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*From OSO and OPC to
the Clandestine Services*

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES¹

Ludwell Lee Montague

This paper . . . is designed to create a single overseas clandestine service, while at the same time preserving the integrity of the long-range espionage and counterespionage mission of CIA from amalgamation into those clandestine activities which are subject to short term variations in the prosecution of the Cold War. . . . There is no reason why the establishment of a single chain of command and of uniform administrative procedures would have any effect of submerging specialized OSO or OPC missions and techniques if intelligently applied.

— Bedell Smith, 15 July 1952

Bedell Smith's third major achievement as Director of Central Intelligence was his organization of the Clandestine Services.² The idea of integrating the Office of Special Operations (OSO) and the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) had been advocated by Allen Dulles since 1948, but was initially opposed by Smith. Until the adoption of NSC 10/5 (October 1951), Smith sought to make a clear distinction between the intelligence activities of CIA, including clandestine collection by OSO, and the covert operations of OPC. Thereafter this idea became less important to him and the advantages of a simpler chain of command and control over all overseas operations more attractive. In the end, it was Smith who dictated the terms of the merger, in July 1952. Only a man of his force of character could have imposed it on OSO.

The Dulles Concept

In May 1948, Allen Dulles moved to counter a State Department proposal by advising the NSC that clandestine intelligence collection and covert operations should be under the control of a single director. That intervention resulted in the establishment of OPC in CIA, though not under the clear control of the DCI.

In the division of labor within the NSC Survey Group, Allen Dulles took as his province not only all CIA clandestine operations, for both intelligence collection and political action, but also all of CIA's overt collection activities as well. Not surprisingly, the NSC Survey Group found that all such activities should be brought under a single direction below the level of the DCI. Specifically, its recommendation was that OSO, OPC, the Contact Branch of the Office of Operations (OO), and perhaps also the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch (FBIB) of OO, should be "integrated" in a new self-sufficient and semiautonomous "Operations Division."

¹ This is Chapter III, Volume IV, of the late Ludwell Montague's History, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950–February 1953*. As in the case of the preceding Chapter II, source references have been omitted here but are to be found in an appendix to the original in the *DCI Historical Series*.

² The other two were his development of a cooperative relationship with the IAC and his reorganization of the DDI offices pursuant to NSC 50. In general, Smith preferred to say that he had *organized* CIA (which he had found *unorganized*). That was substantially true.

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In adopting the recommendations of NSC 50, the NSC adopted this recommendation, excluding the FBIB, and directed the DCI to carry it out. Admiral Hillenkoetter promptly submitted a plan for this purpose, but, inasmuch as it required the amendment of NSC 10/2 in a way that would transfer the effective control of OPC from State to the DCI, it was not adopted. (Apparently that consequence of the Survey Group's recommendation had not been foreseen!) Thus, when Bedell Smith became DCI in October 1950, the situation with regard to OSO, OPC, and OO remained exactly as it had been in January 1949, when the NSC Survey Group submitted the recommendations of Allen Dulles to the NSC.

Bedell Smith's Initial Concept

On 12 October 1950, General Smith told the NSC that he would promptly comply with the direction contained in NSC 50, with one exception: he would not merge OSO, OPC, and the Contact Branch of OO. The NSC accepted that exception without inquiring why the DCI was opposed to the merger, or what alternative arrangement he had in mind.

There is no record of Smith's reasons for making this exception. From his subsequent actions, however, two considerations can be inferred: (1) he wished to maintain a clear distinction between clandestine intelligence collection and covert action operations by preserving an organizational distinction between OSO and OPC, and (2) he hoped to effect the necessary coordination between them by appointing a Deputy Director to have supervision of both. That Deputy Director was, of course, Allen Dulles.

Although it thus appears that Bedell Smith intended, from the first, to have a Deputy particularly charged with the supervision and coordination of OSO and OPC, he realized also, from the first, that two CIA units operating independently in the same overseas area would require some local supervision and coordination. For this purpose he devised a system of Senior Representatives (of the DCI) abroad.

