SECRET/SENSITIVE

THE MONSTER PLOT:
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE CASE OF
YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

By John Hart

December 1976

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INTRODUCTION

On 5 June 1962 Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, a Soviet official temporarily assigned to Geneva, contacted an American Foreign Service Officer in a move which was eventually to lead to Nosenko's defection. This act was the first in a chain of events which is unequaled in complexity by any other Soviet operation handled by the Central Intelligence Agency since its establishment. Because the case still has important implications for the overall Soviet intelligence effort of the United States, and because it raises many basic questions about the techniques of handling Soviet agents and defectors, a reinvestigation of the case was commissioned by the Agency in June 1976. The results are embodied in this report and its annexes.

Although United States officials of many agencies, up to and including a President of the United States, were briefed on the case, and either played some role in making decisions concerning it or actively participated in running the operation, it does not now appear that, between 1962 and 1976, any single individual has ever been fully informed as to all its aspects. The complexity of this investigation therefore stems in large measure from the fact that the case has proceeded along at least two, and often more, compartmented tracks. Thus, the effort to get a total picture of what transpired has involved an unusual amount of research in the files of various components of the Agency, plus personal interviews with a large number of present and former Agency employees.

Even so, the present investigation cannot pretend to be complete. Limitations of time, personnel and authority have precluded an investigation of the rather extensive involvement in this case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The present report should therefore be regarded as adequate only in its coverage of CIA's principal role; the important, but secondary, role played by the FBI has been covered hardly at all.

At the outset, it had not been intended to mention names of the CIA officers involved in this operation. It was felt that no post hoc investigation can ever capture the perspective in which events are seen as they take place. Thus, to allude to individuals by name might unjustly and unfavorably reflect on their judgment, because of the superior wisdom of hindsight.

Unfortunately, our initial resolve has had to be reversed. The actions taken in regard to Nosenko were not the result of decisions made by a unitary Agency acting as a corporate entity; rather, in this case more than in most, decisions were made by a number of senior individuals on the basis of their own strongly-held views, which sometimes conflicted with the equally strongly-held opinions of other senior colleagues. Thus, while it would be unfair for this report to attempt to fix blame, it must, if it is to be comprehensible, attempt to depict the decision-making process in all its complexity by naming when necessary the individual participants.

The quintessential quality of a report such as this is that it be objective. At the same time, the events which we were assigned to review made necessary the employment of persons, all of whom, including the senior author, are or have in the past been long-term employees of CIA's Plans Directorate.

Present leadership of the Directorate apparently decided, however, that a more effective review could be conducted by persons of our experience than by outsiders, however qualified otherwise, who would not have first-hand familiarity with the intricacies of the positive intelligence and counter-intelligence processes. In light of this decision, we have taken seriously the trust placed in us, and have tried throughout to correct for whatever biases we have as "insiders."

We have not, on the other hand, refrained from expressing our opinions. Even to have tried to do so would have been futile for two rather obvious reasons. First, into the reconstruction of events of the complexity herein described there always enters a degree of selectivity and judgment; in this sense, "opinion" provides the essential matrix of our product. Secondly, we have viewed our task as one of constructive criticism. All the members of the small task force which produced this paper have spent half a lifetime in an Agency whose task they believe to be essential; yet we find its conduct of its affairs to have been in many ways faulty. Our rather harsh criticisms, particularly in the final chapter, are therefore offered in the hope that they will point the way to much-needed improvements.

Finally, a note is in order concerning documentation. To the rather large number of documents drawn upon directly in writing this study, we have assigned reference numbers. It is these numbers which will be found periodically throughout the text, following direct quotations as well as many statements of fact or opinion which are supported by individual documents. To facilitate reference, a number of documents have been reproduced and segregated as annexes to this study. Other documents too cumbersome to reproduce, as well as certain documents relevant to the study but not directly used in writing it, are listed in a complete index of all relevant documentation. This index indicates the locations of all indexed documents as of January 1977.

CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND: CIA'S HANDLING OF SOVIET POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND CI MATTERS

The history of the Nosenko case can only be comprehended within the framework of the organization and day-to-day functioning of the Central Intelligence Agency as a whole. In fact, opinions regarding the handling of the Nosenko case may differ substantially according to individuals' differing views regarding internal Agency organization and functioning. This being the case, it is useful at the outset to make explicit our understanding of how the Agency actually functioned in the relevant period, the 1960's, as distinct from how it might theoretically have functioned according to Agency organizational charts and regulations.

HELMS ROLE

It is first necessary to specify and delimit the role played by Richard Helms. As of Nosenko's first approach to the Agency in 1962, Helms was the ranking man in the Clandestine Service in his capacity as Deputy Director for Plans (DDP). By the time the case reached its denouement in 1969, Helms was the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), having in the interim advanced through the intermediate rank of Deputy DCI. Throughout this progression, however, he retained an active role in supervising this case although, as we shall now see, the nature and extent of this role are difficult to define in a few words.

By the time Nosenko first established a relationship with the Agency in 1962, Helms' position as the officer principally responsible within the Agency for the conduct of Soviet clandestine positive and counterintelligence operations had long been established. The reasons for this fact can probably no longer be determined with certainty, though they seem to have stemmed from Helms' role as Deputy to the two DDP's who preceded him. The latter had chosen to concern themselves primarily with the fields of political, propaganda and paramilitary activity, leaving to Helms the supervision of the Agency's more traditional clandestine operations role. In any case, and for whatever reason, it was Helms who exercised top-level supervision in the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence fields; when any such matter was referred to a higher level, this was usually done at his suggestion or, at least, with his approval.

Helms' two instrumentalities for the conduct of day-to-day operations in the Soviet field were the Soviet Bloc Division (known successively by this and several other names*), and the Counterintelligence Staff. In the nature and interrelationship of these two organizations, we find the key to much of what was to happen in the Nosenko case.

Although the SB Division was considered a "line" organization, the CI Staff's name would imply (if the Agency's formal organization were to be taken at face value) that its function was limited to advising a command echelon. In fact, such a distinction was never enforced.

"CI Staff" was actually a misnomer, because the organization carrying this name did not even concern itself to any appreciable extent with the counterintelligence function of the Agency on a worldwide basis. Rather, it concentrated on

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* This area component during the period of this report was known as Soviet Russia Division (1952--1966) and Soviet Bloc Division (1966--1974). The two names are often used interchangeably.

the USSR and Soviet Bloc countries, [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(3)

The CI Staff was almost entirely the creation of one man, James Angleton, who set it up in 1953 and exercised virtually total control of its activities until he was asked to retire from the Agency in 1974.* Angleton's relationship with Helms appears to have been a close one, and he remained responsive in a general way to Helms' desires during the latter's progress upward, but was virtually independent of anyone else within the Agency. It is probable, although not provable, that even his responsiveness to Helms diminished as the latter was promoted, since Helms was decreasingly able to devote time to CI matters as time went on.

CREATION OF CI STAFF -- ANGLETON ROLE

Angleton's organization operated according to a doctrine of which he was both the author and sole arbiter. One of its features was extreme compartmentation. Although his Staff claimed the right to monitor the activities of other organizations, including much of what the SB Division did, those other organizations did not enjoy reciprocal privileges. The basis for CI Staff contentions regarding the value of SB Division operations was shrouded in mystery; the Staff offered its conclusions freely but for the most part without supporting evidence. During the most active period of the Penkovskiy case, for example, when it was producing voluminous information of great strategic value, Angleton is known to have volunteered to persons outside the Agency the opinion that Penkovskiy was a Soviet provocation.

MR. X -- ANGLETON VS. MURPHY

In a case which was later to be a key factor in the Nosenko operation, that of Anatoliy Golitsyn, Angleton sought and received Helms' permission to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over this defector, and remained the final arbiter of how and to whom his information should be made available by CIA. During the Nosenko case, David E. Murphy, who was Chief, SB from ~~December~~ September 1963 to March 1968, was allowed to see Golitsyn on only one occasion, and was to a large extent excluded from the raw intelligence product of the Golitsyn case. By contrast, the CI Staff had full access to all information regarding Nosenko, although in at least one important case they were not consulted before SB took a crucial operational decision.

The SB Division position was more fluid. Insofar as it had an operational doctrine at all, this doctrine had evolved over the years as a result of the success or, in most cases, failure of successive operational programs. That the Division nonetheless enjoyed considerable prestige was due not so much to its own active operational efforts as to the high incidence (relative to other nationalities) of defections by important officials of the Soviet and Soviet Bloc Governments.

Angleton's position was strengthened by longevity. By contrast with Angleton's 22-year tenure as Chief of Counterintelligence, the SB Division had four chiefs between the onset of the Nosenko operation in 1962 and its resolution as a problem case in 1969.

Within the SB Division, there was lodged the so-called

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Soviet CI Group, which was in many respects a competitor of the CI Staff. It concerned itself, during most of the period to be covered in this report, primarily with information on the intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the USSR, and as such was inevitably somewhat redundant since the same field was the major preoccupation of the CI Staff. Nevertheless, as will emerge later in this report, there was during most of the period with which we are concerned a substantial congruity of views between the SB/CI Group and CI Staff which militated in favor of coherent operational policy, even though the two organizations might disagree on matters of detail.

One curious aspect of the organizational problem should be mentioned at this point because, while seemingly minor, it may have played a significant role. While the SB Division understandably had a number of competent Russian linguists, the CI Staff did not have a single Russian linguist who could be brought to bear on either the Nosenko or Golitsyn case. The Staff was therefore dependent for its data on translations of Nosenko material and, in the case of Golitsyn, on information obtained from discussions conducted with him in English, a language in which he was not fully fluent.

A third organizational participant in the Nosenko case was the Office of Security. This Office had overlapping jurisdiction with CI Staff and, to a lesser extent, SB Division in any matter which involved a suspected Soviet or Soviet Bloc penetration of the Agency. While not usually a problem, the overlapping jurisdiction was considerable in both the Golitsyn and Nosenko cases because so much of the activity in connection with both operations revolved around allegations that the Soviets had penetrated the Agency at a high level.

Although allegations that the Soviets had recruited Agency staff employees did not first originate with Golitsyn, it was he who lent special force to them by spelling out a complicated theory of Soviet intentions and modus operandi. He thus provided a detailed conceptual framework within which to develop a hypothesis towards which some members of the Agency, in particular Angleton, were already predisposed. Golitsyn thus became the ideologue's ideologue.

Prior to Golitsyn's defection, the Agency as a whole had been hard hit by its dealings with high-level Soviet penetrations of Western governments. There is no need to go into detail on them, since they have been well documented elsewhere, but they included British representatives such as Kim Philby and George Blake. Another important penetration was Heinz Felfe, who rose to be Deputy Chief of Soviet Counterintelligence in the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). The Felfe case is particularly significant because it was believed by a number of counterintelligence specialists in the Agency that Felfe's career had been systematically promoted by the Soviets through what came to be known as the "throw-away" technique. According to the theory of this group, a considerable number of valuable and productive Soviet intelligence operations in Germany were made available to Felfe so that, by detecting them and signaling their presence to the West German authorities,

PENETRATION OF WESTERN GOVTS.

he could build up his reputation as a counterintelligence specialist. While there is debate about the value of the assets which the Soviets made available, there appears to be enough substance to this theory for it to have had a strong impact within the Agency, particularly upon those persons who were members of the former Eastern European (EE) Division of the Plans Directorate. Whether or not by coincidence, the two officers who wielded the most influence over the Nosenko case within the SB Division, David E. Murphy (Division Chief) and Tennent H. Bagley (Chief, SB/CI) had previously served most of their Agency careers within the EE Division. Like most officers who had served in that Division, their thinking had been deeply influenced by the Felfe case.

In the course of time, the continuing record of KGB success in penetrating Western governments made it the most feared of the two principal Soviet intelligence services. Although we had had our successes also in penetrating the Soviets, they were primarily through GRU defectors-in-place such as Popov and Penkovskiy. Not since 15 February 1954, when Petr Sergeyevich Deryabin had defected, had we received up-to-date and high-level information about the KGB, and the defection of Anatoliy Golitsyn on 15 December 1961 was thus a major event.

Once again, it is not necessary here to go into details regarding Golitsyn, because this case has been covered extensively in a recent study. However, two points are worth noting:

A. First, Golitsyn was diagnosed early in 1962 as a "paranoid personality." Although account was taken of this psychological problem, it was considered in the light of a threat to the continuity of the debriefing process rather than as a factor reflecting on the validity of the purported intelligence which he gave us. It was apparently felt that if we could maintain his stability, we could depend not only upon the objectively verifiable facts which he gave us, but also upon his often very theoretical generalizations.

B. Secondly, Golitsyn presented us right from the beginning, and continually elaborated throughout the years, a complicated rationale for believing that the KGB was successfully pursuing a mammoth program of "disinformation" to the detriment of the United States and its Western allies. This rationale is covered in more detail in Chapter VI of this report.

It is against this background that we view the approach to CIA by Nosenko and his subsequent handling. In doing so, we shall for ease of reference from time to time allude to the thesis regarding KGB operations and intentions -- elaborated by Golitsyn, Angleton, Bagley, Murphy, and others -- as the "Monster Plot." In fairness, it must be allowed that this term was in common usage not by the thesis' proponents, but rather by its detractors; yet no other name serves so aptly to capsulize what the theorizers envisaged as a major threat to United States' security. If the term

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Background to "Monster" theory

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carries with it emotive connotations, the latter were certainly shared by both sides to the controversy; and this fact alone is enough to justify including "Monster Plot" in the lexicon of this study.

CHAPTER II

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA: 1927--1962

Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko was born 30 October 1927 in Nikolayev, Ukrainian SSR, son of Ivan Isidorovich Nosenko and Tamara Georgiyevna Markovskaya. His father was born in 1902 and died on 2 August 1956. At the time of his death, the senior Nosenko was Minister of Shipbuilding, member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and recipient of a number of the highest Soviet awards and medals. He received a State funeral, and is commemorated by a plaque on the Kremlin wall. Young Nosenko's brother, Vladimir, born in 1944, was a student at the Institute of International Relations as of 1964.

From his birth until 1934, Nosenko lived in Nikolayev. In 1934 he and his mother joined the senior Nosenko in Leningrad where the latter was working as chief engineer at the Sudomekh shipbuilding plant. Nosenko continued his schooling in Leningrad until late 1938 at which time he and his mother followed the senior Nosenko to Moscow, where he was to serve as Deputy People's Commissar of the Shipbuilding Industry.

In 1941, shortly after the war broke out, Nosenko and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk in the Urals. Nosenko stated that he and a friend tried to run off to the front, but they were caught and returned home. At age 14 Nosenko entered a Special Naval School which, in August 1942, was relocated to Kuybyshev. Later, this school was forced to relocate again, this time to Achinsk in Siberia. Nosenko did not want to go to Siberia and, through the influence of his father, was accepted at the Frunze Naval Preparatory School in Leningrad (not to be confused with the Frunze Higher Naval School, also in Leningrad), which by this time had been relocated to Baku.

Some time after August 1943, Nosenko tried on two separate occasions to get to the front, but failed. He and a friend did succeed in returning home to Moscow without authorization. These escapades seem to form part of a behavior pattern which was eventually to culminate in defection.

By August 1944, Nosenko had resumed his studies at the Frunze Naval Preparatory School which had returned to its original location in Leningrad. Cadets from this school were sent to a forest (some two hundred kilometers from Leningrad) on a wood-cutting detail. In about November of that year he wounded himself, seemingly accidentally, and was hospitalized. He decided not to return to the Frunze Naval Preparatory School and again, through his father's intervention in about January 1945, entered a shipbuilding college (tekhnikum) in Leningrad.

At the end of World War II, Nosenko returned to Moscow. He had meanwhile obtained a certificate from the director of the shipbuilding college which attested to his study in, and the completion of, the tenth class.

At some time prior to July 1945, Nosenko accompanied his father, who went to East Germany with a group of engineers.

For purposes of that trip. Nosenko received temporary rank as an Army Senior Lieutenant, with appropriate documents and uniform.

Nosenko entered the Institute of International Relations in Moscow in July 1945. Upon completion of the second year at the Institute, and by virtue of his participation in a military training program roughly equivalent to the ROTC, Nosenko received the rank of Junior Lieutenant in the "administrative service" [sic]. (The exact meaning of this term is unclear.)

In 1946, according to Nosenko, he married, against his parents' wishes, a student whom he had gotten pregnant. He obtained a divorce almost immediately following their marriage. In about 1947, he married the daughter of Soviet Lt. General (Major General, U.S.-style) Telegin. This marriage, too, was neither successful nor long-lived. Nosenko reported he had found his wife in bed with her brother. A girl was later born with a harelip and a cleft palate. Nosenko insisted that this was not his child.

Nosenko completed a four-year course at the Institute of International Relations, but actually received his diploma a year later, in 1950, because he had failed the examination in Marxism. He had had to wait an extra year in order to retake this examination.

In March 1951, Nosenko was assigned as an English language translator in naval intelligence (Naval RU), serving first in the Far East. While on leave in Moscow (late April 1952), he developed an illness which caused him to cough up blood, and entered a TB sanatorium near Moscow for treatment. For reasons of health, he did not return to the Far East but was sent instead to the Baltic area.

While on leave in Moscow in late 1952, Nosenko accompanied his parents to a New Year's Eve party at the dacha of a certain General Bogdan Zakharovich Kobulov. When Nosenko indicated interest in changing jobs, the General made a vague offer of help in getting employment with the Ministry of State Security (MGB). In March 1953, while again in Moscow, Nosenko was called to Kobulov's office. Kobulov had just returned from Germany to become the First Deputy Minister of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs). Nosenko did not see Kobulov personally but was referred by the latter's assistant to the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate (internal counter-intelligence), hereafter referred to as SCD, by whom he was hired.

His first MGB assignment was in the First (American Embassy) Section of the First (American) Department of the SCD.

In March 1953, following Stalin's death, Lavrentiy Beriya emerged from the resultant reshuffling of the top leadership as Chief of both the MVD and MGB. In March 1954, the new "Committee" for State Security -- the KGB -- was formed.

In June 1953 Nosenko married his third wife, Lyudmila Yulianovna Khozhevnikova, who was a student at the Moscow

State University.

Nosenko, a member of the Komsomol since 1943, was elected Secretary of the SCD Komsomol unit in June 1953 and served as Secretary of that unit until about June 1954. However, earlier in 1954, Nosenko had contracted venereal disease and gone to a clinic; to disguise his identity, he used operational documentation in alias in applying for treatment. When he did not go back for final treatment as instructed, the clinic sent a letter to his ostensible place of work as shown on the alias document. The MVD found out about this improper use of alias documentation, and reported it to the SCD. Nosenko was not only disciplined by the Chief, SCD (reprimanded and placed under arrest for fifteen days), but the Komsomol also removed him as Secretary and expelled him from its organization.

In early spring 1955, Nosenko received a poor kharakteristika (performance evaluation) which described him as unsuitable for work in the First Department. Nonetheless, he was neither dismissed nor transferred.

Although Nosenko survived the 1954 episode as well as the poor performance report, these events caused him to go on what he has described as a "big drunk," which resulted in his having to spend a month under hospital care. To keep Nosenko out of further trouble, his mother intervened by making a telephone call to Petr Vasil'yevich Fedotov, Chief of the SCD. Seemingly as a result of her efforts, Nosenko was transferred in the latter part of May 1955 to the Second Section (which operated against tourists) of the Seventh Department, SCD. In late 1955, Lt. General Oleg Mikhaylovich Gribanov was appointed Chief of the SCD. From a number of indications, Nosenko's relationship with Gribanov developed, despite the difference in rank and position, into a social relationship involving evenings on the town together, heavy drinking, and women. Despite numerous indiscretions, Nosenko's survival within the KGB and his subsequent promotions to increasingly responsible positions may well have resulted in part from Gribanov's patronage. To a considerable degree, of course, his rise must also be attributed to his being the son of a highly-placed member of the Soviet Government.

At this point in his KGB career, Nosenko had lost his Komsomol membership and not achieved CP-member status. It was not until 1956 that he was accepted as a candidate member of the CP, and only in 1957 that he was admitted as a full Party member. Once this happened, according to Nosenko, the Komsomol removed its reprimand from his file.

In December 1959, Nosenko was promoted to the rank of captain. He held this rank until his defection in February 1964, despite having been promised he would be promoted and the fact that he had held several positions which were usually filled by officers of higher military rank.

Nosenko worked in the Seventh Department, SCD, until January 1960 when he was transferred back to the First Section (American Embassy) of the First Department. Then he held the position of a Deputy Chief of the First Section. He was re-transferred back to the Seventh Department as of late

December 1961-early January 1962. In July 1962, he was appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department. He continued in this position until 18 January 1964, the date he left Moscow on TDY to Geneva.

Nosenko defected in Geneva on 4 February 1964, leaving behind in Moscow his wife, Lyudmila, and two daughters. His prior travels to the West had included two TDYs to England in 1957 and 1958, TDY to Cuba in 1960, and the first TDY to Geneva from mid-March until June 1962. He also went on TDY to Bulgaria in 1961. Details of his defection and subsequent developments are covered in Chapter III.

1: Initial Contacts

When Nosenko first approached the CIA on 9 June 1962, he had been assigned, as a representative of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, to be Security Officer of the Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference being held in the Palais des Nations in Geneva. Taking advantage of the fact that he was the watchdog for the Delegation whereas its members could not watch him, Nosenko used his freedom of movement to approach the Agency, ostensibly for personal financial assistance.

As he told it, Nosenko had recently slept with a Swiss woman who had stolen 900 Swiss Francs of official funds which he had on his person at the time; inability to reimburse this relatively trivial amount (about US$250 at the time) would jeopardize his career. In exchange for 2,000 Swiss Francs, he therefore proposed that he provide us with two items of information. These items, subsequently verified, related to:

A. KGB recruitment of a U.S. Army sergeant while he was serving in the American Embassy in Moscow as a "code machine repairman."

B. A Soviet official whom the Agency had ostensibly recruited but who was being run against us under KGB control.

At this time Nosenko was not forthcoming in response to general intelligence requirements on which we tried to quiz him, excluded the possibility of becoming an agent, and flatly refused to consider meeting Agency representatives inside the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he "agreed 'perhaps' meet us when abroad"[1] again at a later date. For our part, our interest in him was whetted by his identification of his deceased father as a former Minister of the USSR. In addition, such information as he gave about himself indicated that he would be of high operational interest. Inter alia his most recent assignment in Moscow was as head of a KGB sub-section working against American tourists.

2: Bona Fides

By 11 June, the two case officers (one a native Russian speaker) who were handling Nosenko sent a cable to Headquarters which read in part:

> SUBJ CONCLUSIVELY PROVED BONA FIDES. PROVIDED INFO OF IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY, SUBJ NOW COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE. WILLING MEET WHEN ABROAD AND WILL MEET AS OFTEN AND AS LONG AS POSSIBLE UNTIL DEPARTURE 15 JUNE.[3]

With the question of bona fides seemingly resolved, the principal case officer, Tennent ("Pete") Bagley, who at the time was assigned to Bern, flew to Washington carrying the tapes of the meeting. Bagley's arrival and sojourn at Headquarters were described by James Angleton, on 23 July 1976, as follows:

JA: . . . we got the first message from Pete Bagley on Nosenko from Geneva, and Bagley was ordered back, and we had a big meeting here on Saturday morning, and Bagley thought he had the biggest fish of his life. I mean he really did . . . and everything I heard from him was in direct contrast from what we heard from [redacted]

Q: What you're saying is that it was unreasonable for a Second Chief Directorate man to be there . . .

JA: Under the circumstances, getting drunk and needing $300 to . . ."not to be recruited but to give us three full, big secrets" for an exchange for the money in order that he could replenish the account from which he embezzled the money on a drunk. So I brought Pete in here one evening, I think it was Friday, Saturday and a Sunday, and I brought about 10 to 15 volumes of [redacted]'s interrogation, without prejudicing him in any way, just to read it, and he had all the books out, and at the end of it all he said that there was no question about it, that they were being had. I mean, mind you, he was of split motivation because this was the big case of his entire life and yet there he was reading material, etc. So we went to Dick [Helms, then DDP] and we put up a proposition that we should permit [redacted] to read the real material, I mean the transcripts and everything from Nosenko. And he wouldn't agree to that, but we made a compromise and that was to take the material and falsify it as though it was an anonymous letter sent to the Embassy by an alleged KGB person. So the anonymous letter was drawn up, and Pete interviewed [redacted] with the anonymous letter, and [redacted] statement was that "this is a person under control, I want to see the letter" which created a situation because we didn't have a letter. But he began to point out in some detail exactly

INITIAL BONA FIDES -- ENTER BAGLEY -- BAGLEY MTG WITH ANGLETON

2: Bona Fides

By 11 June, the two case officers (one a native Russian speaker) who were handling Nosenko sent a cable to Headquarters which read in part:

> SUBJ CONCLUSIVELY PROVED BONA FIDES. PROVIDED INFO OF IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY, SUBJ NOW COMPLETELY COOPERATIVE. WILLING MEET WHEN ABROAD AND WILL MEET AS OFTEN AND AS LONG AS POSSIBLE UNTIL DEPARTURE 15 JUNE.[3]

With the question of bona fides seemingly resolved, the principal case officer, Tennent ("Pete") Bagley, who at the time was assigned to Bern, flew to Washington carrying the tapes of the meeting. Bagley's arrival and sojourn at Headquarters were described by James Angleton, on 23 July 1976, as follows:

JA: . . . we got the first message from Pete Bagley on Nosenko from Geneva, and Bagley was ordered back, and we had a big meeting here on Saturday morning, and Bagley thought he had the biggest fish of his life. I mean he really did . . . and everything I heard from him was in direct contrast from what we heard from [redacted]

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> what was instigating and inspiring -- in terms of what he'd already given to us and he very wisely stated that he wanted everything on tape, because he knew that as time passed in hundreds of interviews and their counteraction took place, there would be people accusing him of not having divulged certain information. 133

Bagley's review of the [redacted] information had indeed converted him to the view that Nosenko's defection was bogus. Equally convinced, as clearly indicated by a number of documents which he drafted, was Bagley's superior, David Murphy, who had become Chief, SR Division in December 1963. The reasons for Murphy's conviction may not have been the same as Bagley's (see 131), but for all practical purposes the views of the two men at the time were identical.

A joint CI Staff-SR Division recommendation was therefore made to Helms that the transcripts of the Nosenko debriefings be made available to Golitsyn for comment. Helms agreed, with the single reservation that Nosenko not be identified by name as the source. As a result, Bagley had a number of items of information from Nosenko embodied in a letter ostensibly stemming from an anonymous KGB source; in this form, it was assumed, the information could be shown to Golitsyn without disclosing the source. (This ruse seemed plausible enough, since a previous defector, Michal Goleniewski, had written CIA a number of anonymous letters before eventually defecting and disclosing his identity.)

In carrying out the plan, Bagley made his own views clear to Golitsyn:

> I told [Golitsyn] that . . . I thought it quite possible, in view of his own statements about disinformation, that this was the beginning of a disinformation operation possibly relating to [his] defection.
>
> Golitsyn felt, in general and without having the full details necessary to an assessment, that there were indeed serious signs of disinformation in this affair. He felt such a disinformation operation, to discredit him, was a likelihood, as he had earlier said. A KGB officer could be permitted to tell everything he knew, now, if he worked in the same general field as Golitsyn had. When told that so far this source had not done anything to discredit Golitsyn, and had in fact reported that the KGB is greatly upset about Golitsyn's defection, and asked what he thought the purposes of such a disinformation operation now might be, Golitsyn agreed that kidnapping was a likely one, "to arrange an exchange for me." Also, to divert our attention from investigations of his leads by throwing up false scents, and to protect their remaining sources. He also added, "There could be other aims as well. The matter should be looked into. It seems serious to me." He thought the KGB might allow a first series of direct meetings with the KGB officer, to build up our confidence, and then in the next session do whatever the operation's purpose might be (discredit Golitsyn, kidnap, pass serious disinformation items, etc.).

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"Anonymous letter", also see Fn. 8 pg. 24.

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First Bagley mtg with Golitsyn

3: The Case Against Nosenko

During the remainder of 1962 and 1963, SR Division continued to build up a case against Nosenko. Virtually any information provided by Nosenko, or action taken by him, was interpreted as part of a KGB "provocation." If his information was in accord with that from other sources, this fact not only confirmed our suspicion of Nosenko, but was interpreted as casting doubt on the other sources as well.

While the above aspect will be covered at length in Chapters V and VI, one example will serve to highlight the attitude which prevailed. Nosenko had, during our meetings with him in 1962, contributed information which materially aided in the identification and arrest of William Vassall, a British Admiralty official who was also a KGB agent. Because Golitsyn had previously provided similar, but less specific information, the usefulness of Nosenko's intelligence was discounted; once Vassall had been identified, it was concluded that Nosenko had been allowed to expose him in order to support his own bona fides. The argument ran that Vassall would in any case have been identified sooner or later on the basis of Golitsyn's leads.

In January 1964, Nosenko reappeared in Geneva accompanying another Soviet delegation. By now, the case against him had been well established in the minds of those dealing with the matter, and the record is therefore replete with manifestations of suspicion. A particularly colorful example of our tendency to interpret unfavorably almost anything Nosenko said is provided by notes which Murphy forwarded to Helms on 27 January 1964, with the suggestion that they "convey very well the flavor of the man . . . and the complexities of the operation." 10 By way of background, although Nosenko's cryptonym at this juncture was AEFOXTROT, he had previously been designated AEBARMAN. This bit of history led to the following incident during a safehouse meeting, as reported by Bagley:

AEBARMAN passed w/ Bagley 0

> I cannot attribute to coincidence a bizarre remark AEFOXTROT made on 24 January. As I went behind a bar which stands in the apartment, to serve drinks to AEFOXTROT . . . AEFOXTROT saw me standing there behind the bar and his face lit up and he said with a smile, "Ha. You are the barman." Now this could be an idle pleasantry about my standing there like a bartender, but it is not funny as AEFOXTROT (ex-AEBARMAN) seemed to think it was and I am afraid it means that he knows his own CIA cryptonym. 10

The above incident exemplifies a main theme of Bagley's notes, his fear (shared by Angleton and Murphy) that CIA was itself penetrated. This fear had existed before Golitsyn defected, but it was fed constantly by the latter's allegations that information concerning him was leaking to the KGB, and Bagley's conclusion that the leaks must have originated within the Agency.

Thus it was that a memorandum from Murphy on 27 January 1964, submitted to and approved by Helms, began as follows:

MURPHY/BAGLEY BUILDUP AGAINST NOSENKO

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Thus it was that a memorandum from Murphy on 27 January 1964, submitted to and approved by Helms, began as follows:

> Our goal in this case must be eventually to break Subject and learn from him the details of his mission and its relation to possible penetrations of U.S. intelligence and security agencies and those of allied nations as well as to broader disinformation operations in the political sphere. Ideally, our interests would be best served if Subject were broken as early as possible but since this is unlikely, our actions must be conceived and carried out in a manner which contributes to our basic goal without alerting Subject unduly at any stage.11

Far from "alerting Subject unduly," Nosenko was on the surface welcomed with both cordiality and generosity. The following excerpts from a 30 January 1964 meeting with Bagley make the point clearly:

Nosenko: . . . the only thing I wanted to know and I asked this question, "What should I expect in the future?"

Bagley: The following awaits: As I presented it, you wanted to come to the United States and have some job, some chance of a future life, which gives you security and if possible the opportunity to work in this field which you know. Is that correct?

Nosenko: Absolutely.

Bagley: Mr. Helms said yes, flatly absolutely yes, in fact I would say enthusiastic . . . that's the only word to describe it. We talked about, and since this was a business discussion I'll repeat all of it whether it was pleasant or unpleasant. So the next thing will be some details that we spoke about. We talked about the means by which [you] could have a solid career with a certain personal independence. Because of the very great assistance you've been to us already and because of this desire to give you a backing, they will give you a little additional personal security, we want to give you an account of your own, a sum of at the beginning just plain $50,000 and from there on as a working contract $25,000 a year. But in addition because of the arrest of Vassall which would have been impossible without your information we are going to add at least $10,000 to this initial sum.12

4: Defection

As might be expected, Bagley devoted a good deal of effort during the second Geneva visit to persuading Nosenko to stay in place. Nosenko, however, dismissed out of hand the possibility of remaining in contact with CIA from within the Soviet Union, and became increasingly anxious to defect immediately. When Bagley continued to press him to remain in Geneva long enough to effect an audio penetration of the local rezidentura, Nosenko forced the issue. At a meeting on 4 February, he announced that a cable had been received from Moscow ordering him back home for a "tourism conference." [14] Though this claim was subsequently to be the source of almost endless controversy, it was accepted at the time without apparent question. Preparations therefore immediately began for evacuation to the United States [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

The layover in [redacted] lasted about a fortnight. It was used for further debriefing and assessment, but while useful from the operational handlers' standpoint, the delay raised problems as their charge became impatient: (b)(1) (b)(3)

> CAN EASILY CONTINUE DEBRIEFING FOR ANOTHER FEW DAYS ALONG ABOVE LINES. SUBJ IS CARRYING MANY NOTES OUTLINING DETAILS ALL SCD [i.e., Second Chief Directorate, KGB] OPS KNOWN TO HIM WHICH HE WANTS TO CARRY PERSONALLY AND PRESENT TO HEADQUARTERS IN ORDER TO AVOID ARRIVING WITH EMPTY HANDS. WORKING ON THIS MATERIAL WILL OCCUPY US PROFITABLY BUT SUBJ NEEDS SOONEST SOME EXPRESSION OF HEADQUARTERS REACTIONS AND PLANS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT. HIS VIEW OF CURRENT SITUATION IS THAT IT IS NECESSARY TRANSITION. HE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND INDEFINITE DELAY. REMEMBER THAT SUBJ HAS JUST MADE AN ENORMOUS DECISION AND FACED A TURNING POINT IN HIS LIFE. SIMPLY TO MOVE THE LOCALE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY AND SIT WITH THE SAME CASE OFFICERS FULL TIME IN A SAFEHOUSE IS HARDLY WHAT HE EXPECTS. REQUEST URGENTLY THAT HEADQUARTERS PROVIDE SOME RECOGNITION TO SUBJ. AMONG ALTERNATIVES WE CAN SUGGEST ARE:
>
> A. [MURPHY] TRIP WITH ONE OR TWO DAYS DISCUSSION OF LONG RANGE OPS PLANS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PREPARATIONS FOR ONWARD MOVE . . . [15]

The above cable triggered a visit to [redacted] by Murphy. Nothing that happened during this visit modified his already well-formed views. After a conference with the two principal handlers, Bagley and Serge Karpovich, he wrote: (b)(1) (b)(3)

RE DEFECTION/MURPHY VISIT GERMANY MEET NOSENKO

Murphy visit Germany 19 Feb 64

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Murphy visit to Germany 8 & 9 Feb 64

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Cont'd

emotionless and mechanical delivery of his statement announcing his intention to defect.

> After my talks with the case officers, I had my first visit with Subject at the safehouse. This lasted from 2000 to 2230 and included dinner with Subject and the case officers. Conversation during this first meeting was general in nature and followed no special agenda. However, it did give me an opportunity to take Subject's measure. I started by telling Subject that I had come to form my own impressions of him as a person and an intelligence officer who desired to place his knowledge and experience at the disposal of the United States Government. I added that I wished to determine for myself why Subject had come to the West, a most serious step which neither we nor Subject should underestimate in terms of its lasting effect on Subject's own life and those of his family left behind. Subject rose to this opening by first assuring me in a most fawning manner that he, as an intelligence officer, fully understood the need for a senior officer to make his own judgments on the spot. He then went on to explain his motivation for first contacting us, his reasons for defecting and his intense desire to collaborate with us in Soviet operations since he has no specialty other than intelligence. These remarks were repetitious of his original statements delivered in the same mechanical fashion, the major difference being that Subject was intensely nervous at the outset, calming down only after it appeared that I was accepting his statements at face value.
>
> By the end of the evening I had come to the same conclusions reached by Bagley and Karpovich. The totality of our conclusions are treated in detail in a separate memorandum. However, in reaching them, I was beset by a sense of irritation at the KGB's obvious conviction they could pull off an operation like this successfully and by a feeling of distaste for the obvious and transparent manner in which Subject played his role. [17]

Murphy's distaste was sufficient to overcome any interest he might otherwise have had in a recruitment opportunity suggested by Nosenko:

> One other subject touched upon . . . was the possible recruitment of Vladimir Suslov, Under-Secretary in the UN Secretariat and top-ranking Soviet in the UN organization . . . Subject [described] Suslov as a playboy who liked liquor and women and who could be easily blackmailed into cooperation for fear of hurting his career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I objected to the blackmail angle saying that it could

> cause a tremendous political flap if it backfired. Undaunted, Subject modified his position to assure us that it would not have to be "crude blackmail" in which we would have to get directly involved. I certainly got the impression that Suslov's recruitment is part of the plan and that we would succeed no matter how half-heartedly we tried. [17]

Despite his misgivings, however, Murphy remained convinced that the Agency must continue to dissemble:

> It will be necessary to maintain an effective degree of secrecy with regard to our knowledge of Subject's true status and our plans to try to secure from him a full confession. If, Subject, or the Soviets, become aware of our intentions, we will probably be forced to act prematurely. [18]

With these considerations in mind, Murphy therefore renewed the commitments previously made by Bagley:

> I informed Subject that I was satisfied that he was genuine. Based on this and assuming his continuing "cooperation," I said we would proceed to make arrangements to bring him to the States. Second, I confirmed our agreement to pay him $25,000 for each year in place ($50,000) plus $10,000 for his part in the Vassall case and our readiness to contract for his services at $25,000 per year. [17]

On 12 February 1964, consistent with the above commitments, Nosenko was flown to the Washington area and lodged in a safehouse, under close supervision of the Office of Security. Now that he was in the United States, the Agency (and the U.S. Government as a whole) found themselves faced with a seeming dilemma, much more crucial than the problems facing them while he remained abroad. The Agency's perception of the dilemma, and the possible solutions to it, are covered in paragraphs 3, 4, 6 and 7 of a memorandum written by Murphy and approved by Helms on 17 February 1964:

> While admitting that Subject is here on a KGB directed mission, it has been generally agreed by both us and the FBI that he still possesses valid information which we would like to obtain. At the same time, we, at least, believe that Subject must be broken at some point if we are to learn something of the full scope of the KGB plan, the timing for its execution, and the role played by others in it. In addition, we must have this information if we are to decide what countermeasures we should take in terms of counter-propaganda, modifications in our security practices, and planning for future operations against the Soviet target. Admittedly, our desire to continue debriefing to obtain additional information may conflict with the need to break Subject. Clearly, the big problem is one of timing. How long can we keep Subject,

RENEWAL OF COMMITMENTS

NOSENKO ARRIVES U.S.

