




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Intelligence Report

Office of Scientific and Weapons Research

10 April 1995

The NPT Extension Conference: A Challenging Endgame




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The Western Group enters the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in a relatively strong position, with a notional majority of some 92 NPT signatories having indicated either publicly or diplomatically that they support indefinite extension (see matrix of estimated country positions). Nevertheless, significant efforts by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Arab League to negotiate consensus positions behind alternative extension options are likely to continue during the end game and indefinite extension is by no means assured. Obtaining indefinite extension will depend on:

- *Our ability to assuage concerns about a series of contentious issues that the NAM consistently has linked to indefinite extension.*
- *The West's ability to prevent NAM supporters of indefinite extension from "defecting."*
- *Obtaining favorable voting procedures.*
- *Conference dynamics.*

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Although the composition of the "northern" or Western-Eurasian coalition behind indefinite extension has remained relatively constant, the loyalties of the "southern" group will continue to be vulnerable to efforts by the NAM and the Arab League to develop alternative extension options.



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As a result, and because many undecided states will delay their extension decision until the eleventh hour, we may not have an accurate count as we enter the vote.



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The Basis for a Possible Majority Vote

Since the Fourth Preparatory Committee (prepcom) meeting in January 1995, the bloc in favor of indefinite extension has grown by approximately 30 votes and at 92 now constitutes a notional majority of Treaty parties. The bulk of this support comes from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-NATO, Russia, the former Soviet Republics, Eastern Europe, and the rest of Western Europe with the exception of Switzerland. Pockets of support that we assess as critical to maintaining this majority also have emerged among the NAM but these countries remain vulnerable to backsliding because of continued attempts by the NAM to develop a joint position. A surge to negotiate a common NAM position is likely during the 11-12 April NAM Senior Officials Meeting and at the Conference itself-if Conference dynamics prove favorable to a bandwagon emerging behind a more limited extension option. 


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Currently, blocs of nonaligned support for indefinite extension come from:





- *Central America.* The six Central American states are expected to support indefinite extension. ¹ Several of these had previously supported the "Venezuelan" 25-year fixed period option.
- *The Caribbean Islands.* In fall 1994, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) issued a statement supporting indefinite extension. Only half of the member states have committed to indefinite extension independently, however. ²
- *The South Pacific.* In 1994 the South Pacific Forum (SPF) issued a communique supporting the unconditional indefinite extension of the NPT, and historically the SPF has voted as a bloc. ³ Nevertheless, since then a few South Pacific countries, including Papua New Guinea, have expressed reservations about supporting indefinite extension.
- *Francophone Africa.* French-speaking African countries, which account for roughly a dozen of the states in Central and Western Africa, are inclined to follow Paris' cue on NPT extension and thus have indicated a preference for indefinite extension.

¹ The Central American states are Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, and Costa Rica. (U)

² CARICOM members of the NPT are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. (U)

³ NPT signatories in the SPF are Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa. Additionally, Vanuatu and Palau may accede before the Conference. 

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This report was prepared by  Office of Scientific and Weapons Research with contributions from other offices in the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to  Chief, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Division, OSWR  Information available as of 29 March was used in this report 

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Nevertheless, some have indicated that they would not oppose a regional or NAM consensus, should one emerge. 


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Opposition Is Concentrated In the Middle East and the NAM

The Middle East. The majority of states in the Middle East continue to oppose the unconditional, indefinite extension of the NPT and, absent Israeli signature of the Treaty, are not likely to change their positions by April. Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Yemen probably will be among those voting against indefinite extension or possibly abstaining in the interests of not damaging relations with Washington. This group probably will pursue a single fixed extension or a series of limited extensions—such as a rolling five-year extension—as the best way of enabling them to retain leverage with the West and Israel on arms control issues. Although the Arab League⁴ meeting in late March failed to adopt a consensus position *against* indefinite extension, it left the issue open for further discussion. The Arab League's resolution said the Arab position would "take shape" depending on the "extent to which universal implementation" of the Treaty had been achieved. The resolution also supports the NAM's efforts to link other arms control issues to the extension decision. 

