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BY HAND

THE MONSTER PLOT

See addendum 190-709-103x1

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THE MONSTER PLOT

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Introduction

On 5 June 1962 Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Soviet official temporarily assigned to Geneva, contacted an American Foreign Service Officer in a move that was eventually to lead to Nosenko's defection. This act was the first in a chain of events that is unequaled in complexity by any other Soviet operation handled by the Central Intelligence Agency since its establishment. Because the case still has important implications for the overall Soviet intelligence effort of the United States, and because it raises many basic questions about the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors, a reinvestigation of the case was commissioned by the Agency in June 1976. The results are embodied in this report and its annexes.

Although United States officials of many agencies, up to and including a president of the United States, were briefed on the case and either played some role in making decisions concerning it or actively participated in running the operation, it does not now appear that, between 1962 and 1976, any single individual has ever been fully informed as to all its aspects. The complexity of this investigation therefore stems in large measure from the fact that the case has proceeded along at least two, and often more, compartmented tracks. Thus, the effort to get a total picture of what transpired has involved an unusual amount of research in the files of various components of the Agency, plus personal interviews with a large number of present and former Agency employees.

The actions taken in regard to Nosenko were not the result of decisions made by a unitary Agency acting as a corporate entity; rather, in this case more than in most, decisions were made by a number of senior individuals on the basis of their own strongly-held views, which sometimes conflicted with the equally strongly-held opinions of other senior colleagues. Thus, this report must, if it is to be comprehensible, attempt to depict the decision-making process in all its complexity by referring when necessary to the individual participants.

The quintessential quality of a report such as this is that it be objective. We have not, on the other hand, refrained from expressing our opinions. Even to have tried to do so would have been futile for two rather obvious reasons. First, into the reconstruction of events of the complexity herein described there always enters a degree of selectivity and judgment; in this sense, "opinion" provides the essential matrix of our product. Secondly, we have viewed our task as one of constructive criticism.

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CHAPTER I

Organizational Background: CIA's Handling Of Soviet Positive Intelligence and CI Matters

The history of the Nosenko case can only be comprehended within the framework of the organization and day-to-day functioning of the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole. In fact, opinions regarding the handling of the Nosenko case may differ substantially according to individual's differing views regarding internal Agency organization and functioning. This being the case, it is useful at the outset to make explicit our understanding of how the Agency actually functioned in the relevant period, the 1960s, as distinct from how it might theoretically have functioned according to Agency organizational charts and regulations.

The two instrumentalities for the conduct of day-to-day operations in the Soviet field were the Soviet Bloc Division (known successively by this and several other names*) and the Counterintelligence Staff. [redacted]

*This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952-1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966-1974). The two names are often used interchangeably.

[redacted]

Although allegations that the Soviets had recruited Agency staff employees did not first originate with Golitsyn, it was he who lent special force to them by spelling out a complicated theory of Soviet intentions and modus operandi. He thus provided a detailed conceptual framework within which to develop a hypothesis towards which some members of the Agency were already predisposed. Golitsyn thus became the ideologue's ideologue.

Prior to Golitsyn's defection, the Agency as a whole had been hard hit by its dealings with high-level Soviet penetrations of Western governments. There is no need to go into detail on them, since they have been well documented elsewhere, but they included British representatives such as Kim Philby and George Blake [redacted]

[redacted]

In the course of time, the continuing record of KGB success in penetrating Western governments made it the more feared of the two principal Soviet intelligence services. Although we had had our successes also in penetrating the Soviets, they were primarily through GRU defectors-in-place such as Popov and Penkovskiy. The defection of Anatoliy Golitsyn on 15 December 1961 was thus a major event.

Once again, it is not necessary here to go into details regarding Golitsyn, because this case has been covered extensively in a recent study. However, two points are worth noting:

1. [redacted]

2. Secondly, Golitsyn presented us right from the beginning, continually elaborated throughout the years, a complicated rationale for believing that the KGB was successfully pursuing a mammoth program of "disinformation" to the detriment of the

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United States and its Western allies. This rationale is covered in more detail in Chapter VI of this report.

It is against this background that we view the approach to CIA by Nosenko and his subsequent handling. In doing so, we shall for ease of reference from time to time allude to the thesis regarding KGB operations and intentions--elaborated by Golitsyn and others--as the "Monster Plot." In fairness, it must be allowed that this term was in common usage not by the thesis' proponents but rather by its detractors; yet no other name serves so aptly to capsulize what the theorizers envisaged as a major threat to United States' security. If the term carries with it emotive connotations, the latter were certainly shared by both sides to the controversy; and this fact alone is enough to justify including "Monster Plot" in the lexicon of this study.

CHAPTER II

Biographical Data: 1927-1962

Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko was born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, Ukrainian SSR, son of Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko and Tamara Georgiyevna Markovskaya. His father was born in 1902 and died on 2 August 1956. At the time of his death, the senior Nosenko was Minister of Shipbuilding, a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and recipient of a number of the highest Soviet awards and medals. He received a state funeral, and he is commemorated by a plaque on the Kremlin wall. Young Nosenko's brother, Vladimir, born in 1944, was a student at the Institute of International Relations as of 1964.

From his birth until 1934, Nosenko lived in Nikolayev. In 1934 he and his mother joined the senior Nosenko in Leningrad, where the latter was working as chief engineer at the Sudomekh shipbuilding plant. Nosenko continued his schooling in Leningrad until late 1938, at which time he and his mother followed the senior Nosenko to Moscow, where he was to serve as Deputy People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry.

In 1941, shortly after the war broke out, Nosenko and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk in the Urals. Nosenko stated that he and a friend tried to run off to the front, but they were caught and returned home. At age 14 Nosenko entered a Special Naval School that, in August 1942, was relocated to Kuybyshev. Later, this school was forced to relocate again, this time to Achinsk in Siberia. Nosenko did not want to go to Siberia and, through the influence of his father, was accepted at the Frunze Naval Preparatory School in Leningrad (not to be confused with the Frunze Higher Naval School, also in Leningrad), which by this time had been relocated to Baku.

Some time after August 1943, Nosenko tried on two separate occasions to get to the front, but failed. He and a friend did succeed in returning home to Moscow without authorization. These escapades seem to form part of a behavior pattern that was eventually to culminate in defection.

By August 1944, Nosenko had resumed his studies at the Frunze Naval Preparatory School, which had returned to its

original location in Leningrad. Cadets from this school were sent to a forest (some two hundred kilometers from Leningrad) on a wood-cutting detail. In about November of that year he wounded himself, seemingly accidentally, and was hospitalized. He decided not to return to the Frunze Naval Preparatory School and again, through his father's intervention in about January 1945, entered a shipbuilding college (tekhnikum) in Leningrad.

At the end of World War II, Nosenko returned to Moscow. He had meanwhile obtained a certificate from the director of the shipbuilding college that attested to his study in, and the completion of, the tenth class.

At some time prior to July 1945, Nosenko accompanied his father, who went to East Germany with a group of engineers. For purposes of that trip, Nosenko received temporary rank as an Army senior lieutenant, with appropriate documents and uniform.

Nosenko entered the Institute of International Relations in Moscow in July 1945. Upon completion of the second year at the Institute, and by virtue of his participation in a military training program roughly equivalent to the ROTC, Nosenko received the rank of junior lieutenant in the "administrative service" (sic). (The exact meaning of this term is unclear.)

In 1946, according to Nosenko, he married, against his parents' wishes, a student whom he had gotten pregnant. He obtained a divorce almost immediately following their marriage. In about 1947, he married the daughter of Soviet Lieutenant General (Major General, US-style) Telegin. This marriage, too, was neither successful nor long-lived. [redacted]

Nosenko completed a four-year course at the Institute of International Relations, but he actually received his diploma a year later, in 1950, because he had failed the examination in Marxism. He had had to wait an extra year in order to retake this examination.

In March 1951, Nosenko was assigned as an English language translator in naval int[redacted] serving first in the Far East.

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[redacted] he did not return to the Far East but was sent instead to the Baltic area.

While on leave in Moscow in late 1952, Nosenko accompanied his parents to a New Year's Eve party at the dacha of a certain General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov. When Nosenko indicated interest in changing jobs, the general made a vague offer of help in getting employment with the Ministry of State Security (MGB). In March 1953, while again in Moscow, Nosenko was called to Kobulov's office. Kobulov had just returned from Germany to become the First Deputy Minister of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs). Nosenko did not see Kobulov personally but was referred by the latter's assistant to the deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (internal counterintelligence), hereafter referred to as SCD, by whom he was hired.

His first MGB assignment was in the First (American embassy) Section of the First (American) Department of the SCD.

In March 1953, following Stalin's death, Lavrentiy Beriya emerged from the resultant reshuffling of the top leadership as chief of both the MVD and MGB. In March 1954, the new "Committee" for State Security--the KGB--was formed.

In June 1953 Nosenko married his third wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna Khozhevnikova, who was a student at the Moscow State University.

Nosenko, a member of the Komsomol since 1943, was elected secretary of the SCD Komsomol unit in June 1953 and served as secretary of that unit until about June 1954.

[redacted]

In early spring 1955, Nosenko received a poor kharakteristika (performance evaluation), which described him as unsuitable for work in the First Department. Nonetheless, he was neither dismissed nor transferred.

[redacted]

At this point in his KGB career, Nosenko had lost his Komsomol membership and not achieved CP-member status. It was not until 1956 that he was accepted as a candidate member of the CP, and only in 1957 that he was admitted as a full Party member.

[redacted]

In December 1959, Nosenko was promoted to the rank of captain. He held this rank until his defection in February 1964, despite having been promised he would be promoted and the fact that he had held several positions that were usually filled by officers of higher military rank.

Nosenko worked in the Seventh Department, SCD until January 1960, when he was transferred back to the First Section (American embassy) of the First Department. Then he held the position of a deputy chief of the First Section. He was retransferred back to the Seventh Department as of late December 1961-early January 1962. In July 1962, he was appointed deputy chief of the Seventh Department. He

continued in this position until 18 January 1964, the date he left Moscow on TDY to Geneva.

Nosenko defected in Geneva on 4 February 1964, leaving behind in Moscow his wife, Lyudmila, and two daughters. His prior travels to the West had included two TDYs to England in 1957 and 1958, a TDY to Cuba in 1960, and the first TDY to Geneva from mid-March until June 1962. He also went on TDY to Bulgaria in 1961. Details of his defection and subsequent developments are covered in Chapter III.

CHAPTER III

Chronicle: 1962-1969

A. Initial Contacts

When Nosenko first approached the CIA on 9 June 1962, he had been assigned, as a representative of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, to be security officer of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference being held in the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Taking advantage of the fact that he was the watchdog for the delegation whereas its members could not watch him, Nosenko used his freedom of movement to approach the Agency, ostensibly for personal financial assistance.