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Commitments 9 Feb 64

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or his KGB controllers, ignorant of our awareness of this operation and how long will it take us to assemble the kind of brief we will need to initiate a hostile interrogation in conditions of maximum control?

If we are to proceed along the lines indicated above we should accept in advance the premise that we will not be able to prevent Subject from evading our custody or communicating with the Soviets unless we place him under such physical restraint that it will become immediately apparent to him that we suspect him. This may not be an acceptable risk and if it is not, we should so determine right away and decide on a completely different course of action. If this is to be the case, we should agree to forego additional debriefings, place Subject in escape-proof quarters away from the Washington area under full-time guard and commence hostile debriefing on the basis of the material we already have (although the prospects for success would not be great). Disposal would probably be via Berlin followed by a brief press release to the effect that Subject had confessed to being a plant and had been allowed to return to Soviet control. [In the meantime, SR Division would:]

-- Advise Subject that during this phase he will continue to live and work in the safehouse and will be escorted at all times when on shopping trips, visits to movies, etc., because of his faulty English and unfamiliarity with the country, customs, etc. While we can explain this regime as needed for his security, we cannot keep him locked up in the house 24 hours a day.

-- Provide Subject with "flash" documentation in another name to be carried on his person during excursions from the house. They may also help persuade him he has been accepted.

-- Make available to Subject a portion of the $60,000 promised him which he can use for purchases of clothes, cigarettes, personal effects, etc.

-- Agree that whenever this first phase is over (four to six weeks) that he be permitted to take a two-week vacation with escort.

The vacation period will be of greater benefit to us since it will provide us with an opportunity to review and make judgments on the value of the information already obtained and also to consider the progress made in the other aspects of the case outlined below. During the vacation we can decide on whether we should proceed to the second phase or are ready to commence hostile interrogation under controlled conditions. If it is the former, we will have to reckon with

CONCEPT OF INCARCERATION/HOSTILE INTERROG.

the need to modify the living and working arrangements for Subject in a way which will inevitably give him some additional freedom. At the same time, we would be expected to move forward with Subject's legalization, i.e., final decision on a name he will use, securing an alien registration card, establishing a bank account, etc. Therefore, it will be terribly important to make the proper decision at the end of phase one.

This decision will depend not only on our evaluation of the material obtained during the debriefings but on how far we have been able to go in clarifying other cases which are related to Subject case and form an important part of any explanation of the KGB's goals in this operation. 21

Thus, Nosenko was surrounded from the first with ambivalence and uncertainty. On the one hand, he was housed in circumstances which his principal day-to-day handler, John B. McMahon of SR Division, describes as "our typical, luxurious style . . ." He continues by saying that "there was all the food and drink one could possibly want . . . I remember all of the effort and the money we spent to get a billiard table -- something like $1,000 was spent on that table . . ." On the other hand, McMahon, who was assigned to this case after having worked on the Golitsyn affair, was told at the outset that Nosenko was "dirty, that he had been sent by the KGB . . ." 134

Writing of his first meeting with Nosenko on 13 February, McMahon recorded his first impressions of Nosenko:

In this brief meeting lasting actually less than two hours, I couldn't prevent myself from putting him in three successive categories. In the first few minutes I put him in the category of a Cuban exile living in the Harlem section of New York City. This impression came to my mind strictly on the basis of his clothing (dark trousers and sport shirt, black elevated shoes, sharply pointed and with a design) and his mannerisms . . .

Half way through the session I put him in the category of a big city but small-time con man. While dictating to Nick [i.e., Serge Karpovich] from his notes, he knew exactly what he wanted to say and how he wanted to say it. But when I had brief conversations with him on other topics, or when I saw him stealing glances in my direction to size me up, I could almost see the con man's wheels turning rapidly in his head. I had an urge to check my wallet just to make sure it was still safe.

As the session ended and we moved into the living room I put him in a third category. Before leaving the debriefing room I noticed how he touched Nick on the shoulder. When Nick went

CASE HANDLER ASSESSMENT OF NOSENKO

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The Nosenko impressions of McMahon

downstairs for a few minutes, George and I walked into the living room. During that brief walk I decided to give him a President Johnson handshake (hand and elbow grasp, Texas style) on departure and a few sincere words about how pleased I was to meet and talk with him, but his actions soon changed my mind. As soon as we reached the middle of the living room he gave me an unexpected and prolonged hug around the shoulders and waist, the type that one man gives another well known to him only after some achievement such as making the decisive point in a football game. His embrace really took me by surprise and I had to pull away from him without hurting his feelings. At this point I realized that I couldn't go through with the President Johnson handshake; he'd have to settle for less. In this, the third category, I saw him as a jazz musician who sells heroin on the side and has homosexual tendencies.[20]

A week later, on 20 February, however, McMahon reported more favorable impressions, those of the Office of Security personnel assigned to guard Nosenko at the safehouse:

Subject is not at all concerned about his own security or the threat of assassination or kidnapping. He seems to think the present security system is fine . . . [This was in marked contrast to Golitsyn's behavior.]

Subject is not a heavy drinker and is never "under the influence" . . .

Subject is not a heavy smoker . . .

At mealtime Subject sits at the dining table with the guards and acts as if he is one of the boys. He does not sit at the head of the table but to the side. He always offers the boys a drink, asks them to take more food, and kids them . . .

He does not play cards, has shown no interest in chess, and has not mentioned checkers. He does not gamble and doesn't seem to have any hobby or inside activity to keep himself busy. He has shown a desire to play pool . . .

Subject does not say anything for or against the USSR or the Communist Party. Even when viewing the Olympics on TV Subject never once commented on how good the Soviets were and how poor a showing the Americans made. The same could not be said for "Big Bad John" [Golitsyn] . . . On the contrary Subject wants to be an American as soon as possible.

Subject's sexual desires appear to be normal . . . Subject has made several joking references to their all going together to a house of prostitution. . . . Subject definitely wants a woman

SECURITY PERSONNEL ASSESS. OF NOSENKO

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Subject has not commented one way or another, for or against, any person associated with him, including the housekeepers. Compared with other cases he is ideal. He is polite, likes to kid, doesn't have a drinking problem, doesn't have a mental problem, and wants to become an American and work like and with Americans as soon as possible.

Subject became angry only once and even then it was not a loss of temper in the true sense. The day that Pete discussed the schedule with him, Subject became moody and started to drink alone. He told the guards that he wants to use his brains and work hard as Americans do. He feels that the present schedule does not utilize his talent to the fullest. [23]

The "schedule" referred to above had been outlined to Nosenko in a 17 February meeting, during which Bagley had assured him that "both Mr. Murphy and myself are enthusiastically optimistic about future cooperation with him in operations against the USSR." Nosenko greeted plans for a period devoted to systematic debriefing with the statement that this "might represent an attempt to extract all his information from him, after which he would not be needed." He also said he needed a vacation at "an early date in order to help him forget and get over the strain and worry of his abrupt change of situation, particularly the strain of leaving his family behind." [22]

BAGLEY REASSURANCE OF COOPERATION

5: The Problem of Disposition

Far from being optimistic about our "cooperation" with Nosenko, SR Division was discussing the possibility of forcibly returning him to the Soviets if the "overall effort to break him" came to naught. In addition, an alternative plan was being developed for the incarceration of Nosenko, so that "there can be no question of [his] escaping after he becomes aware of our attitude." [24] Finally, it was agreed between Murphy and Helms that Golitsyn, who had meanwhile recognized Nosenko as the author of the ostensible "anonymous letter" of 26 June 1962, would be brought into the operation to back up our interrogation. Helms originally had some misgivings about this procedure, but appears eventually to have agreed to giving Golitsyn "full access" to material from Nosenko, but not to Nosenko himself. [24]

Within less than a week of McMahon's favorable report on Nosenko's behavior, the situation deteriorated. By 24 February, Nosenko was reported as being in a "highly tense, nervous, and emotional state" following an interrogation by the FBI. [25] He complained that "the FBI agents were treating him like a criminal and he deeply resented their attitude and would not talk to them again." He then persuaded his security guards to take him to downtown Washington, where he visited several night clubs.

(b)(6)

Notwithstanding this incident, the guards still had favorable things to say about Nosenko when McMahon questioned them on 28 February. They described him as "very bright . . . a neat dresser . . . not a heavy drinker . . . the easiest and nicest defector they have worked with." [26]

Despite the fact that an FBI interrogation seems to have triggered Nosenko's first disruptive episode, the FBI viewed him much more favorably than did CIA. As early as 8 February 1964, when Murphy was in Frankfurt to assess Nosenko, Angleton had sent him a cable reading in part:

> FOLLOWING YOUR DEPARTURE, SAM [Samuel Papich, FBI liaison officer with CIA] STATED VERY INFORMALLY THAT FRIEND OF HIS WHO IS EXPERT IN FBI QUICKLY SCANNED AEFOXTROT PRODUCTION AND CAUTIONED US THAT "IT LOOKS VERY GOOD" IN TERMS OF CASES KNOWN TO THEM. [16]

Later, in a memorandum to Helms on 9 March, Murphy stated that "the FBI personnel on the case have so far indicated they believe Subject to be a genuine KGB defector." By implication, both Murphy and Angleton regarded this divergence of view as a serious problem. Their concern is understandable, because a subsequent paragraph of the Murphy memorandum contained plans for the following action, to be initiated around 1 April 1964, which would not be appropriate if CIA were forced, as a result of inter-agency consultations, to treat Nosenko as a bona fide defector:

> a. Subject to be moved to a high security safehouse under maximum guard.

NOSENKO DISPOSITION

INITIAL FBI ASSESS OF NOSENKO

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Nosenko Disposition

Anonymous letter

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FBI Initial Assessment of Nosenko

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> a. Subject to be moved to a high security safehouse under maximum guard.

b. The DCI to inform the President, Secretary of State, Director, FBI, and USIB principals that Subject is a KGB plant whom we intend to return to Soviet control after (1) trying to break him, and (2) publicizing his case.

c. Retain Subject incommunicado for about three weeks during which time we will continue efforts to break him.

d. At the same time, commence the publicity campaign which will precede Subject's deportation. As a first step there will be a brief official announcement probably by a State Department spokesman to the effect that Subject has confessed to having faked his defection at KGB direction in order (1) to penetrate U.S. intelligence and security agencies, and (2) to discredit the act of defection by Soviet citizens. At the same time, a press backgrounder will be made available which will characterize this KGB operation as an act of desperation following a decade of defection and disloyalty to the regime on the part of a score of senior Soviet intelligence officers (from Deryabin to Golitsyn). As a follow-up, we will have ready for press and magazine outlets special stories on Subject's case ranging from the gory details of tourist operations to his vitriolic views on African students. 27

PROPOSED HANDLING OF NOSENKO

6: Erratic Behavior and Its Aftermath

While planning was going on for his confinement and hostile interrogation, Nosenko was taken to Hawaii for two weeks' relaxation, beginning on 12 March. During this period, his consumption of alcohol was enormous, and his behavior became increasingly erratic. Prior to his departure, he had on several occasions been violent; on one occasion he took a swipe with his fist at Bagley, and on another tried to strangle one of the Office of Security escorts.

[redacted] (b)(6)

[redacted] McMahon, who spent the first part of the vacation with Nosenko, recorded these impressions:

> In my opinion Subject is under extreme tension and pressure. Any man who skips breakfast and starts the day off with alcohol is on his way to becoming an alcoholic. He drinks not for the enjoyment of it, but with an attempt to erase or lessen problems of a serious nature. I suspect that these tensions are the result of two things: one, fear on his part that he cannot follow through with his assignment; and, two, his homosexual desires. I predict that the situation will not improve but grow worse. [28]

NOSENKO UNDER EXTREME TENSION

Yet McMahon concluded on the following note:

> Despite our oral arguments and the various incidents we experienced, Subject and I parted on the best of terms. He gave me an affectionate embrace on the night of my departure, and in front of Pete thanked me for my attention to his needs and patience in dealing with him. We agreed to see each other upon his return to Washington. [28]

During the last half of the vacation, Bagley arrived and took charge of the escort team. Nosenko was more restrained in his presence than he had been previously, but Bagley had no success in eliciting information from him during this period. Not only was Nosenko uninformative, according to Bagley, but he was also very tense and unable to sleep more than a few hours at a time.

Although debriefing was resumed upon return to Washington, it cannot have been very successful. Nosenko was still drinking enormously, and had by now discovered the unfettered night life [redacted]; it is doubtful that he was physically able to respond meaningfully to interrogation during the day. (b)(1) (b)(3)

On 30 March 1964, Murphy wrote a memorandum to the DDP entitled "Final Phase Planning," which Helms duly initialed and returned without written comment. Inter alia, Murphy had this to say:

> We have concluded that there is little to be gained by prolonging the status quo beyond next weekend and every reason to suspect that if Subject learns we doubt him, he will try to escape. Accordingly, we have instructed the security guards to be alert to any attempts on Subject's part to elude them . . .
>
> On either Thursday or Friday evening [2--3 April], while Nosenko is readying himself for his usual evening outing, we will have him taken into custody by three OS officers he has never seen and transported by secure means to the OS maximum security safehouse in [redacted] He will be placed in a detention cell and left alone (but under constant and direct observation) for approximately 24 hours. (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3)
>
> Further scheduling must depend in considerable degree on the results of the interrogation. However, since we do not anticipate that Nosenko will ever break to the point of becoming completely cooperative, and since we must assume that within five or six days after the confrontation begins, news of our action will have leaked out through the briefings (however necessary they may have been), we should be ready to take this action:
>
> > Have State Department spokesman issue low key statement indicating that Nosenko is plant with mission to seek out and report on bona fide defectors living in the United States.
> >
> > Follow up with backgrounder to be given to newsmen by Public Affairs or used as basis for "exclusive" story to be given to selected news outlets.
> >
> > Mail letter in Moscow (or from Helsinki to Moscow) addressed to Lt. Gen. Oleg Mikhailovich Gribanov which makes it clear that we were on to operation all along but also that choice of Nosenko as key figure in operation was a mistake. To emphasize latter point include as an attachment a description of Nosenko behavior. This would be couched in dry, almost clinical, language with such touches as fact that [redacted] (b)(6)
> >
> > Aside from the not inconsiderable satisfaction we will have in preparing it, this letter will serve to dissuade the Soviets from an overly hasty reaction to our press stories and should also make them reasonably anxious to get Nosenko back to determine what happened. 30

MURPHY FINAL PHASE PLAN FOR NOSENKO

Cont next pg.

Since failure to "break" Nosenko -- i.e., force him to admit that he had come to us, not as a genuine defector but as a KGB-dispatched agent -- was considered virtually certain, plans were also being laid to return him to the Soviet authorities. Before doing this, however, it would be necessary to:

> . . . Discuss with Legal Counsel the legal problems which might be encountered in arranging Nosenko's deportation. The simplest method still appears to be [redacted] to Tempelhof in Berlin. Thence to S-Bahnhof Tiergarten where Subject, in his best civilian clothes, with diplomatic passport, would be placed on an S-Bahn which then stops inside East Berlin only at the control point S-Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse. [30]

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

7: The Decision to Incarcerate

On 2 April, Helms, Murphy and Lawrence Houston (CIA General Counsel) carried the Nosenko problem to Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach. The Justice Department position was that, inasmuch as Nosenko had been admitted on "parole" to the Agency, this arrangement "can be interpreted to mean parole to a specific locale which would provide some justification for our detaining him for questioning. It was then pointed out, however, that if he said he wished to leave the country to return to the Soviet Union, technically we would not be able to detain him further." [33] Though the record is not specific on this issue, it is a legitimate presumption that at the 2 April briefing Helms had presented the case in the same light as he had on the previous day to Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson and his colleagues at the State Department, i.e., ". . . Nosenko is not a genuine defector but more probably an agent planted on us by the KGB." [32] Had the presumption of guilt not been so forcefully presented, Justice's position might have been less permissive.

Although Nosenko had already contributed considerable intelligence of value (see Chapter IV), including information which led directly to the arrest of William Vassall in 1962, there is no indication in the files from this period that the possibility of his being a bona fide defector was given any credence whatsoever, either within the Agency or in discussions with other parts of the Government.

On the contrary, Nosenko was treated as one whose guilt had been established. Since the only problem in the minds of Murphy and Bagley was that of forcing him to admit his guilt, it was decided to apply to him techniques the KGB had employed with Professor Frederick Barghoorn in 1963. The logic of doing this, in light of their conviction that Nosenko would never break to the point of becoming completely cooperative, is not clear from the files. Nevertheless, even while Murphy was registering with certainty his lack of hope for a favorable resolution, plans were drawn up for an "arrest," strict confinement and hostile interrogation. These plans are worth quoting at length: Memo 30 March 64

> The operational and psychological assessments of AEFOXTROT suggest strongly that the timing and the staging of the "arrest," and the physical surroundings and psychological atmosphere of the detention could influence AEFOXTROT strongly, and if properly done, could go a long way towards "setting him up" for the interrogators. For this reason, we wish to emphasize that apart from the purely mechanical problems involved, every member of the guard force will have an important part to play as an actor.
>
> Briefly, the plot is as follows: On the evening of April 2 (the actual date may yet be moved up or delayed a few days), a team of four or five security officers will pull up to the present safehouse in a van or panel truck. Three of them, all unknown to Subject, will enter the

BARGHOORN MODEL FOR IMPRISONMENT

DARKNESS AT NOON PAPER

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Darkness at Noon (or Phase 3)

Cont next page

safehouse, will inform Subject that he is under arrest, slap handcuffs on him, lead him out to the van and hustle him into the rear of it. All of this is to be done as quickly as possible, and with an absolute minimum of conversation. AEFOXTROT is not to be allowed to take anything with him, and any questions or requests on his part are to be completely ignored. It is anticipated that he will put up physical resistance and, if necessary, the security guards already at the house can bear a hand; however, if possible it would be desirable that they stand completely apart. What we are after in this initial scene is complete surprise, and also to keep Subject in suspense for as long as possible as to who is perpetrating this outrage on him and why. Therefore, it would be desirable for the new "hostile guards" and the old "friendly guards" at the safehouse not to let on that they know each other.

The van will then proceed to the Detention House (Clinton). AEFOXTROT will remain handcuffed throughout; seated in the rear of the van with three guards he should be unable to see anything of the route. The guards should continue to ignore anything he may say; nor should they speak to each other -- an atmosphere of stony and even unnatural silence is just what we want.

Upon arrival at the Detention House, AEFOXTROT is to strip completely and to put on prison attire. Again for psychological reasons, it would be desirable to have genuine prison clothes; failing that, coveralls and slippers without laces, or something along those lines will do. The senior officer at the Detention House should play the part of "warden." He is the one who should explain the "prison rules" to Subject and "assign him to his cell."

For a cell, Subject should have the smallest room in the house. From the description, one of the attic bedrooms sounds about right. It is to be furnished with a cot, a hard chair and a slop pail. Nothing else. The window will be grilled, and there should be a single overhead light bulb (about 60 watts) for illumination. This light will remain on at all times. There should be a screened observation window in the cell door, and Subject is to be under observation at all times that he is in the cell. There is no need for this to be covert; in fact, we want Subject to feel that he is under a microscope. Under no circumstances should the guard talk to Subject, however. The prison routine is to be patterned after the description provided by Prof. Barghoorn of his stay in the KGB prison in Lubyanka. Subject will be made to rise at 0600. He will then be taken to the WC where he will be

Darkness at Noon

allowed to empty his slop pail and wash up (cold water only). Meals will be brought to him, and will follow the following pattern:

Breakfast: weak tea (no sugar), porridge

Dinner: watery soup, macaroni or porridge, bread, weak tea

Supper: weak tea and porridge

After the first few days, this diet may be augmented if Subject is cooperative at the interrogation sessions. Subject is not to receive any tobacco or alcohol. A doctor will be on call at all times if medical treatment is required. There should be a buzzer outside the cell door so that the duty guard can summon help without leaving his post. Some provision should be made for a half hour's outdoor exercise once a day, but this is not necessary for the first few days of detention. Subject is not allowed to lie on his cot after reveille; he may sit on his cot or chair. He may retire at 2200. Every several days he will be required to sweep and mop his cell.

There is to be no use of brutality, threats, or third-degree measures of any kind. However, if resistance is encountered, force is to be used whenever necessary during the arrest or to enforce the prison regulations. Force should be applied as swiftly and efficiently and impersonally as possible, without unnecessary talking, and preferably in total silence. Specific measures will have to be considered for violations of or refusal to follow the prison regulations. For example, the first time Subject tries to unscrew the light bulb, he could be placed in a straitjacket for the remainder of the night. On cleaning days, food will not be brought to him until he has cleaned his cell, and so on. We do not expect Subject to be an easy prisoner, but if we are ready to counter his every move from the beginning, it is not likely that he will give much trouble for very long. Suicide is a remote possibility; constant observation and the ready availability of a doctor should be adequate safeguard.

It might be worth listing our objectives in the security aspects of Phase 3. First of all, we want to be sure that we take Subject by surprise, before he can destroy or swallow anything, or take any defensive measures of any kind. We want to prevent him from escaping or from communicating with anyone. We want to keep him from harming himself. We want no one to know where he is. All these objectives could be achieved by more or less routine security measures. On a deeper level, we would like for Subject to be overwhelmed by the sudden change in his fortunes; we want to exploit the shock to his system when he

NOSENKO DIET

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After the first few days, this diet may be augmented if Subject is cooperative at the interrogation sessions. Subject is not to receive any tobacco or alcohol. A doctor will be on call at all times if medical treatment is required. There should be a buzzer outside the cell door so that the duty guard can summon help without leaving his post. Some provision should be made for a half hour's outdoor exercise once a day, but this is not necessary for the first few days of detention. Subject is not allowed to lie on his cot after reveille; he may sit on his cot or chair. He may retire at 2200. Every several days he will be required to sweep and mop his cell.

There is to be no use of brutality, threats, or third-degree measures of any kind. However, if resistance is encountered, force is to be used whenever necessary during the arrest or to enforce the prison regulations. Force should be applied as swiftly and efficiently and impersonally as possible, without unnecessary talking, and preferably in total silence. Specific measures will have to be considered for violations of or refusal to follow the prison regulations. For example, the first time Subject tries to unscrew the light bulb, he could be placed in a straitjacket for the remainder of the night. On cleaning days, food will not be brought to him until he has cleaned his cell, and so on. We do not expect Subject to be an easy prisoner, but if we are ready to counter his every move from the beginning, it is not likely that he will give much trouble for very long. Suicide is a remote possibility; constant observation and the ready availability of a doctor should be adequate safeguard.

It might be worth listing our objectives in the security aspects of Phase 3. First of all, we want to be sure that we take Subject by surprise, before he can destroy or swallow anything, or take any defensive measures of any kind. We want to prevent him from escaping or from communicating with anyone. We want to keep him from harming himself. We want no one to know where he is. All these objectives could be achieved by more or less routine security measures. On a deeper level, we would like for Subject to be overwhelmed by the sudden change in his fortunes; we want to exploit the shock to his system when he

Cont next pg.

learns that he was not really fooling everyone as he thought. Particularly at first we want to keep him as much in the dark as possible as to what went wrong, who are the new people who arrested him, where was he taken, and above all, what is in store for him. In the Detention House, we want to create an atmosphere in which he feels totally cut off from the world, trapped in a situation from which there is no escape, caught in a dismal trap in which he may be stuck for the rest of his life. To this end, we would like for him not even to hear the sound of human speech any more than is absolutely necessary. The section of the house in which the cell is located should be sufficiently well shielded acoustically from the rest of the house so that Subject cannot hear the sounds of voices, laughter, telephone calls, comings and goings, etc. No one should ever so much as smile in his presence. No one except the interrogators should ever talk to him. In addition, it would be well if everyone behaved as if the Detention House were a permanent installation and tried to give Subject the impression (without words) that they had been working there for years and that he was just another nameless and faceless prisoner brought there to rot. Although we are ruling out the use of threats, there is no harm in letter [sic] Subject's imagination do the job for us. The best way to do this is to keep him from getting any clues as to what the true state of affairs is. 31

OS OBJECTS TO PHASE 3

The above plans were modified slightly by the Office of Security. The chronological record states that ". . . OS does not want the SR Phase 3 to be carried out as originally planned. They desire a heated room for Subject, no slop pail, and no aggressive arrest at night. They propose Subject be lured to [safehouse in] Clinton [Maryland] during daylight hours for a poly (PL 110 processing) . . . Poly operator would say that Subject was withholding and Pete [Bagley] would be called in." 13

FIRST INSTRUCTIONS RE POLYGRAPH

The long-delayed polygraph evaluation was administered on 4 April 1964. It did not, however, take place under standard conditions. In his report of 8 April 1964, the polygraph operator stated:

During the pre-polygraph conferences with representatives of SR Division, the undersigned was informed that the polygraph interview was part of an overall plan to help break Subject and elicit the truth from him. SR Division's instructions were that, regardless of whether Subject passed his polygraph test or not, he was to be informed at the termination of his polygraph interview that he was lying, and had not passed his polygraph interview. 36

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Instructions for first Polygraph

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8: First Polygraph Examination

To raise Nosenko's level of apprehension and reduce his supposed defenses against the polygraph interrogation technique, an additional mechanism was also attached to him which he was told was an electroencephalograph (EEG). Murphy later told [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) that "Nosenko was completely confident of the polygraph when told that it would be used until he discovered that an electroencephalograph was used at the same time. The unexpected addition of the EEG to the polygraph was successful and materially aided the interrogators. Nosenko proved to be an excellent reactor . . ." 47

NOSENKO FIRST POLY & EEG

Despite the unusual circumstances surrounding the examination, the polygraph operator's conclusions, as stated in his report of 8 April 1964, were categorical:

> It is the undersigned's conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector, but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Intelligence for a specific mission or missions.

> According to the pre-agreed upon plan, the different phases involving various pertinent areas were covered with Subject polygraphically. Challenge of Subject's reactions was indirect and "soft." On no occasion did Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the possible causes for his polygraph reactions. He continually denied and refused to admit that there was anything to any of the questions which were asked of him. When the final test questions were completed and a record was obtained of all of Subject's polygraphic responses, the nature of the challenge and probing was changed.

> Subject was told that he was lying to numerous pertinent questions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only explanation to the undersigned's direct accusation was that he could not be a dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volunteered to American Intelligence.

> Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected complete self-control and composure, now exhibited a completely different picture. His composure was nonexistent, his eyes watered, and his hands trembled. Prior to being confronted with the undersigned's opinion that Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject was asked on one of the last test runs (a) if he was sent to penetrate American Intelligence, and (b) if Subject received instructions from KGB on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given in a voice that actually trembled.

> After completion of the interview, the SR representative at the safesite was informed, in front

NOSENKO TAKEN INTO CUSTODY

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34, 37, 38

responding to questions under intense cross-examination, particularly with regard to the sourcing of some of his information, he became quite erratic, contradicted himself many times and became upset physically.

As a result of this session, we know that Subject can be thrown off balance by aggressive questioning in those areas which we know to be important parts of the entire KGB operation. Thus, we will continue along these lines for several days with a specific interrogation plan mapped out for each session.

At the end of the first interrogation session, Subject noted that he had not harmed the United States in any way and that if we did not believe him, he would consider going to a third country because as he put it, "I could not return to the USSR." When we begin the next session with him, we will tell him that his statement with respect to not having harmed the U.S. is erroneous. We will refer to his direct participation in the Barghoorn case and to the fact that his very mission itself is directed against U.S. internal security. If he again raises the third country approach (but only if he raises it), we will advise him that were he to go to a third country at some point in the future that country would be fully apprised to our information concerning his mission to the West and the details of his personal behavior. 35

MURPHY OFF-BALANCE THEORY

Whether Helms was informed of the peculiar conditions under which the polygraph was administered cannot be ascertained from the record. Murphy simply told him that the examiner had "obtained significant reactions" and that "Subject can be thrown off balance . . ." 35 In this connection, it is useful to note here that in a number of documents related to this case, this polygraph examination is referred to as valid evidence of Nosenko's duplicity, without giving the reader any hint of the unusual circumstances surrounding it. Even in Bagley's lengthy study of February 1967 (commonly referred to as "the thousand-page paper"), and the shorter "green book" formally published in February 1968, one finds no cautionary notes. To put in perspective the developments of this case, both those already reported and those still to come, we shall therefore jump ahead briefly to quote from a formal Office of Security report covering a review of the 1964 examination. The senior of the three polygraph specialists who reviewed it stated his conclusions as follows, in a memorandum dated 1 November 1966:

Even without the review by reviewing examiners, I considered the formal report dated 8 April 1964 to have been in error in that the conclusions reached in the case were a gross misinterpretation of the extent to which the reactions added up. In fact, in some instances the Subject was deemed to be lying when it is known he was telling the truth. With the review by the reviewing examiners, I can conclude only that the initial examiner did exactly what the requestor asked, i.e., he was

OS JUDGMENT POLY INVALID

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told to collect reactions and he did. The fact that reactions were not consistent (and indeed may not have occurred) was not important since it had already been decided Subject was wrong and the polygraph was used only to support his decision. (These findings are dealt with more at length in Chapter VIII.) [90]

pages 37-38 missing

emphasize our willingness to keep his [sic] indefinitely and to heighten his tensions. 40

Meanwhile, Golitsyn had been brought into the case and was being employed as a behind-the-scenes consultant in connection with the interrogations. Golitsyn was given for analysis voluminous material relating to the case, and was told that "one of the most perplexing aspects of the Nosenko case to us at the present time is not whether he was sent (we all certainly agree with your view that he was sent on a mission) but the exact nature of his service with the KGB." 38 Golitsyn's role will be covered more thoroughly in a separate chapter.

MR. X AS "CONSULTANT"

To ensure cooperation in the interrogation, an "Outline of Action to be Taken Should Subject Refuse to Answer Requirements" was drawn up on 25 August 1964. The tenor of this Outline, which essentially set the basic policy of the incarceration until late 1967, is conveyed by the following excerpt:

> Should Subject refuse to answer the case officer's questions, Subject will be returned to his cell at a time chosen by the case officer, there will be no further conversations between Subject and the guards except that which is absolutely necessary, and the case officer will notify Chief, SR. At the case officer's discretion, Subject may lose his cigarette privileges immediately. Each day for an indefinite period the case officer will return and begin a session with Subject. If Subject refuses each day to discuss the questions, he will lose an additional privilege in the following order: cigarettes, table, chair, reading material, ruler, paper and pencil. In no case, however, will any of these privileges be removed except with the prior approval of Chief, SR. 46

The basic policy to be followed during interrogations was outlined even more fully in a lengthy memorandum of 2 November 1964. Like all other documents on this subject, it assumed that Nosenko was lying and had to be "trapped":

> How the Interrogation will be Begun: Subject will initially be confronted only by interrogators already known to him. They will begin detailed and apparently routine questioning on carefully selected operations or other aspects of the 1960--1962 period. This time, however, the interrogators will be prepared to stick doggedly to the particular subject. They will probe deeper and deeper for detail, never allowing Subject to dismiss them with such statements as "that is the way it was" or "that is all I remember." We would prefer to begin in this way so that Subject will already be under pressure, cornered and in trouble by the time he realizes that this is not a routine questioning but the climax of his long period of detention. In view of Subject's personality, one psychologist believes that Subject would otherwise welcome this climax and sharpen his

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Quote is presumed to be Bagley memorandum signed 17 Apr 64

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wits for a final battle to hoodwink us and regain his freedom.

Position Into Which Subject is to be Put: Once Subject has been trapped and cornered a few times, the basic theme of the interrogation will be put to him. He has protested his sincerity and desire to convince us of his truth. He must do this now; otherwise he is here to stay. He can only talk his way out by convincing us. In fact, he has shown in the present session and over the past months that he is unable to support his legend. He simply does not know the facts that anyone in his alleged position would have to know. We will confront him with our collateral knowledge, and insist that he answer our questions and prove his point. As he repeatedly fails to do so, he will be repeatedly accused of lying and of proving what we already know: that the entire service in the American Department was a clumsy fabrication, and he must confess it in order to get out.

Interrogation Guides: We will identify every detailed weakness, contradiction and omission in his stories, line them up with care according to priorities designed for maximum impact on Subject, and prepare interrogation briefs accordingly . . .

The Question of Attacking Him Personally or Placing the Blame on his KGB Superiors: In planning this interrogation we have examined two alternative methods of approach: (1) to attempt to destroy his own self-confidence by attacking him personally, exploiting our knowledge of his weaknesses and misbehavior, or (2) to pin the ultimate blame on his superiors, who sent him out under serious misapprehensions and with inadequate briefing. Psychologists who have examined Subject agree that he is pathologically self-centered. Since his own pride and his illusions of infallibility may constitute his last bulwark of self-protection, he may resist us more doggedly in this area than any other. The other course seems best. As he increasingly fails to answer our questions, we will point out to him the inadequacy of his briefing and the stupidity and fraud of which he has been made a victim. We will confront him with actual incidents which he must know about and then ask him for details. Over and over again, we will demonstrate and emphasize how inadequate his training and preparation was. We will demonstrate to Subject that the KGB consciously and callously sent him on an impossible mission and purposefully deceived him about the information that Subject himself considers the most important to the establishment of his bona fides . . . [49]

The possible outcomes foreseen as a result of the interrogation were also based on the assumption that he had been lying about his reasons for coming to us:

1. Full Success: If Subject confesses fully, he will

have broken with the KGB and will become dependent upon us for his security and well-being. After full debriefing and establishment of bona fides he will presumably be returned to a conventional safehouse and a life similar to the January to April 1964 period in which he will be permitted to go out with a security escort while we continue his exploitation and plan his future.

Partial Success: If Subject makes significant admissions and falls back on a second level cover story, he will be kept in the present safehouse. His personal circumstances and intensity of interrogation will be determined by the situation obtaining at that time.