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
Nonetheless, a few positive signs are emerging:



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The Non-Aligned Movement. An ad hoc NAM NPT working group—chaired by Malaysia—has been meeting since late 1994 with the goal of developing a unified NAM position. Although the group completed a position paper for use by NAM countries during the NPT Conference, we believe they failed to agree upon a common extension proposal.



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⁴ The Arab League consists of Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen, and the Palestine Liberation Organization. (U)



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- Indonesia, as president of the NAM, is spearheading NAM efforts to oppose indefinite extension. Jakarta has proposed different extension options over the last six months, including a fixed-term extension and a series of rolling fixed periods.

[Redacted]

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- Iran favors extending the Treaty for a fixed term unless certain alleged defects in the Treaty—principally so-called discriminatory export control practices—are corrected.

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- Mexico's opposition to indefinite extension appears to have remained unchanged as of 10 March.

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Targets for NAM Maneuvering: Regions Vulnerable to the Opposition

Africa. No Organization of African Unity (OAU) consensus has emerged, largely because many African States are ambivalent about NPT extension. States in this region probably will be more influenced by the votes of key regional players—such as South Africa—than by NAM hardliners:

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
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- South Africa has consistently supported indefinite extension or extension “in perpetuity.” In an effort to “bring along its neighbors in the region,” on 10 March it suggested a rolling fixed periods option as a possible compromise.



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The SADC⁵ constitutes a key pocket of opposition to indefinite extension, but South Africa will probably influence its ultimate decision.



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Southeast Asia. Since Philippine President Ramos’ late January statement that Manila will vote for indefinite extension, the six Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations appear to have given up efforts to reach a consensus position opposing indefinite extension.⁶ Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand appear intent on fixed-term extensions, while Singapore remains undecided. It is not clear how Brunei—which may have been awaiting an ASEAN consensus against indefinite extension—will proceed. Other Southeast Asian states—Burma, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia—are also divided on the issue.



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South Asia. South Asian NPT member states—concerned about neighboring India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear weapon capabilities—have been consistently supportive of nuclear nonproliferation objectives but hold mixed views on NPT extension. Afghanistan, the Maldives, and Bangladesh support unconditional, indefinite extension—although Bangladesh’s support may be wavering. Other South Asian signatories, such as Nepal, either support a fixed extension period or have not decided what form extension should take. Sri Lanka, charged with presiding over the conference in April, will go along with the consensus so as to preserve the appearance of impartiality as president.



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Latin America. Most of Latin America probably will support indefinite extension in the end, but the region also includes some key NPT troublemakers. Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador have all expressed interest in limited term extensions—citing the

⁵ Members of the SADC are: Angola (not an NPT signatory), Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (U)

⁶ ASEAN members are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Laos, Papua New Guinea, and Vietnam participate as observers. (U)



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weapons states' poor disarmament track record (Article VI). [redacted]

Seventeen countries have publicly or privately endorsed indefinite extension; the remainder may be susceptible to the lobbying efforts of Mexico and other NAM opponents of indefinite extension. [redacted]

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Key Variables That Could Affect the Conference Outcome

Longstanding Linkage Issues. The issues outlined in the NAM documents presented at the Third and Fourth Preparatory Committee meetings remain central negotiating positions of NAM opponents of indefinite extension. They include calls for: a time-bound framework for eliminating nuclear weapons, treaty universality, support for nuclear weapon-free zones, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a fissile material cut-off, legally binding security assurances, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Most conciliatory measures recently proposed by the NWSs in an effort to widen support for indefinite extension do not cut deeply enough to satisfy such hardline NAM opponents as Iran, Indonesia, Egypt, and Nigeria (see inset). ***Maintaining majority backing for indefinite extension will depend in part on our ability to convince NPT signatories that progress made to date on these issues is indicative of our good faith and is at least substantial enough to give them the political cover to support indefinite extension.*** [redacted]