As he told it, Nosenko had recently slept with a Swiss woman who had stolen 900 Swiss Francs of official funds that he had on his person at the time; inability to reimburse this relatively trivial amount (about US $250 at the time) would jeopardize his career. In exchange for 2,000 Swiss Francs, he therefore proposed that he provide us with two items of information. These items, subsequently verified, related to:

1. KGB recruitment of a US Army sergeant while he was serving in the American embassy in Moscow as a "code machine repairman."

2. A Soviet official whom the Agency had ostensibly recruited but who was being run against us under KGB control.

At this time Nosenko was not forthcoming in response to general intelligence requirements on which we tried to quiz him, excluded the possibility of becoming an agent, and flatly refused to consider meeting Agency representatives inside the USSR. Nevertheless, he "agreed 'perhaps' meet us when abroad" again at a later date. For our part, our interest in him was whetted by his identification of his deceased father as a former minister of the USSR. In addition, such information as he gave about himself indicated that he would be of high operational interest. Inter alia his most recent assignment in Moscow was as head of a KGB sub-section working against American tourists.

B. Bona Fides

By 11 June, the two case officers (one a native Russian speaker) who were handling Nosenko sent a cable to Headquarters that read in part:

> SUBJ CONCLUSIVELY PROVED BONA FIDES. PROVIDED INFO OF IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY, SUBJ NOW COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE. WILLING MEET WHEN ABROAD AND WILL MEET AS OFTEN AND AS LONG AS POSSIBLE UNTIL DEPARTURE 15 JUNE.

With the question of bona fides seemingly resolved, the principal case officer flew to Washington carrying the tapes of the meeting. His arrival and sojourn at Headquarters were described by Chief, CI on 23 July 1976 as follows:

Chief, CI: . . . we got the first message . . . on Nosenko from Geneva, and [the principal case officer] was ordered back, and we had a big meeting here on Saturday morning, and [the principal case officer] thought he had the biggest fish of his life. I mean he really did . . . and everything I heard from him was in direct contrast from what we heard from Golitsyn. I mean, we had no agents, this, that and . . . yet here was a Second Chief Directorate man in Geneva peace talks on disarmament. So I got hold of [the principal case officer], and I brought him in here on a weekend.

Q: What you're saying is that it was unreasonable for a Second Chief Directorate man to be there . . .

Chief, CI: Under the circumstances, getting drunk and needing $300 to . . . "not to be recruited but to give us three full, big secrets" for an exchange for the money in order that he could replenish the account from which he embezzled the money on a drunk. So I brought [the principal case officer] in here one evening, I think it was Friday, Saturday and a Sunday, and I brought about

> 10 to 15 volumes of Golitsyn's interrogation, without prejudicing him in any way, just to read it, and he had all the books out, and at the end of it all he said that there was no question about it, that they were being had. I mean, mind you, he was of split motivation because this was the big case of his entire life and yet there he was reading material, etc. So we went to Dick [Helms, then DDP] and we put up a proposition that we should permit Golitsyn to read the real material, I mean the transcripts and everything from Nosenko. And he wouldn't agree to that, but we made a compromise and that was to take the material and falsify it as though it was an anonymous letter sent to the embassy by an alleged KGB person. So the anonymous letter was drawn up, and [the principal case officer] interviewed Golitsyn with the anonymous letter, and Golitsyn's statement was that "this is a person under control, I want to see the letter" which created a situation because we didn't have a letter. But he began to point out in some detail exactly what was instigating and inspiring--in terms of what he'd already given to us and he very wisely stated that he wanted everything on tape, because he knew that as time passed in hundreds of interviews and their counteraction took place, there would be people accusing him of not having divulged certain information.

The principal case officer's review of the Golitsyn information had indeed converted him to the view that Nosenko's defection was bogus. Equally convinced, as clearly indicated by a number of documents that he drafted, was his superior, the person who had become Chief, SR Division in December 1963. The reasons for Chief, SR's conviction may not have been the same as the principal case officer's, but for all practical purposes the views of the two men at the time were identical.

A joint CI Staff-SR Division recommendation was therefore made to Richard Helms, the Deputy for Plans,

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that the transcripts of the Nosenko debriefings be made available to Golitsyn for comment. Helms agreed, with the single reservation that Nosenko not be identified by name as the source. As a result, a number of items of information from Nosenko were embodied on a letter ostensibly stemming from an anonymous KGB source; in this form, it was assumed, the information could be shown to Golitsyn without disclosing the source.

[redacted]

In carrying out the plan, the principal case officer made his own views clear to Golitsyn:

> I told [Golitsyn] that . . . I thought it quite possible, in view of his own statements about disinformation, that this was the beginning of a disinformation operation possibly relating to [his] defection.
>
> Golitsyn felt, in general and without having the full details necessary to an assessment, that there were indeed serious signs of disinformation in this affair. He felt such a disinformation operation, to discredit him, was a likelihood, as he had earlier said. A KGB officer could be permitted to tell everything he knew, now, if he worked in the same general field as Golitsyn had. When told that so far this source had not done anything to discredit Golitsyn, and had in fact reported that the KGB is greatly upset about Golitsyn's defection, and asked what he thought the purposes of such a disinformation operation now might be, Golitsyn agreed that kidnapping was a likely one, "to arrange an exchange for me." Also, to divert our attention from investigations of his leads by throwing up false scents, and to protect their remaining sources. He also added, "There could be other aims as well. The matter should be looked into. It seems serious to me." He thought the KGB might allow a first series of direct meetings with the KGB officer, to build up our confidence, and then in the next session do whatever the operation's purpose

might be (discredit Golitsyn, kidnap, pass serious disinformation items, etc.).

C. The Case Against Nosenko

During the remainder of 1962 and 1963, SR Division continued to build up a case against Nosenko. Virtually any information provided by Nosenko, or action taken by him, was interpreted as part of a KGB "provocation." If his information was in accord with that from other sources, this fact not only confirmed our suspicion of Nosenko but was interpreted as casting doubt on the other sources as well.

While the above aspect will be covered at length in Chapters V and VI, one example will serve to highlight the attitude that prevailed. Nosenko had, during our meetings with him in 1962, contributed information that materially aided in the identification and arrest of [redacted] official who was also a KGB agent. Because Golitsyn had previously provided similar, but less specific, information, the usefulness of Nosenko's intelligence was discounted; once [redacted] had been identified, it was concluded that Nosenko had been allowed to expose him in order to support his own bona fides. The argument ran that [redacted] would in any case have been identified sooner or later on the basis of Golitsyn's leads.

In January 1964, Nosenko reappeared in Geneva accompanying another Soviet delegation. By now, the case against him had been well established in the minds of those dealing with the matter, and the record is therefore replete with manifestations of suspicion. A particular example of our tendency to interpret unfavorably almost anything Nosenko said is provided by notes that Chief, SR forwarded to Helms on 27 January 1964, with the suggestion that they "convey very well the flavor of the man . . . and the complexities of the operation." By way of background, although Nosenko's cryptonym at this juncture was [redacted] he had previously been designated [redacted] this bit of history led to the following incident during a safehouse meeting:

I cannot attribute to coincidence a bizarre remark [redacted] made on 24 January. As I went

behind a bar which stands in the apartment to serve drinks to [redacted] . . . [redacted] saw me standing there behind the bar and his face lit up and he said with a smile, "Ha. You are [redacted] but it is not funny as [redacted] (ex[redacted] seemed to think it was and I am afraid it means that he knows his own CIA cryptonym.

The above incident exemplifies a main theme that CIA was itself penetrated. This fear had existed before Golitsyn defected, but it was fed constantly by the latter's allegations that information concerning him was leaking to the KGB, and the conclusion that the leaks must have originated within the Agency.

Thus it was that a memorandum from Chief, SR on 27 January 1964, submitted to and approved by Helms, began as follows:

> Our goal in this case must be eventually to break Subject and learn from him the details of his mission and its relation to possible penetrations of US intelligence and security agencies and those of allied nations as well as to broader disinformation operations in the political sphere. Ideally, our interests would be best served if Subject were broken as early as possible but since this is unlikely, our actions must be conceived and carried out in a manner which contributes to our basic goal without alerting Subject unduly at any stage.

Far from "alerting Subject unduly," on the surface the Agency welcomed Nosenko with both cordiality and generosity. The following excerpts from a 30 January 1964 meeting make the point clearly:

Nosenko: . . . the only thing I wanted to know and I asked this question, "What should I expect in the future?"

Principal case officer:

> The following awaits: As I presented it, you wanted to come to the United States and

have some job, some chance of a future life, which gives you security and if possible the opportunity to work in this field which you know. Is that correct?

Nosenko: Absolutely.

Principal case officer:



D. Defection

As might be expected, the principal case officer devoted a good deal of effort during the second Geneva visit to persuading Nosenko to stay in place. Nosenko, however, dismissed out of hand the possibility of remaining in contact with CIA from within the Soviet Union, and he became increasingly anxious to defect immediately. When the principal case officer continued to press him to remain in Geneva long enough to effect an audio penetration of the local rezidentura, Nosenko forced the issue. At a meeting on 4 February, he announced that a cable had been received from Moscow ordering him back home for a "tourism conference." Though this claim was subsequently to be the source of almost endless controversy, it was accepted at the time without apparent question. Preparations therefore immediately began for evacuation to the United States.

A layover in another country en route to the United States lasted about a fortnight. It was used for further

debriefing and assessment, but, while useful from the operational handlers' standpoint, the delay raised problems as their charge became impatient:

> CAN EASILY CONTINUE DEBRIEFING FOR ANOTHER FEW DAYS ALONG ABOVE LINES. SUBJ IS CARRYING MANY NOTES OUTLINING DETAILS ALL SCD OPS KNOWN TO HIM WHICH HE WANTS TO CARRY PERSONALLY AND PRESENT TO HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER TO AVOID ARRIVING WITH EMPTY HANDS. WORKING ON THIS MATERIAL WILL OCCUPY US PROFITABLY BUT SUBJ NEEDS SOONEST SOME EXPRESSION OF HEADQUARTERS REACTIONS AND PLANS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT. HIS VIEW OF CURRENT SITUATION IS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TRANSITION. HE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND INDEFINITE DELAY. REMEMBER THAT SUBJ HAS JUST MADE AN ENORMOUS DECISION AND FACED A TURNING POINT IN HIS LIFE. SIMPLY TO MOVE THE LOCALE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY AND SIT WITH THE SAME CASE OFFICERS FULL TIME IN A SAFEHOUSE IS HARDLY WHAT HE EXPECTS. REQUEST URGENTLY THAT HEADQUARTERS PROVIDE SOME RECOGNITION TO SUBJ. AMONG ALTERNATIVES WE CAN SUGGEST ARE:
>
> A. [redacted]

[redacted] After a conference with the principal handlers he wrote:

> Both . . . were unanimous in their view that Subject was not a genuine defector. His contact with us in Geneva and subsequent defection were, according to these officers, clearly undertaken at the direction of the KGB. I was particularly interested in [one officer's] statement that he had suspected Subject from the very first meeting [redacted]

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This lasted from 2000 to 2230 and included dinner with Subject and the case officers. Conversation during this first meeting was general in nature and followed no special agenda. However, it did give me an opportunity to take Subject's measure. I started by telling Subject that I had come to form my own impressions of him as a person and an intelligence officer who desired to place his knowledge and experience at the disposal of the United States government. I added that I wished to determine for myself why Subject had come to the West, a most serious step which neither we nor Subject should underestimate in terms of its lasting effect on Subject's own life and those of his family left behind. Subject rose to this opening by first assuring me in a most fawning manner that he, as an intelligence officer, fully understood the need for a senior officer to make his own judgments on the spot. He then went on to explain his motivation for first contacting us, his reasons for defecting and his intense desire to collaborate with us in Soviet operations since he has no specialty other than intelligence. These remarks were repetitious of his original statements delivered in the same mechanical fashion, the major difference being that Subject was intensely nervous at the outset, calming down only after it appeared that I was accepting his statements at face value.