Failure: If the interrogation fails, we would plan to put him "on ice" for a period, then interrogate him again. For this interim period, Subject would be transferred to visibly more permanent and more secure quarters. From the makeshift physical set up of his present quarters, the large number of guards who rotate weekly and the round-the-clock visual observation by two guards, it is obvious to Subject that his quarters (and therefore his situation) is temporary. As long as he knows this, he can hope. Our only hope of breaking Subject will be to allow him to convince himself that he has got into a situation from which he can extricate himself only by cooperating. This could be best achieved by breaking sharply with the present situation, placing him in permanent quarters, preferably remote and more primitive than his present quarters, physically secure and resembling jail, and capable of being manned by a minimum of guard personnel who would not keep him under constant direct visual observation. No Headquarters case officer would visit him, until he has given sign that he has changed his mind. This period would last for several months, pending another attempt to break him based on information obtained in the interim. 49

Pages 42-50 missing

> and that the time has come to prepare Subject for his move to the ostensibly permanent detention site . . . It will be ready for occupancy on or about 1 August. Chief, SR/CI (Bagley) visited the site on 11 June and reports that the installation is excellent from every point of view. 63

Before returning the memorandum to Murphy, Helms penned a marginal note next to the above paragraph: "I would like both you and JA [Angleton] to examine this site." 63

If Helms had had any doubt about the site's suitability, he must have been reassured by a 28 July 1965 memorandum addressed to him by the Director of Security, Howard Osborn:

> On Tuesday, 27 July, the Chief, CI Staff, the Chief, SR Division and the undersigned visited ISOLATION to inspect the newly constructed special detention facility there. As you know, while it is planned to utilize this facility to hold AEFOXTROT for an indefinite period, it has a long-range potential in fulfilling a need which has always existed for a maximum security site in an area completely under Agency control. We not only inspected the site and its surroundings but also the building itself and the security safeguards that have been included in its construction . . . This represents the first time that the Agency has constructed an operational detention facility based on actual operating experience and needs and it is our opinion that we have come close to achieving the ultimate both in utility as well as security. 64

ANGLETON/MURPHY/OSBORN VISIT LOBLOLLY

By mid-August, the time had come for Nosenko's transfer. The events surrounding it are recounted in a 19 August 1965 memorandum for the record:

> As planned, after Ted [Deryabin] had concluded his interrogation of Subject on the afternoon of 13 August, Pete Bagley had a brief "confrontation scene" with Subject on the same evening, immediately prior to his removal to new quarters. The purpose of this session was not to deliver a new message of any sort, or to give Subject "another chance to confess"; everything that could be said had already been said by Ted and the previous interrogators, and there was no doubt that Subject understood perfectly well the meaning and importance of what had been said to him; also, it was recognized that Subject would sense an impending move or change of some sort, and that it was inevitable that he would hope that the change would be for the better until he saw otherwise. The purpose of the confrontation was rather to close the circle: to show him that although Bagley had not seen him for over a year nothing had changed, and nothing would change until he told the truth. An additional effect would be to emphasize that the interrogators who had worked with him in the interim were fully responsible and authoritative, and that just as

Memorandum for the Record

PLANS FOR NOSENKO TO LOBLOLLY

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pages 52-55 missing

The new detention facility, code-named LOBLOLLY, had been designed and staffed with the intention of engendering in Nosenko a feeling of hopelessness, from which the only escape would be through confession that he was a KGB agent and revelation of the full details of how he had been briefed and dispatched by the Soviet authorities. With the exception of being allowed certain books, carefully selected for him by the Covert Action Staff of SR Division, Nosenko was confined under conditions which were as close to stimulus-free as was consistent with maintaining him in good physical health. For example, the TV used by the guards was fitted with earphones, so that there was no risk of his overhearing snatches of dialogue. Bagley was assured, in answer to an inquiry, that "while he does note planes going overhead as well as animal noises from the woods during exercise periods, everything else . . . is excluded." As to the guards, if Nosenko were to attempt to open conversation with them on any subject, "the guards should instruct him in rude terms to shut up." 67

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IMPORTANCE OF LOBLOLLY

At this point, we must pause to consider for the moment how the period which follows is to be covered. Because there were long periods of time when no human being other than the guards was in contact with Nosenko, and because he was not allowed to keep a diary, the story of his sojourn at LOBLOLLY from August 1965 to October 1967 does not lend itself easily to narrative presentation.

Yet this period cannot be ignored. It constituted over half of Nosenko's solitary confinement. And that three-and-a-half-year period amounts to five percent of the total life span of a man who lives to be 70.

Obviously, then, this period will weigh heavily in the findings made at the conclusion of our study. For these findings to be valid, they must be made on the basis of as much empirical evidence as can be gathered. Because the effect on Nosenko of this long period of confinement can only be dealt with speculatively, such few remarks as we have on that subject will be confined to the relatively discursive chapter on "Psychological and Medical Findings." Within the body of Chapter III, we are limiting ourselves to coverage of the main recorded events, none of which are seen through the eyes of Nosenko himself. In addition, as a special annex, we have provided excerpts from the daily "morning reports" to SR/SB Division, which may give some feel for how the prisoner reacted and behaved on a day-to-day basis. These reports cover minutiae, such as the frequency of bowel movements; but the very fact that such matters were worthy of recording may serve to give us some insight into the subjective experience of Nosenko's confinement. It was of just such details that his life primarily consisted, and not to report them would be to distort reality.

We now resume our narrative.

* * * * * * * * * * *

On 13 August 1965, before Nosenko was locked into his cell for the first time, he was read the following instructions which outlined the basic rules to be followed from then on:

The new detention facility, code-named LOBLOLLY, had been designed and staffed with the intention of engendering in Nosenko a feeling of hopelessness, from which the only escape would be through confession that he was a KGB agent and revelation of the full details of how he had been briefed and dispatched by the Soviet authorities. With the exception of being allowed certain books, carefully selected for him by the Covert Action Staff of SR Division, Nosenko was confined under conditions which were as close to stimulus-free as was consistent with maintaining him in good physical health. For example, the TV used by the guards was fitted with earphones, so that there was no risk of his overhearing snatches of dialogue. Bagley was assured, in answer to an inquiry, that "while he does note planes going overhead as well as animal noises from the woods during exercise periods, everything else . . . is excluded." As to the guards, if Nosenko were to attempt to open conversation with them on any subject, "the guards should instruct him in rude terms to shut up." 67

* * * * * * * * * * *

At this point, we must pause to consider for the moment how the period which follows is to be covered. Because there were long periods of time when no human being other than the guards was in contact with Nosenko, and because he was not allowed to keep a diary, the story of his sojourn at LOBLOLLY from August 1965 to October 1967 does not lend itself easily to narrative presentation.

Yet this period cannot be ignored. It constituted over half of Nosenko's solitary confinement. And that three-and-a-half-year period amounts to five percent of the total life span of a man who lives to be 70.

Obviously, then, this period will weigh heavily in the findings made at the conclusion of our study. For these findings to be valid, they must be made on the basis of as much empirical evidence as can be gathered. Because the effect on Nosenko of this long period of confinement can only be dealt with speculatively, such few remarks as we have on that subject will be confined to the relatively discursive chapter on "Psychological and Medical Findings." Within the body of Chapter III, we are limiting ourselves to coverage of the main recorded events, none of which are seen through the eyes of Nosenko himself. In addition, as a special annex, we have provided excerpts from the daily "morning reports" to SR/SB Division, which may give some feel for how the prisoner reacted and behaved on a day-to-day basis. These reports cover minutiae, such as the frequency of bowel movements; but the very fact that such matters were worthy of recording may serve to give us some insight into the subjective experience of Nosenko's confinement. It was of just such details that his life primarily consisted, and not to report them would be to distort reality.

We now resume our narrative.

* * * * * * * * * * *

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Cell

This is your cell. You are to keep it clean and will be given cleaning materials for this purpose.

Reading Privilege

You will be permitted one book a week which you may retain in your cell.

Smoking Privilege

You will receive a daily cigarette ration.

Exercising Privilege

Every day, weather and other factors permitting, you will have an exercise period.

Writing Material

Writing material will be provided only for correspondence with the appropriate authorities concerning your confession.

Schedule

This prison operates on a schedule. You will become familiar with this schedule and adhere to it at all times. 65

RULES AT LOBLOLLY

Within the framework of the above rules, which were strictly enforced, Nosenko's only diversion was reading the one book per week which he was at first allowed. He did not even have the distraction of being questioned, for, when queried by Helms on 12 January 1966, Murphy stated that no one from SR Division had seen Nosenko since the beginning of his confinement there, five months earlier. 70

On 1 November 1965, his privileges began to be reduced, for reasons that are not always clear from the record. From that date on, for instance, he no longer received books to read, and for minor acts of indiscipline, soap, towel and tooth brush were temporarily denied him.

Some time in January or February 1966, Nosenko claimed to be suffering from auditory hallucinations. In a memorandum dated 18 February 1966, Murphy reported:

> . . . There are hopeful signs that the isolation is beginning to have an effect on Subject. (Dr. Bohrer's visit may have had further impact in this direction when Dr. Bohrer told Subject that his visit constituted an "annual" physical exam; as he left Subject's room, Dr. Bohrer also remarked, "I'll see you next year." Subject's reaction was visible.)
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> Now we have just received further confirmation of the development of Subject's attitude. On the evening of 16 February 1966, he shouted for a few seconds in English, apparently to guards, that he would commit suicide and kept repeating, "You'll see. You'll see." He asked to see the local

MENTAL DETERIORATION OF NOSENKO

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Removal of Privileges to Nosenko

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"doctor" (he has been told that the medical technician at the base is a doctor), but the guards told him it was too late in the evening. When the technician came the following day, 17 February, Subject talked at some length about his worries that he might be going mad. He has repeatedly stressed his belief that he is being drugged, but said on this occasion that he recognized that there are no drugs designed to make a person mad. Consequently, he said, he was concerned about the fact that during the past day or two he had heard voices emanating from various objects, such as his shoe and his spoon, the engine of an aircraft overhead, and a bird in a nearby tree. When questioned, he said that the voices were saying in English "first die" while the bird was saying "kid." He asked if the "doctor" considered him insane. He was told that he did not appear to be so, upon which he reiterated his worries and spoke of his desire to die. He expressed his recognition that his present circumstances do not afford means to commit suicide. 71

Nosenko's alleged hallucinations triggered a special meeting on 24 February 1966. The resultant memorandum for the record, written by Atherton Noyes of SR/CI, is worth quoting in its entirety:

Representatives of SR Division, the Office of Security, and the Medical Staff met in the SR Conference Room from approximately 1400 to 1430 hours this date to discuss recent incidents in Nosenko's behavior and a forthcoming examination of Nosenko by Dr. [redacted] Present from SR were Mr. Bagley, Mr. Karpovich and the undersigned, while the Office of Security was represented by Mr. Jack Bauman and Mr. Joe Langan, and the Medical Staff by Doctors Bohrer and [redacted] The undersigned entered the Conference Room after discussions had begun, so some of the initial remarks are not noted here. (b)(3) (b)(3)

Dr. Bohrer first described to those present his examination of Nosenko on 21 January 1966 and stated his opinion, based on observations made at that time, that the recent outbursts by Nosenko and his threats of suicide are all contrived and do not represent an involuntary reaction on his part. Nosenko's recent behavior started with suicide threats, then progressed to auditory hallucinations, and has now reached the stage where every inanimate object in his environment, including the trees and the wind outdoors, are talking to him. Doctor Bohrer expressed his view that, if Nosenko actually does hear voices, it could normally be expected that they would speak to him in his native language, rather than in English as he told the base medical technician during a recent visit. Nosenko apparently now realizes this (Bohrer didn't describe how, but presumably the technician commented on it to

DOCTOR'S VIEWS ON NOSENKO MENTAL STATUS

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Doctor's views re Nosenko's Mental State

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Cont'd next pg.

Nosenko) and Nosenko, in Bohrer's opinion, has now picked this up and is trying to recoup by saying that he now does everything in English -- think, speak, everything.

At this point, Mr. Bagley described Nosenko's recently begun word games, in which he takes a Russian word and then figures out as many root derivations as possible, as an illustration of how ridiculous Nosenko's claim is.

Dr. Bohrer continued to say that Nosenko is now agreeing to take medication and is asking for additional medication to help raise his spirits. Dr. Bohrer has told the base medical technician not to answer Nosenko directly, but to "let it be known" to Nosenko that the medication he is now receiving will help him out in this respect. Dr. Bohrer then repeated that he thinks that Nosenko is reacting to his isolation, his lack of human contact, and his environment, but that he is responding in a planned, contrived, and non-spontaneous way, from a psychiatric point of view. Dr. Bohrer added that the only thing that is worrying him at present concerning Nosenko is his possible urinary problem, which is now being looked into.

Mr. Bagley next explained to those present that Nosenko's current behavior is consistent with our knowledge of Soviet training in techniques of resisting interrogation and imprisonment. However, because of intelligence and cunning (although he has a fair share of each), Nosenko has made some mistakes. Mr. Bagley agreed that Nosenko is probably feeling the effects of isolation and is making this try to get out. When he finds that this doesn't work, he may eventually decide "to hell with it" and start to talk. Speaking to Dr. [redacted] Mr. Bagley said that (b)(3) he and Dr. Bohrer agree that, should Nosenko raise the issue of his alleged insanity during the upcoming examination, the best response should be to the effect that, if Nosenko actually is going out of his head, the best possible thing for him is isolation, lots of rest, and a place where he can't hurt himself. This is what is usually prescribed and this is, in fact, the situation Nosenko already enjoys. Mr. Bagley added that the wording of any such response would, of course, be up to Dr. Bohrer.

In support of the above, Dr. Bohrer then said that he had gone over things very carefully during his January visit and, on this basis, can see no basic change in Nosenko. When Dr. Bohrer arrived at the site he had remarked that he had come for Nosenko's annual physical examination and when he was leaving he told Nosenko that he would see him again next year. In Dr. Bohrer's opinion, Nosenko reacted to this by saying to himself: "How can I get out of here?" He has apparently decided that the best way to escape his present situation is to

be sick with something that can't be handled locally and then it will be necessary for him to be moved to a hospital. Dr. Bohrer said that, from Nosenko's point of view, any change will be for the better and agreed with Mr. Bagley that it is important to indicate that there will be none. The simple statement suggested by Mr. Bagley may give Nosenko the message and no further explanation is necessary.

Mr. Bauman then asked if, under conditions of prolonged confinement, there is not a chance that a person actually will go off his rocker. Dr. Bohrer replied that this is absolutely so, that this happens in many cases under less stringent conditions of imprisonment, and that the person usually improves quickly when these conditions are relaxed. Dr. Bohrer does not believe however that Nosenko fits in this category.

Mr. Bauman then asked what sort of behavior can be expected in a person who is actually so affected by his imprisonment. Whether he could be expected to become violent or behave erratically. Mr. Bauman said that he was asking this question from the point of view of his responsibilities for guarding Nosenko. Dr. Bohrer replied that such behavior can take almost any form, that there may be changes in physical behavior, eating and sleeping habits, etc. He added that there certainly has been a change in Nosenko since the January 1966 examination, that he doesn't know for certain what it means, and that there surely is a risk that he may go out of his head. Mr. Bagley pointed out that Dr. Bohrer's remark about the "annual physical" may have triggered this reaction. Dr. Bohrer agreed, saying that while he cannot dismiss true insanity as a real possibility, he doesn't think that this is what is going on right now.

This was followed by a discussion between Dr. Bohrer, Dr. [redacted] Mr. Bagley, and Mr. Bauman concerning the scheduling of Dr. Borcherding's visit. Mr. Bagley said that he and the undersigned would like to go along and Dr. Bohrer said he would like to be present too. It was decided that Tuesday, 1 March, would be most convenient for all concerned and Mr. Bauman said he would arrange for air transportation and a vehicle directly to the site. Mr. Bauman will either fly down with the rest or will meet them there. (b)(3) Noyes

Mr. Bauman next commented that Nosenko is again asking for reading material and asked Mr. Bagley if he wanted to give him any. Mr. Bagley replied absolutely not and Dr. Bohrer concurred that no changes should be made. Mr. Bauman then asked whether Nosenko has any sort of skin disease, pointing out that the guards have to wash his shirts two or three times to get them clean. Both doctors said that Nosenko is not afflicted as far

as they know and Mr. Bauman asked whether it is still policy that Nosenko is to have a clean change of clothes only once a week. Dr. Bohrer expressed the opinion that nothing should be changed, at least until after the examination on 1 March.

Dr. Bohrer remarked that things are bound to change as far as Nosenko is concerned -- he is either going to stop faking or things will get worse. Mr. Bagley added that we (SR) are working hard on other sources of information, that things seem optimistic right now, and that this is no time to falter. He added that Mr. Helms is keeping current of the situation and goes along fully with present plans, without changes.

Mr. Karpovich asked Dr. Bohrer what medication Nosenko is now receiving. Bohrer replied that he is getting 1/4 of a grain of phenobarbital together with an antispasmodic (for gas), which won't have any medical effect on Nosenko's mental state. This is why, he explained, he had instructed the base technician to let Nosenko know that the medication will help him. It can have no real effect and if Nosenko suddenly improves, this will be added confirmation that he is faking. 72

NOSENKO MEDICATION IN LOBLOLLY

On 1 March 1966, Bagley and Noyes accompanied Doctors Bohrer and [redacted] to LOBLOLLY for another examination of Nosenko. [redacted] conducted the examination, while the other members of the party observed it on a television screen. None of the four men gave much credence to Nosenko's claim of hearing voices, but Noyes recorded an evolution of the situation:

(b)(3)
(b)(3)

MEDICAL EXAM OF NOSENKO--"SHAM SYMPTOMS"

Though Nosenko's mental difficulties are apparently a sham, it is also evident that there has been a change in his outlook since SR last had direct contact with him in August 1965. If by nothing else, this is evidenced by the single fact that he has taken a new tack in his relationship with CIA: He has apparently given up hope that his legend or "another source" can help him escape his predicament and, as Dr. Bohrer earlier proposed, is using his "voices" (except for which Nosenko claims to be sane) to force some sort of change. For the first time in the undersigned's recollection, Nosenko said that he now knows that his CIA handling officers will never (Nosenko's emphasis) believe him because of his behavior and for other reasons, and that there is nothing he can do about it. But, beyond this, it is difficult to interpret the significance of his remarks and behavior during Dr. [redacted] interview -- on one hand there were indications of deterioration; on the other Nosenko is an astute actor, who was clearly playing a role for Dr. [redacted] Bearing in mind that these superficial indications may well be a part of this act, Nosenko appeared far more subdued, almost despondent, compared with six months ago. For most of the interview, he slouched or sat listlessly in his chair and only seldom did he lean forward and, by the motions of his hands, attempt

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to reach and to secure the understanding and belief of the interviewer. There appears to be a slight deterioration in his English-language fluency (see transcript below) and his replies were broken by frequent pauses, incomplete sentences, and confusing revisions. 73

Nosenko's changed outlook next took the form of two letters to Bagley, written in mid-April 1966 (although incorrectly dated, because by now his calculation of the passage of time was no longer completely accurate). The first, and briefer of the two, read:

> I ask you to excuse me for my baseness in 1962 and 1964. Now I have completely realized all my delinquencies and have reevaluated my past "life."
>
> I want to live an exclusively honest and modest life and I am ready to work in whatever place that it may be possible, taking into account my knowledge of Soviet Russia. I believe that I have sufficient strength to live only a real life.
>
> I ask you to help me. 75

The second letter was even more self-accusatory, and was clearly modeled after the self-criticisms exacted from prisoners in the Soviet Union. It began:

> My despicable behaviour from the beginning of my acquaintance with you in 1962 led to it being necessary to create special conditions for me and to assist me, which has finally helped me to realize all my delinquencies and mistakes and to reevaluate all my past "life."
>
> I should have honestly told you everything about myself, about my moral principles and my life in Soviet Russia in order to start a conscientious life in June 1962. 75

This letter next summarized Nosenko's career from childhood until his arrival in the United States, and admitted that although he had been documented "erroneously" as a lieutenant colonel he had actually never held a military rank higher than captain in the KGB. It concluded:

> Work in the KGB was the chief and deciding period of my degradation -- drunkenness, debauchery, baseness, and falsehood.
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> I should have told you all about this in 1962 or in 1964, before flying to America.
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> I started my life in the United States of America absolutely incorrectly. My behaviour was base, dirty, and boorish.
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> The creation of isolated living conditions and the appropriate assistance were necessary for me. But I was unable to honestly and

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

NOSENKO LETTERS TO BAGLEY

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

directly tell everything about myself in 1964 or in 1965, right up to the last conversation with you. And only in 1966 did I gradually begin to realize and to correctly understand all my mistakes and delinquencies and to think about my behaviour. And only here was I able to reevaluate all my past "life."

Now I can think correctly about real life and work, and therefore I address myself to you because you know me more and better than anyone else, with the request to decide the question of my future life. By work against the Communists, and only with real life, I will try to justify the confidence placed in me. 75

Murphy forwarded both letters to Helms (still DDCI), on 19 Apr 66 together with a memorandum which read in part:

> The letters themselves do not represent a complete break but they reveal that his defenses are weakening and he may be seeking a way out. He tells essentially the same story as before but with more discrepancies of detail which suggest further deterioration and, by this time, an inability to recount his legend consistently. The most significant change is that he now admits he was only a Captain in the KGB and not a Lt. Colonel. On the other hand, this may be a prearranged fall-back position. We recall that [a Soviet agent] -- who, in telling us repeatedly in 1964 of the importance of Nosenko, said he was a Lt. Col. -- informed the FBI in February 1965 (after our doubts about Nosenko had become well known and Nosenko himself had possibly missed pre-arranged contacts with the KGB) that [a Soviet agent] had heard that although Nosenko was a Deputy Department Chief, he was only a Captain and not a Lt. Colonel. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the rank of Lt. Col. was part of the KGB prepared legend for Nosenko, and not simply his own improvisation. This is proved by the fact that one of the personal documents that Nosenko brought with him to Geneva in 1964 was a TDY travel order which Nosenko claims to have used to travel to Gorkiy . . . (and) was clearly a deliberate plant by the KGB and there can be no question of its being filled out erroneously. Furthermore, the rank was necessary to sustain the fiction of Nosenko's high supervisory positions, which in turn were necessary to explain his access to the information he claims to have.
>
> Aside from the hope they offer for success in breaking Nosenko, the most interesting aspect of the letters is their tone. He does not complain of our treatment of him but on the contrary expresses appreciation for it and says that it was entirely justified. They are the latest in

a series of indications that Nosenko is weakening. They follow an attempt to feign insanity, an abortive hunger strike and some erratic behaviour concerning his exercise period.

We plan to answer him along the lines that we are willing to forgive his "baseness and falsehood" and discuss his rehabilitation but only when he is prepared to drop the legend which he seems to maintain in his letter. If he is, as we think, getting desperate to get out, he may reply with further admissions.

We have clarified the medical questions which were delaying further interrogation. We are now reviewing with Chief, TSD the proposals discussed with you earlier concerning the use of special interrogation techniques. The attached letters afford an ideal opportunity to resume discussions with Nosenko whenever we wish. 75

(Murphy's reference to "special interrogation techniques" harked back to a 13 January 1966 discussion with Helms, during which the latter had stated that "he was inclined to try special techniques on Subject in the hope that they might somehow provide the answers we are seeking." 70 In this context, "special techniques" was a euphemism for the use of drugs, specifically sodium amytal and LSD, as aids in interrogation. As will be shown later, although Helms was willing to discuss the use of such techniques in this case, he in fact never gave his consent and they were never employed. Nevertheless, the use of drugs for interrogation purposes seems to have been contemplated for some time, since it is foreseen in handwritten notes made by Bagley as early as November 1964, and Murphy and Bagley continue to press for permission to employ them until a final negative decision by Helms on 1 September 1966.) 51, 85

On 26 April 1966, Murphy again wrote Helms to say that a response to Nosenko's letters had been delayed in order to allow time for discussion with Angleton and Bohrer. Their combined judgment seems to have been that the letters were "an attempt to relieve the isolation by reestablishing personal contact, if only with his interrogators." He bolstered this view by an appeal to medical authority:

It is Dr. Bohrer's opinion, in which we fully concur, that any such contact would in fact constitute a relief for Nosenko and that it would be a serious mistake to grant him this at the very moment that his psychological defenses may be cracking. On the contrary, Dr. Bohrer feels we should cut off any hopes Nosenko may harbor that he can alter his present situation without a full confession.

Since it is the technique of isolation and rejection that has led to the recent promising changes in Nosenko's attitude and behavior, we believe that it is logical to continue along the same lines and that there is a reasonable

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re use of LSD & Sodium Amytal (also, torture p pg 67)

(Murphy's reference to "special interrogation techniques" harked back to a 13 January 1966 discussion with Helms, during which the latter had stated that "he was inclined to try special techniques on Subject in the hope that they might somehow provide the answers we are seeking." [70] In this context, "special techniques" was a euphemism for the use of drugs, specifically sodium amytal and LSD, as aids in interrogation. As will be shown later, although Helms was willing to discuss the use of such techniques in this case, he in fact never gave his consent and they were never employed. Nevertheless, the use of drugs for interrogation purposes seems to have been contemplated for some time, since it is foreseen in handwritten notes made by Bagley as early as November 1964, and Murphy and Bagley continue to press for permission to employ them until a final negative decision by Helms on 1 September 1966.) [51, 85]

On 26 April 1966, Murphy again wrote Helms to say that a response to Nosenko's letters had been delayed in order to allow time for discussion with Angleton and Bohrer. Their combined judgment seems to have been that the letters were "an attempt to relieve the isolation by reestablishing personal contact, if only with his interrogators." He bolstered this view by an appeal to medical authority:

Torture Implements

> It is Dr. Bohrer's opinion, in which we fully concur, that any such contact would in fact constitute a relief for Nosenko and that it would be a serious mistake to grant him this at the very moment that his psychological defenses may be cracking. On the contrary, Dr. Bohrer feels we should cut off any hopes Nosenko may harbor that he can alter his present situation without a full confession.
>
> Since it is the technique of isolation and rejection that has led to the recent promising changes in Nosenko's attitude and behavior, we believe that it is logical to continue along the same lines and that there is a reasonable

expectation that this treatment will produce further results in the near future. We therefore intend to send Nosenko the attached letter and to wait approximately 60 days before changing our tactics. 76

The letter thereupon sent to Nosenko in Bagley's name read as follows:

I have received your letters and so-called "autobiography." We understand fully what degradation the Soviet system has forced you into and as you have been told, we are willing to help you establish a real life.

As I told you in August, however, we have no further interest in reading or listening to the legend (or its variations) that you continue to repeat. We are only interested in evidence that you really want to talk truthfully. In the future we will reply only to a true written account of your life and how your legend was prepared. Do not waste our time with the lies of the past. This legend cannot be the basis of a new life for you. 78

BAGLEY REPLY TO NOSENKO PLEAS

Helms was taking sufficient interest in the details of the case to have sent the following handwritten note to Murphy on 26 April: "Please phone me about the text of the letter. I have a couple changes to suggest." Though there is written evidence that a discussion did take place, the letter was nonetheless sent in the exact form which Murphy had originally proposed. 76

Murphy's next blow-by-blow report to Helms, dated 11 May 1966, was the following:

As previously agreed on 28 April, a brief note was passed to Nosenko in response to his earlier note and slightly amended biographical statement. He made no response upon receiving our note (although he did not touch his meal that night); but on the evening of 4 May he asked for a pencil and paper, indicating, in reply to a question from the guard, that he had a statement to make in response to our note. After writing his note, he sealed it in an envelope and gave it to the guard to be delivered.

The note, written in English, states:

Allow me to thank you very much for your kind letter. Now I understood fully what degradation the Soviet Russia had forced me into. At last I can tell you that I really want to talk truthfully.

I want to begin the job against the Soviet Russia. My only wish is to establish a real life with your help as you are willing to do so.

[signed] [redacted] Nosenko

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We have discussed his note with Dr. Bohrer, who feels that the final sentence of the first paragraph probably reflects no real desire on the part of Nosenko to talk truthfully at this time, but is rather a further attempt by him either to generate a personal dialogue with us or at least to continue this written exchange.

We feel that it would not be in our interest to answer this latest note with another note, thus permitting additional and, to Nosenko, psychologically necessary contact and involvement -- albeit impersonal. In order to cut off this effort on his part, but at the same time to allow for the possibility that this latest note might actually convey an intention to talk truthfully, we intend to deliver to Nosenko the attached statement. The requirement for direct "YES" or "NO" answers accompanied by his signature allows for no misunderstanding of the questions and does not permit lengthy discourses on peripheral matters.

Dr. Bohrer concurs in our plan and recommends that it be carried out as soon as possible to achieve maximum effect. If we get a positive response we will follow up immediately. 78

YES/NO NOTE TO NOSENKO

In accordance with the above memorandum, the following form was passed to Nosenko at LOBLOLLY on 13 May 1966, apparently by the Security guards:

Answer "YES" or "NO":

1) Do you admit that you came to the United States on a KGB mission?

YES [__] NO [__]

2) Are you ready to tell us about your KGB mission and how your legend was prepared and taught to you?

YES [__] NO [__]

Date _____ Signed _____

If the answers to both questions are "YES" someone will come to talk to you. If not, there is no need to write any more letters. 78

The next major maneuver on Nosenko's part was a hunger strike, in the course of which he lost some forty pounds. 79 This tactic was counteracted with the help of an Agency medical officer while administering a physical check-up on 22 June 1966:

NOSENKO HUNGER STRIKE

In the course of the examination, Dr. Borcherding questioned Subject on the reasons for his fast and got him to admit that this was a deliberate

We have discussed his note with Dr. Bohrer, who feels that the final sentence of the first paragraph probably reflects no real desire on the part of Nosenko to talk truthfully at this time, but is rather a further attempt by him either to generate a personal dialogue with us or at least to continue this written exchange.

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highest weight, 174 lbs in Nov 65) lowest, 130 in June 66 Nosenko Hunger Strike

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In the course of the examination, Dr. [redacted] (b)(3) questioned Subject on the reasons for his fast and got him to admit that this was a deliberate

tactic. As planned, the doctor showed no concern, assured Subject that he was still in good health, described to him in some detail the physical and mental consequences of prolonged undernourishment, and emphasized that Subject would not be allowed to do himself any damage in this manner. The doctors' description of some of the standard methods of forced feeding and his matter-of-fact emphasis that all appropriate medical measures could and would be taken at the present site made an instant and evident impact on Subject, who nevertheless continued to assert that he had no need or desire for more food. (Despite the weight loss, the results of the medical exam showed that Subject is in good overall condition.)

On 23 June, the day following the doctor's visit, Subject began to eat ravenously and he has been consuming all his meals since. By 6 July he had gained 15 lbs. 81

The Agency's next step was to have Bagley see Nosenko. This interview, which took place on 6 July 1966, lasted for about 45 minutes and "was the first time that a case officer had talked to Subject since he was moved to [LOBLOLLY] . . ." 81 The interview resulted in another stand-off, Bagley insisting that Nosenko admit to being a KGB agent and the latter refusing. Once again, however, Agency officers in charge felt they were making progress:

Dr. Bohrer, who monitored the entire interview, was impressed by the fact that Subject had used it solely to appeal to the pity and sympathy of the interviewer, and felt that the way in which the interview was conducted would very effectively slam shut still another psychological door. It is believed that for the first time Subject has come to appreciate the measure of our resolve and determination, and that he is actively grappling with the realities of his present situation. Subject's pattern of behavior over the past few months suggests that he will need some time to fully digest the import of the Bagley interview, but that he will then be impelled to initiate some new effort to releive [sic] his lot. Very few alternatives short of confession -- real or false -- appear to be left to him. 81

Following the above interview, the Division planned an interrogation assisted by the use of drugs. The primary drug to be employed would be sodium amytal, but the possible use of LSD was also foreseen; there had already been some experimentation with the latter substance, which was included in the category of "special techniques." On 21 June 1966, Helms approved in writing a memorandum which included the following plans:

Amytal Interview. It was agreed that previous operational experience with sodium amytal does not give cause for great expectations, at least

DOCTOR ASSESS OF EFFECTIVENESS OF CONFRONTATION

AMYTAL INTERVIEW

Bagley w/Nosenko first 65 to 66

Murphy memo to Helms

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Another Bagley mtg w/Nosenko

In almost one year — 13 Aug 65 to July 66

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> so far as extracting a confession is concerned, and that the most we can realistically expect is to place Subject in lowered state of resistance and awareness during which we can probe the weak parts of his legend and search for additional fissures for later exploitation. In addition, there is some chance that if Subject were conditioned by special techniques in preparation for his mission, that some clues to this conditioning might turn up during the amytal interview. Dr. Bohrer emphasized that in order to maximize stress, the build-up to the interview will have to be planned and staged as carefully as the interview itself. It was agreed that essentially the amytal interview is a matter of preparing as carefully as possible, and then hoping that something useful will pop out. It is impossible to predict the nature of Subject's reactions and responses, and we should be prepared to run a series of such interviews should the first ones give unexpectedly good results.
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> Special Techniques. It was agreed that we are not in a position right now to do any specific planning beyond the amytal interview, but that we will have to regroup at that time to evaluate the results of the steps outlined above and to consider the further use of special techniques.[80]

A subsequent memorandum to Helms, who had become DCI on 30 June 1966, advised him of plans for a drug-assisted interview to take place at "the end of August." The reason for delay was explained, in the last paragraph of an 8 July memorandum, as follows:

> As proposed in paragraph 9 of reference, our next step is to be the sodium amytal interview. Barring any dramatic developments we propose to schedule this for the end of August. Both we and Dr. Bohrer believe that the intervening interval of isolation will be extremely valuable in terms of allowing Subject to ponder on the complete failure of his recent gambits, and of building up tension and frustration that can be exploited in the amytal interview. Happily, this schedule is also compatible with the summer vacation plans of the key personnel concerned.[81]

On the cover sheet of the above memorandum Helms wrote: "OK on last para." Nevertheless, by some six weeks later he had begun to change his mind. While he did not order cancellation of plans for the drug-related interrogations, on 23 August 1966 he did instruct Desmond FitzGerald, then DDP, and Murphy to close the case "within about sixty days assuming there are no new developments which would warrant reconsideration of this development." Murphy gave this account of Helms' reasoning:

> . . . the Director advised us that in his view the time had come to consider disposal of Subject. He was willing, he said, to proceed with the immediate plans we had for the sodium

HELMS' SECOND THOUGHTS RE AMYTAL

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amytal interview and to consider proposals for use of special techniques within the time frame we suggested but unless these steps developed new information or indicated definite progress in resolving the case, he wanted us to wind it up. He emphasized that he was not willing to accept the kind of press attacks which would be directed at the Agency if it became known that we had held Subject in these circumstances and in what would be interpreted as outright defiance of law and custom. He commented that we had to recognize as almost inevitable the possibility that some day, directly or indirectly, someone connected with the case would become concerned at this violation of Subject's rights and surface the matter in Congress or in the press . . . Regardless of the importance of the case or the professional correctness of our position, the Director said a matter of this kind could not be contained in our society . . . The Director made it clear that he would favor some form of return to Soviet control on the grounds that one could handle accusations by Pravda with Senator Fulbright, but a live AEFOXTROT, able to speak to the press in whatever country we had resettled him, or even to return to this country would be disastrous. 83

Helms' decision triggered a new rash of activity within the SB Division. Murphy, noting that "there is no appeal . . . unless we uncover new, compelling data," reconstituted a special Task Force to work on the case, headed by Bagley, who had by now become Deputy Chief of SB Division. 83

Bagley, in a series of handwritten notes, set forth the Task Force objective as he saw it: "To liquidate & insofar as possible to clean up traces of a sitn in which CIA cd be accused of illegally holding Nosenko." Further on, he summed up a number of "alternative actions," including:

5. Liquidate the man.

6. Render him incapable of giving coherent story (special dose of drug etc.) Poss aim commitmt to looney bin.

7. Commitment to loony bin w/out making him nuts. 82

BAGLEY LIQUIDATION PLAN

A problem which Bagley found particularly thorny, to judge by his notes, was posed by the FBI's unwillingness to accept CIA's evaluation of Nosenko.

> Our case is based primarily on analysis, not confirmed by juridically acceptable evidence, and this analysis is so complex that it probably could not be made more understandable to laymen than it has been to the FBI, which has largely failed to understand it . . . Action serving the interests of this Agency may run counter to the interests of the FBI, since our basic position on Nosenko is different from the Bureau's, and the Nosenko case is inextricably

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Bagley Liquidation Plan

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> linked with [a Soviet agent] and linked to some degree with [a Soviet agent], on which the Bureau official position is most inflexible. 84

The FBI also played a role in Bagley's handwritten ruminations over the value of a bogus "confession" by means of which Nosenko would ostensibly discredit himself:

> "Confession" wd lessen zeal of congress for a session w/him. Or wd it? FBI might leak to cong/press that they don't know of conf. And they might object to the whole premise, view their interests. "Conf" wd also provide basis for explanation of removal to another ctry -- if feasible. Q: Cd we fake to FBI (CSCI, all other contacts) squaring only w/top? Then cd we fake [redacted] under similar circumstances? Any action on Nos likely affect [a Soviet agent] & hence FBI interests. This considered under each alternative for action. 82

BAGLEY NOTES RE CONGRESS/PRESS

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

Despite Helms' expressed preference for returning Nosenko to Soviet hands, Bagley continued to have misgivings about such a course:

> Danger in the Nosenko case lies not only in holding him, but in bringing his case to public notice again, and especially in allowing the Soviets to regain possession of him. (Our denial of Nosenko to the Soviets, particularly if they are in some doubt about his real status/loyalty, is a form of guarantee that the Soviets cannot take the many damaging actions available to them if they had the body.) The course of action therefore must balance the respective dangers. 84

Helms, on the other hand, hardened his position. He was perhaps influenced by Dr. Bohrer's pointing out that in his experience with sodium amytal it had only worked once, and then by accident; Helms promptly revoked his permission for use of this drug. After hearing an explanation by Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, of Technical Services Division, on the use of LSD and similar drugs, Helms remarked that Nosenko was "one person on whom these techniques were never going to be used." 85 The upshot was that, on 1 September 1966, Helms limited the interrogators to the polygraph in any future interrogations, and reiterated his preference for "having Subject turned back to the Soviets . . ." 85

HELMS' DECISION AGAINST AMYTAL

On 2 September, Murphy saw Helms again, to ask that under the new circumstances the sixty-day deadline be extended. Helms agreed on an extension until the end of the year. A discussion of a final report and "disposal" then ensued, reported by Murphy as follows:

> . . . it would be imprudent I thought not to have ready for any eventuality a detailed study of our findings. This would provide backup to our final report to the intelligence community principals, the Secretary of State, Attorney General and others. In the case of the FBI,

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More Bagley ruminations: plans; concern about congress & press.