Smith's intention to appoint such Senior Representatives was known in OSO as early as 12 October 1950—one week after Smith had taken office as DCI, one month before Dulles came to Washington as a consultant, two and a half months before Dulles took office as DDP. In short, this was Smith's idea, not Dulles's, and it, like the appointment of a DDP, was intended to be a substitute for the integration of OSO and OPC, not a step in that direction.³

The first Senior Representative to be appointed was [redacted]

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Other Senior Representatives were stationed in [redacted]
Vienna, Frankfurt, Teheran, [redacted] The most notable of them
[redacted] Lieutenant General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr.,

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³ To quiet apprehensions in OSO that the appointment of Senior Representatives would be a first step toward integration, the ADSO (Colonel Robert Schow) gave out assurances that General Smith had no such intention.

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(b)(3)in Frankfurt.⁵ [redacted]

[redacted] These Senior Representatives were not in the chain of command. That still ran from the ADSO or the ADPC to the respective station chiefs in the field. The Senior Representatives were, essentially, local observers for the DCI, reporting directly to him and not subject to let or hindrance by the ADSO, the ADPC, or the DDP. They were to be kept fully informed by the field stations under their supervision, and could intervene with advice, though not with orders. Their leverage was that, if their advice was disregarded, they would submit their recommendations to the DCI, who would then issue his own orders to the ADSO or ADPC.

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This was not a good system of command and control. It was, perhaps, the best that could be contrived at the time, given a basic decision that the operations of OSO and OPC must be kept separate and distinct.

Creeping Integration

Allen Dulles was of the same opinion still. The steps that he took, as DDP, to coordinate the activities of OSO and OPC were plainly designed to lead eventually to integration.

That coordination was sorely needed is evidenced by a memorandum dated 7 February 1951 from the DCI's Executive Assistant (Lyman Kirkpatrick) for the DDP (Allen Dulles). Both OSO and OPC had made independent approaches to the same individuals and groups with a view to recruitment. There was similar confusing duplication in the two Offices' operational liaison with other U.S. agencies [redacted] and further duplication in such matters as communications and procurement. OSO was concerned lest the security of its long-term clandestine penetrations be jeopardized by OPC's widespread contacts.⁶

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Kirkpatrick's memorandum prompted Dulles to call a meeting on the subject of OSO-OPC coordination. The outcome of that meeting was merely the appointment of a committee to study the subject and submit recommendations. It is significant, however, that Kirkpatrick recorded the proceedings under the title of "Meeting on Integration of OSO and OPC." Thus it appears that the thrust of the discussion was toward integration, although integration was contrary to the policy of the DCI at the time.

The committee appointed on 14 February was composed of Richard Helms (OSO), Kilbourne Johnston (OPC), and John O'Gara (DDA). They rendered their report a month later. In essence, it recommended that certain administrative and support functions common to OSO and OPC be integrated, but that the operational elements of the two Offices be kept distinctly separate.

Meanwhile, by direction of the DDP, a process had already been begun which plainly pointed toward the eventual integration of the operating elements of the two offices. As a first step, the ADPC, Frank Wisner, met on 3 March with the

5 [redacted]

[redacted] Lt. Gen. Truscott had been a distinguished combat commander in Sicily, Italy, and, Southern France. He completed his military career as Fifth Army commander in Italy and Third Army commander in occupied Bavaria.

⁶ Kirkpatrick, 35 in 1951, was a highly ambitious young man. As Executive Assistant, and later as ADSO, he was always "playing his own game"—not OSO's. His constant objective was to outflank Frank Wisner, as ADPC and later as DDP.