By the end of the evening I had come to the same conclusions reached by [the principal handlers]. The totality of our conclusions are treated in detail in a separate memorandum. However, in reaching them, I was beset by a sense of irritation at the KGB's obvious conviction they could pull off an operation like this successfully and by a feeling of distaste for the obvious and transparent manner in which Subject played his role.

[redacted] distaste was sufficient to overcome any interest he might otherwise have had in a recruitment opportunity suggested by Nosenko:

One other subject touched upon was the possible recruitment of [redacted] . . Subject [described] as a playboy who liked liquor and women and who could be easily blackmailed into cooperation for fear of hurting his career [redacted] I objected to the blackmail angle saying that it could cause a tremendous political flap if it backfired. Undaunted, Subject modified his position to assure us that it would not have to be "crude blackmail" in which we would have to get directly involved. I certainly got the impression that [redacted] recruitment is part of the plan and that we would succeed no matter how half-heartedly we tried.

Despite his misgivings, however, [redacted] remained convinced that the Agency must continue to dissemble:

> It will be necessary to maintain an effective degree of secrecy with regard to our knowledge of Subject's true status and our plans to try to secure from him a full confession. If Subject, or the Soviets, become aware of our intentions, we will probably be forced to act prematurely.

With these considerations in mind, he therefore renewed the commitments previously made by the principal case officer:

> I informed Subject that I was satisfied that he was genuine. Based on this and assuming his continuing "cooperation," I said we would proceed to make arrangements to bring him to the States. Second, I confirmed our agreement to pay him . . . [financial details follow].

On 12 February, consistent with the above commitments, Nosenko was flown to the Washington area and lodged in a safehouse, under close supervision of the Office of Security. Now that he was in the United States, the Agency (and the US government as a whole) found themselves faced with a seeming dilemma, much more crucial than the problems facing them while he remained abroad.

The Agency's perception of the dilemma, and the possible solutions to it, are covered in paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 7 of a memorandum written by Chief, SR and approved by Helms on 17 February 1964:

> While admitting that Subject is here on a KGB directed mission, it has been generally agreed by both us and the FBI that he still possesses valid information which we would like to obtain. At the same time, we, at least, believe that Subject must be broken at some point if we are to learn something of the full scope of the KGB plan, the timing for its execution, and the role played by others in it. In addition, we must have this information if we are to decide what countermeasures we should take in terms of counter-propaganda, modifications in our security practices, and planning for future operations against the Soviet target. Admittedly, our desire to continue debriefing to obtain additional information may conflict with the need to break Subject. Clearly, the big problem is one of timing. How long can we keep Subject, or his KGB controllers, ignorant of our awareness of this operation and how long will it take us to assemble the kind of brief we will need to initiate a hostile interrogation in conditions of maximum control?
>
> If we are to proceed along the lines indicated above we should accept in advance the premise that we will not be able to prevent Subject from evading our custody or communicating with the Soviets unless we place him under such physical restraint that it will become immediately apparent to him that we suspect him. This may not be an acceptable risk and if it is not, we should so determine right away and decide on a completely different course of action. If this is to be the case, we should agree to forego additional debriefings, place Subject in escape-proof quarters away from the Washington area under full-time guard and commence hostile debriefing on the basis of the material we already have (although the prospects for success would not be great). Disposal would probably be via Berlin followed by a brief press

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release to the effect that Subject had confessed to being a plant and had been allowed to return to Soviet control. [In the meantime, SR Division would:]

--Advise Subject that during this phase he will continue to live and work in the safehouse and will be escorted at all times when on shopping trips, visits to movies, etc., because of his faulty English and unfamiliarity with the country, customs, etc. While we can explain this regime as needed for his security, we cannot keep him locked up in the house 24 hours a day.

[redacted]

--Make available to Subject a portion of the [money] promised him which he can use for purchases of clothes, cigarettes, personal effects, etc.

--Agree that whenever this first phase is over (four to six weeks) that he be permitted to take a two-week vacation with escort.

The vacation period will be of greater benefit to us since it will provide us with an opportunity to review and make judgments on the value of the information already obtained and also to consider the progress made in the other aspects of the case outlined below. During the vacation we can decide whether we should proceed to the second phase or are ready to commence hostile interrogation under controlled conditions. If it is the former, we will have to reckon with the need to modify the living and working arrangements for Subject in a way which will inevitably give him some additional freedom.

[redacted] efore, it

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will be terribly important to make the proper decision at the end of phase one.

This decision will depend not only on our evaluation of the material obtained during the debriefings but on how far we have been able to go in clarifying other cases which are related to Subject case and form an important part of any explanation of the KGB's goals in this operation.

Thus, Nosenko was surrounded from the first with ambivalence and uncertainty. On the one hand, he was housed in circumstances that his principal day-to-day handler describes as "our typical, luxurious style . . . " He continues by saying that "there was all the food and drink one could possibly want . . . I remember all of the effort and the money we spent to get a billiard table . . . " On the other hand, this handler, who was assigned to this case after having worked on the Golitsyn affair, was told at the outset that Nosenko was "dirty, that he had been sent by the KGB . . . "

[redacted]



A week later, on 20 February, however, the handler reported more favorable impressions, those of the Office of Security personnel assigned to guard Nosenko at the safehouse:

> Subject is not at all concerned about his own security or the threat of assassination or kidnapping. He seems to think the present security system is fine . . . [This was in marked contrast to Golitsyn's behavior.]
>
> Subject is not a heavy drinker and is never "under the influence" . . .
>
> Subject is not a heavy smoker . . .
>
> At mealtime Subject sits at the dining table with the guards and acts as if he is one of the boys. He does not sit at the head of the table but to the side. He always offers the

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boys a drink, asks them to take more food, and kids them . . .

He does not play cards, has shown no interest in chess, and has not mentioned checkers. He does not gamble and doesn't seem to have any hobby or inside activity to keep himself busy. He has shown a desire to play pool . . .

Subject does not say anything for or against the USSR or the Communist Party. Even when viewing the Olympics on TV Subject never once commented on how good the Soviets were and how poor a showing the Americans made. The same could not be said for . . . [Golitsyn] . . . On the contrary Subject wants to be an American as soon as possible.

Subject's sexual desires appear to be normal . . .

[redacted]

Subject has not commented one way or another, for or against, any person associated with him, including the housekeepers. Compared with other cases he is ideal. He is polite, likes to kid, doesn't have a drinking problem, doesn't have a mental problem, and wants to become an American and work like and with Americans as soon as possible.

Subject became angry only once and even then it was not a loss of temper in the true sense. The day that [the principal case officer] discussed the schedule with him, Subject became moody and started to drink alone. He told the guards that he wants to use his brains and work hard as Americans do. He feels that the present schedule does not utilize his talent to the fullest.

The "schedule" referred to above had been outlined to Nosenko in a 17 February meeting, during which the principal case officer had assured him that "both [Chief, SR] and myself are enthusiastically optimistic about

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future cooperation with him in operations against the USSR." Nosenko greeted plans for a period devoted to systematic debriefing with the statement that this "might represent an attempt to extract all his information from him, after which he would not be needed." He also said he needed a vacation at "an early date in order to help him forget and get over the strain and worry of his abrupt change of situation, particularly the strain of leaving his family behind."

E. The Problem of Disposition

Far from being optimistic about our "cooperation" with Nosenko, SR Division was discussing the possibility of forcibly returning him to the Soviets if the "overall effort to break him" came to naught. In addition, an alternative plan was being developed for the incarceration of Nosenko, so that "there can be no question of [his] escaping after he becomes aware of our attitude." Finally, it was agreed that Golitsyn, who had meanwhile recognized Nosenko as the author of the ostensible "anonymous letter" of 26 June 1962, would be brought into the operation to back up our interrogation. Helms originally had some misgivings about this procedure but appears eventually to have agreed to giving Golitsyn "full access" to material from Nosenko, but not to Nosenko himself.

The FBI viewed Nosenko much more favorably than did CIA. As early as 8 February 1964, Chief, CI had sent a cable reading in part:

> . . . [FBI liaison officer] STATED . . . THAT FRIEND OF HIS WHO IS EXPERT IN FBI QUICKLY SCANNED [redacted] PRODUCTION AND CAUTIONED US THAT "IT LOOKS VERY GOOD" IN TERMS OF CASES KNOWN TO THEM.

Later, in a memorandum to Helms on 9 March, Chief, SR stated that "the FBI personnel on the case have so far indicated they believe Subject to be a genuine KGB defector." By implication, both Chief, SR and Chief, CI regarded this divergence of view as a serious problem. Their concern is understandable, because a subsequent paragraph of the Chief, SR memorandum contained plans for the following action, to be initiated around 1 April

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1964, which would not be appropriate if CIA were forced, as a result of inter-agency consultations, to treat Nosenko as a bona fide defector:

a. Subject to be moved to a high security safehouse under maximum guard.

b. The DCI to inform the President, Secretary of State, Director, FBI, and USIB principals that Subject is a KGB plant whom we intend to return to Soviet control after (1) trying to break him, and (2) publicizing his case.

c. Retain Subject incommunicado for about three weeks during which time we will continue efforts to break him.

d. At the same time, commence the publicity campaign which will precede Subject's deportation. As a first step, there will be a brief official announcement probably by a State Department spokesman to the effect that Subject has confessed to having faked his defection at KGB direction in order (1) to penetrate US intelligence and security agencies, and (2) to discredit the act of defection by Soviet citizens. At the same time, a press backgrounder will be made available which will characterize this KGB operation as an act of desperation following a decade of defection and disloyalty to the regime on the part of a score of senior Soviet intelligence officers . . .

F. Erratic Behavior and Its Aftermath

While planning was going on for his confinement and hostile interrogation, Nosenko was taken on a trip for two weeks' relaxation, beginning on 17 March [redacted]

The handler who spent the first part of the vacation with Nosenko recorded these impressions:

[redacted]

> Despite our oral arguments and the various incidents we experienced, Subject and I parted on the best of terms. He gave me an affectionate embrace on the night of my departure, and in front of [the principal case officer] thanked me for my attention to his needs and patience in dealing with him. We agreed to see each other upon his return to Washington.