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Helms' decision against drugs

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Murphy's request for extension of 60 days

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> I added, we would most certainly have to have such a document. [This remark stemmed from the fact that the FBI had never fully agreed with the Agency's views on Nosenko.]
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> As for disposal, [Director Helms] believed that return to Soviet control is the only practical solution. Third country disposal might only delay our having to face the same problems and if accusations are leveled at the agency it would be far preferable to have Subject in Soviet hands. The Director did not believe the Soviets would refuse to accept Subject and felt we could take the sting out of any Soviet reaction by our own statement concerning Subject's mission. If our position is publicized first, anything the Soviets or anyone else says about the case thereafter will have very little effect. In the conclusion the Director emphasized the need to bring this case to an end in a manner which will permit us to arrange events and timing to our advantage. He does not want to be stampeded by publicity beyond our control.[86]

Interrogation of Nosenko, preparatory to the preparation of the above-mentioned final report, was recommenced on 18 October 1966. Assisting in the interrogation was Nicholas Stoiaken, the polygraph operator whose 1964 polygraph tapes were at this very time under review by the Office of Security; on 1 November, thirteen days later, they were officially and in writing pronounced to have been invalid.

Hope nevertheless seemed to spring eternal in the breasts of the investigators, and this is what Murphy had to report on 25 October 1966:

> Nosenko knows he is reacting in sensitive areas and this is worrying him because he is not sure how much we know or how we learned it. Nosenko's reactions have given us hope that we may by this procedure have begun to strike home. We do not know what it is that keeps this man sitting month after month in his present situation. We speculate that one factor may be confidence that the KGB will get him out. Related to this may be the thought that the KGB has CIA so deeply penetrated that it would be unhealthy for him to confess. Our current line of interrogation, expanded and used even more forcefully, might break down some of his obstacles to confession by showing us in a different and stronger posture.[88]

Despite eight days of interrogation employing the polygraph, however, SB Division did not achieve their goal: Nosenko did not "confess" to being a "provocateur." Operating under the constraint of Helms' injunction to wind up the case by the end of the year, Bagley made one last attempt to shatter Nosenko's resolution. In a long letter, Bagley outlined the hopelessness of Nosenko's situation and adduced a number of proofs of Nosenko's prevarication, derived in part from a fictitious "KGB officer . . . sent out as a

> I added, we would most certainly have to have such a document. [This remark stemmed from the fact that the FBI had never fully agreed with the Agency's views on Nosenko.]
>
> As for disposal, [Director Helms] believed that return to Soviet control is the only practical solution. Third country disposal might only delay our having to face the same problems and if accusations are leveled at the agency it would be far preferable to have Subject in Soviet hands. The Director did not believe the Soviets would refuse to accept Subject and felt we could take the sting out of any Soviet reaction by our own statement concerning Subject's mission. If our position is publicized first, anything the Soviets or anyone else says about the case thereafter will have very little effect. In the conclusion the Director emphasized the need to bring this case to an end in a manner which will permit us to arrange events and timing to our advantage. He does not want to be stampeded by publicity beyond our control. 86

Nosenko 2nd polt

Interrogation of Nosenko, preparatory to the preparation of the above-mentioned final report, was recommenced on 18 October 1966. Assisting in the interrogation was Nicholas Stoiaken, the polygraph operator whose 1964 polygraph tapes were at this very time under review by the Office of Security; on 1 November, thirteen days later, they were officially and in writing pronounced to have been invalid.

Hope nevertheless seemed to spring eternal in the breasts of the investigators, and this is what Murphy had to report on 25 October 1966:

> Nosenko knows he is reacting in sensitive areas and this is worrying him because he is not sure how much we know or how we learned it. Nosenko's reactions have given us hope that we may by this procedure have begun to strike home. We do not know what it is that keeps this man sitting month after month in his present situation. We speculate that one factor may be confidence that the KGB will get him out. Related to this may be the thought that the KGB has CIA so deeply penetrated that it would be unhealthy for him to confess. Our current line of interrogation, expanded and used even more forcefully, might break down some of his obstacles to confession by showing us in a different and stronger posture. 88

Despite eight days of interrogation employing the polygraph, however, SB Division did not achieve their goal: Nosenko did not "confess" to being a "provocateur." Operating under the constraint of Helms' injunction to wind up the case by the end of the year, Bagley made one last attempt to shatter Nosenko's resolution. In a long letter, Bagley outlined the hopelessness of Nosenko's situation and adduced a number of proofs of Nosenko's prevarication, derived in part from a fictitious "KGB officer . . . sent out as a

Cont next pg

MORE MISSING

PAGES: 72, 73,

75

12: Inter-Agency Disagreement

Despite the injunction of Director Helms, the end of the year came and passed without resolution of the case. Nosenko continued to be incarcerated at LOBLOLLY, with his privileges reduced to a minimum; he had not even been allowed to have any reading material (except Bagley's written injunctions) since November 1965. [96] SB Division personnel were no longer seeing Nosenko, who was relegated exclusively to the custody of the Office of Security. The only recorded exception was a visit by Dr. Bohrer. Murphy remarked in a memorandum that "since this will mark the third anniversary of AEFOXTROT's arrival in the West, Dr. Bohrer will advertise his visit as 'the routine, annual physical' in order to gain maximum psychological advantage . . ." [94]

Meanwhile, enormous effort went into preparation of SB Division's "final report" on the case. This document, frequently referred to as the "thousand-page report," was described by Murphy as follows:

> [It] will reflect all of AEFOXTROT's statements concerning his personal life, alleged KGB career and other matters as well as subsequent contradictions or denials of earlier statements plus the results of our investigations at home and abroad of these statements. It will also cover statements pertaining to AEFOXTROT made by various Soviet officials some of whom have been or are now in operational contact with the CS [Clandestine Service] or the FBI. This factual portion will be followed by analysis and conclusions. The latter will be absolutely unequivocal on these points:
>
> a. AEFOXTROT is a dispatched KGB agent whose contact with us and ultimate defection were carried out at KGB direction.
>
> b. AEFOXTROT's claim to service in the KGB was an integral and vital part of his KGB agent mission, forming as it did the basis for all that he has had to say about KGB operations and personnel. Yet, the results of our interrogations of AEFOXTROT supported by polygraph examination demonstrate conclusively that AEFOXTROT did not and could not have served in any of the specific staff positions he has described.
>
> c. Whatever the ultimate goals of this KGB operation might be, it has been possible to determine that among the most significant KGB aims in directing AEFOXTROT to us were: (1) to persuade us of KGB ineptitude and lack of success in developing technical and human penetrations of the U.S. Government, its security and intelligence services while at the same time deliberately diverting these services from specific areas of investigation in which the KGB has been successful; (2) to offer us leads to new sources

THOUSAND PAGE REPORT

End of year & Nosenko still at LOBLOLLY

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13: Voices of Dissent

Meanwhile, although the top leadership of SR Division remained unassailably certain of its thesis regarding Nosenko as a KGB-dispatched agent, there was some dissent at the lower levels. Manifestations of disagreement were not well received by the leadership, however, and thus had no effect on the handling of the case.

A former member of SR/CI [137] remembers that it was sometimes possible to discuss alternative ways of presenting very specific points in preparing the written case against Nosenko (which was eventually to become the so-called "thousand-page paper"), but no qualification of the basic thesis was tolerated. Bagley was notorious for his outbursts of temper when even his most hyperbolic statement regarding the guilt of "the no-good son-of-a-bitch" Nosenko was questioned. (b)(3)

The first recorded dissent, therefore, came from outside SR Division, and it was a tentative one. John Gittinger, the senior Plans Directorate psychologist, had been asked to interview Nosenko in depth, which he did during a series of meetings between 3 and 21 May 1965. As a result of his questioning, he became convinced that at the very least Nosenko was in fact Nosenko. Even this rather bland assertion, however, was met by Murphy with the statement, "John, there are things in this case that you do not know about." [128] Nonetheless, in summing up the sessions, Gittinger had this to say:

> I am totally at a loss to even attempt to rationalize why a story with this much pathology would be used as a legend. Nothing could be served other than to discredit the man to whom it was assigned. In some remote sense -- to me -- it might have been felt it would evoke sympathy but this is really far out and a very dangerous gamble on their part. The manner in which he has told his story and the nuances he has introduced would require great ingenuity and preparation. From my standpoint, he has been essentially convincing and accurate in general if not always truthful in detail. Here I am talking about the psychological data only -- I am not prepared to express an opinion on other aspects. Within whatever frame of reference I can operate, I am forced to conclude that all the psychological evidence would indicate that he is Nosenko, the son of Ivan Nosenko. His life story is essentially as he has described it. It is obviously distorted in places but in each case there is a probable psychological reason for the distortion and deception. No man is a good reporter on himself and we all use rationalization to avoid seeing ourselves as others see us. My opinion, for whatever it is worth, is that Nosenko cannot be broken outside the context of his life story and personality structure. It should be noted here that the life story is completely compatible with the personality structure as projected by psychological tests. [62]

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Gittinger claims now that he had more doubts about the validity of the Murphy-Bagley-Angleton view of Nosenko than he felt it wise to express. The following excerpt from a memorandum of conversation, dated 4 August 1976, gives his memory of the situation facing him:

Need memo of conversation w Gittinger on 4 Aug 76

> In discussing his lengthy series of interviews with Nosenko on 3 - 21 May 1965, Gittinger said that he was very hesitant to express the full extent of his doubts about the theory that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent. The reason for his hesitation was that, when David Murphy got a hint of Gittinger's doubts about the theory, Murphy told Gittinger that such doubts might make Gittinger suspect of himself being involved in the KGB/Nosenko plan.
>
> Gittinger stated that he took Murphy's threat seriously because Gittinger had previously been associated with two staff employees, [redacted] and Peter Karlow, who had been forced to resign from the Agency for what many of us considered somewhat flimsy security reasons. 125 (b)(3)

There is no evidence in the files to indicate that Gittinger's doubts were accorded any impartial consideration. Murphy, in a 15 June 1965 memorandum to Helms (who was by now DDCI, but still riding herd on the case), described the interviews as "unrewarding in terms of producing new information or insights . . . It was obvious that Subject had given some thought . . . to improving and smoothing over some of the rougher spots in his story." 63

By the end of 1965, there were others in SR Division who doubted the Murphy-Bagley-Angleton thesis, and one of them was willing to risk his career by putting his thoughts on paper at great length. Leonard McCoy, then a GS-14 and DC/SR/RR for Requirements, wrote a 31-page memorandum to Murphy commenting on SR/CI's "notebook" documenting the case against Nosenko. It began:

> Introduction
>
> At your request, I have read the basic Nosenko notebook and I hope you will honor my right to dissent. I find the evidence that Nosenko is a bona fide defector far more convincing than the evidence used in the notebook to condemn him as a KGB agent.
>
> It is because I am concerned about the serious ramifications of a wrong verdict that I wish to set forth my dissenting views in considerable detail. If the present verdict of "guilty" is right I believe there must be satisfactory answers to the questions raised herein; if it is wrong -- as I believe it is -- it should be rectified as soon as possible.
>
> Intelligence Production
>
> There are several references in the Nosenko notebook to the extent and quality of the intelligence

he provided. In the 25 March 1964 memo to DDP, it is asserted that "A comparison of his positive intelligence with that of other Soviet Bloc intelligence officers with whom we have had an operational relationship shows that all of them were consistently better able to provide useful positive intelligence than has been Nosenko." Tab D of this same memo states "His positive intelligence production is practically nil," and later: "Viewed overall, however, Nosenko's positive intelligence production has been so meager for a man of his background, training and position as to cast doubts on his bona fides, without reference to other criteria." All of these statements are incorrect.

The three persons in the Clandestine Services with the background and experience to make such a judgment regarding Nosenko's production and access agree that they are incorrect. No KGB officer has been able to provide more useful intelligence than Nosenko has; experience has shown that intelligence usefulness of KGB officers in general is "practically nil." Golitsyn's was nil. Viewed in the proper context, therefore, Nosenko's intelligence production cannot be used in his defense, but neither can it be said honestly to cast any doubt whatsoever on his bona fides. In the realm of substance, judgment regarding his bona fides must therefore be made on the basis of his counterintelligence information.

Counterintelligence Production

The ultimate conclusions about Nosenko's bona fides, as of March 1964 DDP memo and others indicate, must be based on his production -- how much did he hurt the Soviets. I believe that the evidence shows that he has damaged the Soviet intelligence effort more than all other KGB defectors combined. 68

Murphy's reaction, within the circle of those privy to all ramifications of the Nosenko case, was quite restrained. The "notebook" which McCoy had read was a "sterile" version, purposely assembled for those not cleared for all aspects. Yet Murphy was plainly frustrated at his inability, because of the sensitivity of the subject matter, to convert the unconverted by disclosing to them the totality of his arguments. He wrote to Karpovich:

MURPHY RUSE OF MCCOY

I have read this document for McCoy and am of mixed minds. First, it shows clearly that the so-called "sterile" book in the hands of a person with none of the other background on other cases or appreciation of the penetration problems affecting us and the FBI can be a very damaging document. I question seriously whether we should make it available to others in its present form. Second, the book's weaknesses

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> are principally its language and the fact that it was made up of memos from various periods and as our evaluation matured, or we developed additional information, the tone of the subsequent memos changed but the reader can suggest our approach has been superficial or inconsistent. Third, we cannot make the book available unless we are prepared to deal with the totality or near totality of the picture. Fourth, if a book is to be used at all in briefing individuals, it should be re-written and questions of the kind posed by this DC/RR paper trrated [sic] no matter how irritating we find them to be. If one person has this view, others might at some point . . . [68]

In his turn, Karpovich in replying to Murphy also attempted to take a balanced view:

> The paper suffers from many faults. These include bias, intellectual arrogance, and lack of CI background. Needless to say, the conclusions are false. Nevertheless, I found it to be a useful paper, and I think that we would be wise to treat it seriously, because it does highlight some problems which we have all been aware of for some time.
>
> It is inevitable, I suppose, that all of us who contributed substantially to the black books will feel personally attacked by many of the uninformed judgments and intemperate comments contained in Len's paper. I urge that we all strive to overcome the temptation to reply in kind. Despite the paper's shortcomings, it is one reader's serious and sincere response to the black book, and it reflects some serious faults in the book which we must correct.
>
> This is not the first indication we have had that some of our analytical methods, and particularly the style and language we have become addicted to, are not easily understood by "outsiders." We have all been on this problem so long that we've gotten into the habit of taking mental shortcuts and using elliptical proofs, considering the gaps and omissions to be self-explanatory . . . [68]

To those not within his inner circle, however, Murphy's balanced view seems to have been less obvious. In a covering letter which McCoy later wrote to Richard Helms on 4 April 1966, this was how he recalled the submission of his commentary and its direct aftermath:

> On 10 December 1965 I presented the [10 December 1965] memorandum to CSR [Chief, SR Division] and told him that I was sending copies to other SR Division elements concerned. His reaction was quite emotional. He asked in rapid succession

MCCOY MEMO TO HELMS

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McCoy to DCI Helms also pg 81

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who had authorized me to see the notebooks,* when I had read them, who had authorized me to discuss the case with other persons in the division, who had read my comments, when I had written them, and why I had written them. He stated that the U.S. Government was seriously penetrated and manipulated by the KGB. He said that I had taken advantage of him, that my action would necessitate restriction of the circulation of the notebooks, and that I had no competence whatsoever to comment on the case. He stated further that my action was very serious, that the possibility of official reprimand would have to be considered, and that the question of my continued employment naturally would enter into any such consideration. He ordered me to discuss the case with absolutely no one, and to bring him at once all copies of my memorandum, including drafts, and the notebooks themselves.

Later on 10 December, CSR called C/SR/RR, DC/SR/RR and me to his office, as these were the persons whom I had identified as fully aware of my views on Nosenko as stated in my memorandum. He stated that my action was very serious and that all present were forbidden to discuss Nosenko with anyone but himself. He said that the Nosenko case was entwined with many highly sensitive cases for which we had no need-to-know. He added that even if he felt it advisable to discuss those cases and Nosenko freely with us, he would not be permitted to do so, and that he would be subject to criticism if it became known that he had made the notebooks available to me. He concluded with a vigorous assurance that if we did not follow his instructions, serious measures against us would be required . . .74

When interviewed on 22 November 1976, McCoy recalled the next chapter of the story as follows:

> [In April 1967] at an SB Division meeting, Murphy had announced that "there was some question as to why Admiral Taylor had access to the thousand-page paper on Nosenko, but that it was okay for him to have it." McCoy was worried by this comment, feeling that something was going on behind the scenes but not knowing what it was; he hoped that, whatever happened would lead to a constructive solution of the case. He therefore consulted with Katharine Colvin on the advisability of getting a copy of his 10 December 1965 paper to

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* According to notes made by Katharine Colvin, Murphy, in September 1965, had personally requested McCoy to review the "Nosenko notebooks."

> some level of authority above the Division Chief. Colvin replied that it would of course be improper to go out of channels in such a matter, but that, if he were to do so, it would probably be best to get the paper to the personal attention of Director Helms. McCoy therefore took a copy of the paper to Mr. Helms' secretary, asking her to show it to the Director. [139]

Part of the letter covering his reasons for submitting the memorandum to Helms has already been quoted above, but another paragraph is of interest here:

> My primary reason for bringing the attached bootleg copy of my memorandum to your attention is the morbid effect that the Nosenko case has, and will continue to have, on intelligence collection against the USSR by all agencies of the U.S. Government. The accusations against Nosenko, which I believe to be entirely false, have contaminated all current agent operations against the USSR and most of the past operations, ex post facto . . . Any case which we get from now on which supports Nosenko, especially the GRU and KGB cases, will likewise be considered tainted. Since all such good cases are bound to support him, U.S. intelligence faces a bleak future. The explicit ramifications of the concept of an all-powerful KGB, which can with impunity present us one of their senior personnel, or a knowledgeable facsimile, are already apparent in the negative moods of CIA personnel here and overseas. [74]

Not long thereafter, Helms called McCoy by phone and told him he was having a great deal of trouble with the Nosenko case. He said that he was therefore going to turn it over to Admiral Taylor, who he hoped could get to the bottom of it for him. Helms also asked McCoy if he would agree to Helms' passing McCoy's paper to John Gittinger. McCoy of course agreed. A few days later, Helms again called McCoy by phone and asked if he would agree to his paper being passed to both Admiral Taylor and Howard Osborn.

As a postlude, it may be mentioned that although a promotion which McCoy had previously been promised was briefly held up in June 1967, it was made effective after he protested to the Assistant DDP, Thomas Karamessines. The latter did, however, enjoin McCoy to confine himself to requirements and leave counterintelligence to those who understood it. Finally, Karamessines stated that "we had treated Nosenko in a gentlemanly manner, which was more than the Soviets would do in a similar case." [101]

14: Helms Takes Control

With the third anniversary of Nosenko's confinement drawing near, no resolution of the case was yet in sight. The FBI continued to take what Murphy described as a "neutral position" in regard to Nosenko, while continuing to believe in the bona fides of Soviet agents whom it was running in the United States. On the other hand, the Bureau's agents had to be provocateurs within the framework of CI Staff and SB Division logic, for all in varying degrees supported Nosenko's reporting.

The conflicting views of the various interested parties are not sufficiently relevant to the purposes of this study to require a detailed coverage. What is relevant is the fact that the stand-off increased Helms' impatience with continued delay. He therefore initiated a number of measures which gradually took handling of the entire Nosenko matter out of the hands of the SB Division. The first of these measures was to instruct Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, the Deputy DCI, to undertake a thorough study of the Nosenko case; in doing so he told Taylor that, if he could make sense of the affair, he would earn "three gold stars" and Helms' undying gratitude. [136]

DDCI TAKES OVER NOSENKO CASE

When debriefed regarding the Nosenko case on 21 September 1976, Rufus Taylor remembered his involvement as follows:

RT: I became concerned as a result of Dick Helms [saying] that there was a matter that worried him very deeply, that needed resolution, that he doubted that there was enough objectivity amongst the people in the Agency who handled it so far to arrive at any kind of a really objective solution to the problem, and it was very sensitive indeed, would I please look into it and let him know my conclusions. Then he went on to tell me about Nosenko, the defector, who was at that time incarcerated [redacted] And he mentioned that there was a dichotomy of views in the DDP as to whether Nosenko was a bona fide defector or whether he had been sent on a mission, and that in any case he, Helms, felt that it was wrong to keep him confined and we had to do something with him one way or the other. (b)(1) (b)(3)

Q: He said that it was wrong to keep him confined?

RT: Yes, he was really distressed about the fact that this fellow had been in confinement so long and that they had never been able to arrive at a conclusion as to whether he was a bona fide or whether he was a plant, and he just had to get it resolved and something had to be done to get this fellow in a . . . oh, I've forgotten just how he put it, but in a more acceptable position. So, I said, yes, I would undertake this job and I sent for all the background papers on it and studied them first. Then I interviewed Angleton and Murphy and arrived at the conclusion . . . I think I talked to some other people in the Soviet Division of the DDP also, but I arrived at the conclusion that people had their feet so mired in concrete of opinion as to one side or the other of the case, that it was just damned near impossible to get any worthwhile information out of interviews. And I

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> Q: He said that it was wrong to keep him confined?
>
> RT: Yes, he was really distressed about the fact that this fellow had been in confinement so long and that they had never been able to arrive at a conclusion as to whether he was a bona fide or whether he was a plant, and he just had to get it resolved and something had to be done to get this fellow in a . . . oh, I've forgotten just how he put it, but in a more acceptable position. So, I said, yes, I would undertake this job and I sent for all the background papers on it and studied them first. Then I interviewed Angleton and Murphy and arrived at the conclusion . . . I think I talked to some other people in the Soviet Division of the DDP also, but I arrived at the conclusion that people had their feet so mired in concrete of opinion as to one side or the other of the case, that it was just damned near impossible to get any worthwhile information out of interviews. And I

then wrote a memorandum to Helms in which I indicated that I had, after reviewing the . . . making a preliminary review of the case, that I had considerable doubt that Nosenko was a plant; if so, I couldn't figure out what he was planted for. Nor could I get out of anybody else what he was supposed . . . what his mission was supposed to be, even in their hypothesis . . .

. . . My second memorandum to Helms was to the effect that, whatever the case, I didn't believe that Nosenko was any threat whatsoever to the Agency, that he ought to be rehabilitated, and I got a free hand from Helms to go ahead with the idea of rehabilitating him. And Howard Osborn then had him moved . . .

Q: Well, do you remember anything about Dick Helms' reactions to your recommendations?

RT: He seemed rather pleased with the information. I got the impression from discussing the case with him that he never had been able to get what he felt was a really fair appraisal of it from anybody; and I got the impression that he felt at last he had a fair appraisal of it.

Q: How did his attitude impress you at first? Was it one of worry or annoyance or a combination of the two, or what?

RT: It was worry. It was clearly worry. He was worried about the failure to have any kind of a conclusion with regard to the treatment of this defector that he could accept one way or the other. And he was really . . . I got the impression . . . quite concerned that the right thing was not being done, and that the right answers had not yet been adduced, and he wanted somebody who had no axe to grind whatsoever to look at it and he thought I would be that someone. As you know, there was a lot of chit-chat back and forth about penetrations of the Agency and perhaps there was a penetration in the Soviet Division of the DDP, most of it suspicion and most of it speculation . . .

. . . Another off-shoot of the Nosenko case [was] that I told Dick that I thought the situation was so bad in that Division [SB] that there ought to be some major personnel changes, owing to the way in which people had gotten at odds with one another over this question of was there a penetration and whether or not Nosenko was a plant, and so on. That it was a very unhealthy situation, and that recommendation was accepted, as I recall. [136]

Regrettably, it is not possible to document this transitional phase as completely as has been done for the years 1962 through 1966. Helms took a number of actions but did not record them. Admiral Taylor played a major role, but wrote only two memoranda in the course of doing so; neither has been retrieved, despite our best efforts to do so. What had happened was that the Director and his Deputy had taken personal charge of the Nosenko case on an interim basis, but did not have time to record their every move as had the DDP

components involved.

The measures Helms took in early 1967 may have been triggered by word carried to him by Howard Osborn, Director of Security, regarding the state of affairs at LOBLOLLY. Osborn, in turn, had been alerted by uneasiness expressed by the LOBLOLLY guards, who were contract employees rather than Agency staff employees. In Osborn's words:

> . . . They were getting uneasy and restive and unhappy about the whole damned thing, because they didn't like to treat human beings that way . . . Essentially, the guy was a pretty decent fellow and they began to admire his guts. You know, he just took this, and took it, and took it, and had great fortitude . . . [138]

There is no accurate record of when Helms brought Taylor into the case but this assignment appears to have been made around March 1967; on the 28th of that month, Murphy wrote [97] to the DDP expressing puzzlement at Taylor's interest in Nosenko, and asking for an explanation. Taylor then made a personal study of the case. He visited Angleton's office to examine evidence relating to Angleton's allegations of a monster KGB disinformation operation, of which Nosenko was part. From his examination of this documentation, the Admiral concluded that "there was evidence of a great KGB interest in penetration [of CIA], but no evidence that they actually had succeeded." Taylor also talked to David Murphy, but found him "reticent . . . it was like pulling teeth to really get him to say anything, and I also got the impression that he didn't like my looking into it . . ." [136] The Admiral was able, however, to get the SB Division point of view by reading in its entirety Bagley's 1967 "thousand-page paper," just recently completed.

On 26 May 1967, Taylor called Howard Osborn, Director of Security, to his office and Osborn recorded the meeting as follows:

> [Admiral Taylor] started by asking me whether or not I had seen the eight hundred page report summarizing the Soviet Bloc Division's interrogation and exploitation of [Nosenko]. I said that I had not read it personally but that Mr. Bruce Solie, of my Security Research Staff, was now in the process of reviewing it and commenting on selected portions of it. He then asked if I agreed with its conclusions. I told him that I did not; that it had been the consistent position of this Office that while we did not, under any circumstances, consider him bona fide, we were not convinced that he was a provocation dispatched by the KGB with a specific mission. Rather, our position has always been that there is something wrong with [Nosenko] and his story but we do not know enough in order to make a final decision.
>
> I went on to point out to the Admiral that I had thought, and had so recommended on numerous occasions in the past, that it would make a lot of sense for Mr. Bruce Solie, of my Office, to take over the interrogation of [Nosenko] in order to resolve several discrepancies that had always concerned us. Further, I said that the polygraph

OSBORN COMMENTS TO DDCI

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> examination given [Nosenko] at the outset was designed only to "break him" and was not an objective polygraph examination designed to establish or deny his bona fides. I indicated that the Director had approved this idea but that I had been unable to sell the idea to Mr. Murphy, SB Division.
>
> Admiral Taylor said that he thought this was an excellent idea. He agreed with me that we had everything to gain and nothing to lose through such a course of action and that he would so recommend to the Director. I pointed out to him that one of the things that had always concerned us was that the Soviet Bloc Division had never released any verbatim transcripts covering their many interrogations of [Nosenko] and that we could make our judgment only on the basis of written summaries prepared by the Division. 100

Thus, acting under Taylor's orders, the Office of Security transferred Nosenko from LOBLOLLY to what Osborn describes as "a decent, respectable safehouse." SB Division was cut out of the case, as was the CI Staff, because Taylor did not want "either one to have anything to do with our reinterrogation." 138

In fact, no one from SB Division had visited Nosenko for about a year (since October 1966), but to make sure that the Division remained in ignorance of the changes being made, Office of Security personnel were instructed to continue sending morning reports, ostensibly from LOBLOLLY, to the Division on a daily basis; thus a pretense was maintained that Nosenko was still being held there. 138

15: Resolution of the Case

Bruce Solie, of the Office of Security, took over the handling of Nosenko in October 1967. He immediately inaugurated a rapid transition from maximum-security incarceration to normal living conditions. Throughout this process, he found Nosenko fully cooperative, and without any tendency toward drunkenness or other aberrant behavior.

The following is a summary report which Solie prepared on 16 November 1967:

> Nosenko was moved to his current location on 27 October 1967 and the first interview with Nosenko occurred on 30 October. During the first interview, particularly the first hour, Nosenko was quite nervous and showed a certain reticence to talk. This condition ameliorated rapidly and it is considered that the current situation is better than could have ever been anticipated in view of the conditions of his previous confinement.
>
> Nosenko on the first day indicated his complete willingness to answer all questions and to write his answers to questions on areas of specific interest. It was determined that his English is adequate both for interview and for preparation of written material. Interviews are not usually over two and a half hours a day, six days a week, with Nosenko preparing from six to ten pages of written material each day. Prepared material has included life history, individual cases, trips of Nosenko, reason for defection, and detailed drawings of pertinent offices during his claimed period of KGB employment.
>
> There does not appear to be any impairment of his memory. His current living conditions, although physically secure, are luxurious compared to those he had been in during the past three years and have resulted in a relaxation of physical tension.
>
> Definitive resolution of the complex problems in this case will require a considerable period of time for further interviews, preparation of written material and a comparative analysis against his previous statements and information from other sources, interviews and investigation. Nosenko freely admits certain previous lies concerning a recall telegram while in Geneva and having received certain awards or decorations.
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> Central Intelligence has been orally briefed by the Director of Security. As of the present time, it is estimated that there are 1,000 pages of material completed or awaiting completion. All of the finished material is in a form which will permit dissemination to the FBI in part or in toto when such dissemination is considered appropriate.
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> Work thus far with Nosenko has resulted in a clarification of certain areas of previous controversy. As an example, it is considered that there can be at this time little doubt that Nosenko was in the KGB during the approximate period which he claims to have been in the KGB. The matter of the actual positions held by Nosenko during the approximate 1953 - early 1964 period is not considered adequately resolved at this time and any speculation concerning the dispatched agent aspects would be completely premature.
>
> If even a degree of optimism is realistic, it is felt that the additional interviews and work in the Nosenko case together with a detailed comparative analysis of all information will provide a firmer basis for a final conclusion of the Nosenko problem. Nosenko has been very responsive the normal consideration he is now receiving, e.g., our current work with him, and if it accomplishes nothing else, will at least condition Nosenko more favorably for whatever future action is taken relative to his disposition. 102

Solie's questioning of Nosenko was paralleled by a separate investigation conducted by the FBI. Results were covered in two reports published at about the same time, the FBI's on 20 September 1968 and the CIA Office of Security's on 1 October 1968.

The essence of Solie's findings was expressed in his covering memorandum to the Director of Security:

> In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that Nosenko is the person he claims to be, that he held his claimed positions in the KGB during 1953 - January 1964, that Nosenko was not dispatched by the KGB, and that his previous lies and exaggerations are not actually of material significance at this time. 108

The conclusions of the FBI report were more sweeping:

> (1) The current interrogations and collateral inquiries have established a number of significant omissions and inaccuracies in the February 1968 CIA paper* and have invalidated the vast majority

FBI REPORT RE NOSENKO

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of conclusions on which that paper relied to discredit Nosenko.

re Nosenko's Aug 68 polygraph by OS/Solie

(2) The current interrogations and the polygraph examination* disclosed no indication of deception on the part of Nosenko. He is knowledgeable in the areas and to the extent he should be; he furnished logical explanations for acquisition of information which would not normally have been accessible to him in his claimed positions. There is no substantial basis for doubting his bona fides as a defector.

(3) The variety and volume of information provided by Nosenko is such that it is considered impossible that he acquired the information only by KGB briefing. It is also illogical and implausible that the KGB would have dispatched an officer of his caliber with instructions to disclose the variety and volume of valuable information furnished by him. No compensatory objective is apparent.

(4) The current interrogations show that Nosenko is in possession of information not previously obtained. In the interest of both intelligence and counterintelligence agencies of the government, interviews should be continued to exhaust his knowledge.

(5) There should be a thorough re-examination of all information and cases emanating from Nosenko and other defectors where the decision for action, or lack of action, was previously influenced by the presumption that Nosenko was not a bona fide defector. [107]

Despite the above findings, the CI Staff never gave up its contention that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent. On 31 January 1969, the CI Staff argued that to accept Nosenko's bona fides meant repudiating Golitsyn, "the only proven reliable source about the KGB for a period of time which appears to be vital to both Nosenko and CIA." [113]

Angleton reaction

Angleton presented his arguments at a meeting in Helms' office on 31 January 1969, the conclusions of which were embodied in a memorandum signed jointly by Osborn and Thomas Karamessines, the DDP. The memorandum included the following statement:

> The doubts about Nosenko's bona fides are substantial and there is a basis for honest disagreement. The DCI stressed the need to

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* Reference is being made by the FBI to the polygraph examination of Nosenko performed by CIA between 2 and 6 August 1968 as part of the interrogation undertaken by Bruce Solie.

maintain the investigative momentum of the concerted effort to resolve the question of bona fides and he expects to be kept advised.[114]

Osborn wrote a memorandum, dated 10 February 1969, implying disagreement with the above statement, and emphasizing instead the need for a maximum effort directed at Nosenko's rehabilitation:

> I know that you will appreciate that this Office takes its responsibilities for the care and handling and ultimate rehabilitation of Nosenko very seriously. You will, I am sure, appreciate that through the more than fifteen months of arduous work of Bruce Solie's, we believe we have changed a vegetable back into a human being. We are trying to move very, very slowly and are relaxing restraints as gradually as is consistent with his attitude and frame of mind. The amount of time we will have before achieving final resettlement will depend to a large degree on our skill in prolonging this process. I think, however, that all of us must clearly understand that we cannot delay the process to the point where he regards this as retrogression or a reversion to his former situation. If we do, then all of the good work thus far will have been wasted and his ultimate disposition will become extremely difficult.[115]

The record does not disclose what reception the above recommendation received from Karamessines, to whom it had been addressed. Nevertheless, since Osborn had control of Nosenko, whereas Karamessines and Angleton did not, subsequent events indicate that Osborn carried the day. An undated memorandum written by Bruce Solie essentially brings this chronicle to a close:

> Since April 1969, Nosenko has had his own private residence and since June 1969, his own automobile. Even prior to April 1969, Nosenko could have, if he chose to do so, acted in a way seriously adverse to the best interests of this Agency since control was not of such a nature as to preclude independent action by Nosenko.
>
> It is the opinion of Agency representatives in regular contact with Nosenko that he is genuinely interested in maintaining the anonymity of his current identity, that is, not becoming publicly known as identical to Nosenko. As an example, he was very interested in having a facial birthmark removed. However, he has on numerous occasions indicated his interest in participating under the Nosenko identity in some action or activity which would "hurt the KGB." Nosenko considers that he has certain capabilities and knowledge which could be useful in the effort of the United States Government against the KGB. This interest has

not been associated with any particular curiosity in regard to the activities of this Agency . . .

Nosenko has consistently expressed his deep interest in obtaining United States citizenship as soon as possible. He realizes that under normal circumstances, citizenship could not be obtained until February 1974, but also is aware that citizenship can be obtained in less than the normal waiting period by legislative action.

Nosenko is considered by Agency personnel and FBI personnel in contact with Nosenko to have made an unusual adaptation to American life. He lives like a normal American and has an obvious pride in his home and personal effects. His home life from all appearances is quite calm. The fluency of Nosenko in the English language has greatly increased and there is no difficulty in understanding Nosenko or in his ability to express his thoughts. Obviously his accent and occasional incorrect sentence structure (and misspelling of words) has not been eliminated and probably will never be entirely eliminated.

Nosenko continues to complete work assignments expeditiously and with interest. As indicated above, Nosenko is very interested in doing "something active" which is understandable. Full consideration should be given to this interest since if properly controlled and channeled, could be used in a way adverse to the best interests of the KGB. [121]

Nosenko has since become a United States citizen, has married an American woman, continues to lead a normal life, and works productively for the CIA.

CHAPTER IV

NOSENKO'S CONTRIBUTION: A SUMMARY EVALUATION

Any attempt to assess Nosenko's value to the U.S. Government must begin by pointing out that he might well have been able to contribute more had he been permitted to do so. Unfortunately, we were unwilling to give serious consideration to his stated desire to assist us in making recruitments of Soviet officials; we discounted Nosenko's suggestions along this line as possibly part of a plan to embarrass the U.S. Government. It may have been for this reason, therefore, that when Katharine Colvin, Chief of SR/Reports and Requirements, recommended to David Murphy in 1964 that Leonard McCoy of her staff "be authorized to review the case for positive intelligence exploitation," 19 her recommendation was not accepted. There is no telling what potential recruitment targets might have emerged had we, soon after Nosenko's defection, debriefed him with such targets in view.

In this part of our study, we therefore confine ourselves to a summary of the contributions which, despite considerable odds, Nosenko was able to make. Let us take them, very briefly, one by one.

1: Information on KGB Personnel

The Office of Security's 1968 report summed up Nosenko's contribution in this field as follows:

> Nosenko has furnished information concerning perhaps 2,000 KGB officers and 300 KGB agents or operative contacts (here the terms agents or operative contacts are used to refer to Soviet nationals), mainly in the Second Chief Directorate or internal KGB organizations. However, he has identified approximately 250 former or current First Chief Directorate officers and there is a considerable exchange of officers between the FCD and SCD. In addition, numerous officers of the SCD and other internal KGB organizations travel abroad with delegations, tourist groups, and as visitors to various major exhibitions such as World's Fairs. It is impossible at this time to estimate the number of KGB officers identified by Nosenko who have been outside the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out some time in the future.
>
> There has been very little attempted exploitation of information furnished by Nosenko concerning other KGB officers and, therefore, the possible value of this information to United States Intelligence cannot be estimated nor can the potential damage to the

KGB be estimated. [This remark reinforces a similar point made in the introduction to this chapter.] [108]

2: KGB Recruitment Efforts Against U.S. Citizens

Most of Nosenko's own operational experience with the KGB involved efforts against U.S. citizens, either visitors to the USSR or members of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. As a result of this background, Nosenko was able to provide some 238 identifications of, or leads to, Americans in whom the KGB had displayed some interest.