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new ADSO, Major General Willard Wyman,⁷ and they agreed upon a redefinition of the territories to be covered by their respective area divisions, so that they would correspond exactly to one another. The next step was to rearrange the office space allotted to these divisions, so that the corresponding divisions would be adjacent to each other. This required finding enough extra space to hold one complete division "in transit" while another moved into the space the first had vacated, and so on. It was not easily done in the cramped quarters available. By the end of June, however, it had been accomplished. And it could be anticipated that, when this rearrangement had been made, the next step would be the appointment of a common chief for each pair of divisions.

So it happened. On 9 June 1951 the ADSO and the ADPC agreed to combine their small Latin American divisions into one common Western Hemisphere Division. Its Chief, from OSO, reported to both Assistant Directors. Below him, the OSO and OPC elements of the combined division remained distinct. This was not yet true integration, but it was coming close.

Meanwhile, in March, Wyman proposed to Wisner that their overseas operating bases targeted against the USSR should be combined, beginning in Germany. The DCI himself approved that proposal, on 18 April.

Thus it will be seen that by the summer of 1951 Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner, and Willard Wyman had gone a long way toward integrating OSO and OPC, despite the fact that during the same period Bedell Smith—who still hoped to rid himself of most of OPC's operational commitments—was constantly directing them to keep the operations of OSO and OPC separate and distinct. Dulles, Wisner, and Wyman complied, technically, with Smith's direction, but it is evident that they were working toward integration as an ultimate objective, an objective that General Smith was not yet prepared to approve.

It is also evident that General Wyman's attitude in this respect was quite different from that of the old hands in OSO as represented by Richard Helms.

The OSO Attitude Toward Integration

OSO was derived from the clandestine services of OSS.⁸ By 1951 it had been a going concern for ten years, and its old hands regarded themselves as professional clandestine operators. From their point of view, OPC was a parvenu, its ranks composed of enthusiastic, but inexperienced, amateurs. To be sure, some members of OPC were OSS veterans, notably Frank Wisner, the ADPC, but they had left the service at the end of the war and so had not had the continuous experience of the OSO professionals. Moreover, they had not shared in OSO's struggle to survive in the postwar world, and so could not really be members of the clan.

Another factor in OSO's antipathy toward OPC was that OPC was born rich, while OSO remained relatively poor. That was true not only of Office budgets, but of personal pay. Since the establishment of the OSO grade and pay structure, there had been a general inflation in such matters. In order to recruit, OPC had to offer higher grades than were available in OSO for similar work. Thus the "amateurs" in OPC were, generally, better paid than the professionals in OSO. That must have rankled.

⁷ General Wyman relieved Colonel Schow as ADSO on 15 February 1951. Wyman had no intelligence experience, but considerable command experience overseas.

⁸ When OSS was dismembered, 1 October 1945, these elements became the War Department's Strategic Services Unit (SSU). OSO was derived from SSU and activated on 11 July 1946, although organizational continuity was then technically broken.

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A related factor was that OPC was expanding rapidly, while OSO remained generally static. Consequently the prospects for promotion were better in OPC.

Another source of institutional jealousy was that OSO was committed to a long-term and, by definition, unspectacular task, while much of OPC's work was designed to produce an immediate or early impact, from which a sense of current achievement could be derived.⁹ The urgency with which OPC undertook these tasks made it easy for the OSO professionals to regard the OPC "amateurs" as reckless adventurers. And, given OPC's dependence on OSO's clandestine contacts, there was some substance to OSO's concern lest OPC's operations expose OSO's assets. OSO's operations were not by nature self-revealing, but the effect of any successful OPC operation would necessarily be noticeable, and therefore might provoke investigation and counteraction by the enemy.

On 24 May 1951, William Jackson, the DDCI, brought the subject of integration into the open. In reporting on his survey of OPC, he recommended "that ultimately covert intelligence and covert operations be administered through a single command chain down to the station level." That recommendation evidently reflected OPC's then current view. It was made subject to confirmation after Jackson had completed his survey of OSO.