During the last half of the vacation, the principal case officer arrived and took charge of the escort team. Nosenko was more restrained in his presence than he had been previously, but the principal case officer had no success in eliciting information from him during this period.

[redacted]

On 30 March 1964, Chief, SR wrote a memorandum to Helms entitled "Final Phase Planning," which Helms initialed and returned without written comment. Inter alia, Chief, SR had this to say:

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PAGES 30 THROUGH 64 WITHHELD IN THEIR ENTIRETY.

[redacted]

L. Inter-Agency Disagreement

Meanwhile, enormous effort went into preparation of SB Division's "final report" on the case. This document [redacted] was described by Chief, SB as follows:

> [It] will reflect all o[redacted] statements concerning his personal life, alleged KGB career and other matters as well as subsequent contradictions or denials of earlier statements plus the results of our investigations at home and abroad of these statements. [redacted] This factual portion will be followed by analysis and conclusions. The latter will be absolutely unequivocal on these points:
>
> a. [redacted] is a dispatched KGB agent whose contact with us and ultimate defection were carried out at KGB direction.

b. [redacted] claim to service in the KGB was an integral and vital part of his KGB agent mission, forming as it did the basis for all that he has had to say about KGB operations and personnel. Yet, the results of our interrogations of [redacted] supported by polygraph examination demonstrate conclusively that [redacted] did not and could not have served in any of the specific staff positions he has described.

c. Whatever the ultimate goals of this KGB operation might be, it has been possible to determine that among the most significant KGB aims in directing [redacted] to us were:

[redacted]

Preparation of the report was somewhat complicated by disagreements between CIA and the FBI, as well as between SB Division and CI Staff within the Agency. The intra-CIA disagreement stemmed from differing views on the validity of Golitsyn information. Whereas SB Division insisted that Nosenko, during his KGB career, had never "served in any of the specific staff positions he has described," Golitsyn had in some respects supported Nosenko's claims regarding his KGB service. After a conference with Chief, CI, the Chief, SR summed up the problem on 29 March:

> Chief, CI said that he did not see how we could submit a Final Report to the Bureau if it contained suggestions that Golitsyn had lied to us about certain aspects of Nosenko's past. He

recalled that [redacted] Chief, CI went on to say that if we submitted to the FBI a report on Nosenko in the form we now have it, it would most certainly cause us difficulties. It might cause us to lose whatever impact our report would be able to make on the overall question of Nosenko's bona fides . . .

The disagreements between the Agency and the FBI were never to be resolved as long as Nosenko remained within the jurisdiction of the SB Division and the CI Staff. Within house, Chief, SR and Chief, CI eventually papered over their differences sufficiently to publish a second, compromise report on the Nosenko case in February 1968. But by then the case had been taken out of their hands, and the report was a dead letter even before it went to press.

M. Voices of Dissent

Meanwhile, although the top leadership of SR Division remained unassailably certain of its thesis regarding Nosenko as a KGB-dispatched agent, there was some dissent at the lower levels. Manifestations of disagreement were not well received by the leadership, however, and thus had no effect on the handling of the case. A former member of SR/CI remembers that it was sometimes possible to discuss alternative ways of presenting very specific points in preparing the written case against Nosenko (which was eventually to become the so-called "thousand-page paper"), but no qualification of the basic thesis was tolerated.

The first recorded dissent, therefore, came from outside SR Division, and it was a tentative one. A senior Plans Directorate psychologist had been asked to interview Nosenko in depth, which he did during a series of meetings between 3 and 21 May 1965. As a result of his questioning, he became convinced that at the very least Nosenko was in fact Nosenko. Even this rather

bland assertion, however, was met by Chief, SR with the statement, "there are things in this case that you do not know about." Nonetheless, in summing up the sessions, the psychologist had this to say:



The psychologist claims now that he had more doubts about the validity of the SR view of Nosenko than he felt it wise to express. The following excerpt from a memorandum of conversation, dated 4 August 1976, gives his memory of the situation facing him:

> In discussing his lengthy series of interviews with Nosenko on 3-21 May 1965, [the psychologist] said that he was very hesitant

to express the full extent of his doubts about the theory that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent. The reason for his hesitation was that, when [Chief, SR] got a hint of [the psychologist's] doubts about the theory, [Chief, SR] told [the psychologist] that such doubts might make [the psychologist] suspect of himself being involved in the KGB/Nosenko plan.

There is no evidence in the files to indicate that the psychologist's doubts were accorded any impartial consideration. Chief, SR, in a 15 June 1965 memorandum to Helms (who was by then DDCI, but still riding herd on the case), described the interviews as "unrewarding in terms of producing new information or insights . . . It was obvious that Subject had given some thought . . . to improving and smoothing over some of the rougher spots in his story."

By the end of 1965, there were others in SR Division who doubted the thesis, and one of them was willing to risk his career by putting his thoughts on paper in a 31-page memorandum to Chief, SR commenting on a "sterile" version of SR/CI's "notebook" documenting the case against Nosenko. It began:

Introduction

At your request, I have read the basic Nosenko notebook and I hope you will honor my right to dissent. I find the evidence that Nosenko is a bona fide defector far more convincing than the evidence used in the notebook to condemn him as a KGB agent.

It is because I am concerned about the serious ramifications of a wrong verdict that I wish to set forth my dissenting views in considerable detail. If the present verdict of "guilty" is right I believe there must be satisfactory answers to the questions raised herein; if it is wrong--as I believe it is--it should be rectified as soon as possible.

Intelligence Production

There are several references in the Nosenko notebook to the extent and quality of the intelligence

he provided. In the 25 March 1964 memo to DDP, it is asserted that "A comparison of his positive intelligence with that of other Soviet Bloc intelligence officers with whom we have had an operational relationship shows that all of them were consistently better able to provide useful positive intelligence than has been Nosenko." Tab D of this same memo states "His positive intelligence production is practically nil," and later: "Viewed overall, however, Nosenko's positive intelligence production has been so meager for a man of his background, training and position as to case doubts on his bona fides, without reference to other criteria." All of these statements are incorrect.

The three persons in the Clandestine Services with the background and experience to make such a judgment regarding Nosenko's production and access agree that they are incorrect. No KGB officer has been able to provide more useful intelligence than Nosenko has; experience has shown that intelligence usefulness of KGB officers in general is "practically nil." Golitsyn's was nil. Viewed in the proper context, therefore, Nosenko's intelligence production cannot be used in his defense, but neither can it be said honestly to cast any doubt whatsoever on his bona fides. In the realm of substance, judgment regarding his bona fides must therefore be made on the basis of his counterintelligence information.

Counterintelligence Production

The ultimate conclusions about Nosenko's bona fides, as of March 1964 DDP memo and others indicate, must be based on his production--how much did he hurt the Soviets. I believe that the evidence shows that he has damaged the Soviet intelligence effort more than all other KGB defectors combined.

Chief, SR later wrote:

I have read this document and am of mixed minds. First, it shows clearly that the so-called

"sterile" book in the hands of a person with none of the other background on other cases or appreciation of the penetration problems affecting us and the FBI can be a very damaging document. I question seriously whether we should make it available to others in its present form. Second, the book's weaknesses are principally its language and the fact that it was made up of memos from various periods and as our evaluation matured, or we developed additional information, the tone of the subsequent memos changed but the reader can suggest our approach has been superficial or inconsistent. Third, we cannot make the book available unless we are prepared to deal with the totality or near totality of the picture. Fourth, if a book is to be used at all in briefing individuals, it should be re-written and questions of the kind posed by this . . . paper trrated [sic] no matter how irritating we find them to be. If one person has this view, others might at some point . . .

In replying to Chief, SR, another SR officer also attempted to take a balanced view:

The paper suffers from many faults. These include bias, intellectual arrogance, and lack of CI background. Needless to say, the conclusions are false. Nevertheless, I found it to be a useful paper, and I think that we would be wise to treat it seriously, because it does highlight some problems which we have all been aware of for some time.

It is inevitable, I suppose, that all of us [redacted] will feel personally attacked by many of the uninformed judgments and intemperate comments contained in [this] paper. I urge that we all strive to overcome the temptation to reply in kind. Despite the paper's shortcomings, [redacted]

[redacted]

When the author of the dissenting paper wrote to Helms on 4 April 1966, he included the following comments:

[redacted]

Not long thereafter, Helms called the author by phone and told him he was having a great deal of trouble with the Nosenko case. He said that he was therefore going to turn it over to the DDCI, who he hoped could get to the bottom of it for him. Helms also asked the author if he would agree to Helms' passing his paper to an Agency psychologist. A few days later, Helms again called the author by phone and asked if he would agree to his paper's being passed to both the DDCI and the Director of Security.

N. Helms Takes Control

With the third anniversary of Nosenko's confinement drawing near, no resolution of the case was yet in sight. The FBI continued to take what Chief, SB described as a "neutral position" in regard to Nosenko.

The conflicting views of the various interested parties are not sufficiently relevant to the purposes of this study to require a detailed coverage. What is relevant is the fact that the stand-off increased Helms' impatience with continued delay. He therefore initiated a number of measures that gradually took handling of the entire Nosenko matter out of the hands of the SB Division. The first of these measures was to instruct the DDCI to undertake a thorough study of the Nosenko case.

When debriefed regarding the Nosenko case on 21 September 1976, the former DDCI remembered his involvement as follows:

DDCI: I became concerned as a result of Dick Helms [saying] that there was a matter that worried him very deeply, that needed resolution, that he doubted that there was enough objectivity amongst the people in the Agency who handled it so far to arrive at any kind of a really objective solution to the problem, and it was very sensitive indeed, would I please look into it and let him know my conclusions. Then he went on to tell me about Nosenko, the defector, who was at that time incarcerated . . . And he mentioned that there was a dichotomy of views in the DDP as to whether Nosenko was a bona fide defector or whether he had been sent on a mission, and that in any case he, Helms, felt that it was wrong to keep him confined and we had to do something with him one way or the other.

Q: He said that it was wrong to keep him confined?

DDCI: Yes, he was really distressed about the fact that this fellow had been in confinement so long and that they had never been able to arrive at a conclusion as to whether he was a bona fide or whether he was a plant, and he just had to get it resolved and something had to be done to get this fellow in a . . . oh, I've forgotten just how he put it,

but in a more acceptable position. So, I said, yes, I would undertake this job and I sent for all the background papers on it and studied them first. Then I interviewed [Chief, CI and Chief, SB] and arrived at the conclusion . . . I think I talked to some other people in the Soviet Division of the DDP also, but I arrived at the conclusion that people had their feet so mired in concrete of opinion as to one side or the other of the case, that it was just damned near impossible to get any worthwhile information out of interviews. And I then wrote a memorandum to Helms in which I indicated that I had, after reviewing the . . . making a preliminary review of the case, that I had considerable doubt that Nosenko was a plant; if so, I couldn't figure out what he was planted for. Nor could I get out of anybody else what he was supposed . . . what his mission was supposed to be, even in their hypothesis . . .