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Procedural Issues. Unsettled rules relating to voting procedures may affect the outcome in largely unpredictable ways (see inset). ***If simultaneous voting is adopted, a key challenge will be to prevent adoption of a rule that would result in fallback options acceptable to Washington being eliminated in early voting rounds. Similarly, we believe that public balloting will help keep countries in the pro-indefinite extension camp.*** [redacted]

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Delegate personalities. Personalities of delegates in official or unofficial leadership positions are likely to affect conference dynamics. For example, the Committee chairmen may have biases which could affect the tone and content of their final Committee reports (see inset). Isaac Ayewah, the Nigerian who will chair Main Committee 1, was extremely sympathetic to Iran's arguments when he presided over Prepcom III.

- The Conference President, Jayantha Dhanapala from Sri Lanka, has pledged neutrality; however, a recent speech by the Sri Lankan ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament may indicate that Colombo is—in fact—inclined against indefinite extension. If Dhanapala shares his colleagues' views, given the considerable leverage afforded the conference president, such inclinations could affect the process and outcome of the Conference. [redacted]

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Collapse of US-DPRK Agreed Framework. Differences between the United States and North Korea over South Korea's role in providing two light-water reactors to the North

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risks a breakdown in the Agreed Framework. P'yongyang has threatened to refuel its 5 megawatt electric (MWe) reactor if the reactor supplier issue is not resolved by 21 April, about a week into the NPT Conference. The breakdown of the Agreed Framework—particularly if it is followed by a North Korean withdrawal from the NPT and/or a return to the UN Security Council for sanctions—would underscore the international community's limited options for enforcing the NPT regime.

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Outlook

The risk of a bandwagon emerging at the Conference against indefinite extension is real. The uncertainty stems primarily from the lack of an overwhelming consensus behind indefinite extension, the continuing activism of the NAM and others in promoting alternative extension options, and the likelihood that some supporters of indefinite extension will fail to attend the Conference, abstain, or settle for second-best options. Our ability to achieve indefinite extension will be further challenged by:

- Continued activism by the Arab League and the NAM for a more limited extension option, including attempts to sway those NAM countries inclined to support indefinite extension. The NAM will use focused criticism of the weapon states' performance on such long-standing linkage issues as a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a fissile material cutoff, legally binding security assurances, and peaceful nuclear technology transfer to argue that the Non-Nuclear Weapons States need to retain a source of leverage on the Nuclear Weapons States. Many NAM states fear that achieving indefinite extension will curtail further reviews of Treaty operation.
- The likelihood that many states will delay their extension decision until the eleventh hour. We may not have an accurate view of the depth and breadth of support for indefinite extension as we enter the actual vote.
- A NAM push for the Conference to reach all decisions by a "near consensus"—rather than a simple majority, and the possibility that NAM hard-liners will try to adjourn the Conference rather than accept an indefinite extension by simple majority.

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Some supporters of indefinite extension have expressed concern over the strategy to accept a 50 percent plus 1 majority vote, fearing that doing so would alienate too many other states and jeopardize the future of the NPT. Most NPT signatories, however, appear to understand that they will be bound by whatever the majority decides at the conference, and ***we do not foresee mass withdrawals from the Treaty even if indefinite extension is narrowly achieved:***


- With the exception of North Korea, no country has ever come this close to withdrawing from the NPT.
- There has been no indication that any country is *seriously* considering withdrawing from the NPT should the vote not go their way.

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- Iran and Egypt are the only countries that previously have hinted at a possible withdrawal over the extension decision. Iran now denies that it would withdraw if the Treaty is extended indefinitely, presumably because it wants to assure access to technology for its nuclear program. Egyptian President Mubarak said in March that Egypt will not withdraw even if its demands are not met by the time of the Treaty Conference. 

