "mobilization day," which at that time seemed to be approaching. TRD and OPC inspected several possible sites, and it was finally decided that [   ] (b)(1) (b)(3) [   ] was the most practicable. This decision marks the beginning of [   ] Although the Mobilization Training Program never (b)(1) (b)(3) really began, [   ] has continued and has served other -- perhap (b)(1) (b)(3) better -- purposes.

A large part of the total effort to provide paramilitary and other types of covert training was expended in a series of special projects. In the spring of 1950, OPC initiated Project ZRELOPE, a program designed to train [   ] in political warfare and (b)(1) (b)(3) resistance techniques. [   ] (b)(1) (b)(3)

[   ] This was given the designation Project KMKIMONO. Of these special projects only KMKIMONO actually got off the ground, and after a year of operation that was abandoned because there were not enough students to justify its continuation.

[   ] (b)(1) (b)(3)

SECRET

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

C.   Chronology

5 August 1949   [_____] USA,   (b)(3)

appointed Chief, Training Staff, OSO.

By OSO [_____]   (b)(3)

5 August 1949.

14 September 1949   OSO and OPC training units formally

merged into single Staff under [____] (b)(3)

Staff attached to OSO for organization

but Chief responsible to both AD/SO

and AD/PC.   OPC Regulation [____]   (b)(3)

14 September 1949.

17 October 1949   First official reference to conversion

of Training Staff to Training Division (TRD).

16 December 1949   Memorandum from CIA Executive Offi-

cer to CIA Management Officer; TRD to

continue under "committee-type" control --

i.e. Joint (OSO and OPC) Training Com-

mittee; remained so until 1 July 1951.

9 February 1950	TRD assumed responsibility for maintaining "pool" of uncleared personnel; pool became a section of the Basic and Interim Study Course (BISC).
21 June 1950	Training Camp No. 1, for paramilitary training of OPC personnel, established at [ ] (b)(1) (b)(3)
20 July 1950	TRD given responsibility for developing Mobilization Training Program.
25 July 1950	[ ] submitted to AD/SO and AD/PC a statement of "The Mission of the Training Division," the first systematic recording of TRD's training responsibilities. (b)(3)
26 July 1950	AD/SO assigned to TRD responsibility for providing Agency speakers for non-Agency government activities.

SECRET

9 November 1950	TRD assigned the responsibility
	for [ ] (b)(1) (b)(3)
15 November 1950	Col. Matthew Baird, USAF, appointed CIA Director of Training
20 December 1950	Project ZRELOPE approved.
3 January 1951	CIA Office of Training created, Col. Baird in charge as Director of Training.
4 January 1951	Office of Deputy-Director for Plans (DD/P) created.
13 January 1951	TRD assigned to provide training program for ZRELOPE.
14 February 1951	[ ] appointed OSO (b)(3) Training Officer -- the first appointment of a full-time training liaison officer in a major Agency component.
22 March 1951	Memorandum from the DCI, General Smith, to the DD/A, the AD/SO, the AD/PC, and the Director of

SECRET

Training clarifying the function of the

Director of Training.

1 April 1951

Mr. Rolfe Kingsley appointed Acting

Chief of TRD to replace [   ] (b)(3)

who was recalled to military duty.

18 April 1951

Office of Training transferred from

DD/A to O/DCI. CIA Regulation No.

[   ] 18 April 1951.   (b)(3)

June 1951

TRD assigned to develop Political Ac-

tion training for KMKIMONO project

[   ] (b)(1)
                                                           (b)(3)

26 June 1951

DD/P notified AD/SO and AD/PC that

TRD would be detached from OSO as of

1 July 1951 and would become a com-

ponent of the DD/P.

1 July 1951

CIA REGULATION [   ] assigned TRD,   (b)(3)

renamed Training (Covert), to the Office

of Training under the nominal command

of the Director of Training.

SECRET

Appendix A

Identification of Positions

Following are identifications of the positions held by the major

OSO, OPC, and DDP personnel mentioned. The positions identified

are those held during the approximate time-span of this paper. Mili-

tary ranks then held are given for military officers assigned to duty

with the Agency.

Angleton, James   Appointed Chief of Staff A, OSO, by OSO

                                                                                        17

October 1949. Appointed Chief, Special Projects Staff, OSO, by   (b)(3)

Amendment No. 2 to OSO REGULATION   effective 16

July 1951.