. . . My second memorandum to Helms was to the effect that, whatever the case, I didn't believe that Nosenko was any threat whatsoever to the Agency, that he ought to be rehabilitated, and I got a free hand from Helms to go ahead with the idea of rehabilitating him. And [the Director of Security] then had him moved . . .

Q: Well, do you remember anything about Dick Helms' reactions to your recommendations?

DDCI: He seemed rather pleased with the information. I got the impression from discussing the case with him that he never had been able to get what he felt was a really fair appraisal of it from anybody; and I got the impression that he felt at last he had a fair appraisal of it.

On 26 May 1967, the DDCI called the Director of Security to his office, and the Director of Security recorded the meeting as follows:

[The DDCI] started by asking me whether or not I had seen the eight hundred page report summarizing the Soviet Bloc Division's interrogation and exploitation of [Nosenko]. I said that I had not

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read it personally but that [a member] of my Security Research Staff was now in the process of reviewing it and commenting on selected portions of it. He then asked if I agreed with its conclusions. I told him that I did not; that it had been the consistent position of this Office that while we did not, under any circumstances, consider him bona fide, we were not convinced that he was a provocation dispatched by the KGB with a specific mission. Rather, our position has always been that there is something wrong with [Nosenko] and his story but we do not know enough in order to make a final decision.

I went on to point out to the [DDCI] that I had thought, and had so recommended on numerous occasions in the past, that it would make a lot of sense for [a member] of my Office to take over the interrogation of [Nosenko] in order to resolve several discrepancies that had always concerned us.

[The DDCI] said that he thought this was an excellent idea. He agreed with me that we had everything to gain and nothing to lose through such a course of action and that he would so recommend to the Director. I pointed out to him that one of the things that had always concerned us was that the Soviet Bloc Division had never released any verbatim transcripts covering their many interrogations of [Nosenko] and that we could make our judgment only on the basis of written summaries prepared by the Division.

Thus, acting under the DDCI's orders, the Office of Security transferred Nosenko to "a decent, respectable safehouse." SB Division was cut out of the case, as was the CI Staff.

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O. Resolution of the Case

The Office of Security took over the handling of Nosenko in October 1967. The officer in charge immediately inaugurated a rapid transition to normal living conditions. Throughout this process he found Nosenko fully cooperative. [redacted]

The following is a summary report prepared on 16 November 1967:

> Nosenko was moved to his current location on 27 October 1967 and the first interview with Nosenko occurred on 30 October. During the first interview, particularly the first hour, Nosenko was quite nervous and showed a certain reticence to talk. This condition ameliorated rapidly and it is considered that the current situation is better than could have ever been anticipated in view of the conditions of his previous confinement.
>
> Nosenko on his first day indicated his complete willingness to answer all questions and to write his answers to questions on areas of specific interest. It was determined that his English is adequate both for interview and for preparation of written material. [redacted]
>
> There does not appear to be any impairment of his memory. His current living conditions, although physically secure, are luxurious compared to those he had been in during the past three years and have resulted in a relaxation of physical tension.
>
> Definitive resolution of the complex problems in this case will require a considerable period of

time for further interviews, preparation of written material and a comparative analysis against his previous statements and information from other sources, interviews and investigation. Nosenko freely admits certain previous lies concerning a recall telegram while in Geneva and having received certain awards or decorations.

All interviews with Nosenko are recorded and transcripts of the interviews are being prepared. In addition, all written material from Nosenko is being typed with certain explanatory remarks . . . In addition, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence has been orally briefed by the Director of Security. [redacted] All of the finished material is in a form which will permit dissemination to the FBI in part or in toto when such dissemination is considered appropriate.

Work thus far with Nosenko has resulted in a clarification of certain areas of previous controversy. As an example, it is considered that there can be at this time little doubt that Nosenko was in the KGB during the approximate period which he claims to have been in the KGB. The matter of the actual positions held by Nosenko during the approximate 1953-early 1964 period is not considered adequately resolved at this time and any speculation concerning the dispatched agent aspects would be completely premature.

If even a degree of optimism is realistic, it is felt that the additional interviews and work in the Nosenko case together with a detailed comparative analysis of all information will provide a firmer basis for a final conclusion of the Nosenko problem. Nosenko has been very responsive [to] the normal consideration he is now receiving, e.g., our current work with him, and if it accomplishes nothing else, will at least condition Nosenko more favorably for whatever future action is taken relative to his disposition.

This questioning of Nosenko was paralleled by a separate investigation conducted by the FBI. Results were covered in two reports published at about the same time, the FBI's on 20 September 1968 and the CIA Office of Security's on 1 October 1968.

The essence of the Office of Security's findings was expressed in a covering memorandum to the Director of Security:

> In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that Nosenko is the person he claims to be, that he held his claimed positions in the KGB during 1953-January 1964, that Nosenko was not dispatched by the KGB, and that his previous lies and exaggerations are not actually of material significance at this time.

The conclusions of the FBI report were more sweeping:

> 1. The current interrogations and collateral inquiries have established a number of significant omissions and inaccuracies in the February 1968 CIA paper and have invalidated the vast majority of conclusions on which that paper relied to discredit Nosenko.

2. [redacted]

3. [redacted]

*Reference is being made by the FBI to the polygraph examination of Nosenko performed by CIA between 2 and 6 August 1968 as part of the interrogation undertaken by the Office of Security.

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. [redacted]

Despite the above findings, the CI Staff never gave up its contention that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent. On 31 January 1969, the CI Staff argued that to accept Nosenko's bona fides meant repudiating Golitsyn, "the only proven reliable source about the KGB for a period of time which appears to be vital to both Nosenko and CIA."

An undated memorandum written by the Office of Security officer in charge of Nosenko essentially brings this chronicle to a close:

> Since April 1969, Nosenko has had his own private residence and since June 1969, his own automobile. Even prior to April 1969, Nosenko could have, if he chose to do so, acted in a way seriously adverse to the best interests of this Agency since control was not of such a nature as to preclude independent action by Nosenko.
>
> It is the opinion of Agency representatives in regular contact with Nosenko that he is genuinely interested in maintaining the anonymity of his current identity, that is, not becoming publicly known as identical to Nosenko [redacted] however, he has on numerous occasions indicated his interest in participating under the Nosenko identity in some action or

activity which would "hurt the KGB." Nosenko considers that he has certain capabilities and knowledge which could be useful in the effort of the United States government against the KGB. This interest has not been associated with any particular curiosity in regard to the activities of this Agency . . .

Nosenko has consistently expressed his deep interest in obtaining United States citizenship as soon as possible. He realizes that under normal circumstances, citizenship could not be obtained until February 1974, but also is aware that citizenship can be obtained in less than the normal waiting period by legislative action.

Nosenko is considered by Agency personnel and FBI personnel in contact with Nosenko to have made an unusual adaptation to American life. He lives like a normal American and has an obvious pride in his home and personal effects. His home life from all appearances is quite calm. The fluency of Nosenko in the English language has greatly increased and there is no difficulty in understanding Nosenko or in his ability to express his thoughts. Obviously his accent and occasional incorrect sentence structure (and misspelling of words) has not been eliminated and probably will never be entirely eliminated.

Nosenko continues to complete work assignments expeditiously and with interest. As indicated above, Nosenko is very interested in doing "something active" which is understandable. Full consideration should be given to this interest since if properly controlled and channeled, could be used in a way adverse to the best interest of the KGB.

Nosenko has since become a United Stated citizen, has married an American woman, continues to lead a normal life, and works productively for the CIA.

CHAPTER IV

Nosenko's Contribution: A Summary Evaluation

Any attempt to assess Nosenko's value to the US government must begin by pointing out that he might well have been able to contribute more had he been permitted to do so. Unfortunately, we were unwilling to give serious consideration to his stated desire to assist us in making recruitments of Soviet officials; we discounted Nosenko's suggestions along this line as possibly part of a plan to embarrass the US government. There is no telling what potential recruitment targets might have emerged had we, soon after Nosenko's defection, briefed him with such targets in view.

In this part of our study, we therefore confine ourselves to a summary of the contributions that, despite considerable odds, Nosenko was able to make. Let us take them, very briefly, one by one.

A. Information on KGB Personnel

The Office of Security's 1968 report summed up Nosenko's contribution in this field as follows:



B. KGB Recruitment Efforts Against US Citizens

Most of Nosenko's own operational experience with the KGB involved efforts against US citizens, either visitors to the USSR or members of the US embassy in Moscow. As a result of this background, Nosenko was able to provide [redacted] identifications of, or leads to, Americans in whom the KGB had displayed some interest.

Some of the KGB operational efforts culminated in "recruitments" that, according to Nosenko, were more statistical than real; the KGB played the numbers game, for purposes of year-end reporting. Nonetheless, Nosenko's reporting did result in the uncovering of certain US citizens genuinely working for Soviet intelligence:



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[redacted]

C. Moscow Microphones

In 1962, Golitsyn had in general terms reported on the existence of microphones in the US embassy in Moscow. This information was promptly sent to the Department of State, but no action was taken; lack of specificity was cited as one of the reasons. It was not until Nosenko's more detailed information was communicated to the Department of State in March and June 1964 that action was taken that led to the uncovering of a system of 52 microphones, beginning in April of that year. Of the microphones found, 42 were active at the time of discovery. These microphones covered most of the offices in the embassy most significant from the Soviet standpoint.

D. [redacted]

Nosenko, in June 1962, told us the KGB had an agent in [redacted] Though this information eventually contributed to the arrest and conviction of [redacted] CIA for some time tended to give Golitsyn credit for this success.

[redacted]

E. Leads to Foreign Nationals

Altogether, Nosenko is estimated to have provided [redacted] identifications of, or leads to, foreign nationals (including recruited agents) in [redacted] countries in whom the KGB had an active interest.

F. Summary Evaluation

It is not feasible, within the terms of this study, to make comparisons between Nosenko's counterintelligence production and that of other similarly qualified defectors. Enough has been said, however, to demonstrate on an absolute basis that, both in terms of quantity and quality of information, Nosenko's contribution was of great value to the US government.

PAGES 86 THROUGH 101 WITHHELD IN THEIR ENTIRETY.



Functions of a KGB Deputy Section Chief: Within this framework, an understanding of the functions and responsibilities of any deputy chief of section in the KGB is important. The following description of this position has been confirmed by Deryabin, Rastvorov, Golitsyn, Goleniewski, and even in large part by Nosenko when speaking in general terms:

a. He must be broadly informed on the section's operations and individual case officer duties in order to act in the chief's absence, when he assumes responsibility for the entire section's work.

b. He approves and retains monthly schedules for planned use of safehouses by the section.

c. He discusses agent meeting schedules with individual case officers and approves and then retains a list of planned agent meetings for each case officer on a monthly basis.

d. He approves the acquisition of new agents and new safehouses and their transfer from one operation to another.

e. He usually maintains liaison with other KGB units on matters related to the section's target.

f. Based on file reviews and discussions with individual case officers, he assigns priorities for the operations that each case officer handles.

g. He reviews and approves by signature the periodic written reports, general operational plans of the section, periodic section progress reports, and specific operational proposals of individual case officers which are required by the KGB. If the department [sic--meant to read "section"] chief signs these papers, the deputy chief still reads them in order to keep himself informed on the section's activity.

h. He assigns priorities for processing microphone material and telephone taps, for selecting targets for surveillance, etc.

i. He participates directly in important operational activities and is often in contact with agents or agent prospects. As a senior officer responsible for the section's operations, he or the section chief are almost invariably present during the compromise and recruitment of important target individuals. He periodically participates in control meetings with the section's agents in order to check on the development of individual operations and case officer's performance.