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Four days later, by coincidence, [redacted] the Senior Representative [redacted] attended the Weekly Staff Conference and strongly urged the integration of OSO and OPC. [redacted] must have complained that the OSO and OPC personnel [redacted] were more loyal to their respective home offices than they were to him, for Bedell Smith took the occasion to lay down the law that their primary loyalty must be to the Agency, and consequently to the DCI's personal representative.

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It appears that William Jackson never rendered a written report on his survey of OSO, which was made during July and August.¹⁰ There is in the record, however, a lengthy memorandum from Lyman Kirkpatrick, the new DADSO,¹¹ to Jackson, dated 31 August 1951 and self-said to be based on Kirkpatrick's participation in Jackson's survey of OSO. This memorandum may have been intended to serve as a contribution to Jackson's eventual report. It was decidedly at variance with the view that Jackson had acquired in OPC.

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Kirkpatrick certainly did not contemplate an integrated chain of command down to station level. Rather, he recommended a redefinition of functions so that OSO would hold a monopoly of all contacts with clandestine agents and underground organizations, whether for intelligence collection or for covert action operations, and OPC would be left with only such political and psychological activities as did not involve such contacts.¹² This proposal became the key to OSO's attitude toward integration from that time forward: that any merger of OSO and OPC functions should occur within OSO, under OSO control.

⁹ It should be noticed, however, that a large part of OPC's work consisted of planning and preparations for contingencies that might never arise.

¹⁰ Jackson ceased to be DDCI on 3 August, when he signed a personal services contract (WAE). He returned to private business but remained active in CIA affairs as the DCI's Special Assistant and Senior Consultant. In 1956 President Eisenhower named Jackson Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Jackson later retired to Arizona, where he died on 28 September 1971.

Allen Dulles succeeded Jackson as DDCI on 23 August 1951, at which time Frank Wisner became DDP and Kilbourne Johnston ADPC.

¹¹ Kirkpatrick, the DCI's first Executive Assistant, became DADSO on 1 July and ADSO on 17 December.

¹² Incidentally, he recommended also that the Contact Branch, OO, of which he had once been Chief, be transferred from OO to OSO.

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Kirkpatrick recommended also "that the staff of the DDP be held to an absolute minimum so that the present operating offices will not be echeloned down to a lower level, and that the operating support units being currently gathered around DDP not become the tail wagging the operating dog, just as the CIA administrative staff once did." Whatever the merits of that matter, this reference to the findings of the NSC Survey Group was a plain appeal to Jackson's prejudice against Hillenkoetter's administrative staff.

When Kirkpatrick wrote, there were three integrated special staff units directly subordinate to the DDP: Covert Training, Communications, and Technical Services. On 25 September, Frank Wisner, the new DDP, added three general staff units: Plans, Operations, and Administration and Logistics. Whether or not Wisner was then aware of Kirkpatrick's out-of-channels memorandum for Jackson, his course as DDP was diametrically opposite to Kirkpatrick's recommendation.

Moreover, on 3 October 1951, Wisner proceeded to create a second merged area division by combining the Middle Eastern divisions of OPC and OSO. Again the chief of the combined division was from OSO, but this time he was given two deputies, one from OPC and one from OSO.¹³ Wisner stressed that the constituent area branches of the two antecedent divisions and their field operations were *not* to be merged—for the time being.

On 24 October General Wyman, on his return from a visit to the Far East, strongly urged upon General Smith the necessity of integrating the field operations of OSO and OPC, but his idea of how that should be done was similar to Kirkpatrick's recommendation to Jackson in August. Wyman supplemented his memorandum for Smith with another for Jackson which supplies the following quotation: "I strongly believe that those functions now regarded as belonging to OPC, but which are of a purely clandestine intelligence nature, should be controlled by those individuals engaged in intelligence work." On 13 November Allen Dulles (DDCI) reported to the Director's morning meeting that General Wyman felt strongly "that operations should be subordinated to intelligence." That generalized statement was not a precise reflection of the Wyman-Kirkpatrick position, but shows how it was understood (and reacted to) by Dulles, and also by Wisner and Kilbourne Johnston.