Dulles, Allen W.   CIA   and CIA REGULA-   (b)(3)

TION   1 December 1950, established the position of Deputy   (b)(3)

Director for Operations. The Executive Registry and AD/SO files

show that in December of 1950 one piece of correspondence was

addressed to Mr. Dulles as Deputy Director (Operations), but

there appears to be no official document naming him as Deputy

SECRET

SECRET

Director for Operations. He was appointed Deputy Director for

Plans by CIA[   ] 4 January 1951, and   (b)(3)

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence by CIA NOTICE [   ]   (b)(3)

23 August 1951.

George, W. Lloyd   As of 17 October 1949 was Chief, Foreign Divi-

sion Z, OSO: see OSO [   ]   (b)(3)

[   ] (Revised), 17 October 1949. Appointed Chief, Far East   (b)(3)

Division, OSO, by OSO REGULATION [   ] 8 January 1952.   (b)(3)

[   ] Appointed Acting Executive Officer, OPC by OPC   (b)(3)

Administrative Memorandum No. 3.001, 9 March 1949. Appointed

Chief of Staff II, OPC, by AD/PC Memorandum of 15 May 1950

supplementing OPC REGULATION [   ] 20 March 1950.   (b)(3)

Helms, Richard   As of 17 October 1949 was Chief, Foreign Division

M, OSO: see OSO [   ]   (b)(3)

(Revised), 17 October 1949. Appointed Chief of Operations Staff,

OSO, by Amendment No. 2 to OSO REGULATION [   ] effective   (b)(3)

16 July 1951. Appointed Deputy Assistant Director for Special

Operations by CIA NOTICE [   ] 29 November 1951.   (b)(3)

SECRET

Horton, Herman   As of 17 October 1949 was Chief, Foreign Division

P, OSO; see OSO [   ]   (b)(3)

(Revised), 17 October 1949.   Appointed Chief, Southeastern Europe

Division, OSO, by OSO REGULATION [   ] 8 January 1952.   (b)(3)

Kingsley, Rolfe   Appointed Deputy Chief, Training Division (OSO/

OPC) by OSO REGULATION [   ] (Attachment C), 30 Decem-   (b)(3)

ber 1950.   Became Acting Chief of TRD in April of 1951 and was

appointed Deputy Director of Training (Special) by CIA NOTICE

[   ] 8 January 1952.   (b)(3)

[   ] USA   Appointed by the Director of Training to   (b)(3)

fill a new position of Assistant Director (Covert) resulting from the

reassignment of training for covert operations from the DDP to the

nominal command of the Director of Training.   Appointed Chief of

Requirements, OSO, by OSO REGULATION [   ] 8 January 1952.   (b)(3)

Lindsay, Franklin A.   Appointed Chief of Operations, OPC, by

OPC Administrative Memorandum No. 3.011, 11 July 1949.

Appointed Chief, Eastern Europe Division, OPC, by AD/PC

Memorandum of 15 May 1950.   Appointed Deputy for Plans and

SECRET

Administration, OPC, by OPC BULLETIN [   ] 18   (b)(3)

January 1952.

McConnel, Murray   Appointed CIA Executive Officer by CIA

[   ] 16 October 1950. Appointed Deputy   (b)(3)

Director for Administration by CIA [   ]   (b)(3)

CIA REGULATION [   ] 1 December 1950.   (b)(3)

[   ] Appointed Acting Chief, Training Branch, OSO/   (b)(3)

CIG, by OSO [   ] 16 December 1946.   (b)(3)

Appointed Chief of the Training Staff, OSO, by OSO [   ]   (b)(3)

[   ] 1 July 1947. (Remained in that position until

5 August 1949.)

[   ] Appointed Deputy Chief of the Training Divi-   (b)(3)

sion, OSO/OPC, by OSO [   ]   (b)(3)

[   ] (Revised), 17 October 1949.

[   ] USA   Appointed Chief of the Training   (b)(3)

Staff, OSO, by OSO [   ] 5 August 1949.   (b)(3)

Also formally named Chief of Training, OPC, by agreement of OSO

and OPC, 14 September 1949 by OPC REGULATION [   ] 14   (b)(3)

SECRET

SECRET

September 1949. By 17 October 1949 the Training Staff had become the Training Division, as indicated by a memorandum to Chief, TRD, from DAD/SO of that date. Remained Chief of TRD/OSO/OPC until 1 April 1951 when he left the Agency to return to the Army.

Schow, Robert G., Col. USA   Appointed Assistant Director for Special Operations by CIA NOTICE [   ] 1 January 1949. (b)(3)
(Remained in that position until 15 February 1951.)

[   ] Appointed Executive Officer of OSO by SO [   ] (b)(3)
[   ] 1 July 1947. Appointed Special Assistant (AD/SA) by OSO [   ] 12 February 1951. (b)(3)

Wheeler, William   As of 17 October 1949 was Chief, Foreign Division T, OSO; see OSO [   ] (b)(3)
[   ] (Revised), 17 October 1949. Appointed Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, OSO, by OSO REGULATION [   ] 8 (b)(3)
January 1952.