Hostile interrogations in January 1965 produced a different picture. Nosenko said that, as deputy section chief, his principal responsibility was to supervise operational activity against American embassy code clerks. [redacted]

As for other aspects of his "job description," Nosenko said simply that he did whatever his chief told him to do, and, while he granted that he did from time to time perform some of the tasks outlined above, he denied that he had any such fixed administrative responsibilities. He contended that the other officers in the section were not children and did not require that Nosenko teach them what to do and how to do it.

The outline of the duties of a "deputy chief" was erroneous, because it was based on a misinterpretation of the Russian word zamestitel, the term Nosenko applied to himself when speaking his native language. When the meaning of this terms was researched in 1968, a clear distinction was drawn between the American and Soviet conceptions of a "deputy":

> "Zamestitel," or "Deputy," in Soviet bureaucratic practice and usage is not limited to denoting what we think of as the number 2 in the office, but rather is a broader term which can perhaps most accurately be rendered in English as "assistant." Soviet offices, at least at the higher levels, commonly have several "Deputies"; some may have five or six or even more. In keeping with this multiplicity, the Soviet term does not carry with it the same sense of responsibility and authority paralleling the Chief and of automatic replacement as the American term. The Soviet position of "Deputy" is probably not as intimately associated with a specific slot as is the American position of Deputy, if indeed it is so associated at all.

In addition, the outline of a "deputy chief's" duties can be considered tendentious because it was designed to establish a criterion of knowledgeability that Nosenko clearly did not meet. Had the principal case officer examined the validity of the criterion more closely, he could easily have determined for himself that it was unrealistic.

How misleading the Agency's misconceptions could be was also brought out in a paper written by certain SB

Division officers in January 1969. The following excerpt is instructive:

[Officer No. 1]

[redacted]

[Officer No. 2]

[redacted]

[redacted]

F. The A Priori Assumption of Disinformation as Applied to the Popov and Related Cases

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a retrospective analysis of the Popov case and the involvement of Nosenko therein.

SECRET

1. Prologue

It is ironic that both Nosenko and Golitsyn should have become so involved in the retrospective analysis of the Popov case, because neither knew a great deal about it. Perhaps they would not have become thus involved had it not been for the disinformation hypothesis.

Some time after 19 June 1962 the principal case officer was given access to tape transcripts of debriefings of Anatoliy Golitsyn, the KGB officer who had defected in Helsinki in December 1961. [redacted]

In a memorandum written by the principal case officer dated 27 June 1962, the day after his interview with Golitsyn, he set forth his views on "Possible Control of [Nosenko]." He opened with a statement: "Detailed study of [Golitsyn's] production in the light of [Nosenko's] has suggested the possibility that [Nosenko] may be part of a major Soviet disinformation operation . . . "

2. Implications of the Popov Case

Unfortunately for Nosenko he had, at the end of his first meeting with the principal case officer in 1962, said, "Tomorrow, I'll tell you how Popov was caught." Feelings ran high over this case, [redacted]

Petr Popov was a CIA source within the GRU from [redacted] October 1959, when the KGB rolled up the operation in Moscow. He was the most important Soviet source CIA had ever had until the advent of Penkovskiy in 1961. Therefore, any information Nosenko might have on how the KGB had learned of Popov's clandestine cooperation with CIA was of great interest.

In Nosenko's discussion of Popov's compromise, he explained that, in January 1959, the KGB had had

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under surveillance a member of the American embassy in Moscow who, they were certain, was a CIA officer- [redacted] When they observed this man, [redacted] clandestinely mailing a letter in Moscow, the KGB intercepted the letter, found that it was addressed to Petr Popov, and came to realize that this Soviet was working for CIA. He was arrested soon thereafter and sent under KGB direction to make several clandestine meetings with another CIA officer, Russell Langelle. Finally in October 1959 the KGB apprehended Langelle immediately after such a meeting, with material in his possession just received from Popov. The Popov case was over.

Enter Golitsyn. Originally, his information concerning the Popov case had been slight. As of the time of his defection in 1961, he knew or believed only that:

a. There had been an agent leaking Soviet military, political and intelligence information to the US.

b. When CIA officer Russell Langelle was assigned to Moscow, he was going there to handle "a special agent or mission . . . "

c. Surveillance of Langelle in Moscow then led the KGB to Popov.

Nosenko, for his part, said much the same thing but added that the KGB had been led to Langelle through their surveillance of another CIA officer in Moscow, [redacted] Unfortunately, to the principal case officer no statement meant what it purported to mean. Under Golitsyn's influence, his doubts concerning Nosenko's bona fides led to [redacted] By the time this June 1962 memorandum was written, the principal case officer had decided that the story of the Popov compromise given by Nosenko was the primary area to determine whether CIA itself had been penetrated by the KGB.

Golitsyn's 1962 reporting on how Popov was compromised, i.e., identified by name through KGB surveillance of Langelle in Moscow in 1959, varied from Nosenko's story only in the name of the officer surveilled. The Golitsyn report was actually completely omitted from a 17 April 1963 memorandum. (Why this omission passed unnoticed is not explained in any records in this case.) Yet when Golitsyn gave a completely different story of the compromise in June 1964, after he had read all the Popov case materials, this story became the Golitsyn gospel and has remained so to this day in Golitsyn's argumentation. We shall come to Golitsyn's 1964 version shortly, but first some additional background is needed.



Kislov, Nosenko had told CIA in 1962, was his friend in the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva with whom Nosenko had gotten drunk on several occasions. Asked if Kislov was also a KGB officer, Nosenko specifically denied that he was.

PAGE 110 WITHHELD IN ITS ENTIRETY.

3. Impact of Penkovskiy's Arrest on "Popov Compromise Theory"

Without our going into details on the Penkovskiy case, it is important to know that in October 1962, only four months after the first Nosenko meetings, the KGB dramatically announced the arrest of another penetration of the GRU--Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy. This was yet another blow to CIA, even more serious than the Popov arrest, and a great deal of worried thought was given to the cause of Penkovskiy's exposure.

Penkovskiy's arrest heightened the suspicions within CIA--especially Soviet Russian Division--that there must be a KGB penetration of CIA for two such calamities to have occurred within three years.



4. Golitsyn's 1964 Story

In June 1964, while commenting on Nosenko's version of the Popov compromise, Golitsyn stated that the KGB report he had referred to in 1962 stated that the KGB did not consider running Popov as a double because he could not be trusted. He then went on to give a completely new story of the Popov compromise, diametrically opposite to his original information.

Golitsyn stated then that a certain Kotov (first name not given), who had been in the KGB in Vienna during the period Popov was there, suspected Popov of being a Western agent and made known his suspicions. At the time, no action was taken by Kotov's superiors. In 1957 or 1958, however, when the KGB received similar information from another source, Kotov was sent to Germany because he knew Popov and was familiar with his background. (Contrary to his 1962 report, Golitsyn here implied strongly that Popov, by name, was identified

by the KGB as a CIA agent in Berlin in 1957 or 1958.) Golitsyn's 1964 story must be evaluated within the framework of the facts that follow.

On 21 November 1963, Chief, SR recorded the passage to Golitsyn, through the CI Staff, of all materials passed to CIA by Popov, including English language transcripts of all operational meetings held with Popov [redacted] Thus, by the time Golitsyn was commenting on Nosenko's version of the Popov compromise in June 1964, he had become aware of everything Popov had told CIA, specifically what was going on in [redacted] In view of the fact that Golitsyn's story in June 1964 varied drastically from that he had told in March 1962, it is legitimate to suspect that he had recreated a story of Popov's compromise based on deductions he had made after reading the Popov transcripts. Thus, the 1964 decision must be thrown out of court.

5. The Hypothesis that CIA was Penetrated

Unfortunately for the course of events in the Nosenko case, it was Golitsyn's 1962 version that was ignored in favor of his "facts" of 1964, which condemned Nosenko's story as strongly as his 1962 version had supported Nosenko. The reason for this is obvious. The Popov compromise hypothesis had been feeding on itself for so long that it had come to be treated as fact, with the result that the subject of Popov's compromise became a kind of litmus paper test of every Soviet source. If a Soviet source reporting to CIA on Popov agreed with Nosenko that KGB surveillance, rather than a KGB agent--a penetration of CIA--had compromised Popov, then that Soviet source was held to be a part of an ever-growing massive KGB conspiracy to protect penetration(s) of CIA. By further extension, Nosenko's failure to produce evidence that Popov and Penkovskiy had been

compromised by a KGB penetration of CIA was interpreted as proof that indeed such a penetration must exist.

The acceptance of Golitsyn's story in turn guaranteed not only that Nosenko could never be seen as bona fide, but also that all other Soviet sources must be considered suspect if they supported Nosenko's story. The overall result was to distort seriously for a number of years the ability of the Soviet Bloc Division accurately to evaluate the bona fides of any defector or agent.

CHAPTER VI

Dezinformatsiya: Origins of the Concept and Application in the Nosenko Case

There can be little doubt that the handling Nosenko received as a supposed dispatched agent would not have taken place precisely as it did had it not been for the Soviet intelligence practice known as dezinformatsiya. Furthermore, the timing of Nosenko's defection, some months after that of Golitsyn, the fact that Nosenko provided information on some of the same or similar persons or leads as had Golitsyn, and Golitsyn's conclusion that Nosenko had been dispatched by the KGB specifically to discredit him (Golitsyn) as part of a dezinformatsiya operation--all these factors combined to preclude "normal" professional treatment of Nosenko. As a defector, Nosenko's bona fides should have been established, or not established, on the basis of careful and sound analysis and investigation of the information he provided under standard interrogation procedures. In actuality, he came under suspicion as a KGB-controlled agent long before he presented himself as a defector, and his handling was therefore based upon this prejudgment.

Dezinformatsiya is a Soviet concept and practice of long standing that has been defined or described by numerous sources through the years. Two representative definitions are as follows:

> Petr Deryabin: Dezinformatsiya is the deliberate and purposeful dissemination of false information regarding accomplished facts and/or intentions, plans of action, etc., for the purpose of misleading the enemy. Such disseminations may be accomplished by means of the press, radio and television, agent reports and communications, operations, etc. The term also refers to the information itself.
>
> Anatoliy Golitsyn: In Soviet parlance, the term dezinformatsiya is used to denote false, incomplete, misleading information passed, fed or confirmed to opposition services for the purpose of causing these services (and their governments) to reach erroneous conclusions regarding the USSR or inducing them to undertake action beneficial to the USSR.