Some of the KGB operational efforts culminated in "recruitments" which, according to Nosenko, were more statistical than real; the KGB played the numbers game, just as components of CIA occasionally have done, for purposes of year-end reporting. Nonetheless, Nosenko's reporting did result in the uncovering of certain U.S. citizens genuinely working for Soviet intelligence:

A. U.S. Army Sergeant Robert L. Johnson, who had been recruited in 1953, was arrested in 1965 on the basis of a Nosenko lead to an agent assigned to a U.S. military installation outside Paris, who was providing the KGB with important documents as of 1962--1963. Johnson was custodian of classified documents at Orly Field Armed Forces Courier Transfer Station during this period, and provided documents from there. Excerpts from a preliminary damage assessment are included below:

> The full extent of damage will only be known when the current review of documents by all affected agencies is completed. The damage assessments prepared by the military services, however, based on a review of their documents to date, indicate that as a result of access to documents in the Orly vault, the Soviets may have learned:
>
> 1. Details of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) including the attack plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the identity of Soviet targets, the tactical plans of USAF elements including weapons systems and methods of delivery.
>
> 2. U.S. Intelligence holdings on Soviet military capabilities, atomic energy production, weapons storage facilities, industrial complexes and order of battle.
>
> 3. Daily U.S. Intelligence summaries including our comments and reports on military and political developments around the world.
>
> 4. Comprehensive comparisons of U.S. and Soviet SAM Systems.

pages 92-98 missing

from Golitsyn and Nosenko. Their reply, although very cautiously worded, states in essence that, although Vassall probably would "eventually" (underlining is that of MI-5) have emerged as a "leading candidate" for suspicion as a result of the Golitsyn information, it was in fact Nosenko's information which "was to clinch the identification of Vassall as the spy." 135

MI-5 added that "[Nosenko's] information affecting UK interests seems to have been consistent with his position and we cannot recall any indication in the leads of UK interest that [Nosenko's] object might have been to mislead or deceive." 135

5: Leads to Foreign Nationals

Altogether, Nosenko is estimated to have provided some 200 identifications of, or leads to, foreign nationals (including recruited agents) in some 36 countries in whom the KGB had an active interest.

6: Summary Evaluation

It is not feasible, within the terms of this study, to make comparisons between Nosenko's counterintelligence production and that of other similarly qualified defectors. Enough has been said, however, to demonstrate on an absolute basis that, both in terms of quantity and quality of information, Nosenko's contribution was of great value to the U.S. Government.

CHAPTER V

THE ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE "MONSTER PLOT"

In the words of one woman who participated in the Nosenko case, its handling was from the outset "accident-prone." In fact, she is too charitable; a better description would be "incompetent."

The above-mentioned participant, [redacted] was a junior member of SR/CI at the time Nosenko first approached the Agency in Geneva, and her involvement in the case dates from 19 June 1962. Because her involvement continued until about 1970, she was naturally sought out as a source when research for this study was initiated. It then became rapidly apparent that in [redacted] we had found not only a first-hand source with a superb grasp of detail, but also a person whose analytic ability matched her knowledge. Because she is herself a first-hand source, we have in [redacted] case abandoned the anonymity in which one usually cloaks authors of studies such as this. By so doing, we gain two advantages: (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3)

A. We are not forced to cite [redacted] name repetitively in the text of this chapter as the source of individual items of information; and (b)(3)

B. We can present her contributions much as she wrote them.

A word now about what we asked [redacted] to accomplish. (b)(3)

For purposes of this study, we have not chosen to duplicate the mammoth effort put into analyzing and validating Nosenko's information by Bruce Solie of CIA and Bert Turner of the FBI; we have reviewed their work, and can find no possible reason to challenge their findings. On the other hand, this study can do what Solie and Turner did not attempt: that is, explain how an organization purportedly devoted to professional handling of intelligence and counterintelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, could have mishandled a highly significant case as badly as it did this one.

Chapter III, the Chronicle, has already furnished some of the answers. It provides ample insight into how the largely mythical concept of disinformation developed into a Juggernaut, which commanded blind obedience and drove several of the senior participants in the case to ever-increasing excesses.

There remains, however, the question of how these intelligence officers, supposedly experienced in the careful collection and evaluation of information, could have drawn so many erroneous conclusions from data tendered by a source whom we now believe to have been cooperative and acting in good faith. Therefore, rather than asking [redacted] to review the whole enormous fiasco in the handling of Nosenko's informational product, we requested her to separate the sources of confusion and misunderstanding into certain categories, then to select a few examples and examine them in detail. Her response to this requirement is contained in the pages which follow. (b)(3)

CATEGORY ONE: Lack of Systematic Interrogation

At no time between June 1962 and October 1967 was Nosenko afforded the kind of systematic, objective, non-hostile interrogation by well-informed professional intelligence officers which had otherwise been standard operating procedures in dealing with defectors and in-place sources from Soviet and East European intelligence services.

We now examine the manifestations and consequences of this problem at various stages of the case.

1: June 1962 Meetings

The transcripts of the 1962 meetings reveal a disastrous problem of communication:

-- Nosenko spoke fair English, but preferred to use Russian for the sake of precision. He spoke Russian very rapidly, and his voice ranged from loud and dramatic to excited whispering.

-- Bagley spoke fair Russian, but preferred to speak English when saying anything important. Bagley was largely unable to follow Nosenko's "machine-gun style" of delivery in Russian.[2] Nosenko and Bagley frequently interrupted one another at important moments.

-- Kisevalter, with native Russian, arrived on the scene for the second meeting filled with assurance of his own omniscience concerning the Soviet Union, derived from his involvement in two important operations concerning CIA sources in Soviet Military Intelligence: Popov from 1953 to 1958, and Penkovskiy (who was still working in-place as of the June 1962 Nosenko meetings). Unfortunately, the communication problem was exacerbated, not only by Kisevalter's showing off his knowledge to Nosenko rather than listening to what Nosenko had to say, but also by Kisevalter's inaccurate summarizations in English rather than translations of Nosenko's statements in Russian. Kisevalter's presence was justified by the fact that Bagley could not cope with Nosenko's Russian, but Kisevalter distorted so much of what was said that he was a barrier to communication.[6]

The second meeting, the longest of the five, was further disorganized by the fact that Nosenko arrived half-drunk from partying the previous day and most of the night. Even during the nearly eight-hour interview, Nosenko continued to drink. This point was consistently overlooked or ignored in later examination of boastful claims Nosenko made during this meeting; e.g., Nosenko personally handled the Langelle/Popov case, Nosenko personally ran the operation against Security Officer Edward Ellis Smith, Nosenko personally talked to code clerk James Storsberg to try to recruit him, etc. When confronted in hostile interrogations in 1964 and 1965 with these claims, he denied personal participation in all

three instances (other than directing the Storsberg case behind the scene), and said that if he had said such things in 1962 it was because he was either drunk or under very strong tension at the time.[58] Such explanations were not considered acceptable by his interrogators, and the claims were let stand as evidence of his mendacity.

While Nosenko provided a substantial amount of information during these five meetings, there was little or no follow-up questioning on most of it, partly because of lack of time but also because of the case officers' lack of background on the KGB in general and the Second Chief Directorate in particular. Ignorance of the Second Chief Directorate was only to be expected, of course, since Nosenko was the first KGB officer ever to talk to CIA who had spent his career in this component.

2: January--March 1964

The second series of meetings in Geneva, in January and February 1964, were somewhat better organized, but -- given the already prevailing belief that Nosenko was a KGB controlled agent -- he was not carefully questioned on the information he gave. This was partly because it was considered of primary importance not to reveal even by implication how much we already knew, lest his mission include elicitation of information CIA had received from Golitsyn or other sources considered bona fide.

Debriefings in the United States after Nosenko's defection were similarly limited to noncontroversial generalities, and were not noteworthy for attention to accuracy and detail. (Although most of the debriefings of this period were taped, none of these tapes was ever transcribed. Notes were taken, and reports were then written up on the basis of the notes. This three-stage process did not always result in an accurate version of what had been said.)[77,105]

3: April 1964--October 1966

The hostile confrontation which took place for some two weeks in April 1964 cannot be considered systematic interrogation; "shouting matches" would better characterize these sessions.[34]

During one period -- May to November 1964 -- Nosenko was systematically debriefed in neutral fashion to obtain additional information on leads to American and other Westerners recruited by the KGB, in part to meet requirements provided by the FBI. The other two objectives of this debriefing period, of greater importance to the CIA concerns in this case, were:

-- to obtain answers to questions posed in writing by Golitsyn, whose aim was to trap Nosenko into exposing his ignorance or "lies" about topics Golitsyn considered central to Nosenko's "KGB missions."

-- to acquire fuller background on Nosenko's alleged duties and activities in his various KGB positions

page 103 missing

CATEGORY TWO: Faulty Record of Conversations with Nosenko

The outcome of the Nosenko case was prejudiced at the outset by the establishment of a faulty record. Not only was the record grossly inaccurate, but there is reason to believe that Bagley (although perhaps not Murphy or other overseers of the case) knew that it was.

Let us look first at what happened during the June 1962 meetings. The inadequacy of Bagley's Russian for use in an interrogation has already been mentioned. The problem was exacerbated, however, by the fact that he nonetheless took notes on what Nosenko is purported to have said, which became part of the official record without their being compared with tape transcriptions by a more competent Russian linguist.

If anything, the role of George Kisevalter, who had a native command of Russian but little patience with detail, simply compounded Bagley's errors. Returning from Geneva on 15 June, Bagley on 18 June began to dictate, using his own notes, a series of 30 memoranda covering highlights of the meetings as he had understood them. These memoranda were reviewed by Kisevalter as they were typed, but he made only minor additions or corrections.

The so-called "transcripts of the tapes" from the five meetings were then prepared by Kisevalter between the week of 19 June and mid-August 1962. Contrary to the usual procedure, Kisevalter did not first transcribe from the tapes into the combination of Russian and English (predominantly Russian) actually used in the meetings, and then make his translations on the basis of transcriptions. Rather, he dictated them into English directly, using the error-filled Bagley memoranda for guidance.

In March 1964, Petr Deryabin, a KGB defector of 1954 vintage, was brought into the case to examine Nosenko's reporting in terms of his own expertise on personalities, file procedures, reorganizations, etc. He concentrated on the early years of Nosenko's career, particularly 1952 and 1953. In a resultant memorandum dated 12 March 1964, Deryabin commented as follows:

> The undersigned began work on this special project by reviewing the taped recordings of the meetings only, without reference to the meeting transcripts, believing that it would be possible and preferable to get all the necessary information and other material firsthand in this way. From the beginning, however, it was obvious that this would be very difficult, if not in many cases impossible; the early tapes (Nos. 1 - 6 and especially No. 1) were very poor in quality. (These are the tapes for meetings No. 1 and 2.)
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> After proceeding thus far in a review of the tapes, the undersigned then switched over and began anew, reviewing the transcripts alone and without reference to the tapes. This method also quickly proved unsatisfactory; from his memory of the

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> discussions as actually presented on the early tapes, although poorly reproduced and hard to "catch," the undersigned soon was able to tell that the transcripts are, to say the least, faulty.
>
> A point-by-point review of the tapes and transcripts was then initiated and has been pursued until the present time by the undersigned. In the course of this review, a large number of errors -- omissions and other discrepancies -- have been discovered scattered throughout the transcript coverage of the meetings recorded on the tapes.
>
> It is impossible to make enduring pronouncements of the following type without knowing the whole situation and being fully aware of all the motives and factors -- personal and professional -- involved, yet it should be noted that the undersigned in many places throughout the records of the meetings has encountered examples of what he would consider errors in the handling and conduct of those meetings. Let it suffice merely to register this point here; notes on this subject will be drafted and presented in later papers. [29]

Deryabin then proceeded to cite nine major examples of errors, omissions, distortions, and procedures characteristic of the Kisevalter transcripts (and performance during the meetings). He concluded by saying:

> The foregoing present but a few examples of errors, discrepancies, distortions, etc., to be found throughout the transcripts. A complete report of all such errors, etc., will be prepared upon request. [29]

The "complete report" was never prepared, and may never have been requested. Bagley's friendship and working relationship with Deryabin were exceptionally close. There can therefore be little doubt that Bagley was made aware of the inadequacies of the record by Deryabin; thus, the fact that no "complete report" was prepared may have been based on a decision by Bagley.

Later, the first series of hostile interrogations of Nosenko, beginning on 6 April 1964, was monitored by Deryabin who listened from an adjacent room. On 17 April, Nosenko was challenged concerning a claim he had supposedly made in June 1962 (according to the Kisevalter "transcripts") that he in person had recruited an American professor of Slavic languages visiting in Bulgaria during the time Nosenko was on TDY for briefing sessions with the Bulgarian internal counterintelligence service. Nosenko denied ever having made such a claim, and went into lengthy detail explaining just what had happened. In effect, because by chance he was in Sofia when the Bulgarians were planning their operation against Professor Horace G. Lunt, he gave the Bulgarians advice on how to go about the compromise operation -- a homosexual one -- and how to handle the actual

confrontation and recruitment. Apparently as a result of listening to Nosenko tell his story, and his vehement denial of any claim to personal meetings with Lunt, Deryabin went back to the 1962 tape recordings and retranscribed exactly what Nosenko had said on the two different occasions in 1962 when he had referred to this case. The retranscription clearly verified Nosenko's denial. Nonetheless, all subsequent papers on the Nosenko bona fides question included reference to his having claimed in 1962 that he recruited Lunt in person. His denial of such a statement in all sessions from 1964 onward was lost from sight.48

Nowhere in the records of this case is there any indication as to why Deryabin's observation concerning the Lunt case was ignored. Yet, like the 12 March 1964 memorandum, it had certainly come to Bagley's attention.

In the course of the second series of hostile interrogations in January--March 1965, a still further discovery was made by Deryabin when Nosenko was challenged on another "claim" supposedly made in 1962, which Nosenko also denied having made. Reviewing the tape recording of the 1962 meeting in which the alleged claim had been made, Deryabin once again established that the record was erroneous, and that Nosenko was right again. (Specific details of this incident have not been retrieved, but [redacted] was present when it occurred and can attest to it personally.) (b)(3)

Later in 1965, retranscription of the 1962 tapes was begun, faithfully transcribing Russian when Russian was used, and English when English was spoken. These transcripts were not translated into full English, however, until mid-1968 under the auspices of the Office of Security reexamination of the entire Nosenko case. In late 1968--early 1969, a line-by-line commentary on the more significant discrepancies between the two versions was prepared. It required some 35 pages to cover only the major errors and the effects they had had in supporting the charge that Nosenko was a false defector who "lied" and "changed stories."

In judging this aspect of the case, it must be pointed out that the misunderstandings which resulted from a faulty record were not simply the result of inefficiency. Deryabin had the confidence of, and easy access to, both Bagley and Murphy to a degree otherwise rare for any but rather senior staff officers of the Agency. Furthermore, Deryabin was meticulous in preparing written reports to Bagley concerning discrepancies which he found in the record. Bagley himself was therefore certainly aware of these discrepancies. That he did not take them into account, but instead continued to depend on a record which he knew to be faulty in establishing his thesis that Nosenko was a KGB-dispatched agent, indicates clearly the total lack of objectivity of Bagley's approach.

CATEGORY THREE: CIA Misapprehensions Regarding Nosenko's Life Story

The first step in debriefing a new defector is to obtain his most "perishable" information, i.e., positive intelligence and important agent leads. The next step usually is to obtain a biographic statement, highlighting his personal history, family members, education and career.

In February 1964, all information relating to his life story, collated from transcripts of meetings with Nosenko (in Geneva, 1962 and 1964), was presented in written form to Nosenko for him to correct or expand upon. This draft was so full of errors derived from defective transcripts that only in the most general terms did it correspond to his actual statements. At this time, however, Nosenko was restless, tense, and impatient with the tedious interviews with which CIA was trying to keep him occupied. It appears obvious that he paid scant attention to the dates or terminology used in this draft, because he made only one noticeable change: he insisted on deletion of a statement attributed to him to the effect that he had attended a one-year course in counterintelligence at the beginning of his KGB career (a mistake dating from the 1962 Kisevalter "transcripts"). Given the volume of other erroneous statements in this "biography" which he left untouched, one can only assume that he considered this biography an exercise of no particular importance.

When hostile interrogations began on 6 April 1964, the inaccurate biography was used as the base point for measuring so-called "lies" about Nosenko's entire life story. It therefore caused him to be accused time and again of "changing his stories."

One of the first wrangles that arose in the hostile interrogations concerned his responses to questions on his schooling. Among other aspects of this subject, Nosenko told his interrogators that he had spent approximately three years during World War II in various naval preparatory schools -- (rough equivalent of American high school-level military "academies"). The problem which arose in this instance was traceable first to a careless transcription by Kisevalter, but was exacerbated by ignorance on the part of the interrogators concerning the subject under discussion. Because it typifies other misapprehensions which complicate the Nosenko case, this example is worth relating in detail.

Kisevalter "transcribed" the tape of the 25 January 1964 meeting in Geneva, quoting Nosenko thus (underlining is ours):

> . . . When I first came here I graduated from the Institute of Foreign Relations. I specialized in International Law and on the USA there. I came to GRU in 1949. Before I attended this Institute I was in a naval school. I also studied in Baku in a navy preparatory school and I even studied in Frunze. And then the war ended. The only time I participated in wartime activities was when heavy combat was going on near

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Novorossiysk. They threw the students from Baku into the battle.

After we lost Novorossiysk the remnants which were somewhere between one third and one half of the students were brought back to Baku. When the war ended I had not yet graduated from Frunze and I was demobilized. I didn't want a military career so I went to the Institute of Foreign Relations in 1945 and graduated in 1949. Toward the end of the year in early 1950 the placement commission (raspreditelnaya komissaya) [words missing in original transcript] where I wanted to work. I said that I've had some military experience and I'd rather have something along that line rather than go to MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]. They said I would be called on the phone and they would let me know. I was called up by the personnel section of the old MGB.[8]

To Kisevalter, as well as to Bagley and Karpovich, Nosenko's interrogators in April, "Frunze" meant only one thing -- the Frunze Naval Academy, equivalent to the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. Unfortunately, the naval preparatory school to which Nosenko referred was named Frunze also; it was the prep school for those Soviet boys with aspirations for naval command positions, who would later go on to the Frunze Naval Academy.

When Nosenko was asked in April 1964 to discuss his schooling, he referred to having entered a naval preparatory school -- at roughly the high school level, and in Russian called a uchilishche. This was, said he, the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School named after Frunze*. In 1942, the school was relocated to Baku because of the fighting around Leningrad. Nosenko's interrogators clearly did not understand what he was talking about, as they had no background on these naval preparatory schools; the only Frunze they knew of was the Academy and every time Nosenko mentioned the prep school carrying Frunze's name confusion erupted. At the end of several heated exchanges on this topic, with the interlocutors invariably at cross purposes, the conclusion was reached that Nosenko had lied in saying originally that he had attended the Frunze Naval Academy. The claim was then made that he had been made to admit that he had not done so. He then was accused of telling stories, which were confused and contradictory, about the secondary schools he claimed to have attended.

Asked repeatedly if he was then saying that he did not attend the Frunze Academy, he consistently replied no, it was the Frunze preparatory school. This discussion was repeated several times during these interrogations, without the problem area being resolved in the minds of the interrogators.

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* In the Russian language, the fact that a school is named after a great man is always made explicit. Thus, in Russian, the George Washington University would be called the "University named after George Washington."

Because of the lack of background on the part of the interrogators (as well as their ignorance or disregard of the distortions in the Kisevalter transcription), a memorandum for the record, dated 14 April 1964, Subject: "Interrogation of Yuriy I. Nosenko, 4--11 April 1964," contained the following relevant quotations (underlining is ours):

> . . . On 10 April, Subject was interrogated in the morning and afternoon for a total of nearly five hours. Questioning covered his early schooling, his studies at the Institute [of International Relations], and his service in the naval GRU, both in the Far East and in the Baltic. Gaps and contradictions in his accounts cast doubt on whether he was telling the truth about the early years of his life and even raised some possibility that we may not be dealing with the real Nosenko . . .
>
> . . . Under pressure, Subject admitted that he had not entered the Frunze Higher Naval School (Vysshaya Voyenno-Morskaya Shkola imeni Frunze) in 1944, but that he had merely attended the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School (Leningradskoye Voyenno-Morskoye Podgotovitelnoye Uchilishche) of the Frunze Higher Naval School. His story now is that he attended the Moscow Naval Special School (Moskovskaya Spetsialnaya V.M. Shkola) in Kuybyshev from 1941 to 1942, then entered the Leningrad Naval Preparatory School in Baku, completing two classes of this school in Baku (1942--1943 and 1943--1944), and the third class in Leningrad (1944--1945). Subject insists that he was given credit for successfully completing each of the four years of secondary schooling, but says that at the end he had the equivalent of 10 years' education. He can offer no explanation for the discrepancy -- by his chronology he would have completed 11 years of schooling plus one year of kindergarten. Subject has been very weak in providing names of teachers and classmates and descriptions of school layouts and curriculum for this period, particularly for the period in Baku. It is interesting that [Nikolay Artamonov], who has identified pictures of Subject as being identical with the son-of-a-minister Nosenko whom he knew at the Leningrad Naval Prep School in Leningrad in the period 1944--1946, has provided information about the history and make-up of this school which is incompatible* with Subject's story, as is

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* This is not a true statement. Artamonov's statements are more confusing than clarifying. The possibility that Artamonov's memory might have been unclear was not considered.

> [Artamonov's]* statement that Nosenko was a class junior to [Artamonov] and would not have graduated from the prep school until 1946. Subject has never mentioned [Artamonov], and has not yet been challenged on this part of his story. 37

Further compounding the confusion on this one subject was the development of suspicion that Artamonov, cited in the memorandum above, was himself not bona fide. This doubt arose because Artamonov claimed to have known the Nosenko in question, and, as shown in the paragraph cited below from a 21 April 1964 summary of interrogations for the second week, because his "own elementary and secondary schooling is a curious parallel to Nosenko's . . ." (underlining is ours). The following is quoted as an excellent example of the reasoning process by which one could at one and the same time be suspicious of Artamonov's bona fides because some of his information supported what Nosenko said, while also citing his reporting as evidence that Nosenko was lying because Artamonov's memories of the schools differed from Nosenko's:

> . . . Adding to the mystery of Nosenko's wartime years is the information provided by Nikolay Artamonov, the Soviet naval defector. When Nosenko's defection was first made public, Artamonov volunteered the information that, if this was the same Nosenko who was the son of a minister, he had attended school with him in Leningrad. Later, when shown photographs of Nosenko he positively identified him as the same man he had known in Leningrad in the period 1944 to 1946 and gratuitously provided the names of six schoolmates from Leningrad that Nosenko should remember because they were prominent members of the student body there. Nosenko was subsequently queried about three of these names, but out of context and with no indication of who and what they might be. He immediately identified them as schoolmates, but positively affirmed that two of them had been the roommates in Kuybyshev in 1941--1942, while the other had been in the school in Baku. According to Nosenko, none had gone on to Leningrad. Of the names provided by Artamonov, Nosenko mentioned a fourth one independently, but although he originally placed him in Leningrad he later moved him to Kuybyshev and stated categorically that he saw him for the last time in Moscow in 1942, before going to Leningrad. Artamonov, whose own elementary and secondary schooling is a curious parallel to Nosenko's, has provided other information on the schools and dates which Nosenko claims to have attended which is incompatible with Nosenko's story but it has not been believed advisable to

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* Nikolay Artamonov is a Soviet naval officer who had defected in 1959.

requery Artamonov on this until we can be certain that Artamonov is not deliberately trying to substantiate Nosenko's bona fides according to a prearranged plan which misfired owing to crossed signals or Nosenko's poor memory. 39

In May 1965, in preparation for his own set of interrogations, it apparently occurred to Petr Deryabin that the original "transcript" should be rechecked for accuracy (he was right). After transcribing it into Russian first, he then translated it into English, but with one unfortunate mischoice in wording. He translated the Russian word "uchilishche" into English as "academy." The Russian equivalent to the English "academy" in the sense of a college-level institution is "akademiya." The following is Deryabin's translation of meeting No. 3 on 25 January 1964:

> Telling about his entrance into the Naval GRU, Nosenko says: . . . I went there . . . I completed the Institute of International Relations in 1949. I studied in the Juridical Faculty, i.e., specialist in international law and specializing on the U.S. Before the Institute, I studied at the Naval Academy (voyenno-morskoye uchilishche), etc. In the beginning, I was still in the Special School (spetsshkola). Following the Seventh Class of the School, I then studied at the Preparatory School (podgotovitel'noye uchilishche), was transferred to the Frunze Academy [sic -- uchilishche]. The war ended. We weren't successful in getting into battle. The only time they sent us in was when we were in Baku. There was heavy fighting near Tuapse. We students were sent in near Nov., i.e., near Novorossiysk. There was heavy fighting there. We took part in these battles there and then returned when Novorossiysk surrendered. Our health was gone: less than one-half of one-third of all the students remained, and they sent us back to the school.
>
> So, the war ended and I didn't finish Frunze Academy [sic -- uchilishche] after demobilization. What to do? Be a soldier? I didn't want to. Study? Where? I went to the Institute of International Relations and entered it in 1945. And I graduated from there in 1949 -- the end of 1949 or the beginning of 1950. When the placement commission asked me where I wanted to work -- it is mandatory for the commission to ask -- I said that I was a military man and asked that they give me something related to military. 9

To sum up, the following problems typical of the whole case are evident in this episode:

A. Nosenko had been misquoted in the Kisevalter transcript, because Kisevalter did not understand what he was talking about. He had referred specifically to the "Leningrad Naval Preparatory School named after Frunze," a fact once again uncovered by

Deryabin's rechecking of the meeting tape, but not until May 1965. When Nosenko "admitted" to his interrogators in April 1964 that he had not attended the Academy, he didn't know this was considered an admission; he never realized his interrogators had thought he had made such a claim.

B. In general, Nosenko's interrogators overestimated their substantive background. Nosenko's "stories" about the several naval preparatory schools he had attended during the war are difficult to follow, because war conditions brought about a number of relocations of these schools: the Leningrad School was relocated to Omsk oblast, but was still called Leningrad School; the Moscow School was relocated first to Achinsk, then to Kuybyshev, but was still the Moscow School, etc. Nosenko's interrogators were almost totally ignorant of these matters, but did not know they were. Because they were unable to follow his detailed description of all these changes (documented by other informed sources, including Soviet historians), they thought something was wrong with Nosenko, not with themselves.

CATEGORY FOUR: Errors or Omissions in Available CIA Headquarters Records

In this category lie many of the causes of error in building the case against Nosenko. We are not speaking here of transcript errors, but rather of sometimes quite understandable lacunae in CIA's collateral records.

Two important examples concern John Abidian, the State Department Security officer in Moscow who was, according to Nosenko, an American for whom Nosenko was operationally solely responsible.

One point at issue was whether Abidian employed a maid in Moscow who would have been in a position to treat Abidian's clothes with a so-called "thief powder" used by the KGB to facilitate postal surveillance. Nosenko claimed there was such a maid, and that her actions enabled the KGB to pick up three operational letters Abidian mailed for CIA, when the powder activated a sensor in the Soviet postal system.

The second point concerns the question of whether Nosenko lied in claiming that Abidian cased a dead-drop site in Moscow which we assumed Nosenko knew was crucial to the KGB apprehension of Oleg Penkovskiy.

On the first point, CIA had no record of Abidian's having a maid, because he did not formally hire one until a few months after his last letter mailing for CIA. However, the maid who served an American woman in the Embassy, with whom Abidian was regularly sleeping, also informally took care of Abidian's apartment throughout the time period in question. Thus, we were wrong, Nosenko was right.

The second point has yet to be subjected to confirmation, but there is strong circumstantial evidence that Abidian "cased" the Penkovskiy dead-drop site not once, but twice. The CIA officer tasked with the first casing had been too afraid to go himself, as ordered, and therefore apparently prevailed upon Abidian to handle the job for him. The report submitted by the case officer, however, could lead the reader to believe that the CIA man had carried out the first casing mission -- under circumstances and in the time period when, according to Nosenko, Abidian handled the assignment.

Evidence discussed in a memorandum of 15 September 1970 regarding Abidian and the dead-drop site leads one to believe that Nosenko was entirely accurate about Abidian's first visit. An interview of Abidian about these two Penkovskiy casings to verify Nosenko's story may reveal that the CIA record was deliberately falsified by a delinquent case officer.

Both these problems seem minor in and of themselves. But they were not minor in the context of the inquisition to which Nosenko was subjected. Rather, the discrepancies involved were evoked, as was every other discrepancy arising from whatever cause, to bolster the case against him.

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One point at issue was whether Abidian employed a maid in Moscow who would have been in a position to treat Abidian's clothes with a so-called "thief powder" used by the KGB to facilitate postal surveillance. Nosenko claimed there was such a maid, and that her actions enabled the KGB to pick up three operational letters Abidian mailed for CIA, when the powder activated a sensor in the Soviet postal system.

The second point concerns the question of whether Nosenko lied in claiming that Abidian cased a dead-drop site in Moscow which we assumed Nosenko knew was crucial to the KGB apprehension of Oleg Penkovskiy.

On the first point, CIA had no record of Abidian's having a maid, because he did not formally hire one until a few months after his last letter mailing for CIA. However, the maid who served an American woman in the Embassy, with whom Abidian was regularly sleeping, also informally took care of Abidian's apartment throughout the time period in question. Thus, we were wrong, Nosenko was right.

The second point has yet to be subjected to confirmation, but there is strong circumstantial evidence that Abidian "cased" the Penkovskiy dead-drop site not once, but twice. The CIA officer tasked with the first casing had been too afraid to go himself, as ordered, and therefore apparently prevailed upon Abidian to handle the job for him. The report submitted by the case officer, however, could lead the reader to believe that the CIA man had carried out the first casing mission -- under circumstances and in the time period when, according to Nosenko, Abidian handled the assignment.

Evidence discussed in a memorandum of 15 September 1970 regarding Abidian and the dead-drop site leads one to believe that Nosenko was entirely accurate about Abidian's first visit. An interview of Abidian about these two Penkovskiy casings to verify Nosenko's story may reveal that the CIA record was deliberately falsified by a delinquent case officer.

Both these problems seem minor in and of themselves. But they were not minor in the context of the inquisition to which Nosenko was subjected. Rather, the discrepancies involved were evoked, as was every other discrepancy arising from whatever cause, to bolster the case against him.

CATEGORY FIVE: CIA Assumptions about the Second Chief Directorate

Lacking contemporary information on the organization, responsibilities, policies and capabilities of the KGB's Second Chief Directorate from knowledgeable sources other than Nosenko, it was necessary for Nosenko's interrogators to extrapolate from pre-1954 defector information plus that received from Goleniewski and Golitsyn. Not one of the sources cited below by Bagley had ever been regularly employed in the Second Chief Directorate -- except Nosenko.

In a memorandum of 20 October 1964, Bagley set out to demonstrate at great length that Nosenko's claim to the position of Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section between early 1960 and late 1961 was completely false. Having informed his readers that this position was one of the most important in the entire Second Chief Directorate, he then proceeded to present a "job description" for it:

> Functions of a KGB Deputy Section Chief: Within this framework, an understanding of the functions and responsibilities of any deputy chief of section in the KGB is important. The following description of this position has been confirmed by Deryabin, Rastvorov, Golitsyn, Goleniewski, and even in large part by Nosenko when speaking in general terms:
>
> a. He must be broadly informed on the section's operations and individual case officer duties in order to act in the chief's absence, when he assumes responsibility for the entire section's work.
>
> b. He approves and retains monthly schedules for planned use of safehouses by the section.
>
> c. He discusses agent meeting schedules with individual case officers and approves and then retains a list of planned agent meetings for each case officer on a monthly basis.
>
> d. He approves the acquisition of new agents and new safehouses and their transfer from one operation to another.
>
> e. He usually maintains liaison with other KGB units on matters related to the section's target.
>
> f. Based on file reviews and discussions with individual case officers, he assigns priorities for the operations that each case officer handles.
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>
> g. He reviews and approves by signature the periodic written reports, general operational plans of the section, periodic section progress

> reports, and specific operational proposals of individual case officers which are required by the KGB. If the department [sic -- meant to read "section"] chief signs these papers, the deputy chief still reads them in order to keep himself informed on the section's activity.
>
> h. He assigns priorities for processing microphone material and telephone taps, for selecting targets for surveillance, etc.
>
> i. He participates directly in important operational activities and is often in contact with agents or agent prospects. As a senior officer responsible for the section's operations, he or the section chief are almost invariably present during the compromise and recruitment of important target individuals. He periodically participates in control meetings with the section's agents in order to check on the development of individual operations and case officer's performance. [48]

Hostile interrogations in January 1965 produced a different picture. Nosenko said that as deputy section chief, his principal responsibility was to supervise operational activity against American Embassy code clerks. His detailed knowledge of this activity, and his description of innovative programs he had instituted in this area of operations have, with few exceptions, been fully verified by investigations and already existing collateral reporting.

As for other aspects of his "job description," Nosenko said simply that he did whatever his chief told him to do, and while he granted that he did from time to time perform some of the tasks outlined above by Bagley, he denied that he had any such fixed administrative responsibilities. He contended that the other officers in the section were not children and did not require that Nosenko teach them what to do and how to do it.

Bagley's outline of the duties of a "deputy chief" was both erroneous and tendentious. It was erroneous because it was based on a misinterpretation of the Russian word zamestitel, the term which Nosenko applied to himself when speaking his native language. When the meaning of this term was researched in 1968, a clear distinction was drawn between the American and Soviet conceptions of a "deputy":

> "Zamestitel," or "Deputy," in Soviet bureaucratic practice and usage is not limited to denoting what we think of as the number 2 in the office, but rather is a broader term which can perhaps most accurately be rendered in English as "assistant." Soviet offices, at least at the higher levels, commonly have several "Deputies"; some may have five or six or even more. In keeping with this multiplicity, the Soviet term does not carry with it the same sense of responsibility

and authority paralleling the Chief and of automatic replacement as the American term. The Soviet position of "Deputy" is probably not as intimately associated with a specific slot as is the American position of Deputy, if indeed it is so associated at all. 106

In addition, Bagley's outline of a "deputy chief's" duties can be considered tendentious because it was designed to establish a criterion of knowledgeability which Nosenko clearly did not meet. Had Bagley examined the validity of the criterion more closely, he could easily have determined for himself that it was unrealistic.

How misleading the Agency's misconceptions could be was also brought out in a paper written by three SB Division officers -- [redacted] and Serge Karpovich -- in January 1969. The following excerpt is instructive: (b)(3)

[redacted] In the absence of a firm information base, we were obliged to formulate a stereotype of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) against which to compare Nosenko's information. That stereotype contains a variety of quite fixed assumptions regarding the authority of the SCD in the USSR, the extent of SCD cooperation with the First Chief Directorate, and the manner in which the SCD operates. Of particular relevance, with respect to some anomalies found in Nosenko's statements, are assumptions regarding the relative weight the SCD placed on the recruitment of agents among foreigners as compared to the control of foreigners, how much the SCD itself might know of certain events, and how much a specific SCD officer (Nosenko) should have known and recalled. I believe that some of our assumptions are too finely drawn, with the consequence that, at least in some instances, Nosenko's assertions have been improperly impugned. (b)(3)

[redacted] The SB Study is, I believe, generally reflective of an exaggerated view as to the overall capabilities of the SCD. There are implicit judgments made that the SCD had to be aware of certain things; therefore, Nosenko should have known about them in his various positions. For example, there is some question in my mind as to the validity of the assumption that KGB surveillance of Americans, even suspected CIA officers, is such as to make it suspicious when Nosenko is unaware of certain operational activities these CIA officers are known to have performed. (b)(3)

This possibly exaggerated view is also apparent when we question Nosenko's ignorance of incidents that we know occurred and which

> we conclude, or at least suppose, are KGB-inspired.
>
> Finally, and possibly the most important, is the question of control as opposed to recruitment of American officials (excepting code clerks). While these two missions are not mutually exclusive, in either Nosenko's or our eyes, many times (particularly in the case of Abidian) we have faulted him for not knowing information that would be significant only in terms of interest in recruitment. If control was the main interest, as in Nosenko's claim, it would appear appropriate to judge Nosenko's information more in this context (perhaps a comparison with the FBI's mission with regard to Soviets would be helpful) than in the context of CIA operations against Soviets abroad. I sense that the latter was the case.112

Thus, largely because of the influence of Golitsyn, the Agency greatly exaggerated the competence and, indeed, the authority of the KGB. Even though this defector's claims were often extravagant, they were received with very little reserve by Bagley, Murphy, and Angleton, who in turn applied them across-the-board. On a different conceptual level, this pattern of exaggeration was applied to individual positions within the KGB; since that organization was conceived as an all-seeing eye, it seemed to follow that individual officers within it would partake of its omniscience. Such habits of thought, regrettably, were self-reinforcing in a situation where the objective of CI analysis was not to uncover the truth, but rather to prove that a particular present or former Soviet official was part of a grand plot against the security of the United States. It made possible constant exciting discoveries of duplicity on the part of any Soviet source who came under analysis, simply because he could rarely ever measure up to our expectations of what he ought to have known, accomplished, or said.