General Wyman departed on 13 December 1951, to accept a command in Korea. Lyman Kirkpatrick succeeded him as ADSO on 17 December and Richard Helms became DADSO.

The DCI Accepts Integration as a Goal

It appears that the turning point in Bedell Smith's attitude toward integration was the NSC's adoption of NSC 10/5, on 23 October 1951. The NSC thereby approved the immediate expansion of OPC and the intensification of its activities. In particular, it committed Smith to bring about an expansion and intensification

[redacted] The NSC discussion of the subject showed Smith that there was no chance that he would be able to transfer responsibility for guerrilla operations from CIA to the JCS. He promptly withdrew NSC 10/4 from further consideration.

From that point onward, the question was not whether OSO and OPC would be integrated, but only how that should be done.

¹³ The three men were Kermit Roosevelt, [redacted] and Miles Copeland.

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On 8 January 1952 Smith signed an order prepared by Wisner directing that the remaining area divisions of OSO and OPC be merged. The merged divisions would be responsible directly to the DDP, as a single operating service. Thus the chain of command would run from the DCI through the DDP to the division chiefs, and the ADSO and ADPC would become merely staff officers to the DDP.

At the same time, Wisner mentioned the low state of morale in OSO and OPC. Both Kirkpatrick (the ADSO) and Johnston (the ADPC) wished to see Smith about that. Smith evaded Kirkpatrick's request to brief him on the merger, but consented to visit OPC for morale-building purposes. There Smith confessed to the principal officers of OPC that he "screamed like a wounded buffalo" when disappointed but said that they must not take that too hard. He really appreciated their operational skill and devoted service; he depended on them. That apparently took care of the morale problem in OPC.

Meanwhile OSO was fighting a rear guard action. On 31 January Richard Helms, then Acting ADSO, saw Frank Wisner and Gerald Miller (DADPC) and persuaded them, he believed, to slow down the merger process. He said that he was not opposing the merger as such, but that he was concerned regarding the security of OSO's clandestine assets if the ADSO were to lose control of his own operations and personnel to the chiefs of the merged divisions. In short, the ADSO must be kept in the chain of command, at least for the time being.

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By March 1952 it was felt in the ADPC's staff that any further progress toward integration, particularly in the field, would be resisted by the ADSO and his immediate staff, though not by the OSO personnel in the merged divisions.

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Integration in Germany

The integration of OSO and OPC activities in Germany proceeded in parallel with integration in Washington and ahead of integration elsewhere in the field (except for the very small OSO and OPC stations [redacted] which had merged in the fall of 1951). General Lucian Truscott's development of integration in Germany made a contribution to thought on the subject in Washington, and served as a prototype for subsequent integration overseas.

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General Truscott, the DCI's Senior Representative in Germany, was baffled by a system that gave him no command authority over the OSO and OPC stations under his supervision. That seemed to him contrary to sound military principles. Truscott and the OPC station of which [redacted] was Chief, were both housed in the [redacted] in Frankfurt. The OSO station, of which Gordon Stewart was Chief,¹⁴ was some 100 miles away at Karlsruhe.

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In November 1951, when the office of the U.S. High Commissioner, Germany (HICOG), in Frankfurt, became the American Embassy, Bonn, [redacted]

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[redacted] and Truscott arranged to have the OSO station move up from Karlsruhe. While they were about it, Truscott, Stewart, and [redacted] agreed to merge the two stations, with Stewart as Chief of Station and [redacted] as Deputy Chief. Richard Helms (DADSO) and John Bross (OPC) came to Frankfurt to discuss that idea. They were favorably impressed, but Helms concluded that Truscott should be Chief of Station with two deputies.