By means of dezinformatsiya, again according to Golitsyn, the Soviet government hopes to ensure that the policy decisions of a given country will be based on a false impression of the USSR's domestic or military posture. Specific measures taken to achieve this end might be designed to induce a foreign country to engage in costly and useless research projects, to create a misconception about or adversely affect the stature of another country in the eyes of the world, to remove by nonviolent means, such as publicly discrediting, individuals who are considered a threat to the national interests of the USSR, or to weaken or dissolve, create or strengthen certain political parties.

With regard to the definitions quoted above, Deryabin, Golitsyn and others have spoken from knowledge gained as Soviet state security officers. However, implicit in all definitions is the fact that dezinformatsiya is not an activity that is the exclusive prerogative of the security organs. It has always been carried out as a matter of government policy, as an activity that at times may involve the security organs.

Before 1959, there was no separate dezinformatsiya department within the KGB (or its predecessor organizations), although establishment of such a unit had been discussed from time to time. Each geographic component handling foreign intelligence operations was responsible for dezinformatsiya work within its own sphere of activity. All such work was carried out with the approval of higher authorities within the KGB, frequently in consultation with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and even in many instances with the specific approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It was not until 1959 that responsibility for dezinformatsiya insofar as it was to be the concern of the First (foreign intelligence) Chief Directorate of the KGB was centralized within that unit, and not until 1961 that the concept of dezinformatsiya played any significant role in the thinking of CIA counterintelligence officers.

The dezinformatsiya concept was first highlighted for CIA by the senior Polish UB officer, Michal Goleniewski, who [redacted] while under interrogation following his defection in January 1961. The information he provided was of major significance, as he had dealt with the KGB on the subject of dezinformatsiya from as early as 1953 and was in fact not only a ranking Polish intelligence officer but also a KGB agent. While Goleniewski was not the first source to refer to dezinformatsiya, he was the first to bring it to

CIA consciousness as a technique to be reckoned with in our analysis of the USSR's foreign policy. It was his claim that the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence services played a major role in the implementation of such policies.

Specifically, Goleniewski provided information that was to serve as the basis for premises as to what the KGB would do upon learning of the defection of a KGB officer. Goleniewski stated that one of the many objectives of KGB dezinformatsiya was the protection of Soviet agents by means of action designed to mislead Western security services. He listed among specific objectives and types of dezinformatsiya operations those designed to confirm unimportant true information, thus establishing in the eyes of the opposition the reliability of a channel through which the KGB passes misleading information to anti-Soviet governments.

Conversely, another type of dezinformatsiya operation might be designed to discredit accurate information of significance received by the opposition through sources not under Soviet control, e.g., defectors, thus casting doubt on the veracity of the source or sources of this true information.

Goleniewski stated further that the information passed through dezinformatsiya channels could be based on analysis of what was already known about any sensitive items, i.e., could stem from defector damage assessments. One means obviously might be the channeling of information at variance with that provided by the defector. Another means might be the provision of "give away" material, which neither added to information already in the hands of the opposition nor, by the same token, did any particular damage to the KGB. In extreme cases, the KGB would be willing to sacrifice some of their own agent assets in the interest of enhancing the reputation of an agent penetration of one of the anti-Communist intelligence services.



In all its essentials, the information provided by Goleniewski was confirmed and elaborated upon by Golitsyn, who defected in December 1961 and who was the first significant Soviet or Soviet Bloc defector to come into CIA hands after Goleniewski. In addition to the general definition of dezinformatsiya quoted above, Golitsyn said that a KGB (or GRU) defector's file would be sent to the KGB dezinformatsiya unit; the latter would search for opportunities to exploit the situation, after review of the probable areas of information revealed to the opposition by the defector. He indicated in this connection that the Disinformation Department of the KGB maintained extensive files organized on a topical basis, containing all information on a given topic that was known (from the debriefing of defectors to the Soviets, double agents, captured agents, etc.) to be in the hands of opposition intelligence services. For example, a KGB officer assigned to Beirut to work against the American embassy who defected to CIA would be assumed by the KGB Department of Disinformation to have told CIA everything he knew about KGB operations against the embassy and embassy personnel. By reference to their files on Beirut operations, the Department of Disinformation would be able to determine the extent to which KGB operations in that area had been compromised to CIA.

On the basis of the foregoing information, it might be assumed that the Golitsyn and Nosenko defections would have received similar handling by the KGB Department of Disinformation and by CIA upon their arrival as defectors to the West. However, the two men were not similarly received by CIA when they presented themselves as defectors; they received completely different handling, based on quite different assessment of the information they provided and their motives for defecting. Golitsyn was accepted as a bona fide defector in relatively short order, while Nosenko was speedily rejected as a bona fide defector, as explained below.

Golitsyn, an officer of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, defected to CIA in Helsinki in mid-December 1961. Information that he provided relating to the organization and structure of the KGB was accepted as factual and true, at least in part because there was relatively little record information against which it could be compared, but also because the information appeared to be logical and reasonable. In addition, he provided voluminous and valuable information on KGB personalities; available CIA file holdings were limited, but the information provided by Golitsyn proved to

be accurate to the extent it could be checked against these holdings. Finally, he provided a theory of KGB operations that was not only accepted at face value but received with outright enthusiasm. Given the value of his information, plus his apparent motivation for defecting, which included an obsession with the evil inherent in the KGB and an emphatically-stated wish to "fight against the KGB," his bona fides was accepted in March 1962.

The reception accorded Nosenko, after he defected in 1964, has already been recorded in detail. That Nosenko did not receive standard treatment as a defector whose bona fides would be determined on the basis of the information he provided under interrogation after defection inevitably involves reference to Golitsyn. As explained in Chapter III, Golitsyn himself played a curious role in that, as a result of the trust placed in his judgment, he was actually encouraged to label Nosenko as a deception agent.

This situation arose as follows: During initial contacts with CIA in 1962, Nosenko provided information on personalities that was similar to that provided a few months earlier by Golitsyn. Because CIA counterintelligence officers had been warned by Goleniewski that they should not be "taken in" by false information fed to them through no matter what channels, the "duplication" or "overlapping" information given by Nosenko was viewed with extreme suspicion. This original doubt led to information provided by Nosenko being shown to Golitsyn soon after the former's defection. The paranoid Golitsyn immediately saw Nosenko as a person sent out to discredit or even assassinate him.

Thereafter, the desire of CIA counterintelligence officers not to be outwitted by the KGB led them to apply an analytical technique that has been referred to variously as "double think" or "mirror reading." This "analysis" led to the conclusion that Nosenko, as a dispatched agent, was feeding us what the KGB wanted us to believe. Thus, everything Nosenko said had to be "interpreted." If he said that the KGB had been unable to recruit any Americans serving at the US embassy in Moscow during a given period, this meant that the KGB had been quite successful in doing so. If he provided information on a given topic that we had already received from another source, this meant that the KGB wanted us to believe that particular piece of information, hence the other source undoubtedly was a KGB agent as well. And so on. Facts were discarded or ignored when they did not fit the hypothesis

that Nosenko was a dispatched agent. Any other sources whose information confirmed, tended to confirm, or dealt with any of the topics mentioned by Nosenko were regarded as "contaminated"--that is to say, they were considered part of the same dezinformatsiya plot in which Nosenko figured.

Golitsyn played a major role in this "analytical process." As soon as Nosenko's defection became public, Golitsyn asked whether he could participate in Nosenko's interrogation. As of 20 February 1964 the DDP had agreed that Golitsyn should be brought into the operation and given full access to the "Nosenko material." The reasoning at this time, given Golitsyn's identification of Nosenko's function as a false defector, was that the Nosenko operation was "the reverse of the Golitsyn coin" and thus that Golitsyn's assistance was required to pursue it properly. Accordingly, over the next several months Golitsyn was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with Nosenko and at his request was supplied with all available biographic data on Nosenko to assist him in "analyzing" the operation.

On 29 June 1964 Golitsyn was interviewed by Chief, CI Staff, Deputy Chief, CI Staff and Chief, SR Division. The following is quoted from the transcripts of this meeting:

> Golitsyn: I have made a study of the documents and information which was provided to me about Nosenko and his interrogations. I would like now to make known my conclusions . . . my conclusion is that he is not a bona fide defector. He is a provocateur, who is on a mission for the KGB . . . to mislead, chief in the field of investigations . . . on Soviet penetrations made mainly by [the] Second Chief Directorate to Moscow . . . Why did they choose Nosenko for that mission? In my opinion, Nosenko was recommended by Churanov, Kovshuk and Guk* for the mission. Nosenko could have been

*Vladimir Aleksandrovich Churanov, Vladislav Mikhaylovich Kovshuk and Yuriy Ivanovich Guk. Churanov and Kovshuk were colleagues and good friends of Nosenko's in the Second Chief Directorate. Guk, also a close friend of Nosenko's, was a one-time officer of the Second Chief Directorate; he transferred to the First Chief Directorate and was posted at the Soviet Mission to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva at the time of Nosenko's temporary duty there in 1962.

named or recommended by them and the KGB gave these people a chance. They are very energetic--all of them. And, of course, they discuss things among themselves. Many of them had made mistakes--they had told too much. They were, therefore, in the damage report (on my defection) and for them the only way to act was to suggest an operation against me in order to save their face, to save the situation.

It can be argued that Golitsyn had two interests: (a) to discredit Nosenko in order to maintain a position of preeminence as advisor to CIA (and other Western intelligence services) on Soviet intelligence matters, and (b) to promote his contentions as to how the West was being deceived by the Soviet Union in political and strategic matters, and thus to enhance his position as advisor to governments on overall Soviet political matters.

Golitsyn clearly had a high opinion of himself. When he defected [redacted] which he made clear he wished to discuss with President Kennedy and the Director of Central Intelligence personally, to alert them to what was going on and to measures needing to be taken. Moreover, his willingness to cooperate with CIA and other US government agencies underwent changes from time to time, depending upon whether his demands for access to and interviews with specified ranking officials of those organizations were granted.

Golitsyn's chosen role as interpreter of Soviet policy and anti-Western actions was threatened by the arrival of Nosenko. His response was to gain access to virtually all of CIA's files on Nosenko for purposes of providing CIA with an "interpretation" of the latter's role. In any event, the idea took hold within CIA as a result of Golitsyn's hammering away at this theme that we were being "had" by the Soviets, particularly by being penetrated as a result of clever KGB counterintelligence operations, and that Nosenko had to be "broken" at all costs; his "confession" would make clear to us the details and dimensions of the Soviet machinations.

[redacted]



No attention was paid to the fact that, despite the assertions of Goleniewski and Golitsyn, there was no known case of a KGB officer's ever having been sent to discredit a previous defector in the eyes of a Western intelligence service. After brief consideration of the notion that Nosenko might not even be a member of the KGB at all, it was decided that the KGB had dispatched him to counter Golitsyn.