CATEGORY SIX: The A Priori Assumption of Disinformation as Applied to the Popov and Related Cases

Editor's Note: Like Euclid's geometry, the reasoning of Messrs. Bagley and Murphy in the Nosenko case was founded upon principles presumed to be self-evident. Without being fanciful, we could add that they seemed to share with Kant the idea that experience was not intelligible unless it could be interpreted in the light of one's presuppositions.

The particular set of presuppositions on which the disinformation hypothesis was founded have already been dealt with briefly, and will be covered in more detail in Chapter VI. Here it is worth noting that Bagley's conversion to these presuppositions took place in such a remarkably short time that to "presupposition" we must add "predisposition" as a factor helping to explain the problems which ensued. In 1968, Bagley himself told the senior author of this study that he and Murphy were looking for some explanation for their lack of success in the field of Soviet operations, and that it was in the "disinformation" or "provocation" hypothesis that they found the needed rationale. They were thus predisposed by lack of operational success to support a hypothesis, no matter how convoluted, which placed blame for their troubles on an evil, almost omnipotent enemy.

The remainder of this chapter is devoted to [redacted] account of Bagley's conversion to the Angleton-Golitsyn hypothesis and, by way of illustration, to a retrospective analysis of the Popov case and the involvement of Nosenko therein. (b)(3)

1: Prologue

It is ironic that both Nosenko and Golitsyn should have become so involved in the retrospective analysis of the Popov case, because neither knew a great deal about it. Perhaps they would not have become thus involved had it not been for James Angleton's conversion of Tennent Bagley to belief in the disinformation hypothesis.

Some time after 19 June 1962 (date supplied by writer, who was brought into the case on that date) Bagley was given access by Angleton to tape transcripts of debriefings of Anatoliy Golitsyn, the KGB officer who had defected in Helsinki in December 1961. Debriefing of Golitsyn had been going on for over six months, compared with five relatively short, hectic conversations with Nosenko. According to Bagley's statements in a 1976 interview, he spent "three weeks" in June 1962 studying the Golitsyn materials. According to Angleton in 1976, however, Bagley spent only three days studying 10 to 15 volumes of Golitsyn's interrogation. 129,133

Given 20 June as the earliest possible date Bagley could have started reviewing the Golitsyn transcripts, Angleton's statement of a two- to three-day review is undoubtedly closer to the amount of time involved than Bagley's estimate of three weeks. The amount of time involved is important because of a memorandum written by Bagley dated 27 June 1962, the day after his interview with Golitsyn, in which he set forth

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his views on "Possible Control of [Nosenko]." He opened with a statement: "Detailed study of [Golitsyn's] production in the light of [Nosenko's] has suggested the possibility that [Nosenko] may be part of a major Soviet disinformation operation . . ." [5] (Underlining supplied by [redacted]) (b)(3)

2: Implications of the Popov Case

Unfortunately for Nosenko he had, at the end of his first meeting with Bagley in 1962, said, "Tomorrow, I'll tell you how Popov was caught." Feelings ran high over this case, with which Bagley had been personally concerned in a minor capacity as a junior case officer in Vienna.

Petr Popov was a CIA source within the GRU from January 1953 to October 1959, when the KGB rolled up the operation in Moscow. He was the first CIA penetration of the GRU, and was the most important Soviet source CIA had ever had until the advent of Penkovskiy in 1961. Therefore, any information Nosenko might have on how the KGB had learned of Popov's clandestine cooperation with CIA was of great interest.

In Nosenko's discussion of Popov's compromise, he explained that in January of 1959, the KGB had had under surveillance a member of the American Embassy in Moscow who, they were certain, was a CIA officer -- as indeed he was. When they observed this man, George Winters, clandestinely mailing a letter in Moscow, the KGB intercepted the letter, found that it was addressed to Petr Popov, and came to realize that this Soviet was working for CIA. He was arrested soon thereafter and sent under KGB direction to make several clandestine meetings with another CIA officer, Russell Langelle. Finally in October 1959 the KGB apprehended Langelle immediately after such a meeting, with material in his possession just received from Popov. The Popov case was over.

Enter Golitsyn. Originally, his information concerning the Popov case had been slight. As of the time of his defection in 1961, he only knew or believed that:

A. There had been an agent leaking Soviet military, political and intelligence information to the U.S.

B. When CIA officer Russell Langelle was assigned to Moscow, he was going there to handle "a special agent or mission . . ."

C. Surveillance of Langelle in Moscow then led the KGB to Popov.

Nosenko, for his part, said much the same thing, but added that the KGB had been led to Langelle through their surveillance of another CIA officer in Moscow, George Winters. Unfortunately, to Bagley, no statement meant what it purported to mean. Under Golitsyn's influence, Bagley's doubts concerning Nosenko's bona fides led to the use of an analytical technique which he described as trying "to read the case through a mirror to find its implications if it is bad . . ." By the time this June 1962 memorandum was written, Bagley

had decided that the story of the Popov compromise given by Nosenko was the primary area to determine whether CIA itself had been penetrated by the KGB.

Golitsyn's 1962 reporting on how Popov was compromised, i.e., identified by name through KGB surveillance of Langelle in Moscow in 1959, varied from Nosenko's story only in the name of the officer surveilled. The Golitsyn report was actually completely omitted from Bagley's 17 April 1963 memorandum. (Why this omission passed unnoticed is not explained in any records in this case.) Yet when Golitsyn gave a completely different story of the compromise in June 1964, after he had read all the Popov case materials, this story became the Golitsyn gospel and has remained so to this day in Golitsyn's argumentation. We shall come to Golitsyn's 1964 version shortly, but first some additional background is needed.

Since Nosenko had said that Popov was compromised through KGB surveillance of Winters, the "mirror" technique indicated that this was not the case. The mental leap from this postulate was that if surveillance of Winters was not the cause of the compromise, then recruitment of Winters by the KGB was the logical possibility to be explored.

George Winters as a CIA officer was a maverick in anyone's terms; that he was sent to Moscow, of all posts, was a poor personnel selection. Both his personal and his professional conduct in Moscow were a sorry picture. He was indiscreet and insubordinate, especially in maintaining social contacts with a Soviet he himself labeled (correctly) probably a KGB officer. The Soviet was known to him as Vladimir Komarov, who had spent nearly a year assigned to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. After Winters reported meeting this Soviet, he was specifically instructed to break off the relationship. He did not; he first argued a case that he would learn what Komarov was up to by keeping in touch. When this was overridden, he just continued to see him anyway.

The man called Komarov was known to Golitsyn and to Nosenko as Vyacheslav Kovshuk, a Second Chief Directorate case officer who was Chief of the Section working against the American Embassy, Moscow.

Winters' documented association with Komarov/Kovshuk came to light immediately when name traces were run on the Soviet. The same reporting documented his one-time meeting with a friend of Komarov/Kovshuk's -- a TASS correspondent just returned from Washington, named Aleksandr Kislov.

Kislov, Nosenko had told CIA in 1962, was his friend in the Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva with whom Nosenko had gotten drunk on several occasions. Asked if Kislov was also a KGB officer, Nosenko specifically denied that he was.

A review of FBI reporting on Komarov/Kovshuk's TDY in Washington brought to light a close regular association with Kislov, in company with a number of identified KGB officers, leading to a strong circumstantial case that, contrary to Nosenko's denial, Kislov probably was a KGB officer. His

contact with George Winters in Moscow, introduced by Komarov/Kovshuk, was therefore held to be not a coincidence but:

> We cannot find a convenient explanation for Kislov's role in this theory, but it appears significant . . .

A further twist concerned Golitsyn's and Nosenko's reporting on Komarov/Kovshuk's TDY to Washington. Both sources agreed that it was related to recruitment of an American who had earlier served in the Moscow Embassy (speculation by Golitsyn) or reactivation of an American already recruited in Moscow (also Golitsyn speculation; but statement of fact by Nosenko, supplemented with specific details which would eventually lead to identification of the agent).

Nosenko said Kovshuk came to Washington to reactivate a code machine mechanic, KGB code name "ANDREY," who had been recruited and had worked in Moscow in the early fifties. In the first Geneva cable of 9 June 1962, in Bagley's memoranda, and throughout the "Kisevalter transcripts" of 1962, this agent was consistently misdescribed as a garage mechanic, although Nosenko in fact always called him a code machine mechanic. Thanks to this major error in notes and transcription, the FBI was hindered in its investigation of this lead until Nosenko corrected our misconception in January 1964. The FBI already had located the one possible candidate for this lead, but could not actively pursue the investigation until this confusion was cleared up. By December 1965, they finally succeeded in obtaining a limited confession from Dayle Wallace Smith, a code machine mechanic at the American Embassy, Moscow, from 1952 to 1954, which confirmed the essentials of Nosenko's reporting of 1962.

George Winters was in training in preparation for his CIA Moscow assignment during the time Komarov/Kovshuk was TDY in Washington. (He had been previously assigned to the American Embassy, Moscow, from 1947 to 1949 as an Assistant Attache prior to entering CIA service in 1950.) Komarov/Kovshuk returned to the USSR in February 1958; Winters left for Moscow in June 1958.

The case built by Bagley, postulating George Winters as a KGB agent recruited or re-recruited in Washington in 1957 or 1958, was built from the above-summarized material as follows:

A. Nosenko was sent to CIA by the KGB.

B. His mission (or a major part of it) was to mislead CIA about the true cause of Popov's compromise.

C. George Winters, a KGB agent within CIA, revealed Popov's identity to the KGB deliberately, not through KGB surveillance.

D. Nosenko lied about the Popov case, about Kislov's KGB status, and about Komarov/Kovshuk's real agent in Washington (ANDREY, later identified

as Dayle Wallace Smith).

E. Thus, there were good and substantial grounds to doubt Nosenko's bona fides.

3: Impact of Penkovskiy's Arrest on "Popov Compromise Theory"

Without going into details on the Penkovskiy case, it is important to know that in October 1962, only four months after the first Nosenko meetings, the KGB had dramatically announced the arrest of another penetration of the GRU -- Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy. This was yet another blow to CIA, even more serious than the Popov arrest, and a great deal of worried thought was given to the cause of Penkovskiy's exposure.

Although not reflected in the Bagley memorandum of 1963, Penkovskiy's arrest heightened the suspicions within CIA -- especially Soviet Russia Division -- that there must be a KGB penetration of CIA for two such calamities to have occurred within three years.

When in April 1963 a KGB officer, working within the KGB as a Western agent, reported that Penkovskiy (like Popov) had been exposed to the KGB through its omnipresent surveillance in Moscow, Bagley, Murphy et al., interpreted this report as proof of KGB disinformation designed to conceal KGB penetration of CIA. Winters remained a principal suspect.

4: George Winters Cleared of Suspicion, 1964

Until April 1964, the above "case" against George Winters stood as the cornerstone of the case against Nosenko's bona fides. At that time, however, Bruce Solie, of the CIA Office of Security, conducted an extensive series of interrogations of Winters, concluding his investigation with a thorough and professional polygraph examination. Solie established that Winters as a case officer and as a human being was every bit as poor a specimen as the records had shown, but unequivocally cleared him of any suspicion of collaboration with the KGB at any time in his life.

5: Golitsyn's 1964 Story

With Winters out of the picture, did the case against Nosenko as a KGB instrument to conceal the true cause of Popov's compromise collapse? No, merely the case against Winters. Why? Because by this time Golitsyn had come up with a new story about Popov.

In June 1964, while commenting on Nosenko's version of the Popov compromise, Golitsyn stated that the KGB report he had referred to in 1962 stated that the KGB did not consider running Popov as a double because he could not be trusted. He then went on to give a completely new story of the Popov compromise, diametrically opposite to his original information.

Golitsyn stated then that a certain Kotov (first name not given), who had been in the KGB in Vienna during the period Popov was there, suspected Popov of being a Western agent,

and made known his suspicions. At the time, no action was taken by Kotov's superiors. In 1957 or 1958, however, when the KGB received similar information from another source, Kotov was sent to Germany because he knew Popov and was familiar with his background. (Contrary to his 1962 report, Golitsyn here implied strongly that Popov, by name, was identified by the KGB as a CIA agent in Berlin in 1957 or 1958.) Golitsyn's 1964 story must be evaluated within the framework of the facts which follow.

On 21 November 1963, the then-Chief, SR Division, David Murphy, recorded the passage to Golitsyn, through the CI Staff, of all materials passed to CIA by Popov, including English language transcripts of all operational meetings held with Popov in Vienna in 1953--1955, and all operational meetings held with him in Berlin 1957--1958. Thus, by the time Golitsyn was commenting on Nosenko's version of the Popov compromise in June 1964, he had become aware of everything Popov had told CIA, specifically what was going on in Berlin in 1957 and 1958. This included Popov's mention of a KGB officer named Kotov, who arrived a week or two before Popov was recalled to Moscow, and another KGB officer named Zhukov, who had worked against the Yugoslav target at the same time that Popov worked on this target for the GRU in Vienna. In view of the fact that Golitsyn's story in June 1964 varied drastically from that he had told in March 1962, it is legitimate to suspect that he had recreated a story of Popov's compromise based on deductions he had made after reading the Popov transcripts. Thus, the 1964 version must be thrown out of court.

6: The Hypothesis that CIA was Penetrated

Unfortunately for the course of events in the Nosenko case, it was Golitsyn's 1962 version which was ignored in favor of his "facts" of 1964, which condemned Nosenko's story as strongly as his 1962 version had supported Nosenko. The reason for this is obvious. The Popov compromise hypothesis had been feeding on itself for so long that it had come to be treated as fact, with the result that the subject of Popov's compromise became a kind of litmus paper test of every Soviet source. If a Soviet source reporting to CIA on Popov agreed with Nosenko that KGB surveillance, rather than a KGB agent -- a penetration of CIA -- had compromised Popov, then that Soviet source was held to be a part of an ever-growing massive KGB conspiracy to protect penetration(s) of CIA. By further extension, Nosenko's failure to produce evidence that Popov and Penkovskiy had been compromised by a KGB penetration of CIA was interpreted as proof that indeed such a penetration must exist.

Instead of Winters, the CIA staff officer who "gave away Popov to the KGB" became Mr. "X," and suspect after suspect came under consideration within the Soviet Division or CI Staff over the next several years. Suspicion even extended to Bagley, David Murphy and, finally, even to James Angleton himself.

The Popov compromise continued to be a burning issue for years after Winters was cleared of suspicion. This was the

case because, inasmuch as Golitsyn's 1964 version best fitted Bagley's hypothesis, it came to be accepted as the only reliable "evidence" concerning the Winters case. The acceptance of Golitsyn's story in turn guaranteed not only that Nosenko could never be seen as bona fide, but also that all other Soviet sources must be considered suspect if they supported Nosenko's story. The overall result was to distort seriously for a number of years the ability of the Soviet Bloc Division accurately to evaluate the bona fides of any defector or agent.

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CHAPTER VI

DISINFORMATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT AND APPLICATION IN THE NOSENKO CASE

There can be little doubt that the handling which Nosenko received as a supposed dispatched agent would not have taken place precisely as it did had it not been for the Soviet intelligence practice known as dezinformatsiya (usually translated into English as disinformation). Furthermore, the timing of Nosenko's defection, some months after that of Golitsyn, the fact that Nosenko provided information on some of the same or similar persons or leads as had Golitsyn, and Golitsyn's conclusion that Nosenko had been dispatched by the KGB specifically to discredit him (Golitsyn) as part of a dezinformatsiya operation -- all these factors combined to preclude "normal" professional treatment of Nosenko. As a defector, Nosenko's bona fides should have been established, or not established, on the basis of careful and sound analysis and investigation of the information which he provided under standard interrogation procedures. In actuality, he came under suspicion as a KGB-controlled agent long before he presented himself as a defector, and his handling was therefore based upon this prejudgment.

Dezinformatsiya is a Soviet concept and practice of long standing which has been defined or described by numerous sources through the years. Two representative definitions are as follows:

> Petr Deryabin: Dezinformatsiya is the deliberate and purposeful dissemination of false information regarding accomplished facts and/or intentions, plans of action, etc., for the purpose of misleading the enemy. Such disseminations may be accomplished by means of the press, radio and television, agent reports and communications, operations, etc. The term also refers to the information itself.
>
> Anatoliy Golitsyn: In Soviet parlance, the term dezinformatsiya is used to denote false, incomplete, misleading information passed, fed or confirmed to opposition services for the purpose of causing these services (and their governments) to reach erroneous conclusions regarding the USSR or inducing them to undertake action beneficial to the USSR.

By means of dezinformatsiya, again according to Golitsyn, the Soviet Government hopes to ensure that the policy decisions of a given country will be based on a false impression of the USSR's domestic or military posture. Specific measures taken to achieve this end might be designed to induce a foreign country to engage in costly and useless research projects, to create a misconception about or adversely affect the stature of another country in the eyes of the world, to remove by nonviolent means, such as publicly discrediting, individuals who are considered a threat to the national interests of the USSR, or to weaken or dissolve, create or strengthen certain political parties.

With regard to the definitions quoted above, Deryabin,

Golitsyn and others have spoken from knowledge gained as Soviet state security officers. However, implicit in all definitions is the fact that dezinformatsiya is not an activity which is the exclusive prerogative of the security organs. It has always been carried out as a matter of government policy, as an activity which at times may involve the security organs.

Before 1959, there was no separate dezinformatsiya department within the KGB (or its predecessor organizations), although establishment of such a unit had been discussed from time to time. Each geographic component handling foreign intelligence operations was responsible for dezinformatsiya work within its own sphere of activity. All such work was carried out with the approval of higher authorities within the KGB, frequently in consultation with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, and even in many instances with the specific approval of the Central Committee of the CPSU. It was not until 1959 that responsibility for dezinformatsiya insofar as it was to be the concern of the First (foreign intelligence) Chief Directorate of the KGB was centralized within that unit, and not until 1961 that the concept of dezinformatsiya played any significant role in the thinking of CIA counterintelligence officers.

The dezinformatsiya concept was first highlighted for CIA by the senior Polish UB officer, Michal Goleniewski, who initially provided information by anonymous correspondence starting in 1958, and later while under interrogation following his defection in January 1961. The information he provided was of major significance, as he had dealt with the KGB on the subject of dezinformatsiya from as early as 1953, and was in fact not only a ranking Polish intelligence officer but also a KGB agent. While Goleniewski was not the first source to refer to dezinformatsiya, he was the first to bring it to CIA consciousness as a technique to be reckoned with in our analysis of the USSR's foreign policy. It was his claim that the Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence services played a major role in the implementation of such policies.

Specifically, Goleniewski provided information which was to serve as the basis for premises as to what the KGB would do upon learning of the defection of a KGB officer. Goleniewski stated that one of the many objectives of KGB dezinformatsiya was the protection of Soviet agents by means of action designed to mislead Western security services. He listed among specific objectives and types of dezinformatsiya operations those designed to confirm important true information, thus establishing in the eyes of the opposition the reliability of a channel through which the KGB passes misleading information to anti-Soviet governments.

Conversely, another type of dezinformatsiya operation might be designed to discredit accurate information of significance received by the opposition through sources not under Soviet control, e.g., defectors, thus casting doubt on the veracity of the source or sources of this true information.

Goleniewski stated further that the information passed through dezinformatsiya channels could be based on analysis

of what was already known about any sensitive items, i.e., could stem from defector damage assessments. One means obviously might be the channeling of information at variance with that provided by the defector. Another means might be the provision of "give away" material, which neither added to information already in the hands of the opposition nor, by the same token, did any particular damage to the KGB. In extreme cases, the KGB would be willing to sacrifice some of their own important agent assets in the interest of enhancing the reputation of an agent penetration of one of the anti-Communist intelligence services. (That this latter technique was used to advantage by the KGB in building Heinz Felfe as a penetration agent within the German Intelligence Service has been assumed in most analyses of that case. Felfe was a KGB agent for all of the ten years he worked for the German Intelligence Service, from 1951 until his arrest in 1961. During this period Felfe was able to work his way up to the position of Chief of the Soviet Section of the German counterintelligence staff. It has been postulated that Felfe's rise in the German intelligence ranks was assisted by the KGB, which was willing to sacrifice less important agent assets to enhance Felfe's reputation and position as their long-term penetration agent. For full details on the Felfe case, see the study entitled KGB Exploitation of Heinz Felfe, dated March 1969.)

In all its essentials, the information provided by Goleniewski was confirmed and elaborated upon by Golitsyn, who defected in December 1961 and who was the first significant Soviet or Soviet Bloc defector to come into CIA hands after Goleniewski. In addition to the general definition of dezinformatsiya quoted above, Golitsyn said that a KGB (or GRU) defector's file would be sent to the KGB dezinformatsiya unit; the latter would search for opportunities to exploit the situation, after review of the probable areas of information revealed to the opposition by the defector. He indicated in this connection that the Disinformation Department of the KGB maintains extensive files organized on a topical basis, containing all information on a given topic which is known (from the debriefing of defectors to the Soviets, double agents, captured agents, etc.) to be in the hands of opposition intelligence services. For example, a KGB officer assigned to Beirut to work against the American Embassy who defected to CIA would be assumed by the KGB Department of Disinformation to have told CIA everything he knew about KGB operations against the Embassy and Embassy personnel. By reference to their files on Beirut operations, the Department of Disinformation would be able to determine the extent to which KGB operations in that area had been compromised to CIA.

On the basis of the foregoing information, it might be assumed that the Golitsyn and Nosenko defections would have received similar handling by the KGB Department of Disinformation and by CIA upon their arrival as defectors to the West. However, the two men were not similarly received by CIA when they presented themselves as defectors; they received completely different handling, based on quite different assessment of the information they provided and their motives for defecting. Golitsyn was accepted as a bona fide defector in relatively short order, while Nosenko was speedily rejected

as a bona fide defector, as explained below.

Golitsyn, an officer of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, defected to CIA in Helsinki in mid-December 1961. Information which he provided relating to the organization and structure of the KGB was accepted as factual and true, at least in part because there was relatively little record information against which it could be compared, but also because the information appeared to be logical and reasonable. In addition, he provided voluminous and valuable information on KGB personalities; available CIA file holdings were limited, but the information provided by Golitsyn proved to be accurate to the extent it could be checked against these holdings. Finally, he provided a theory of KGB operations which was not only accepted at face value, but received with outright enthusiasm. Given the value of his information, plus his apparent motivation for defecting, which included an obsession with the evil inherent in the KGB and an emphatically-stated wish to "fight against the KGB," his bona fides was accepted in March 1962.

The reception accorded Nosenko, after he defected in 1964, has already been recorded in detail. That Nosenko did not receive standard treatment as a defector whose bona fides would be determined on the basis of the information he provided under interrogation after defection inevitably involves reference to Golitsyn. As explained in Chapter III, Golitsyn himself played a curious role in that, as a result of the trust placed in his judgment, he was actually encouraged to label Nosenko as a disinformation agent.

This situation arose as follows: During initial contacts with CIA in 1962, Nosenko provided information on personalities which were similar to those provided a few months earlier by Golitsyn. Because CIA counterintelligence officers had been warned by Goleniewski that they should not be "taken in" by false information fed to them through no matter what channels, the "duplication" or "overlapping" information given by Nosenko was viewed with extreme suspicion. This original doubt led to information provided by Nosenko being shown to Golitsyn soon after the former's defection. The paranoid Golitsyn immediately saw Nosenko as a person sent out to discredit or even assassinate him.

Thereafter, the desire of CIA counterintelligence officers not to be outwitted by the KGB led them to apply an analytical technique which has been referred to variously as "double think" or "mirror reading." This "analysis" led to the conclusion that Nosenko, as a dispatched agent, was feeding us what the KGB wanted us to believe. Thus, everything Nosenko said had to be "interpreted." If he said that the KGB had been unable to recruit any Americans serving at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow during a given period, this meant that the KGB had been quite successful in doing so. If he provided information on a given topic which we had already received from another source, this meant that the KGB wanted us to believe that particular piece of information, hence the other source undoubtedly was a KGB agent as well. And so on. Facts or material were discarded or ignored when they did not fit the hypothesis that Nosenko was a dispatched agent. Any other sources whose information confirmed, tended to confirm, or dealt

with any of the topics mentioned by Nosenko were regarded as "contaminated" -- that is to say, they were considered part of the same dezinformatsiya plot in which Nosenko figured.

Golitsyn played a major role in this "analytical process." As soon as Nosenko's defection became public, Golitsyn asked whether he could participate in Nosenko's interrogation. As of 20 February 1964 the DDP had agreed that Golitsyn should be brought into the operation and given full access to the "Nosenko material." The reasoning at this time, given Golitsyn's identification of Nosenko's function as a false defector, was that the Nosenko operation was "the reverse of the Golitsyn coin" and thus that Golitsyn's assistance was required to pursue it properly.[24] Accordingly, over the next several months Golitsyn was provided with material from the 1962 and 1964 meetings with Nosenko and at his request was supplied with all available biographic data on Nosenko to assist him in "analyzing" the operation.

On 29 June 1964 Golitsyn was interviewed by James Angleton, Chief, CI Staff, Raymond Rocca, Deputy Chief, CI Staff and David Murphy, Chief, SR Division. The following is quoted from the transcripts of this meeting:

> Golitsyn: I have made a study of the documents and information which was provided to me about Nosenko and his interrogations. I would like now to make known my conclusions . . . my conclusion is that he is not a bona fide defector. He is a provocateur, who is on a mission for the KGB . . . to mislead, chief in the field of investigations . . . on Soviet penetrations made mainly by [the] Second Chief Directorate in Moscow . . . Why did they choose Nosenko for that mission? In my opinion, Nosenko was recommended by Churanov, Kovshuk and Guk* for the mission. Nosenko could have been named or recommended by them and the KGB gave these people a chance. They are very energetic -- all of them. And, of course, they discuss things among themselves. Many of them had made mistakes -- they had told too much. They were, therefore, in the damage report (on my defection) and for them the only way to act was to suggest an operation against me in order to save their face, to save the situation.[41]

It can be argued that Golitsyn had two interests: (a) to discredit Nosenko in order to maintain a position of preeminence as advisor to CIA (and other Western intelligence

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* Vladimir Aleksandrovich Churanov, Vladislav Mikhaylovich Kovshuk and Yuriy Ivanovich Guk. Churanov and Kovshuk were colleagues and good friends of Nosenko in the Second Chief Directorate. Guk, also a close friend of Nosenko's, was a one-time officer of the Second Chief Directorate; he transferred to the First Chief Directorate and was posted at the Soviet Mission to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva at the time of Nosenko's temporary duty there in 1962.

services) on Soviet intelligence matters, and (b) to promote his contentions as to how the West was being deceived by the Soviet Union in political and strategic matters, and thus enhance his position as advisor to governments on overall Soviet political matters.

Golitsyn clearly had a high opinion of himself. When he defected, he brought with him some 23 classified documents from the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, which he made clear he wished to discuss with President Kennedy and the Director of Central Intelligence personally, to alert them to what was going on and to measures needing to be taken. Moreover, his willingness to cooperate with CIA and other U.S. Government agencies underwent changes from time to time, depending upon whether his demands for access to and interviews with specified ranking officials of those organizations were granted.

Golitsyn's chosen role as interpreter of Soviet policy and anti-Western actions was threatened by the arrival of Nosenko. His response was to gain access to virtually all of CIA's files on Nosenko for purposes of providing CIA with an "interpretation" of the latter's role. In any event, the idea took hold within CIA as a result of Golitsyn's hammering away at this theme that we were being "had" by the Soviets, particularly by being penetrated as a result of clever KGB counterintelligence operations and that Nosenko had to be "broken" at all costs; his "confession" would make clear to us the details and dimensions of the Soviet machinations.

Further, it was deemed expedient not only to proceed with efforts to "break" Nosenko but also to study past operations known to have been Soviet-controlled to see what could be learned from these cases about how the Soviet intelligence services had carried out their activities against the West through the years. This study of historic Soviet cases, designed not to explore an hypothesis but to prove an already-accepted thesis, produced information about an awesome "enemy," cunning and complex, lavishing money and manpower on operations which were almost invariably successful. The fact that many of these cases were primarily of historic interest, undertaken at a particular time to take advantage of or exploit a particular situation which no longer obtained or had little or no pertinence to Nosenko's defection, appears to have been discounted. On the contrary, since the cases included in the study were considered to have been hugely successful in duping or deluding the Western intelligence services and governments, it was concluded that we were continuing to be deluded and duped. It was reasoned that as CIA and other Western intelligence services became increasingly aware of and informed on the Soviet operational techniques being used against them and changed their operational tactics accordingly, the KGB simply adjusted to the new situation and continued to outwit us. With Shelepin and succeeding chiefs of the KGB as members of the Central Committee, it was assumed that those KGB operations which could be (or were) classed as dezinformatsiya were not only important per se but took on added importance inasmuch as the KGB, through its chief, was involved in the policy-making

body of the Soviet Union. Consequently, any operation as important as the one which involved sending a senior KGB officer, Nosenko, to the West on a dezinformatsiya mission must have been an exceedingly important one, involving high-level staff coordination. Any other agents who provided confirmatory information or whose information could in any way be regarded as suspiciously coincidental had to be part of the overall operation. Given the importance of the operation, Chairman Khrushchev was undoubtedly directing the whole thing himself.

No attention was paid to the fact that, despite the assertions of Goleniewski and Golitsyn, there was no known case of a KGB officer ever having been sent to discredit a previous defector in the eyes of a Western intelligence service. After brief consideration of the notion that Nosenko might not even be a member of the KGB at all, it was decided that the KGB had dispatched him to counter Golitsyn.

Conclusions

In retrospect, it seems worthwhile to point out that (a) in the years since Nosenko's first contact and subsequent defection, no information has ever been developed to substantiate the charges made against him either by Golitsyn or by the "mirror-readers"; (b) Golitsyn's information with respect to dezinformatsiya has not been internally consistent; and (c) Golitsyn himself as the architect and sponsor of theories presented has not been able to support his claims, despite the wealth of information made available to him for analysis. The following is quoted from an unsigned paper, dated 10 September 1968, in summation of Golitsyn's claims:

> Golitsyn's overall thesis, that the Soviet leadership in 1959 developed a "New Policy" (peaceful coexistence, non-violent tactics, united front, etc.) is perfectly acceptable as a statement of the "Right" strategy developed during the mid- and late-fifties and enshrined in the November 1960 Moscow Manifesto. Golitsyn's depiction of this policy as, in toto, a "misinformation" operation rests upon his extremely broad use of that term: "special deliberate efforts of the communist governments to mislead Western studies and to direct them in wrong directions" by means of official Soviet speeches and Party documents, official press and propaganda outlets, travel controls, diplomatic activities, leaks, etc. His vocabulary and general handling of this new Bloc policy gives the strategy a conspiratorial quality not justified by its essentially open and public character.
>
> The role of the KGB in the execution and coordination of this policy is constantly alluded to, but no evidence is provided to define the precise nature of its role and no actual "covert" disinformation operations

are cited for the years from 1959 to the present. Golitsyn provided factual evidence for "politicalization" of the KGB in 1959, but its new role may also be interpreted to cover routine operations of covert propaganda, political action, recruitment of agents of influence and specific "disinformation" operations without involving the KGB (or the Bloc intelligence services) in any broader role.

CHAPTER VII

GOLITSYN VS NOSENKO: A COMPARISON OF THEIR HANDLING BY CIA

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the differences in handling by CIA of the two KGB defectors, Anatoliy Golitsyn and Yuriy Nosenko. Comparison is material to this study, since it was Golitsyn's "confirmation" of certain theories regarding Nosenko as a dispatched agent which helped to establish the standards by which CIA judged Nosenko when he walked in some months after Golitsyn. It is also material since Golitsyn played a role in CIA efforts to "break" Nosenko. Brief discussion of the treatment given the two men follows.

Interrogation

The defections of Golitsyn and Nosenko cannot be considered directly comparable, since some five meetings were held with Nosenko about eighteen months before his actual defection. There had been no similar contact with Golitsyn before his defection. However, the following statements can be made.

Golitsyn was brought to this country within days of his defection in Helsinki in December 1961. Standard interrogation procedures were initiated, which included his systematic debriefing regarding his own biographic data, family background and career, and his knowledge of the structure, organization, personalities and operations of the KGB. What he said was checked against CIA files and formed the basis for his acceptance within weeks of arrival in the United States as a bona fide defector.

The "non-routine" aspects of Golitsyn's interrogation were that he was fully cooperative with his handlers only during the first months after arrival in this country. Moreover, he attempted "to call the shots" from the very beginning, refusing to answer some questions, making replies to others conditional on compliance with some demand or other. For full details on the manner in which Golitsyn managed to run his own interrogation to a large extent, readers are referred to Study No. 3, a review of the case of Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Golitsyn, prepared in 1976 by the Counterintelligence Staff of the DDO.

In Nosenko's case, he cannot be said to have been interrogated at all, in the strict sense of the word, during initial contacts with him in Geneva in June 1962. For one thing, he evinced no desire to defect at that time but simply offered certain pieces of information which he thought would be of interest to CIA, in exchange for a specified sum of money which he claimed to need. Also, time with him was limited.

When Nosenko actually defected in February 1964, he was interrogated in a manner which contrasted sharply with that applied in Golitsyn's case. In the interim between initial contacts in 1962 and his defection in 1964, as previously explained, it had been concluded that he was a dispatched agent. Voluminous papers had been written during this period "proving" that such was the case, and because of the accumulated "evidence," it was decided to attempt to "break" him as soon

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as possible. Accordingly, and because it was also believed imperative to act quickly, Nosenko's interrogation took place in various pre-planned stages or phases, ranging from ostensibly friendly to hostile.

In Nosenko's case, then, the entire effort was to force him to admit to CIA's accusations rather than to obtain information from him in any logical or systematic fashion. Efforts were made to "trap" him or "throw him off balance," by indicating that CIA had "proof" that he was lying, that his only option was to "confess" that he had been sent by the KGB, etc. His denials of charges or refusals to "confess" only resulted in increasingly hostile treatment. While his statements did contain inconsistencies and there were questions for which he gave no adequate or consistent and logical answers, the manner in which he was questioned was in no way that afforded the usual defector. Moreover, the pressures which were put upon Nosenko contributed to the creation of a climate not conducive to proper interrogation. It was not until October 1967, in fact, that he received a proper interrogation.

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Because Golitsyn's initial expectations were so grandiose they could not readily be satisfied, he "kept up a steady barrage of demands and complaints" aimed at wringing concessions from CIA. Nevertheless, by 12 February 1962, a "Statement of Agreement with the U.S. Government" had been worked out which apparently was acceptable to both sides; it was therefore signed on that date. It called for Golitsyn's (a) continued cooperation in providing information freely to all U.S. Government agencies, (b) protective custody by the U.S. Government until no longer necessary, (c) continuous consultation in the field of political action against overt and covert Soviet foreign policy, (d) coordination with him of arrangements for his surfacing, (e) general agreement on a work plan and reference materials to be provided him, (f) eventual freedom to launch journalistic efforts, and (g) freedom to use his lump sum payment as he desired, with advice from the U.S. Government. Later, Golitsyn insisted that the original agreement be amended by means of a codicil which reflected more completely his claimed motivation for defecting ("to fight the Soviet regime") and spelled out the freedom from control he desired. Even this codicil he refused to

sign until he had discussed his grievances with Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and had received assurances from Kennedy that the terms of the agreement would be carried out.

Nosenko (defection date: 4 February 1964) held discussions with SR officer Tennent Bagley on 17 February in which Nosenko requested official assurance that he was actually working for CIA, as he had been promised he would be. While trusting his contacts, he still felt the need for "some tangible evidence that he had a status with CIA." He complained of being in a state of suspended animation, which prevented him from relaxing and throwing himself into his work as he should. He did not appear to be satisfied with the reply that CIA wanted to allow him a suitable period in his new country before binding him to a contract. He stated that intelligence work was his only profession, that he was not going to learn a new profession at his age, and that his long-considered decision to defect was based on his determination to combat the present regime in the Soviet Union. [22]

The following statements are quoted from the memorandum for the record prepared by Bagley on his discussions of 17 February with Nosenko:

> Speaking unofficially, I [Bagley] said that there could be no doubt what we in CIA want since both Mr. Murphy and myself are enthusiastically optimistic about future cooperation with him [Nosenko] in operations against the USSR. However, I pointed out our stand in this matter of contract was the official and bureaucratically correct one. I noted that [Nosenko] could not in the long run always lean on official pieces of paper but would sooner or later have to depend to some degree on his confidence in us as individuals. He replied that he did not need paper but, in fact, needed only to be told officially that he is working with us as of a certain date and that his salary has begun . . . I then asked whether he considered me as empowered to speak in this regard for CIA and he said he did. I then said officially that he is working with us as of 5 February 1964 and his salary begins from that date . . . We stressed that a written contract would follow and that it would include such administrative details as leave, provisions, etc. [22]

In point of fact, the SR Division officers concerned appear to have been "enthusiastically optimistic" only about "breaking" Nosenko. On the day the above discussions took place, a memorandum was sent to the DDP by the Chief of SR Division, David Murphy, in which he made the following statements and recommendations:

> We can also opt for a debriefing period during which Subject [Nosenko] believes we trust him while at the same time we take necessary steps to get ready for the final confrontation. To maintain the minimum atmosphere of trust (and conviction on Subject's part that he is moving ahead in his initial goal which is acceptance by

CIA as a CI consultant on operations), we believe we should adhere generally to the statements made to Subject during our meetings in Geneva [redacted] recognizing that we can shape this program to our own timetable.21 (b)(1) (b)(3)

It was not until 1 March 1969 that Nosenko and the U.S. Government entered into a written contractual relationship. This contract defined Nosenko's status as that of an independent contractor or consultant to CIA. Its terms specified that Nosenko would hold himself available at all times to fulfill requests made by CIA or to respond to tasks requested by CIA, and spelled out matters pertaining to communication with CIA representatives, cover and security arrangements, place of residence, compensation, travel and other expenses, hospitalization and medical care, and secrecy obligations. Nosenko acknowledged that in view of the arrangements being made by CIA with respect to his future employment and welfare, that he had no outstanding claims against CIA and that there were no commitments made to him by CIA, arising out of his prior associations with CIA, which remained unsatisfied.