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Truscott needed no better cue than that. He assumed command of the merged German Station, with Stewart as his deputy, and proceeded to organize it on military lines, with a clear distinction between staff and line functions. The

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¹⁴Stewart, twice Chief of the German Station, became Director of Personnel (1957-60), a member of the Board of National Estimates (1966-68), and Inspector General (March 1968 until his retirement).

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OSO and OPC station staffs became two staff sections in his headquarters.¹⁵ The line units were the operating bases in the field.

On 3 March 1952 General Truscott arrived in Washington with Tom Polgar to brief the DCI on his plan for the integration of the German Station. General Smith was highly pleased. At his request, Polgar went aside and diagrammed a plan for the integration of OSO and OPC derived from Truscott's plan for the integration of the German Station. Polgar's diagram was, in essence, the plan that Smith adopted on 15 July.

The immediate effect of Truscott's presentation on Smith is indicated by a conversation that Smith had with Kirkpatrick and Johnston about ten days later. They were discussing certain operational failures in the Far East. Smith attributed those failures to the attempt to run operations in the field from desks in Washington. What CIA needed, Smith declared, was area commanders with their command posts in the field and only backstop desks in Washington.

On 25 June 1952 the DDP, without consulting the ADSO or the ADPC, sanctioned Truscott's organization of the German Station by approving his proposed table of organization. Wisner was pleased to note that Truscott's plan was already working well in practice. He emphasized that Truscott had already proved that there was no substance to the OSO contention that, in an integrated situation, OPC "dynamism" would overwhelm the intelligence function.

Integration Accomplished

On 17 April 1952 Wisner, Johnston, and Kirkpatrick met at Johnston's home in Fairfax. Wisner and Johnston understood that Kirkpatrick then agreed to proceed toward the more complete integration of OSO and OPC, and in particular to clarify the *command* position of the DDP and the *staff* positions of the ADSO and the ADPC. The next morning Wisner reported this happy development at the Director's morning meeting. Smith then remarked that it was not necessary to go too far toward integration, that the merger was really a matter of coordination.

The substance of this so-called "Fairfax Agreement" was already clearly implicit in General Smith's order of 8 January. Thus the agreement, if there was one, was nothing more than an agreement to proceed further toward the implementation of that order. Two weeks later, however, Kirkpatrick submitted a plan for "integration" that was radically at variance with Smith's order, as well as with the supposed "Fairfax Agreement," but entirely consistent with Kirkpatrick's recommendations to Jackson in August 1951 and with the principle advocated by Helms in March 1951 and January 1952. The essence of it was that the ADSO would retain *command* of OSO.

Kirkpatrick proposed that OPC should be divided into two offices, Psychological Warfare and Para-military Activities. Those two offices and OSO "should retain their integrity as offices with separate, independent staffs and with full command control under DDP of their personnel, budget and missions." There should, however, be a strong Vice DDP to give operational and management direction to them and to control compartmentalization between them.¹⁶

Kirkpatrick's proposal of 2 May 1952 was the last stand of OSO against integration.

¹⁵ A third staff section was an intelligence research unit that Truscott had inherited from HICOG.

¹⁶ Kirkpatrick would have been the logical candidate for appointment as Vice DDP. It is not clear what there would have been left for the DDP to do.

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Kilbourne Johnston, the ADPC, forwarded Kirkpatrick's proposal to Frank Wisner, the DDP, with a furious, but cogent, memorandum of dissent. It is not apparent what Wisner did then, but it is evident that Kirkpatrick's paper did reach Bedell Smith in one way or another. Smith rejected Kirkpatrick's conception of a trifurcated command structure, but he adapted some of Kirkpatrick's ideas to his own conception of a single chain of command down to the chiefs of merged overseas stations.