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Contentious Issues: Conditions for NAM Support

Disarmament. The US decisions to withdraw a proposed 10-year out clause from the draft CTBT text and to remove 200 tons of excess fissile material from the nuclear arsenal have been viewed positively. Regardless, some hardline NAM opponents of indefinite extension—including Indonesia, Iran, and Nigeria—consider overall progress on the CTBT, fissile material cut-off, and other disarmament measures inadequate. Consequently, the Indonesian proposal to make future extensions of the NPT contingent upon NWS compliance with a step-by-step process toward disarmament is being viewed positively in the NAM.

Security Assurances. Many NNWS may be willing to accept the UNSC Resolution on positive and negative security assurances as an interim step on the way to legally binding security assurances. Egypt, however, is critical of the limitations of a NWS joint resolution on security assurances.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology. Iran continues to champion the cause for NNWS access to nuclear technology and has managed to spark a measure of discord between the United States and Russia on this issue. The recent controversy over the Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation agreement has refueled Iran's argument. The perceived inconsistency in policy between the provision of nuclear technology to North Korea (vs. Iran) will give Treaty critics considerable ammunition.

Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones. Because no country explicitly links its extension vote to NWFZ issues, US statements in support of NWFZ efforts will not buy many votes but would be welcome by many regional groups as a sign of good faith by the NWS.

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Conference Organization and Procedure

The NPT Conference will have five committees: three Main Committees, a Drafting Committee, and a Credentials Committee. Consistent with practice observed at previous NPT Review Conferences, the Fourth Prepcom endorsed the Chairmen of the first three Prepcoms as heads of the Main Committees:

- Issac Ayewah of Nigeria to chair Main Committee I.
- Andre Erdos of Hungary to chair Main Committee II.
- Jaap Ramaker of Netherlands to chair Main Committee III, replacing first Prepcom Chairman Jan Hoekema (Netherlands) who had been elected to his country's legislative assembly.

In addition, the fourth Prepcom also recommended Tadeusz Strulak of Poland to chair the Drafting Committee and an unnamed representative from the NAM to chair the Credentials Committee.

Each Main Committee will review the performance of a particular aspect of the NPT, in accordance with NPT Article VIII.3, which provides for a Treaty performance review every five years:

- Main Committee I is responsible for reviewing "the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament, and international peace and security."
- Main Committee II is responsible for reviewing "the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, safeguards, and nuclear weapons-free zones."
- Main Committee III is responsible for reviewing "the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to development, research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination."

The Drafting Committee will coordinate the drafting of and editing of all texts referred to it by the Conference or by a Main Committee. The Drafting Committee is expressly forbidden from altering the substance of the submitted texts, and reports to the Conference or to the Main Committee as appropriate.

The Credentials Committee, considered to be the least influential of the five committees, examines the credentials of country representatives and reports its activities to the Conference.

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NPT Extension Voting Procedures

Rules of procedure governing the method for taking the vote remain unresolved. By the end of the Fourth Preparatory Committee, parties began to converge on a procedure of simultaneous voting, in which all proposed voting options would be listed on a single ballot. During intersessional meetings, parties have agreed to accept a NAM proposed simultaneous voting option, with modifications.

- The NAM proposed a multiple vote balloting scheme in which a country can vote for one or more extension options on a single ballot. Some NAM members believe such a scheme would favor a rolling extension outcome, reasoning that some supporters of indefinite extension and some supporters of fixed extension would also vote for rolling extension as palatable alternatives.
- The Western and Others Group (WEOG) objected to the multiple option per ballot scheme and successfully negotiated a single option per ballot rule.
- Procedural details for eliminating less popular extension options remain unresolved. The Western preference, currently, is to retain *all* options on each successive ballot, in order to ensure that the WEOG's "second-best" option does not get eliminated in the early voting rounds.

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
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