Polygraph Examination

As with other phases of their respective handling, the account of Nosenko's polygraph examinations is in marked contrast with that of Golitsyn.

GOLITSYN POLYGRAPH

Golitsyn was given two polygraph examinations, on 27 and 28 March 1962, by polygraph operator Nicholas Stoiaken of the Office of Security. The tests were administered under special ground rules which were established initially during discussions held on 16 March 1962 between Howard Osborn, Deputy Chief, SR Division, and Robert Bannerman, Deputy Director, Office of Security. It was agreed at that time that Golitsyn was to be regarded as a "special case"; his "flap potential" was regarded as high inasmuch as his case had become known to General Maxwell Taylor, Chief of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, to Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and to the DCI, John McCone. There obviously could be repercussions in the event Golitsyn was improperly handled during polygraph sessions in view of the fact that Taylor, Kennedy and McCone were aware of Golitsyn's allegations that the U.S. Government and CIA were penetrated at a high level, and that these allegations had been accepted to that point by CIA without reservations. Also, Golitsyn himself had reacted adversely to the idea of taking a polygraph examination and had consented only after it had been brought home to him that the test was an absolute requirement for receipt of resident alien status in the United States.

The unusual manner in which the tests were conducted is illustrated in the following quotations from the report later submitted by Stoiaken:

> The undersigned [Stoiaken] had a series of pre-polygraph conferences with Ed Knowles, C/SR/CI, Birch O'Neal, CI Staff officer, and Bruce Solie of the Office of Security. The general consensus of the interested parties regarding what areas should and should not be covered during polygraph testing all reflected the fact that Subject [Golitsyn] should be disturbed as little as

> possible by the questions asked during the polygraph test so that he would not feel personally offended and as a result become "sour," unmanageable or uncooperative. Furthermore, that no indication be given to [Golitsyn] during testing that there were any doubts as to his reliability or defection motivation.
>
> . . . [Polygraph] coverage was to deal with questions pertaining to whether [Golitsyn] was a dispatched KGB agent, if [Golitsyn] had a mission in connection with his defection, if [Golitsyn] was intentionally misinforming his [American intelligence] interviewer, whether he had any secret prearranged means of contact with Soviet officials, if he had a concrete plan to return to the USSR, as well as questions dealing with his motivation (the latter to be asked as discreetly as possible so as not to disturb).
>
> . . . It was also pointed out to [Stoiaken] during the pre-polygraph conferences . . . that regardless of how [Golitsyn] reacted specifically, even if there were consistent specific indications of deception to the questions, under no circumstances should [Golitsyn] be made aware of the fact that [Stoiaken] had conclusive polygraph evidence which reflected that [Golitsyn] was attempting deception to the pertinent questions. [140]

Although Stoiaken was fluent in Russian, the test was given to Golitsyn on 27 March 1962 in English; Russian was used by Stoiaken only when Golitsyn failed to comprehend the full and accurate meaning of a question. Golitsyn raised no objections to any questions asked, but Stoiaken did not consider the day's testing conclusive, because of the difficulties which had arisen due to Golitsyn's poor comprehension of English plus a malfunctioning polygraph.

A second test was therefore given the following day, 28 March, in the Russian language, during the course of which Golitsyn was asked the same questions as on the previous day. Before the test could be initiated, however, Golitsyn again had to be convinced of the necessity for taking it. He stated that he had thought over the questions he had been asked the previous day, and considered them "insulting." He resented having been asked whether he had been sent by the KGB, whether he had a mission connected with his defection having to do with misinformation, his motivation for defecting, etc. In Stoiaken's words, he resented "all in all, any and every question which may have reflected that he was not accepted 100 percent on the basis of only his own explanations and assurances." Nevertheless, the test was finally conducted. Upon its completion, Stoiaken informed Golitsyn that he (Stoiaken) had concluded that Golitsyn was substantially truthful in his answers and that, as far as Stoiaken was concerned, the results were favorable.

Six months later, the Office of Security reviewed the polygraph charts, as well as the questions which had been posed,

the transcriptions of the interviews, and the final report prepared by Stoiaken. On 19 September 1962, a memorandum was prepared for the Chief of the Interrogation and Research Division of the Office of Security by reviewer Robert Taylor. Taylor's report contained the following initial statements:

> A review of [Stoiaken's report on the testing of Golitsyn] reflects everything except a clear-cut statement of whether or not Golitsyn lied or did not lie to any or all of the questions. The report states that the first day's testing was inconclusive. The results of the second day's testing is not set forth. The report is rather remarkable for this reason. 141

Taylor's report indicates that the first day's charts showed that Golitsyn was very nervous during testing on that day, considerably less so on the second. No particular interpretation was placed on this lessened apprehension, other than to note that Golitsyn knew what to expect in the way of questions and procedures on the second day, and also that on the second day he was tested in Russian rather than English. Of more interest is the reviewer's conclusion that, while the charts for 28 March show no noticeable reactions to relevant questions, they also show no noticeable reactions to any other questions: the reviewer was unable to determine which, if any, of the questions were designed to be "hot" or control questions which could provoke a response indicative of deception; thus, the reviewer concluded that the questions were not well conceived. In addition, Taylor noted that Golitsyn was not asked any detailed questions on his personal biography which might have indicated whether he was withholding information. Taylor's ultimate conclusion was that the charts, with the limitations noted above, did not show reactions indicating that Golitsyn was a dispatched Soviet agent. However, his report also contained the following conclusion:

> This should not be considered any definitive [polygraph examination]. The conditions and limitations placed on the [polygraph] officer as reflected in the body of the report imposed a set of conditions that preclude and make impossible any unequivocal statement that a conclusive [polygraph examination] was conducted. 141

* * * * * * * * * * *

The use of the polygraph in Nosenko's case contrasts sharply with the way it was used on Golitsyn. We shall not go into detail here, because Nosenko's polygraph examinations are covered at length in Chapter VIII. It is relevant here, however, to make the point that those polygraph examinations of both Golitsyn and Nosenko performed prior to 1968 were all invalid. Since the CI Staff had possession of, or access to, all documents relating to Golitsyn, they were in a position to know that Golitsyn had not been properly polygraphed. To whose attention this fact came, and whether any attention was paid to it, is not the province of this study. In the case

of Nosenko, we know that the leadership of the SR/SB Division, including Murphy and Bagley, were personally involved in employing the polygraph not for assistance in seeking the truth, but to extract an admission of guilt from a person who has since given every evidence of being innocent of the allegations against him.

Access to Classified Information

With respect to their relative access to classified information, the cases of Golitsyn and Nosenko could not stand in greater contrast.

Practically from the moment of his arrival in this country, Golitsyn began to demand access to CIA files. He largely achieved his ends and was soon being given transcripts of his own debriefing sessions as well as what has been described as a "valuable library," including reference publications classified up to Secret. Starting in November 1963, voluminous information was made available to him by the CI Staff and by SR Division, via the CI Staff. The documents and materials have been identified by reference to (1) letters of transmittal from the CI Staff to Golitsyn addressed to "Dear Anatole," and (2) to memoranda of transmittal from SR Division to the CI Staff attaching material "for Golitsyn." They included:

A. Thirty-two documents concerning the Penkovskiy case.

B. Biographical sketch on, and all (83) reports obtained from, Nikolay Artamonov, a Soviet naval officer who defected in 1959.

C. Voluminous documents pertaining to the Popov case, including SW messages, meeting transcripts and contact reports.

D. Copies of the first four substantive cables from Geneva relating to the circumstances of Nosenko's contact with CIA in Geneva in 1962. The cables included details of the first meeting with David Mark, a U.S. Foreign Service Officer.

E. Transcriptions of all meetings with Nosenko in Geneva in 1962 following those noted in the cables described above.

F. Transcriptions of meetings 1 through 13 with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964.

G. Material requested by Golitsyn in connection with his "work on the Nosenko case": biographic information provided by Nosenko before he underwent hostile interrogation; a copy of the documents and handwritten notes which Nosenko brought out with him; a resume of the first week's hostile interrogation of Nosenko; Nosenko's comments on Yuriy Krotkov's manuscript entitled Fear (Krotkov was a writer and KGB agent who defected in London in 1963); and a nearly complete collection of photo identifications made by Nosenko as of that date.

H. A sanitized copy of a cable summary of Nosenko's reactions to Yuriy Krotkov.

I. Biographic sketch of Russell Langelle, a U.S. citizen and CIA staff officer at one time stationed in Moscow, with a list of operations in which he was involved.

J. Biographic sketch of George Winters, a U.S. citizen and former CIA staff officer at one time stationed in Moscow, with a list of operations in which he had been involved.

K. Biographic sketch of Edward Ellis Smith, a U.S. citizen and former CIA staff employee who had served as Security Officer of the American Embassy in Moscow.

L. Biographic sketch of David Mark, a U.S. citizen and Foreign Service Officer who cooperated with CIA during the period of his assignment to the American Embassy in Moscow, plus a list of operational actions carried out by him for CIA.

M. Biographic sketch of Steve Washenko, a U.S. citizen and Foreign Service Officer who cooperated with CIA during the period of his assignment to the American Embassy in Moscow, with a list of operational actions carried out by him for CIA.

N. Biographic sketch of Lewis Wesley Bowden, Jr., a U.S. citizen and Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow at one time. Bowden had no CIA affiliation.

O. Biographic sketch of James A. Ramsey, a U.S. citizen and Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow at one time. Ramsey had no CIA affiliation. Golitsyn was provided with a copy of an interview of Ramsey conducted by U.S. Government security officers (not identified as to agency affiliation).

P. Biographic sketch of Vladimir Toumanoff, a U.S. citizen and Foreign Service Officer assigned to the American Embassy in Moscow at one time. Toumanoff had no CIA affiliation.

Q. Biographic sketch of Jean Lieberman, a U.S. citizen and CIA staff officer at one time assigned to Moscow.

R. Information on Leonid Gran, Russian-born American citizen employed as an interpreter by the United Nations in Geneva. Gran was the object of a KGB recruitment attempt while Gran was on loan to UNESCO for conference work in Tbilisi in 1968.

S. Biographic information on CIA-connected personnel mentioned in the Cherepanov papers. This information was additional to sketches on the same persons given to Golitsyn with the transcript

for Meeting No. 12 with Nosenko in Geneva in 1964.

T. A nine-page summary of the status of the Nosenko case, including information on the results of Nosenko's 1964 polygraph examination, on his confrontation and subsequent interrogation on his life history, on CIA conclusions ("daily support for our conviction that Nosenko was sent on a KGB mission"), on CIA plans for future handling of Nosenko (continued interrogation), and on Nosenko's circumstances (confinement under observation, without cigarettes or reading material).

U. Copies of two reports on the subject of KGB audio-technical operations, one prepared on the basis of information provided by Golitsyn himself in 1962 and one prepared on the basis of information brought out by Nosenko in 1964, with notation for Golitsyn that recent sweeping operations in the American Embassy in Moscow had located all the microphones identified by Nosenko and a number not mentioned by Nosenko.

V. A repeat of Nosenko's commentary on Krotkov (identified above), expanded to include identifications Nosenko made of the KGB people involved with Krotkov.

W. A list of questions which Krotkov had suggested be put to Nosenko to confirm and clarify information given by Krotkov.

X. Biographic sketches on Vladimir M. Kovshuk, Yuriy I. Guk, Aleksandr Feklisov alias Fomin, and Igor I. Ivanov. Kovshuk and Guk were KGB officers known to both Golitsyn and Nosenko; with Vladimir Churanov, they were credited by Golitsyn as having recommended to the KGB that Nosenko be sent to the West to discredit Golitsyn in the eyes of CIA and other Western intelligence services. Feklisov was a KGB officer who visited the United States as part of Khrushchev's party in 1959, and later (1960--1964) served as Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. Ivanov was arrested by the FBI in 1963 in connection with the case of John W. Butenko, U.S. Air Force officer who was arrested as a KGB agent. These reports were given to Golitsyn at his request.

Y. A chronology of the case of Boris Belitskiy, a KGB-controlled CIA source. Golitsyn had asked to "re-read" the file on Belitskiy, whose status vis-a-vis the KGB was first reported to CIA by Nosenko. Golitsyn was also given a background sketch of Belitskiy and transcripts of "all four contact periods."

Z. File summary of the case of GRU Colonel Fedorov alias Rasin, a GRU Colonel who served as an illegal in France in 1958--1959.

AA. Case descriptions of two operations which were serviced by CIA personnel in Moscow. Both were KGB couriers dispatched on emigre operations into West Germany where they were apprehended, agreed to work for American intelligence and later returned to the USSR: Irina Jung and Taisya Konstantinovna Prytkova.

BB. Responses by Nosenko to questions drafted by Golitsyn on: recruitable Soviets (by name and background); American double agents; the Popov case; recruitment of U.S. intelligence personnel; KGB operations against U.S. Embassy (Moscow) personnel; surveys or studies done by the KGB Second Chief Directorate about arrested American spies (including Popov and Penkovskiy); KGB awards (including those given to persons who participated in the investigation of Penkovskiy, Popov, Stashinskiy); the Penkovskiy case; Golitsyn.

CC. Charts indicating what Nosenko had reported on KGB operational interest in specific persons (i.e., operational "leads"), and what CIA had been able to develop on them through investigation, with CIA comments as appropriate; an outline of information provided by Nosenko on the structure and personnel assignments in the KGB as he knew them; a chronology of Nosenko's life "in varying versions."

DD. Information on the operations of Igor Orlov, CIA contractual employee in West Germany from 1951--1961. Orlov was identified by the Office of Security as the individual described by Golitsyn as a KGB penetration agent who worked for an American intelligence unit in Berlin and whose KGB cryptonym was SASHA. Orlov had been sent to Germany during World War II to assist with organizing partisan forces behind the German lines. He was captured in 1943, later served as a counterespionage officer in the Wehrmacht; still later transferred to the Vlasov Army; and finally worked briefly for the embryonic German Intelligence Service. In 1950 he joined a Soviet emigre organization which was attempting to launch information collection, propaganda and defector-inducement programs. In 1951 he left this organization to work for CIA. [7]

By contrast, the CIA position with regard to revelation of information to Nosenko is indicated by the following statement taken from a memorandum for the DDP prepared by David Murphy as Chief, SR Division, dated 30 March 1964:

> . . . I think we should make absolutely sure that Subject [Nosenko] does not learn a single thing from us that we do not want him (and eventually the KGB) to know. I think CIA has to take a very firm position on this issue, otherwise the FBI might urge a delay in confrontation while they present case after case to [Nosenko] in an effort to learn more from him. [30]

For information on Nosenko's deprivation of reading matter of

any sort for long periods of time, much less intelligence files of the sort given to Golitsyn, see Chapter III.

Physical Confinement

Golitsyn cannot be said to have been physically confined at any time. The following description of the protective custody afforded him and his reaction to any type of control is quoted from the 1976 Counterintelligence Staff Study (No. 3) on Golitsyn:

> Golitsyn always felt the need for protection against possible KGB retaliation, but quite obviously believed he alone was the best judge of what this entailed. He wanted guards around, but not underfoot. The record is replete with his complaints against the guards and his attempts to isolate them. This became a key issue in the adoption of the codicil to the Statement of Agreement in July 1962, when Golitsyn moved into his own house and was given complete personal control of the guards, their hours of duty and their responsibilities. From that point on, Golitsyn was essentially unguarded. His wife also railed against her "companions" in the early days. She made frequent trips into Washington to shop or attend movies, theater or ballet. At these times, she would dismiss her chauffeur for lengthy periods. On two occasions she took the bus alone to New York for the day, and Golitsyn also visited New York in November 1962, at which time he roamed the city unescorted.[124]

Golitsyn's behavior from that time on followed a similar pattern. He suddenly left the United States for the United Kingdom in December 1962, and while in England he lived where he wished and had no security protection. The British intelligence unit responsible for him (MI-5) asked Golitsyn to keep his whereabouts to himself, not to stay in one hotel for any length of time, and to call MI-5 when he wanted to meet. According to the study quoted above, this loose method of dealing with Golitsyn probably helped in maintaining a cooperative attitude on his part; it also apparently set a precedent for his attitude toward the manner in which he would live upon his return to the United States in July 1963. Upon his return here, he was given complete freedom to set his own pattern of living and working, following the British example. He obtained his own residence in New York, the location of which was unknown to CIA for some time. He moved several times, developed the concept that he was the best judge of his own security, and at times lived "almost under the eaves of the Soviet Mission" in New York while simultaneously refusing to talk to CIA officers because CIA was penetrated.

Nosenko's physical confinement and deprivation of even minor amenities from the time of his defection in early 1964 until late October 1967 stand in stark contrast to the treatment afforded Golitsyn. This matter has been covered so fully in Chapter III that it requires little further comment. It is of interest to note, however, that the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Howard Osborn and Thomas Karamessines

in February 1969 contained the following provision:

> Although the orientation [i.e., rehabilitation] process will involve an apparent relaxation of restraint, actual control over Nosenko will continue to deny him any opportunity to make contact with the Soviets.[114]

Given the fact that Murphy and Bagley were by now stationed abroad, it is not wildly suppositious to conclude that this provision was drafted under Angleton's aegis. The provision also underlines once again the differential treatment accorded Golitsyn and Nosenko as a result of Angleton's influence with Helms.

Conclusions

If summation is needed, the following can be stated with respect to the five areas dealt with above:

A. Golitsyn controlled his own interrogation, withholding information if he chose, refusing to answer questions according to his own whim, and on occasion refusing even to talk to CIA officers. Nosenko was not really listened to (or even talked to for long stretches of time), much less properly interrogated, for several years after the date of his defection.

B. Golitsyn was given a signed agreement covering the conditions of his cooperation with the U.S. Government, which met all of his demands. Nosenko was specifically denied a written contract, on the grounds that an oral agreement was the "bureaucratically correct" manner of handling his relationship with the U.S. Government, until five years after his defection (1969).

C. Golitsyn's polygraph examination was administered under ground rules imposed by SR Division. These rules produced inconclusive test results, but full assurances were given Golitsyn that he had passed his examination. No further attempt was ever made to establish Golitsyn's bona fides during Angleton's tenure as Chief, CI Staff. Nosenko, on the other hand, underwent three separate series of polygraph tests. Two of the three were conducted in such a manner as to prejudice the results against Nosenko; under the ground rules imposed by the SR Division officers on the polygraph operator, the latter was under instructions to "find" evidences of deception in the polygraph charts whether they were there or not.

D. With respect to access to information, Golitsyn was provided with literally safes-full of classified documents, including files on cases which were regarded as highly sensitive within CIA and to which only a very small number of CIA staff officers had access. Nosenko not only did not see any intelligence material but was denied access to

newspapers, books, radio, or even personal contact with other human beings.

E. As to physical confinment, Golitsyn was simply never confined; the thought of confining him did not even arise. Nosenko spent virtually all of his first five years in this country as a prisoner, given fewer amenities than he would have received in most jails or prisons within the United States, or in some form of protective custody.

It seems self-evident that these two defectors should have received the same treatment, that one was as suspect as the other until completion of all appropriate processing aimed at determining bona fides. Clearly, however, such was not the view of CIA's leadership at the time.

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face of inescapable contradictions, with the statements "I don't know" or "I don't remember." Another technique which we had applied could by now be seen not to work: months and even years of the boredom of detention had failed to break him. It had also been decided that no special technical interrogation techniques would be approved for this case.

For four years we have been analyzing and investigating Nosenko's story and gaining considerable appreciation of how the KGB developed and mounted this operation. We felt this "knowledge" could be used to increase Nosenko's feeling of hopelessness and as such was a weapon which we had not yet used. At this point, despite some risk of error, there was little to lose by introducing it.

The polygraph had been used earlier only for general questions on 4 April 1964. We thus decided to use it as an interrogation tool for whatever added pressure it offered.

This interrogation was therefore a last ditch effort. Its aims were as follows:

a. To gain further information and to strengthen our basic paper on the Nosenko case, now in preparation.

b. To add to the evidence in that paper any valid results the polygraph testing might produce on points of detail.

c. To influence Nosenko toward eventual confession by putting our hypotheses to work: putting to him questions so as to (1) make him aware of the extent of our ostensible knowledge and of the hopelessness of his position; and (2) break down the barriers which have seemed to us to prevent his confession: hope of legal release, confusion about our aims, expectations of vindication or support, perhaps fear of penetrations of AIS, or even more loyalty to his superiors or fellow agents-provocateurs.

d. To gain more insight into points of detail which we could use in fabricating an ostensible Nosenko confession. Insofar as we could make one consistent and believable (even to the Soviets), a "confession" could be useful in any eventual disposal of Nosenko. 89

Nosenko's final polygraph examination, conducted under the direction of Howard Osborn and Bruce Solie, was quite at variance with the first two. Initiated on 2 August 1968, it concluded on 6 August 1968. The tests took place after approximately 7,000 pages of transcripts and related materials had been compiled during the course of Nosenko's new interrogation undertaken in late October 1967. About 60 questions of a pertinent nature were covered in the interview. Nosenko was completely cooperative, no problems were encountered, and the conclusion of the polygraph operator was that Nosenko had been substantially truthful in answering all relevant questions put to him.

In the course of the present investigation, the Office of Security was requested to make a further reevaluation of the Nosenko polygraph charts of April 1964, October 1966, and August 1968. The resultant report, dated 30 September 1976 and signed by Director of Security Robert W. Gambino, states:

> This memorandum is in response to your request for a review of the polygraph charts of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko obtained during polygraph interrogations in April 1964 and October 1966, conducted by Mr. Nicholas Stoiaken and in August 1968, conducted by Mr. Stephen Andros.
>
> After a thorough review of the charts obtained in April 1964, it is our opinion that the polygraph charts obtained do not contain sufficient technical data on which to base a conclusion of deception or to support that Mr. Nosenko was a dispatched agent of the KGB . . .
>
> Finally, the polygraph patterns produced to pertinent questions during the August 1968 polygraph examination substantiate that Mr. Nosenko was truthful and that he had not given false information to his CIA debriefing officers. It is our opinion that the examiner in that testing was correct in his chart analysis. [126]

CHAPTER IX

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MEDICAL FINDINGS

A small, but nevertheless key role was played by two Agency specialists, respectively a psychologist and a psychiatrist, in the handling of Nosenko. Like so much else which occurred in this case, this aspect is edifying mainly in the negative sense of demonstrating how the services of such professionals ought not to be exploited.

In sum, the psychologist and psychiatrist principally involved in this case were given enough misinformation about Nosenko's bona fides to prejudice seriously any chance of an accurate personality assessment. In addition, the psychologist was threatened with reprisal if he did not come up with a conclusion acceptable to Murphy and Bagley. (For details on this matter, see Chapter III.)

We now examine in some detail the roles played by John Gittinger, the psychologist, and Charles Bohrer, the psychiatrist. In doing so, we have very much in mind the fact that both these gentlemen are members of organized professions, both of which impose explicit standards of conduct upon their members. We must therefore look for possible conflict between demands which the Agency made of these professionals on one hand, and their professional standards on the other.

1: The Role of Mr. John Gittinger

Gittinger's role will be dealt with first because, to judge by the written record, he was the first to assess Nosenko from the psychological point of view, by means of a brief interview and test administered on 23 June 1964. His initial report is dated 9 July 1964. In addition, he interviewed Nosenko at length in 14 sessions during the period 3--21 May 1965. He then wrote both a chronicle of Nosenko's life and an overall psychological evaluation based on these interviews.

By way of background, it should be said that Gittinger is an extremely insightful psychologist, with clinical experience acquired both before joining the Agency as well as during his CIA service. He has developed his own system of interpreting the Wechsler intelligence tests (Wechsler-Bellevue and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale), which he calls the Personality Assessment System (PAS). It is PAS which, for over two decades, has been the main resource used by the Clandestine Service in the assessment of personality for operational purposes.

Like any other scientific practitioner, however, a psychologist can only function properly on the basis of valid data. If you put a cube of ice in a patient's mouth before inserting the thermometer, you do not get an accurate temperature reading. If you provide an examining psychologist or psychiatrist with erroneous data regarding a defector, the findings of his examination will inevitably be in part erroneous.

Personality assessment instruments, or "tests," also have their limitations. They yield results which should be read only as statements of the statistical probability of the

presence of a given personality predisposition or characteristic. In other words, the results give the psychologist a suggestion as to what to look for in a person, as he collects further data. In the case here under consideration, the personality formula which Gittinger derived from his administration of the PAS test to Nosenko suggested that Nosenko might have the characteristics of a sociopath. Gittinger's task was then to evaluate this datum within a framework which included the following elements:

A. His judgment of the validity of his own test results. Note that he depended on a single, English-language measurement instrument when he examined Nosenko on 23 June 1964.

B. Personal interviews. He had time for only a limited interview at the time of testing, and it was conducted without benefit of an interpreter in English, a language which Nosenko spoke with far from idiomatic fluency. Lengthy interviews were conducted later, in May 1965, long after the original diagnosis had been made. They also were conducted in English.

C. Collateral data, obtained from Murphy and Bagley, which were uniformly prejudicial to Nosenko. The latter was described as one who lied and changed his story constantly, and who had been sent to the United States on a mission for the KGB. Doubt was even expressed as to whether Nosenko was the person he professed to be.

Subsequent events have revealed that Nosenko's falsehoods were in fact minor ones. But Gittinger did not know all this; told that Nosenko lied constantly and knowing that manipulative lying is part of the psychopathic syndrome, he diagnosed Nosenko as a psychopath.

The term "psychopath" (another term used interchangeably is "sociopath") itself deserves a word of explanation, because its connotation is misleading. Like so many psychological terms, it evolved out of the fact that psychologists tend to be involved primarily with people in trouble, very often with those who end up in prisons and mental institutions. A survey of psychological literature reveals, not surprisingly, that the one quintessential criterion of a psychopath is that he is habitually given to criminal or delinquent behavior. The criteria which psychologists use in distinguishing between psychopaths and non-psychopaths have been developed almost entirely from studies of juvenile delinquents, criminals and mental patients, and thus the term is really only applicable with any certainty to individuals belonging to one or another of those groups. Despite this fact, testing of many people who are not delinquent or criminal may yield a score or profile of scores suggesting psychopathy. To illustrate the point, let us take an example. On the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (one of the most widely used clinical testing instruments in this country), the profile which suggests psychopathy has also been generated in testing persons who turned out to be good WACs in World War II, and others who have been predicted as likely to succeed in the life insurance business. Yet, good

WACs and life insurance agents are obviously not groups to whom we would ordinarily apply the term "psychopath." Thus, the fact that one has a predisposition to psychopathy does not mean that you necessarily become one; the psychopathic profile on either the MMPI or the PAS test is merely a warning signal of what you might do under certain adverse circumstances.

In recalling the events surrounding the 23 June 1964 test, Gittinger is vague. In particular, he was unable to recall exactly what information he had been given about Nosenko. However, that whatever information he did receive from SR Division was tendentious in the extreme is borne out by the following quotation from Page 4 of his initial evaluation:

> . . . When trapped, he can be sly as a fox and is capable of using any trick to get his own way, in his own manner. He is the stuff of which collaborators and informers are made. He has been so busy playing both ends against the middle in order to serve his own ends that it is almost impossible to determine his true loyalties and his true beliefs.[43]

Even the personality formula (couched in alphabetical symbols) yielded by Gittinger's test was unlikely in this case to have been accurate. As one authority says, "It is not very difficult to get a patient to do poorly on a psychological examination . . ."*; in general, it may be said that to get a valid behavioral assessment, you must elicit your subject's maximum performances.** Yet under circumstances which arouse anxiety, there is a disruption in performance.

When he tested Nosenko, Gittinger was not fully aware of all the pressures under which this defector was functioning. He was unaware of the manner of his sudden confinement after glowing promises had been made of rewards for defection; of the falsified polygraph results, and the fact that Nosenko had been informed that the examination showed him guilty of deception; or of the fact that Bagley had told Nosenko that the latter's information (later to prove of great value) was all "crap." Given these factors, we would have to conclude a priori that the resultant PAS personality profile was likely to be partly spurious.

The exact extent to which Gittinger's test results were inexact cannot be determined, but one example is illustrative of the possibilities. One part of the profile suggested that Nosenko was endowed with a well-below average memory. That his memory was functioning at less than average level at the time he took the test cannot be doubted; but it has already been made clear that he was functioning under extremely

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* Lezak, M.D., Neuropsychological Assessment. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. Page 106.

** Ibid., page 107.

adverse conditions, and since the Wechsler subtest which measures memory span has been experimentally shown to be vulnerable to so-called state (i.e., temporary) anxiety,* this aspect of the personality profile must be considered spurious. From Nosenko's performance during extensive debriefings since he was released from confinement and began to receive normally humane treatment, we know that his memory is in fact exceptionally good. We can only conclude that if it functioned badly at the time of testing, this was largely due to anxiety induced by treatment received at the hands of CIA.

As to Gittinger's characterization of Nosenko as a psychopath, the limitations of such a diagnosis have already been made clear. Since his release from incarceration, although he has certainly shown himself to be an empathic person, winning and charming when he wants to be, he has not shown any of the undesirable traits associated with psychopathy. Quite to the contrary, as of this time at least, he has since 1969 comported himself with both dignity and discretion.

As prejudiced as Gittinger's original evaluation seems to have been by the erroneous information received from SR Division, it did not satisfy Bagley. The latter went to Gittinger's office to question his judgments (Gittinger no longer remembers in exactly what respect), and the result was a supplementary evaluation more to Bagley's liking. It contained a section entitled "Vulnerabilities" which was, once again, clearly based on the premise that Nosenko was dissembling when he denied being under continued KGB control. Gittinger wrote:

> Under prolonged pressure he will admit almost anything to get relief. Another vulnerability is that he will "break" in order to get relief. Care should be taken to continue pressure for some time after an initial break is secured to allow for vacillation and modification. Long periods of isolation after these breaks may be useful in evaluating the reliability of his information. In general, it is better to give him slight rewards (e.g., cigarettes, baths, etc.) for no apparent reason than to tie them to periods of cooperation, etc.[43]

Gittinger's last major involvement in the case appears to have been the series of debriefings having to do with Nosenko's personal history, conducted during the period 3--21 May 1965. These led Gittinger to the following conclusions and recommendations:

> A. Nosenko's story was consistent with the previous diagnosis of a "bright sociopath" (i.e., psychopath).

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* Matarazzo, J.D., Measurement and Appraisal of Adult Intelligence. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1972. Page 444.

B. Gittinger was "totally at a loss to even attempt to rationalize why a story with this much pathology would be used as a legend. Nothing could be served other than to discredit the man to whom it was assigned." 62

C. New approaches were necessary, as described in the following paragraph:

> I have few specific recommendations. The first is to consider a pentothal sodium [sic] interview. Dr. Bohrer is capable of doing this but I have no firm basis to assume that he would do it . . . Second, he can be hit with a hostile, or a better term would be a needling, interrogation on his psychological weaknesses. His reaction to my mild needle on him running away from a bad situation suggests he may be highly vulnerable in this area. Third, some consideration could be given to turning him back to the Soviets. The publication of his life story with the proper editorial changes -- emphasizing the class distinctions and privileges in a classless society could be most humiliating to the Soviets. In addition, we could take the gamble of demonstrating that defection is an honorable act of motivated men. The U.S. has no room for the misfits and failures of the Soviet system. 62

The above findings were still insufficient for some of the personnel of SR/CI, who then drafted a series of very specific questions to be put to Gittinger. Of these the first three will be quoted, together with Gittinger's answers:

> 1. This man's story is full of demonstrable lies. Often these lies seem pointless -- no matter from what point of view they are studied. When challenged, he will sometimes retreat from one of his stories; in other instances, he will cling adamantly to one even when it is clear to all that he is lying and even when he has an easy way out. In other words, his lies, distortions and rationalizations are harder to understand than those of most "normal" people. In your opinion, when he lies, does he do so:
>
> a. because he is a compulsive liar; (Answer: No.)
>
> b. because he seeks to bolster his stature and ego for his own reasons; (Answer: Essentially yes.)
>
> c. because the KGB told him to. (Answer: Perhaps.)
>
> 2. Do the incidence and nature of his inaccuracies and distortions add up to a behavior pattern that might reasonably be called "normal"?

If not, how can it be described in layman's terms? (Answer: Not a "normal" personality but legally normal and not hospitalizeable.)

3. If his behavior pattern is not "normal," could it be counterfeit, either for personal reasons or because he was briefed to comport himself this way? Could he play such a role over a considerable period of time? (Answer: Absolutely not.) [69]

When at long last, in February 1968, SB Division concluded its long-awaited study of the Nosenko case, the findings of the psychologist were included in the following abbreviated form:

> Nosenko is a rationalizer, a distorter, and an evasive person clearly capable of dissembling for personal reasons. He is not a compulsive liar. He is inclined to relate what he thinks he is expected to say rather than to tell the truth as he knows it. He lies by design as well as for effect, however, and he does not always embroider just to bolster his ego. He is neither "insane" nor psychotic, and he suffers from no "delusions." Nosenko's rationalizations are not the product of derangement.[104]

The most notable quality of this summary is its selectivity. For example:

A. The summary nowhere mentioned the diagnosis of Nosenko as a psychopath/sociopath. The fact that psychopaths generally try to evade the penalties of their misbehavior by adaptive role-playing (e.g., sudden religious "conversions" to win sympathy and "prove" they are changing their ways) could have served dangerously to undercut the thesis that Nosenko was sufficiently dedicated to persist in carrying out a long-term KGB plot in face of the sort of treatment he had received since 4 April 1964.

B. By the above-cited omission, it tends to establish a dichotomy between the "insane" or "psychotic," who suffer "delusions," and "normal" people who tell the truth. It carefully skirted the existence of a middle ground between normality and psychoticism, in which people do not behave "normally" but are not insane. Yet this distinction had been drawn specifically in answer to one of the SR Division questions quoted above.

Enough has been said to make clear that John Gittinger was put in an impossible position. On the basis of the "facts" provided him, he was frankly puzzled as to how Nosenko could have been selected for a KGB mission involving extended dissimulation. Yet, Murphy had threatened reprisal against him if he cast doubt on the Murphy-Bagley thesis. [125]

Gittinger was not sure enough of his ground to stick to his guns. Given his background as a psychologist who had

dealt previously with a number of Soviet defectors, Gittinger had a greater degree of insight into the absurdity of the Murphy-Bagley claims than anyone else in personal contact with Nosenko. On the other hand, he knew that he did not have all the facts, because Murphy had specifically told him so. Insight is of very little use when not based on adequate data.

Helms tried to help. When told by Gittinger that the latter did not have all the facts necessary to make a judgment about Nosenko, Helms called Murphy and instructed him that Gittinger should be fully informed. This instruction appears to have been disregarded.

We can only conclude that Gittinger did what could legitimately be expected of him, within the constraints of the Agency's command structure. The weaknesses which in retrospect we can perceive in Gittinger's diagnosis and recommendations can be ascribed directly to his being asked to make professional judgments based on inadequate knowledge. The propriety of the Agency's employing a professional in this manner should be carefully reviewed.

2: The Role of Charles A. Bohrer, M.D.

Dr. Bohrer's role in the Nosenko operation was more extensive and of longer duration than Gittinger's. In addition to physical examinations, it included giving advice on how Nosenko should be treated while in confinement, advice on special interrogation techniques such as the use of sodium pentothal, and an assessment of Nosenko's personality.