The next development was a meeting in late May arranged by Wisner and attended by Smith, Wisner, Johnston, and Helms (as Acting ADSO in Kirkpatrick's absence). The result of that meeting was that Helms prepared at Smith's direction a draft dated 4 June 1952 and entitled "A Proposed Organization of the CIA Clandestine Services." The military analogies contained in that paper strongly suggest that its organizational conception had been dictated by Bedell Smith himself. Certainly that conception differed radically from Helms's previous ideas on the subject, while conforming to the concept of Smith's order of 8 January. One may infer that Helms perceived that the time for argument was over and that he loyally wrote as Smith directed. One may infer also that he was made the drafter in order to silence OSO opposition. Nevertheless, it is notable that much of the language of Smith's final version, dated 15 July, was taken verbatim from Helms's 4 June draft. Thus, ironically, it was Richard Helms who drafted the final order for the integration of OSO and OPC.

Bedell Smith, however, personally prepared his own text for that final order. On 30 June 1952 he desired to have Wisner, Kirkpatrick, Johnston, Hedden (the Inspector General), and White (the Assistant DDA) review a revised draft of his own paper entitled "CIA Clandestine Services—Description of Proposed Organization" and suggest any final changes that they might wish to make in it. The next day Gerald Miller, the Acting ADPC, advised Wisner that he should accept Smith's draft "with enthusiasm" and press to have it issued as a directive.¹⁷

In early July Bedell Smith personally cleared his draft with David Bruce, the Under Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, the Secretary of Defense, and Sidney Souers, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The final version of Smith's paper was issued as a directive on 15 July 1952, under the title "Organization of CIA Clandestine Services." Its stated purpose was to create a single overseas clandestine service while at the same time protecting the long-term espionage mission of CIA from becoming lost in multifarious opportunistic and urgent covert operations. (See text at the head of this chapter.)

Smith reaffirmed his decision of 8 January to establish a single chain of command from himself as DCI through the DDP and the chiefs of the merged area divisions to the chiefs of merged stations overseas. To this end, the DDP would assume the residual command functions of the ADSO and the ADPC.

The DDP would be assisted by a Chief of Operations who would serve as both his deputy and his chief of staff. This position may have been suggested by Kirkpatrick's proposed "Vice DDP," but it reflected also Smith's military experience. Kirkpatrick was appointed to the office, but was unable to serve because of his severe illness (polio), which began on 20 July. Richard Helms substituted for Kirkpatrick as Acting Chief of Operations until he was appointed to that position in his own right, on 26 February 1953.

¹⁷Given the textual correspondence between Helms's 4 June draft and Smith's 15 July text, it is virtually certain that Smith's 30 June text was derived from Helms's draft and substantially identical with the 15 July version.

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The Chief of Operations, as chief of staff, would supervise five staff units: Foreign Intelligence, Political and Psychological Warfare, Paramilitary Operations, Technical Support, and Administration. Foreign Intelligence was the former staff of the ADSO. Its function was to exercise *staff* supervision of the espionage and counterespionage operations of the merged divisions and stations. Its designated chief had been Richard Helms, the former DADSO. Similarly, Political and Psychological Warfare and Paramilitary Operations represented the division of OPC recommended by Kirkpatrick, but here they appeared as *staff* units rather than as line offices. Gerald Miller, the former DADPC, was made Chief of the Political and Psychological Warfare Staff.¹⁸

The DCI's Senior Representatives abroad were assigned *command* authority over all CIA activities in their respective areas of responsibility.

General Smith emphasized that in this structure there were only two echelons of command authority: the DCI in Washington and the Senior Representatives abroad. The DDP and his division chiefs had only delegated authority, as the executive agents of the DCI.

This order went into effect on 1 August 1952. OSO and OPC then ceased to exist. In their stead there was a single organization with a plural name, The Clandestine Services.

¹⁸Kilbourne Johnston, the ADPC, had resigned. Miller served as Chief, PP Staff, for only one month and was then made Senior Representative [redacted]

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