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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

# MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam





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Information as of 1600

### HIGHLIGHTS

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There has been no Communist response to Ambassador Goldberg's recent statements that the US would not block Liberation Front participation in talks concerning Vietnam.

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I. <u>Military Situation in South Vietnam</u>: Communist forces continue offensive activity in the central highlands, apparently in coordination with the main effort in the Dak To area (Paras. 1-5). The Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics (Para. 6). (Graphs)

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: A group largely composed of retired generals and calling itself the Freedom Fighters' Association has announced its intention of becoming a political party (Paras. 1-2).


III. <u>Military Developments in North Vietnam</u>: There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. <u>Communist Political Developments</u>: A North Vietnamese trade union delegation was due in Italy on 15 November (Paras. 1-3). The Vietnamese Communists have thus far failed to report or comment on Ambassador Goldberg's recent statement that the US would not block Liberation Front participation in talks concerning Vietnam (Paras. 4-7).

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### I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

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1. North Vietnamese mortarmen on 15 November launched two attacks on a base camp of the US 4th Infantry Division at Dak To. Two Air Force C-130 transport planes were destroyed and a third damaged. Part of an ammunition dump was set afire. These were the third and fourth shellings of Dak To since the current round of fighting began two weeks ago. Meanwhile, US B-52 aircraft continued to bomb the rugged terrain south and west of Dak To. Among the targets were suspected locations of the North Vietnamese 32nd and 66th Regiments.

2. The only ground fighting reported in the immediate Dak To area involved a South Vietnamese Army battalion which encountered heavy resistance while attempting to seize a hill approximately ten miles northeast of the camp on 14 November. Ten government soldiers were reported killed; enemy losses were not determined.

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3. Communist forces are continuing offensive activity in other sections of the central highlands apparently in coordination with the main effort at Dak To.

4. On 14 November, under cover of a mortar barrage, a small enemy force made a hit-and-run attack on a South Vietnamese compound on the outskirts of Kontum city, 25 miles south of Dak To. Seven militiamen were killed. Enemy casualties are not known. Farther south in Darlac Province a US artillery fire support base some 15 miles north of Ban Me Thuot was struck by 30-90 rounds of mortar fire on 14 November. One US soldier was killed and five wounded.

5. Revised casualty reports indicate that in Lam Dong, the southernmost highlands province, the South Vietnamese Army lost 86 killed and 64 wounded in the three days of fighting which ended

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on 14 November. The engagement began when enemy troops destroyed a bridge on Route 20 and then ambushed a reaction force. During the action on 13 November one South Vietnamese company was reportedly cut off and suffered 70 percent casualties. Known enemy losses were two killed.

# Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics

6. The week of 5-11 November compared with the week of 29 October - 4 November:

## I. Casualties

	VC/NVA		US	
	29 Oct-4 Nov	5-11 Nov	29 Oct-4 Nov	5-11 Nov
Killed Wounded	1,894	1,802	178 793	174 759
Missing/ Captured				
TOTALS	1,804	1,802	971	933

	GVN		FREE WORLD		
	29 Oct-4 Nov	5-11 Nov	29 Oct-4 Nov	5-11 Nov	
Killed Wounded	160 533	279 810	10 8	57 103	
Missing/ Captured	60	91	0	0	
TOTALS	753	1,180	18	160	

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# II. Viet Cong Incidents

	29 Oct-4 Nov	<u>5-11 Nov</u>
Attacks Battalion or Larger Small Unit Harassment Terrorism Sabotage Propaganda Antiaircraft	69 •••• 3 •••• 66 297 29 27 8 8	59 ••• 2 ••• 57 245 26 48 2 137
TOTALS	514	517

# III. Weapons Captured


_		VC/NVA			GVN		
2	29 Oct-4 1	Nov 5-11	Nov 2	9_0ct-4	Nov	5-11	Nov
Individual Crew-Served	430 61		lot orted	92 0		2	25 6
				No			
TOTALS	491			92		2	31

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


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### II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A group composed largely of retired generals 1. has announced its intention of becoming a political party. The group was originally formed in July as a veteran's association. Called variously the Freedom Fighters' Association or the Free Combatant's Association, it is headed by Senator Tran Van Don. Its executive committee includes other retired generals such as Thai Quang Hoang, Tran Tu Oai, Le Van Nghiem, Mai Huu Xuan, and Senators Ton That Dinh and Nguyen Van Chuan. Despite the large number of ex-military men presently enrolled, the association claims to be recruiting among workers. The association plans to extend its activities to rural areas, security permitting, and has as its objective combating both corruption and Communism.

2. Tran Van Don is also one of the leaders of the Farmer-Worker-Soldier Party, but retired General Pham Van Dong, chairman of the Freedom Fighters' Saigon chapter, claims there is no connection between the two groups. Both organizations, however, appeal to the same elements--military and labor--and appear to have similar political ambitions. It therefore seems likely that Don will work to bring the two organizations together, if indeed there is no existing connection.

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
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# III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. There is nothing of significance to report.






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### V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

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1. The Italian Foreign Ministry has informed the US Embassy in Rome that a North Vietnamese trade union delegation will arrive there on 15 November for a ten-day visit as guests of a Communist-dominated trade union. The delegation includes Nguyen Cong Hoa, vice president of the North Vietnamese trade union, and several other trade union officials who have recently been in Prague and who attended the Soviet anniversary celebrations in Moscow. According to the Communist paper, L'Unita, the delegation will visit several Italian cities.

2. This is the first visit of a North Vietnamese delegation to Italy and is another step in Hanoi's continuing effort to establish contact in the West. Twice before Hanoi attempted to send more impressive delegations to Italy, but the Italian Government refused entrance visas. The Italian trade union reportedly has assured the government that the delegation will not engage in political activity while in the country.

3. During the past year, Hanoi has also sent trade union groups to several Scandinavian countries and at present has an industrial delegation touring France.

### No Communist Comment on Goldberg Statements

4. Communist media so far have not reported or commented on Ambassador Goldberg's statements of 2 November that the United States would not block Liberation Front participation in talks concerning Vietnam at the United Nations or at a Geneva-type conference. The lack of comment by the Vietnamese Communists suggests they consider Goldberg's remarks a modification in the US position.

5. The South Vietnamese press, in contrast, reacted almost immediately to the Goldberg remarks.

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3.5(c) 3.5(c) The US Embassy in Saigon reports the statements made headlines on 4 November and that subsequently they have received considerable unfavorable comment as a "dangerous concession to the Communists."

6. Hanoi's failure to denounce Goldberg's suggestion that the Front might participate in UN Security Council discussions is especially striking. Both the Front and Hanoi are normally quick to rule out a role for the United Nations in Vietnam. They may, however, still be pondering a proper response.

7. Recent statements by Vietnamese Communist spokesmen have continued to take the line that the US must "recognize" the Front as the "sole"--or, alternatively, the "only genuine"--representative of the South Vietnamese people. They have long insisted that the US must deal with the Front in any negotiations for a settlement in the South, and they may interpret Goldberg's remarks as a major step in this direction.

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