Conclusions

In retrospect, it seems worthwhile to point out that (a) in the years since Nosenko's first contact and subsequent defection, no information has ever been developed to substantiate the charges made against him either by Golitsyn or by the "mirror-readers"; (b) Golitsyn's information with respect to dezinformatsiya has not been internally consistent; and (c) Golitsyn himself as the architect and sponsor of theories presented has not been able to support his claims, despite the wealth of information made available to him for analysis. The following is quoted from an unsigned paper, dated 10 September 1968, in summation of Golitsyn's claims:

> Golitsyn's overall thesis, that the Soviet leadership in 1959 developed a "New Policy" (peaceful coexistence, non-violent tactics, united front, etc.) is perfectly acceptable as a statement of the "Right" strategy developed during the mid- and late-fifties and enshrined in the November 1960 Moscow Manifesto. Golitsyn's depiction of this policy as, in toto, a "misinformation" operation rests upon his extremely broad use of that term: "special deliberate efforts of the communist governments to mislead Western studies and to direct them in wrong directions" by means of official Soviet speeches and Party documents, official press and propaganda outlets, travel controls, diplomatic activities, leaks, etc. His vocabulary and general handling of this new Bloc policy gives the strategy a conspiratorial quality not justified by its essentially open and public character.
>
> The role of the KGB in the execution and coordination of this policy is constantly alluded to, but no evidence is provided to define the precise nature of its role and no actual "covert" disinformation operations are cited for the years from 1959 to the present. Golitsyn provided factual evidence for "politicalization" of the KGB in 1959, but its new role may also be interpreted to cover routine operations of covert propaganda, political action, recruitment of

agents of influence and specific "disinformation" operations without involving the KGB (or the Bloc intelligence services) in any broader role.

CHAPTER VII

Golitsyn Vs. Nosenko: A Comparison Of Their Handling By CIA

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the differences in handling by CIA of the two KGB defectors, Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuriy Nosenko. Comparison is material to this study, since it was Golitsyn's "confirmation" of certain theories regarding Nosenko as a dispatched agent that helped to establish the standards by which CIA judged Nosenko when he walked in some months after Golitsyn. It is also material, since Golitsyn played a role in CIA efforts to "break" Nosenko. Brief discussion of the treatment given the two men follows.



PAGES 124 THROUGH 134 WITHHELD IN THEIR ENTIRETY.

It seems self-evident that these two defectors should have received the same treatment, that one was as suspect as the other until completion of all appropriate processing aimed at determining bona fides.

PAGES 136 THROUGH 176 WITHHELD IN THEIR ENTIRETY

CHAPTER XI

Methodology and Leadership

A. [redacted]

We accept without question the necessity for counter-intelligence, as a category of the intelligence process concerned with the activities of hostile powers' covert and clandestine activities against the United States and our allies. But such a discipline, if it is to fulfill its purposes, must employ an orderly and systematic methodology. Unhappily, in the Nosenko case it did no such thing.

[redacted]

2. [redacted]

3. [redacted]

4. [redacted]

[redacted]

B. Influence of Chief, CI on Methodology

The predominant influence in the counterintelligence field within the Agency until 1975 was the then Chief, CI.

His reputation for expertise rested on his purportedly unique knowledge of the KGB's worldwide covert political role. In truth, no one could compete with him as an expert on this subject. His analyses, based on fragmentary and often inapplicable data, were more imaginative than systematic and therefore neither easily comprehended nor replicated by his interlocutors. But unlike the Emperor and his imaginary clothes, Chief, CI's fantasies were never vulnerable to objective examination, simply because he surrounded such data as existed with a wall of secrecy. His "facts" were available in full only to a minimum number of trusted apostles; to the rest of the intelligence community, both American and foreign, he doled them out selectively--seldom in written form--to prove whatever point he was trying to make at the time.

Chief, CI's preference for oral over written communication is worth emphasizing. [redacted]

C. [redacted]

There is an important interrelationship between counterintelligence, as it was conducted in the 1960s, and the collection of positive intelligence from human sources. Only if this relationship is spelled out can the full impact of the events we have been describing be comprehended.

At the time CIA was established, the primary mission of what was later to become the Plans Directorate's Clandestine Service was conceived to be the collection of strategically-significant intelligence from clandestine human sources. How successful was the Clandestine Service in fulfilling this mission?

Agency claims of success in the human-source collection field have often been so phrased, whether intentionally or not, as to give the impression that our achievements stemmed largely from the process called "development and recruitment."

[redacted]

D. What Went Wrong?

There are no easy or certain answers. Nonetheless, a retrospective glance at the intellectual preparation of those who led the Clandestine Service may shed light on the problem and permit the formulation of constructive recommendations for future action.

[redacted]

[redacted]

On the other hand, the best of the Service's leaders --and there were many good ones--were successful because they possessed a difficult-to-define quality called common sense. Its value should not be underestimated.

[redacted]

Nevertheless, senior Clandestine Service supervisors of the period 1948-1970 had seldom themselves been trained in rigorous analytic techniques, and thus they seldom were in a position to demand high standards of analysis of their subordinates. Until the massive outflow of retirees in recent years changed the demography of the Service, most senior operational supervisors had received their higher educations before systematized analysis became routine even in such "soft" subjects as political science (for which a knowledge of inferential statistics is now required at most universities). Many, probably most, of these same gentlemen were also educated during a sort of interregnum in academe, when the study of classical logic had passed from vogue but had not yet been replaced by emphasis on scientific method. In the realm of technology, almost all senior executives in the Clandestine Service before 1970 had finished college before the first digital computer, an invaluable analytical tool, became commercially available about 1951.

There also have been, of course, a number of bright spots.

[redacted]

[redacted]

E. Summary

If we seem to have wandered far afield from the nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko bona fides studies, we have done so because the unfortunate handling of Nosenko was not an isolated event. Rather, it was symptomatic of some fundamental inadequacies of the Plans Directorate. [redacted]

Whatever the course taken, however, we believe that the last quarter of this century is going to be even more exigent, though in a different way, than the past twenty-five years. We therefore sum up the implications of this chapter by posing a single question: How can we ensure that the upcoming generation of Clandestine Service leaders is better prepared intellectually to meet the challenges that face them than were those who ran the Service in the sixties?

CHAPTER XII

Conclusions and Recommendations

A. The Letter of Instructions

General guidance for the preparation of this report was contained in a Letter of Instructions, signed by the Deputy Director for Operations on 8 June 1976. It assigned the following tasks:

> You are tasked to write an analysis of the Nosenko case which will address the following matters:
>
> [1]. The bona fides of Nosenko.
>
> [2]. The value of Nosenko to the United States and allied governments.
>
> [3]. The relationship and significance of Nosenko to other agents and operations.
>
> [4]. The identification of unexploited Nosenko penetration leads and information.
>
> [5]. The nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko bona fides studies.

We have interpreted the above responsibilities rather liberally, because the ramifications and implications of the Nosenko case have proven more far-reaching than we, and probably the framers of the above letter, anticipated. Nonetheless, we shall commence this concluding chapter with responses to the matters covered in sub-paragraphs a. through e.

1. Bona Fides

Doubts regarding Nosenko's bona fides were of our own making. Had the job of initially assessing him as a person, as well as of gathering and evaluating the intelligence he had to offer, been handled

properly, he could have been declared a bona fide defector as readily as have many other Soviet intelligence officers.

This is not to say that we can be certain of the genuineness of any defector. It will always remain hypothetically possible that the Soviet government, acting through the KGB or some other instrumentality, will attempt to plant an intended "disinformation agent" or prospective penetration of our government on our doorstep. But the usefulness of the Soviets' doing so, in the manner ascribed to them in the Nosenko case, is probably as slight as is the feasibility. Soviet success in using native-born citizens of other countries to spy on their own homelands has been considerable. By contrast, there is no record of the USSR's succesfully infiltrating the government of a major non-Communist power by use of an acknowledged Soviet citizen, least of all one whose career has been spent in a Soviet intelligence or security service.

We therefore conclude that Nosenko was from the beginning a bona fide defector.

2. Value of Nosenko

Nosenko's contribution has been summarized in Chapter IV. He has been of great value, but he probably could have been even more valuable had he been properly handled.

3. Relationship to Other Agents and Operations

As was made clear in Chapters X and XI, the Nosenko case, through no fault of the defector himself, had a most unfortunate effect on all clandestine operations in the Soviet field.

4. Identification of Unexploited Leads

We have not felt that this subject was one we could feasibly or properly investigate. To do so would have meant delving into the past and current operations of both the SE Division and the CI Staff to ascertain the extent to which there might have

been "exploitation" of any of the [redacted] persons whom Nosenko identified by name. This would not have permitted us to accomplish this task, nor would our doing so have been consistent with the principle of compartmentation.

5. Methodology

It has been made clear in Chapter XI that the variety of techniques used in handling Nosenko did not conform to any generally accepted sense of the term "methodology."

B. Recommended Action

Most of our recommendations for action have been previously stated or implied. In the following paragraphs, we recapitulate them, with such supplementary remarks as seem necessary.

1. Examination of the Role of Professionals

We recommend that the role that can properly be played within the Agency by members of the organized professions--medicine, psychiatry, psychology, law, and others--be given careful study, within the context of (a) ensuring that the Agency puts their skills to the best possible use, and (b) refraining from involving them in matters not properly within their professional purview.

2. Improvement of Intellectual Standards

We recommend that the Operations Directorate, and its Clandestine Service, take whatever steps are possible to ensure that the intellectual caliber of their personnel is equal to the exigencies of the future.

We realize that the present personnel selection system sets high standards for those entering on duty at the professional level, particularly as regards IQ and education. But the standards presently in force do not by themselves guarantee that future selections will possess independence of mind, analytical ability, and objectivity.

In the case of personnel already on board, it should be kept in mind that we live in a rapidly-evolving, technologically-oriented civilization. Knowledge and intellectual skills adequate at this time may be inadequate a few years from now. For an intelligence organization, we define "inadequate" as anything that is less than the best.

We suggest that a board of expert consultants be established, drawn primarily from research institutions, high-technology enterprises, and the academic world to recommend a program of screening new entrants and improving the analytical skills of those already on duty, with the aim of achieving and maintaining a high level of intellectual excellence throughout the Operations Directorate.

3. Detection of Deception

We recommend that high priority be accorded a program to develop new methods of detecting deception.

[redacted]

Specific criteria of bona fides will follow naturally from improved methods of detecting deception.

4. Psychological Aspects of Defector/Agent Handling and Personnel Selection

[redacted]

[redacted]

We would thus substantially reduce the threat that the employment of unstable or anti-social personalities poses for the Agency, and particularly for the Operations Directorate.

5. Psychological Assessment of Agents and Defectors

[redacted]

Implementation of this recommendation would, if the other programs above-recommended are also carried out, contribute substantially toward authentication of agent sources and information.