-109-

SECRET

(b)(3)

[_____] USA   Appointed Acting Chief of Training,

OPC, by OPC Administrative Memorandum No. 3.001, 9 March

1949.   Appointed Chief Training Officer, OPC, by OPC Adminis-

trative Memorandum No. 3.0011, 11 July 1949.   Appointed Chief

of the Material Branch, Staff II, OPC, by OPC REGULATION [____]

(b)(3)

[____] 6 September 1950.

Wisner, Frank   Appointed Assistant Deputy Director for Policy

Coordination by [_____] 27 August 1948.

(b)(3)

Appointed Deputy Director for Plans by CIA NOTICE [_____]

(b)(3)

23 August 1951.

Wyman, W. G., Maj. Gen. USA   Appointed Assistant Director for

Special Operations by CIA [_____] 14 February

(b)(3)

1951.   (Remained in that position until replaced by Lyman B.

Kirkpatrick by CIA NOTICE [_____] 29 November 1951.)

(b)(3)

-110-

Appendix B

Missions and Functions of TRD

Following is the statement of the mission and functions of TRD

given in a memorandum of 25 July 1950, "The Mission of the Training

Division," from [   ] Chief of TRD, to the AD/SO   (b)(3)

and the AD/PC:

Mission

Providing instruction in the several activities charged to OSO

and OPC in order to qualify staff personnel in the planning, organiza-

tion, conduct, and administration of these activities both in the field

and in headquarters and in order to properly train agent personnel

for their specific assignments.

Functions

(1)   To ascertain the training requirements of OSO and OPC;

(2)   to organize, supervise, and administer adequate training

programs, staffs, and facilities within the U.S., to fulfill the train-

ing requirements of OSO and OPC, including staff personnel, agent

SECRET

personnel, and foreign national agent personnel in the U.S.;

(3) to provide assistance and technical staff supervision to training conducted in overseas areas;

(4) to insure that the training of each individual is consistent with the cover and security of his proposed assignment;

(5) to arrange and schedule with outside government and private agencies such other training as may be required;

(6) to provide training evaluations of student personnel for assistance to their sponsoring branches in determining assignments;

(7) to conduct such liaison within OSO, OPC, and the remainder of CIA and other outside agencies as may be required to provide a fully coordinated training program;

(8) to conduct applied research on training content and method;

(9) to prepare budgetary estimates for all training activity;

(10) to administer overall TRD personnel, funds, supplies, and facilities;

(11) to assist in the preparation of mobilization plans to fulfill training requirements of OSO and OPC in the event of an emergency;

(12) to provide policy guidance and administrative support to the Assessment Staff.

SECRET

Appendix C

[   ] Remarks to Training Review Committee   (b)(3)

Following is a condensation of the remarks of [   ]   (b)(3)

[   ] to the members of the Training Review Committee at the final

meeting of the Committee on 19 June 1950; the condensation is based

on the minutes of that meeting, and [   ] own phraseology has   (b)(3)

been retained to the extent that the minutes recorded it:

[   ] told the Committee that when training had first started,   (b)(3)

it pretty much had to accept the ideas that were lodged in the heads

of the various instructors because hardly anything had been put down

in black and white.   Within the last year, he felt, tremendous strides

had been made, but the only thing that was vitally important was

whether the instruction was according to the requirements of OSO

and OPC.   "Are we teaching espionage the way OSO is actually con-

ducting it?" "Are we teaching counterespionage the way the opera-

tional and planning staffs feel that we should teach it? " "Is the

doctrine which we are developing identical to the doctrine which is

being developed in OPC? "

[   ] went on to say that TRD was vitally interested in (b)(3)

making certain that what was being said in class was according to the

doctrine and the principles which the operational people were apply-

ing. He hoped that through this committee TRD would be able to

bring the training effort into line with operations. He wanted to be

shown where TRD was out of line and what could be done to improve

the instruction, to make it realistic, and to keep it up to date. He

furthermore hoped that out of this committee would come a procedure

whereby TRD could coordinate instruction on doctrine, principles,

techniques, and tactics with the operating Divisions. He went on to

say that basically he felt that the relationship between Training and

OSO and OPC was vitally important and he wanted to get down to a

complete working arrangement. He stated that doctrine and coordina-

tion were his main concerns. He said that he welcomed criticism as

long as it was constructive and not picayunish. He wanted to know

what was being done wrong in Training because Training had to keep

up to date and realistic.

Index to Persons Mentioned

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