Dr. Bohrer has stated (in discussions with the senior author of this report) that he had been told when he was first assigned to the case that Nosenko was concealing information of great importance to the U.S. Government. That he worked throughout the case under this assumption is evident from the total context of his reporting. On the other hand, there is no evidence that either the SR Division or CI Staff shared the reasons for their suspicions with him to a sufficient extent for him to have evaluated their claim, even had Bohrer been qualified by professional background to make such an evaluation. Bohrer knew and accepted his limitations in the latter regard; for example, in a report dated 23 February 1965, after he had spent an hour observing an interrogation by Thomas Ryan, Bohrer remarked:

> He comes off [in] his responses to questions (at least when I saw him) in the same fashion as always though I am not competent to judge the content of what he says. [Underlining added.] 60

Yet, even though Bohrer was not an "operations officer" according to normal Agency criteria, during his long association with this case (which included 34 examinations of Nosenko in the year 1964 alone) he acted in more than a purely medical capacity. Not only did he check on Nosenko's health and endeavor to safeguard it, he also advised the operational component of the Agency on certain aspects of their

own specialized activities to which his medical and psychiatric knowledge appeared relevant. In this latter capacity, Bohrer's name was invoked frequently in operational correspondence, generally without his knowledge; for example, in a 27 November 1964 memorandum to the DDP, concerning arrangements for forthcoming interrogations, Murphy stated:

> Given . . . the assessment by both Bohrer and Gittinger that Subject is a compulsive talker, we are hopeful that we will make some progress. [52]

By implication, this and other similar references evoked the recondite expertise of the psychiatric and psychological professionals to bolster claims of impending success so frequently but incorrectly reiterated by Murphy and Bagley that they saw their own credit running out.

It should be made clear that throughout the Nosenko affair, Bohrer was entitled to feel that he was acting properly in line of duty. His component, the Office of Medical Services/Operational Services Division, was specifically charged with providing assistance to the operational components of the Agency. It had long been Agency practice, both at Headquarters and in the field, for medical doctors to function in a partly operational capacity, even though they were not necessarily cognizant of all aspects of the operations in which they became involved. The assumption was that senior operations officers knew what they were about and that, within rather vaguely defined limits, a doctor of medicine could accept their authority as guaranty of the rightness of what he did to assist them.

Thus, it was only natural that Bohrer, having been told by senior Agency officials that Nosenko was consistently lying about his true mission, should accept their views. Unlike Gittinger, he did not even have the advantage of having systematically debriefed Nosenko on his life history; had he done so, he might have shared Gittinger's suspicions that the SR Division opinion of Nosenko was not beyond legitimate challenge.

Nevertheless, the anomalous situation in which Bohrer was placed had two unfortunate consequences:

> A. Because he was led to assume that Nosenko was systematically lying, his diagnosis was somewhat distorted.
>
> B. The same assumption led him to play a quasi-operational role in the handling of Nosenko which, in the perspective of 1976, may seem questionable.

Let us now look in greater depth at the first consequence. In so doing, it is not our purpose to second-guess a qualified psychiatrist; rather, it is our purpose to ascertain whether this particular professional, well known to his colleagues for his devotion to duty, was in fact given a fair opportunity to make an honest evaluation.

Bohrer's diagnosis of Nosenko, which he labeled

"Psychiatric Impressions," was dated 20 December 1964. It read in part:

> Psychiatric impression is that of an individual who shows an above average intelligence capacity, is shrewd and perceptive. While he claims to have desired to cooperate and work with U.S. officials, his antisocial behavior was destructive and self-defeating to the aims he claimed to pursue. His own needs and desires are of paramount importance to him and he manipulates those around him without regard to consequence in order to satisfy his needs. As such he tends to be selfish, ungrateful, narcissistic and exhibitionistic. In satisfying his own desires there is no concern for the feelings or interests of others. There has been no evidence of a sense of honor or of shame. He has seen nothing wrong with his own behavior, being unable to view this from another's viewpoint. For most of his adult life, it is reasonable to expect that he has operated in this manner -- without conscience, without guilt and has directed his efforts at satisfying his own needs. He may at times give the impression of being a reliable and steadfast person, but after gaining security for himself and the confidence of others, can shrug off major obligations easily. As with many individuals of this personality makeup, his disregard for the truth is remarkable. Whether there is a good chance that he will get away with a lie or whether detection is almost certain, he shows no signs of perturbation and can coolly maintain his position. While committing the most serious of perjuries, it is easy for him to look anyone calmly in the eye.
>
> Alcohol certainly catalyzes his tendency to uninviting or destructive behavior. It also has an effect on his sexual life which was most certainly promiscuous and marked by indulgence in sexual aberrations which may include homosexual experiences. Emotional attachment is shallow. Although he may give at times the impression of being cordial and affectionate, beneath this is an astonishing callousness.
>
> As a youngster, this man might well have been looked upon as a juvenile delinquent with constant brushes with authority. As he grew older this behavior most likely continued in the same pattern with occasional brushes with the law and perhaps some punishment. But the effectiveness of his ability to manipulate and protect himself by personable appeals may have kept him in circulation in society on the fringe, so to speak. His reaction to his restricted environment is not unusual, as some such individuals come to accommodate to some limits imposed by authority while at the same time not accepting the seriousness of their situation and believing

that, as in the past, they can talk their way out. This man is capable of playing a role and playing it effectively.

With this view of his personality, it seems unlikely that he could have achieved much stature as a staff intelligence officer. He could, however, have been effective in various types of intelligence operations.[61]

On 1 October 1976, the above evaluation was discussed with Bohrer in the light of facts previously unknown to him. Inter alia, he was given (in writing) background on the following aspects of the Nosenko case:

A. Bagley's promises of substantial monetary rewards and an opportunity for Nosenko to work with CIA on a salaried basis.

B. Allegations of homosexuality which appear, from the record, to stem primarily from "a prejudiced source."

C. The conclusion of the Director of Security, as of 30 September 1976, that "Mr. Nosenko was truthful and that he had not given false information to his CIA debriefing officers."

D. Acceptance of Nosenko's bona fides by both FBI and CIA.[127]

The memorandum of conversation dictated by the senior author following the above discussion reads in part:

Dr. Bohrer agreed that his 20 December 1964 memorandum, as well as subsequent psychiatric judgments which he had made, were all heavily dependent on "collateral information" which he obtained from representatives of the SB Division. He agreed that, had he known the facts as stated in my memorandum, his psychiatric judgments might have differed from those he actually made.

In connection with some of the specific points raised in my memorandum, Bohrer made the following observations:

a. He was not aware of the financial or other promises made to Nosenko, and perhaps assumed that Nosenko, like most defectors, was angling for large rewards. Bohrer mentioned Golitsyn as among the precedents which he probably had in mind.

b. Dr. Bohrer's reference to homosexual advances was based on a statement made by John McMahon. (I did not tell Dr. Bohrer that McMahon was in fact the "prejudiced source" to whom I had referred in my memorandum.)

c. In regard to Nosenko's alleged lying and deception, he was totally dependent upon the

judgments of SB Division personnel as well as that of Nicholas Stoiaken.

Dr. Bohrer stated that, until he read my 1 October 1976 memorandum, he had never known that Nosenko had contributed valuable information. He had also never received any information concerning Nosenko's behavior since his being released from incarceration at LOBLOLLY. He expressed puzzlement at the fact that Nosenko had not created more trouble for the Agency and made heavy demands on the U.S. Government for compensation, in light of the facts which I had made available to him.127

We are thus justified in concluding that, in Bohrer's case as in that of Gittinger, a professional was not given the proper "collateral information" on the basis of which to render a sound professional judgment. More explicitly, because neither Bohrer nor Gittinger was accurately informed even about such basic aspects of the case as the promises made to Nosenko (which could not possibly be considered to have had sensitive security implications), neither man had an accurate criterion for judging the appropriateness of Nosenko's behavior in seeking better treatment.

Given the apparent consensus among the Agency's leadership that there were good and sufficient reasons for incarcerating and trying to "break" Nosenko, it is not surprising in hindsight that Bohrer offered judgments and advice extending well beyond the bounds of conventional medicine and psychiatry. Since his quasi-operational participation in this case has been covered to some degree in Chapter III, we need only reevoke a few examples here:

-- His judgment of 24 February 1966 that "things are bound to change as far as Nosenko is concerned -- he is either going to stop faking or things will get worse." 72

-- His judgment, reported by Murphy on 26 April 1966, that reestablishing contact between Nosenko and the interrogators would be a serious mistake because it would constitute a "relief." 76

-- His opinion, offered after monitoring the 6 July 1966 meeting between Bagley and Nosenko, that "the way in which the interview was conducted would very effectively slam shut another psychological door." 81

Admittedly, the above comments come to us second-hand, via memoranda written by others. Nonetheless, they are consistent with everything in Bohrer's handwritten reports of his visits to Nosenko in confinement, which are appended as Annex B. Since they are available to the reader in toto, it will suffice here to illustrate our point with one example, quoted from Bohrer's 14 July 1964 report of a visit to Nosenko, by then incarcerated in Clinton, Maryland:

> Subject was seen for [the] first time in over two weeks. His general physical condition is satisfactory and his weight is now 170 lbs. There is evidence however that he is reacting psychologically to his detention and is showing increased tension, anxiety and is misinterpreting various stimuli in his environment. More significant is his conviction that he is being constantly photographed in his room and in the "privacy of his bath." The latter is most disturbing to him especially being photographed totally nude. He describes hearing the sound of movie cameras especially in the bath and was quite disturbed over having pictures made without his "panties." (This is the exact word he used.) I asked how pictures were being taken in his room and he got off the bed, walked over to the door to his room and pointed to pin holes on each side of the door through which he was being clandestinely photographed. He said he had taken photographs of people in compromising positions for operational use in [the] KGB and he understood the reason for this. But he did not understand why the guards continued to take pictures of him -- especially in the bath. In the guard log is a notation last week about a request from him that picture taking be stopped. This sequence, I am convinced, was not play acting. The nebulous situation he finds himself in is beginning to take its toll. From the psychiatric standpoint this is viewed as first sign of disintegration of personality and loss of contact with reality. It may progress or it may remain at this level. It is interesting that this first indicator centers around his "privacy," being in the nude and is concerned with sexual identification and his underlying concern over this area. At this juncture I do not recommend any changes in his management [underlining is ours] other than those previously suggested, i.e., reading material, writing material, chair and table in his room. He has been given reading material and writing material and I understand from Pete Bagley, who is aware of the above visit, that chair, table, and cigarettes in the room are forthcoming in the next day or so.[44]

Although Bohrer later changed his mind and expressed the conviction that Nosenko had been faking his signs of psychological deterioration, the reasons behind his assurance are not evident, at least to the lay mind. There have been ample studies of the effects of isolation and sensory deprivation on human beings, triggered in large measure by the demands of the space program. They are only partially relevant to Nosenko's situation, because no experimenter in the non-Communist world has ever attempted to impose social isolation or other forms of deprivation on experimental

subjects for more than a few days at a time. (The Soviets, who are bound by fewer restrictions than we, have employed durations of up to 60 days.) Nevertheless, while various researchers have obtained diverse results, there is ample evidence that certain psychological, physiological, and behavioral impairments do indeed result from severe restrictions being placed on physical activity, sensory stimulation, and social interaction; and this generalization seems to apply to Soviets in much the same way as it does to Americans.* Bohrer's judgments were no doubt based in good faith on his clinical judgment, but the question remains as to whether the latter was not distorted by his apparent commitment to the cause of "breaking" Nosenko. Thus we are led inevitably to the problem of whether such a commitment is appropriate in the case of a doctor of medicine.

Once again the question of propriety has arisen. We recommend that the Agency pay more attention to the issue of how medical personnel may be properly utilized than it has heretofore.

3: Conclusions

The senior author of this study spent 1972 making a study of Soviet agents-in-place. Two of the conclusions of that study are worth requoting in part four years later:

> . . . We have not always used our Agency psychiatrists and psychologists to best advantage. When we deal with computers, we know that we have to call on specialists to help us, but we have a false self-confidence in dealing with people. This self-confidence is allowable when we are dealing with people who are normal, but unfortunately many Soviet defectors and just about any Soviet who is willing to serve as an agent-in-place are not psychologically normal. They therefore require very specialized handling . . .**

> . . . An operational death wish seemed to overwhelm us, as we insisted on ascribing every aberration of the agent(s) to some sinister design of the enemy. Granted that we must always keep in mind the possibility of an agent's being under opposition control, as long as there is a chance that he is genuine we should never let him become aware of our suspicions. We have missed some major operational opportunities by violating this rule.***

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* For more details, see Zubek, J.P., Behavioral and Physiological Effects of Prolonged Sensory and Perceptual Deprivation, in Rasmussen, J.E., Man in Isolation and Confinement. Chicago: Aldine, 1973.

** Memorandum to Director Richard Helms, dated 29 December 1972 (ER 72-6579).

*** The Hollow Men: A Theory Regarding Soviet Agents-in-Place, Section IV-E. This study was transmitted to Helms under cover of the memorandum cited above.

In the Nosenko case, the problem lay not in our failure to make use of the psychologists/psychiatrists, but in our gross misuse of them. CIA officials in charge of the Nosenko case until 1967 sought assistance of professionals from this field, as they did from similar people in other fields, only to help shore up certain stubbornly-held misconceptions. What they should have done, on the contrary, was to bring them in at the inception of the case to assess as accurately as possible Nosenko's psychodynamics and, on the basis of this assessment, to evaluate his bona fides and his possible operational usefulness. Instead, the Agency proceeded in the reverse order.

For their part, the psychological/psychiatric professionals were not of as much help as they could have been. They had become accustomed over the years to playing a subordinate support role to the operators, and had developed a "you call--we haul" attitude which is inconsistent with the independent-mindedness legitimately to be expected of a true professional.

In addition, because of the doctrine of compartmentation, the knowledge which the Agency's psychological/psychiatric professionals have had to contribute has, at any given time, been much less than it could and should have been. The persons exercising command authority in the Agency have not even had enough understanding of the differing techniques employed by the Agency's own psychological and psychiatric staffs to know when to call upon one rather than the other. Nor have most of the senior executives within the Agency had the faintest glimmering of the fact that an accurate understanding of the symptomatology of Soviet agents and defectors could only be achieved by a long-term program of data collection regarding them. On the initiative of the psychologists or psychiatrists themselves, some efforts at data collection have been undertaken, and some useful research has been carried out. But, overall, the effort has been sadly insufficient.

Thus, as was certainly true in the Nosenko case, the Agency seldom receives the best advice that could be expected from the psychological/psychiatric professionals, even when it does call on them. We are including a recommendation on this subject in our final chapter.

CHAPTER X

IMPACT OF THE "MONSTER PLOT" ON CIA'S POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND CI MISSIONS

The effect of "mirror reading" analysis, as practiced by many officers of SB Division during the 1960's, was to impede the development of new sources of information. This technique also cast doubt on the bona fides of existing agents and sources, and caused confirmable information to be treated with skepticism if it had been received from a supposedly "tainted" source.

It has not been possible, in the course of this study, to examine in depth the negative effect which the Angleton-Murphy-Bagley thesis (often referred to within the Agency as the "Monster Plot") had on the development of new positive intelligence operations, because the search of numerous developmental case files, in which the impact of the thesis is known to be reflected, would have been too time-consuming. Had time permitted, however, there is no doubt that we could have amply demonstrated the thesis' baneful effect.

Because time has not permitted us to document the problem across-the-board, we have chosen instead to concentrate on two cases by way of detailed illustration. The first is [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) The second concerns two Soviet diplomats, Vladimir P. Suslov and Vasiliy V. Vakhrushev.

[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

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(b)(3)

2: Effect on Other Potential Operations

As previously mentioned, limitations of time have prevented an in-depth study of the effect of the Nosenko case on positive, human-source intelligence operations against the Soviet Union. There are differing views among persons we have talked to on this subject, each probably reflective of some aspect of a complicated situation.

The cases of Suslov and Vakhrushev provide a good example. Both men were long-time friends of Nosenko. Concerning both, we had reliable, independent confirmation of possible vulnerability to recruitment. At the time Nosenko proposed that we mount operations against them with that aim in mind, neither would have qualified as a top priority target, yet they were sufficiently high-ranking in the Soviet hierarchy to be of interest and both were very well-connected with other, more important Soviet officials. Suslov was Undersecretary for Political Affairs in the United Nations Secretariat in New York at the time of Nosenko's proposal. Vakhrushev, who inter alia had once served as an escort-interpreter for Vice President Nixon during the latter's

visit in 1959 to the USSR, was Counselor of the Soviet delegation to UNESCO in Paris. Both men drank excessively, had had marital problems, and manifestly enjoyed the amenities of life outside the Soviet Union.

As of mid-1964, Bagley felt that SR Division should not take advantage of the opportunities which their ready accessibility in New York and Paris presented. As usual, it was precisely the fact that we possessed confirmatory information regarding their vulnerability that weighed most heavily against them. In a 7 July 1964 memorandum, SR Division stated:

> Nosenko is offering us two prime targets for recruitment, both old personal friends of his, neither of the KGB and both now serving abroad. One is V.V. Vakrushev [sic] in Paris, the other is Vladimir P. Suslov in New York. Neither has been recalled as a result of Nosenko's defection, and Nosenko himself claims the KGB is not aware of his special relationship with them. Suslov has come to our attention through other sources and through his own indiscretions, supporting our suspicion that he is being offered to us; Vakrushev [sic] has been recently mentioned by [a medium-level Soviet official who was also a CIA agent], possibly to feel out our interest. Nosenko, in strongly urging us to recruit aggressively among Soviets, and particularly these two, has commented, we think significantly, "Some won't work, some will, we mustn't be daunted by failure but must push on." It thus appears that the KGB might be offering us new "agents" among UN personnel whose later "discovery" by the KGB could involve us in a major political flap.[42]

Had the question of pursuing these operational leads been left to Bagley alone, it is fairly certain that no attempt would have been made to exploit them. His view was summed up as follows:

> We are fighting in the bull's terrain -- he's strongest there. Of all available Sovs, Suslov would give us the closest-in reaction, but he best briefed, has tricks we don't know.[61-a]

Murphy's attitude, on the other hand, was less one-sided. He was an activist; as he said when debriefed on 16 July 1976, " . . . The most difficult thing that I had as a personal problem during all that time was . . . to insist on the development of the Division as a whole and try to push new cases." On the other hand, he was troubled by the supposed inconsistencies in Nosenko's story: "All this time, I had this other thing and my attitudes toward it were in part based on some of my own experiences. . . . I certainly didn't believe that Nosenko was entirely bona fide . . ." [131]

Within the SB Division itself, the conflict was apparently never satisfactorily resolved as long as both Murphy and Bagley remained in positions of authority within it. We have already seen Leonard McCoy's April 1966 letter, in which he

spoke of "the morbid effect which the Nosenko case has, and will continue to have, on intelligence collection against the USSR . . ." (See Page 81 of this study.)[74] A report by the CIA Inspector General, published in October 1968, was highly critical of SB Division's performance between 1964 and 1967, and attributed the Division's problems to preoccupation with the Nosenko case. The report states that the Division "gained a reputation for excessive pessimism . . . for being one-sided in its approach to counterintelligence, security, and operational matters. . . . Facts and implications are repeatedly marshalled to show the RIS at work continuously, on a massive scale, aiming their work at us, and practically never missing a trick."[110]

The fact that even Bagley was somewhat torn between the demands of his CI role and the necessity for collecting intelligence is implied in an interview which he and another senior SR Division officer had with Helms on 19 November 1964:

> Mr. Helms wanted to know what we expected to gain from our operation against Vakhrushev in view of the fact that we believe him to be offered to us by the KGB. We pointed out that Vakhrushev's family connections and official position in Paris should give him access to positive and counterintelligence information of value, and that we could take what the KGB was willing to sacrifice and sort the good from the bad. Mr. Helms remarked that this had been taking us months with Nosenko and doubted that we want to get into a similar situation again.[50]

Although time has not permitted us to examine the record of the Vakhrushev and Suslov cases in detail, it is evident that before and after the above conversation, periodic efforts were made, as the occasion arose, to capitalize on the Vakhrushev and Suslov leads. How efficient or resourceful these efforts were, given the suspicions which surrounded the two targets, we have not been able to determine.

3: How CIA Worked to Defeat Itself

The lessons to be drawn from the [redacted] Suslov, and Vakhrushev cases are clear. (b)(1) (b)(3)

The [redacted] case in particular demonstrates that Nosenko was not an isolated phenomenon. On the contrary, he was the victim of a system of illogic for which it is difficult to find a parallel in Agency history. Secondly, it brings into sharp relief a pattern of self-defeating behavior within the Agency in its conduct of intelligence operations against the United States' single most threatening adversary. (b)(1) (b)(3)

The collection of intelligence has been less systematically reduced to a coherent doctrine than most other Governmental activities, because secrecy and compartmentation have often combined to keep even its more senior practitioners from comprehending the process as a whole. Yet there has been one basic principle upon which neophytes and old hands alike have long depended; this has been the evaluation of information from one source according to the degree of confirmation by other independent sources. The usefulness of this relatively simple principle has been accepted in the past as applicable in the field of both positive and counterintelligence.

The Monster Plot shattered the whole basis for confirmation. As long as any defector or potentially recruitable agent was to be viewed as possibly in some way responsive to a Soviet supra-authority fostering and directing a "grand design" directed at deceiving the United States, there were by definition no longer any valid independent sources. Quite to the contrary, everything any source said could be part of the same integral, though infinitely complex, pattern of deception.

Difficulties produced by the above assumption were aggravated by a pattern of dichotomous thinking. The Soviet defectors and agents-in-place who came under analysis were either good or bad, normal or psychotic, trustworthy to the nth degree (e.g., Golitsyn, Deryabin) or threats to U.S. national security. A middle ground was seldom given serious consideration. This predilection for dichotomies was made to order for Golitsyn, because paranoids do tend to divide all humankind into two categories: their own persecuted selves on one hand, and the persecutors on the other. Even where persecutors and persecutees can be shown to exist, rational men tend to see a preponderant middle component in the population, whereas in paranoid thought the fallacy which logicians call the "law of the excluded middle" is prevalent.

It is troubling that so many otherwise able CIA officers fell prey to this fallacy; but why they did so is beyond the competence of this study. Whatever the reason, the result was to reduce SB Division to a house chaotically divided. It is the view of a number of senior CIA intelligence officers who lived through the difficult period of the 60's and to whom we have talked during this investigation, that the Monster Plot thesis set CIA positive and counterintelligence

programs back by a number of years. And though we may be tempted to look back and say that this is now water over the dam, there can be no assurance that such is the case. For if one poses the question of how many additional Soviet agents and defectors we might have gained had our handling of those who did approach us been better calculated to encourage, rather than discourage, them, the only answer is: Nobody knows.

CHAPTER XI

METHODOLOGY AND LEADERSHIP

Our Letter of Instruction requested that we address ourselves to "the nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko bona fides studies." We have interpreted this instruction as referring to those studies made under the auspices of David Murphy and Tennent Bagley, with input from the CI Staff, between 1962 and 1968. Our attention has been principally devoted to the so-called "thousand-page paper," of February 1967, and the briefer, revised version published in February 1968. We also have reviewed a very large number of formal and informal writings, many of which have been quoted in previous chapters; all will be found included, in their full versions, in the annexes.

1: Lack of CI Methodology

Webster's New International Dictionary (1954) gives, as one of its definitions of Methodology, the following:

> A branch of logic dealing with principles of procedure, whether of theoretic or practical science.

While the word "methodology" can perhaps be stretched to include many things, it is doubtful that it could be so defined as to encompass the techniques which Bagley described as "mirror reading" without being distorted beyond recognition. Certainly, no possible definition could cover mistranslation, selective omission of data, and deliberate misuse of technical data-gathering equipment (i.e., the polygraph).

The disturbing fact is that the analytical and investigative procedures and techniques employed in the Nosenko case were all in varying degrees viewed by the major protagonists -- Messrs. Angleton, Murphy, and Bagley -- as legitimate exercises of the counterintelligence process. We do not believe that they were.

We accept without question the necessity for counterintelligence, as a category of the intelligence process concerned with the activities of hostile powers' covert and clandestine activities against the United States and our allies. But such a discipline, if it is to fulfill its purposes, must employ an orderly and systematic methodology. Unhappily, in the Nosenko case it did no such thing.

We are forced to conclude that, in the 1960's, when Golitsyn, Nosenko, and [redacted] contacted CIA, the Plans Directorate and its Clandestine Service were intellectually, technically, and procedurally unprepared to handle them. (b)(1) (b)(3)
A useful study entitled KUBARK Counterintelligence Interrogation was published by CIA in July 1963, but the handling of Nosenko gives no indication that any of the Agency personnel directly involved had profited from it, if indeed they had read it at all. Insofar as we can ascertain, in respect to Soviet nationals, the Directorate lacked:

A. Explicit written criteria to be applied in evaluating bona fides of a defector or prospective agent.

B. Explicit written procedures for the collection, analysis, and evaluation of the counterintelligence product of a defector or prospective agent.

C. Explicit written procedures for psychological evaluation of a defector or prospective agent.

D. Any broadly-based systematic data base (or systematic written procedures for employing it, had it existed) regarding the relevant psychological characteristics of Soviet agents. There did exist some psychological data regarding defectors, but they had not been collated and analyzed, nor were they objectively applied to the cases of Nosenko and Golitsyn. The latter was himself never even tested.

2: Influence of Angleton on Methodology

The predominant influence in the CI field within the Agency until 1975 was James Angleton, a man of loose and disjointed thinking whose theories, when applied to matters of public record, were patently unworthy of serious consideration. His contention that the Sino-Soviet schism was a disinformation project carried out under the direction of the KGB was subject to ridicule even by some of his friends and supporters.

Angleton's reputation for expertise rested, therefore, on his purportedly unique knowledge of the KGB's worldwide covert political role. In truth, no one could compete with Angleton as an expert on this subject. His analyses, based on fragmentary and often inapplicable data, were more imaginative than systematic, and therefore neither easily comprehended nor replicated by his interlocutors. But unlike the Emperor and his imaginary clothes, Angleton's fantasies were never vulnerable to objective examination, simply because he surrounded such data as existed with a wall of secrecy. His "facts" were available in full only to a minimum number of trusted apostles; to the rest of the intelligence community, both American and foreign, he doled them out selectively -- seldom in written form -- to prove whatever point he was trying to make at the time.

Angleton's preference for oral over written communication is worth emphasizing. During his incumbency as its Chief, the CI Staff, though it supposedly had in its possession information concerning a horrendous hazard to both the United States and its allies, never committed to paper any complete, written, documented report on the subject. Therefore, the threat could never be systematically analyzed and evaluated. Only when Angleton finally departed did dispassionate analysis of CI Staff's data holdings finally become possible, and it has consistently failed to support his central claims regarding the KGB's massive influence in world affairs.

B. During the same period, the Agency was by contrast successful in developing a number of in-place human sources who reported strategic intelligence on the USSR and the other Warsaw Pact countries.

C. Almost without exception, the human sources mentioned in sub-paragraph B volunteered their services in the first instance; the Agency did not develop them from scratch. After they had of their own initiative indicated some degree of willingness to cooperate with U.S. intelligence, the Clandestine Service attempted to assert sufficient control over them to enable us to guide their collection activities. In some cases, there was also a question of whether a volunteer would defect outright, meaning that he would leave his native territory to seek asylum in the non-Communist world, or alternatively remain in place in order to provide a continuing flow of intelligence; the Agency normally attempted to persuade the volunteer to take the latter course. It was in such ways, then, that the Agency can be said to have "developed" its best agents.

The above definition of "agent development" may seem, to some well-informed readers, so self-evident as to be superfluous. It is not, however; for Agency claims of success in the human-source collection field have often been so phrased, whether intentionally or not, as to give the impression that our achievements stemmed largely from the process which, in Clandestine Service parlance, is called "development and recruitment." The impression that we "recruited" our best Soviet and Warsaw Pact sources, in the 1949--1970 period, following a period of orderly development must be dispelled before there can be meaningful discussion of previously described lacunae. In most major Soviet cases prior to 1970, it might be more nearly correct to say that the foreign nationals involved "developed" the Americans. In the case of Penkovskiy, to cite an extreme example, U.S. officials made even the latter process so outrageously difficult for him that he had to write a letter to both the Queen of England and President Eisenhower in order finally to achieve a clandestine working relationship with the British and American intelligence services.

Points A, B, and C above are also valid as applied to the field of counterintelligence information, with one important exception. In the CI field, much information has been obtained from spies of hostile powers arrested in areas under the control of the United States or nations friendly to us. Thus, in this latter field, we are not as dependent on agents or defectors as we are in the case of the positive intelligence collection effort.

Within the framework of what has just been said, we can now judge the seriousness of the lacunae listed on page 184.

If our most significant positive intelligence and much of our most significant counterintelligence from human sources have come from Soviet or other Warsaw Pact nationals who volunteered their services, why did we fail more fully to systematize their handling? Even more to the point within the framework of the present study, why would we not give such persons the benefit of every reasonable doubt rather than

CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1: The Letter of Instruction

General guidance for the preparation of this report was contained in a Letter of Instruction, signed by the Deputy Director for Operations on 8 June 1976. It assigned the following tasks:

> You are tasked to write an analysis of the Nosenko case which will address the following matters:
>
> a. The bona fides of Nosenko.
>
> b. The value of Nosenko to the United States and allied governments.
>
> c. The relationship and significance of Nosenko to other agents and operations.
>
> d. The identification of unexploited Nosenko penetration leads and information.
>
> e. The nature and validity of methodology of previous Nosenko bona fides studies.

We have interpreted the above responsibilities rather liberally, because the ramifications and implications of the Nosenko case have proven more far-reaching than we, and probably the framers of the above Letter, anticipated. Nonetheless, we shall commence this concluding chapter with responses to the matters covered in sub-paragraphs a through e above.

1-a: Bona Fides

Doubts regarding Nosenko's bona fides were of our own making. Had the job of initially assessing him as a person, as well as of gathering and evaluating the intelligence he had to offer, been handled properly he could have been declared a bona fide defector as readily as have many other Soviet intelligence officers.

This is not to say that we can be certain of the genuineness of any defector. It will always remain hypothetically possible that the Soviet Government, acting through the KGB or some other instrumentality, will attempt to plant an intended "disinformation agent" or prospective penetration of our Government on our doorstep. But the usefulness of the Soviets' doing so, in the manner ascribed to them in the Nosenko case, is probably as slight as is the feasibility. Soviet success in using native-born citizens of other countries to spy on their own homelands has been considerable. By contrast, there is no record of the USSR successfully infiltrating the government of a major non-Communist power by use of an acknowledged Soviet citizen, least of all one

recapitulate them, with such supplementary remarks as seem necessary.

3-a: Examination of the Role of Professionals

We recommend that the role which can properly be played within the Agency by members of the organized professions -- medicine, psychiatry, psychology, law, and others -- be given careful study, within the context of (1) ensuring that the Agency puts their skills to the best possible use, while (2) refraining from involving them in matters not properly within their professional purview.

3-b: Improvement of Intellectual Standards

We recommend that the Operations Directorate, and its Clandestine Service, take whatever steps are possible to ensure that the intellectual caliber of their personnel is equal to the exigencies of the future.

We realize that the present personnel selection system sets high standards for those entering on duty at the professional level, particularly as regards IQ and education. But the standards presently in force do not by themselves guarantee that future selectees will possess independence of mind, analytical ability, and objectivity.

In the case of personnel already on board, it should be kept in mind that we live in a rapidly-evolving, technologically-oriented civilization. Knowledge and intellectual skills adequate at this time may be inadequate a few years from now. For an intelligence organization, we define "inadequate" as anything which is less than the best.

We suggest that a board of expert consultants be established, drawn primarily from research institutions, high-technology enterprises, and the academic world to recommend a program of screening new entrants, and improving the analytical skills of those already on duty, with the aim of achieving and maintaining a high level of intellectual excellence throughout the Operations Directorate.

3-c: Detection of Deception

We recommend that high priority be accorded a program to develop new methods of detecting deception.

Some steps are already underway in this regard, but they should be extended and given greater emphasis. Present methods, based mainly on the use of the polygraph, are clearly obsolete.

Specific criteria of bona fides will follow naturally from improved methods of detecting deception.

3-d: Collection, Analysis and Evaluation of CI Product

We are not making a recommendation in this regard because, although well aware of the inadequacies of the Nosenko period, we do not know how the matter is now being handled.

3-e: Psychological Aspects of Defector/Agent Handling and Personnel Selection

We recommend a multi-track program of psychological research, geared specifically to the Operations Directorate's needs, to develop a new generation of personality assessment techniques necessary for both defector/agent handling and selection of DDO personnel. This program should be under direct DDO control.

A surprising amount of relevant expertise now exists within the Agency, and some valuable research is underway, but it is not being geared to DDO's needs to the extent it could be. Instead, it is being handled by DDS&T/ORD/Life Sciences Division, which currently accords it a low priority and may eliminate it altogether.

It is theoretically possible to establish, within the reasonably near future, certain measurable physiological correlates of a number of personality types.

It is also theoretically quite possible, though not yet demonstrated, that by establishing such physiological correlates we could take much of the guesswork out of personality evaluation. We would thus substantially reduce the threat which the employment of unstable or anti-social personalities (e.g., Philip Agee) poses for the Agency, and particularly for the Operations Directorate.

3-f: Further Research on Past CI and SE Division Cases

We recommend that the psychological research program (sub-paragraph 3-e) be supplemented by continuing research on past CI and SE Division cases involving Soviet or Soviet Bloc nationals. The purpose would be to extract possibly objectifiable indicators of the personality of the defectors, agents, or suspects involved, in order that a personality typology be built up to cover persons in those three categories. Such a typology should enhance our ability in the future to predict the behavior of such persons, as well as to improve our handling of them.

3-g: Psychological Assessment of Agents and Defectors

We recommend early, systematic psychological evaluation, by clinical psychologists using standardized measurement techniques, of all denied area agents, as well as defectors from the denied areas. We recommend against dependence on psychiatric examinations, unless the psychiatrists are willing to use the same standardized instruments as the psychologists would.

Although few, if any, of the Soviet or Soviet Bloc agents to whom we have had direct and continuing access have ever been tested as long as they remained in agent status, we do not accept as valid the reasons usually given for not testing them.

Implementation of this recommendation would, if the other programs above-recommended are also carried out, contribute substantially toward authentication of agent sources and information.

4: Review by Higher Echelons

In addition to review at the appropriate echelons of command, we recommend that this report be thoroughly reviewed by the Inspector General and General Counsel.

Although the statute of limitations presumably renders impossible criminal actions as a result of this case, there will remain virtually indefinitely the threat of an action for damages on the part of Nosenko. In the view of the senior author, this danger is minimized by keeping Nosenko actively and productively engaged in work on behalf of the CIA and FBI. Nonetheless, the possibility of Nosenko's eventually deciding to press publicly for further compensation cannot be totally discounted. The Agency should therefore be fully prepared in advance for such a contingency.

5: Moral Responsibility

We recommend consideration be given to establishing a written code of moral responsibility for Agency employees.

Even the conduct of a declared war is to some extent restricted by certain morally-based limitations, such as the Geneva Convention. While the nature of clandestine and covert activities demands exemption from many legally-imposed limitations, this fact should not be taken to imply a total dispensation from all moral imperatives. We believe, for example, that the long incarceration of Nosenko and the [redacted] were moral1 indefensible. (b)(1) (b)(3)

We suggest that there should be enough consensus within the Agency regarding categories of impermissible actions for an explicit code of moral or ethical standards -- call them what you will -- to be established and enforced.

Enforcement is as important as establishment of such a code. In the aftermath of the Nosenko and [redacted] cases, manifestations of outrageously poor judgment on the part of key Agency officers seem regularly to have been followed by assignment to desirable European posts. This sequence may have been adventitious; but whether it was or not, it projected an image of amorality on the part of the Agency's leadership which does not bode well for CIA's future in a democratic society. One of the Clandestine Service's most positive features has always been the dedication of its personnel; yet amorality and dedication are self-evidently inconsistent in our society. It is essential that the Agency's leadership keep this fact in mind. (b)(1) (b)(3)

APPENDIX:

CHRONOLOGY OF THE YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO CASE

1962

mid-March	UN Disarmament Conference opens in Geneva.
5 June	[redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)
9 June	Nosenko offers, [redacted] to sell information to American intelligence; identifies self as KGB officer. [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3)
11 June	Bagley and Kisevalter meet Nosenko. They advise Headquarters Nosenko has conclusively proven bona fides.
12 June	Bagley and Kisevalter meet Nosenko and report him cooperative.
13 June	Meeting No. 4.
14 June	Meeting No. 5.
15 June	Nosenko returns to Moscow after agreeing to re-establish contact with CIA when next in West.
16 June	Nosenko case discussed at CIA Headquarters by Angleton, Maury, Bagley and Kisevalter.
ca 20--26 June	Bagley studies Golitsyn's reporting on alleged KGB disinformation mission.
26 June	Bagley discusses Nosenko material (in disguised form) with Golitsyn. Golitsyn agrees Nosenko's information may reflect disinformation.
27 June	Bagley suggests Nosenko under KGB control and commences to build case against Nosenko.
14 August	Kisevalter completes "summary transcripts" of CIA's five meetings with Nosenko in Geneva.

1963

13 September	Yuriy Krotkov, KGB SCD agent, defects to British.
4 November	The Cherepanov incident in Moscow.

1964

19 January	Nosenko informs CIA of his return to Geneva.
23 January	Meeting No. 1. Nosenko says he wants to defect.

24 January	Meeting No. 2. Bagley cables Headquarters that suspicions regarding Nosenko's bona fides are justified. Requests TDY to Headquarters.
25 January	Meeting No. 3. Karpovich meets Nosenko vice Bagley.
26 January	Meeting No. 4.
27 January	Murphy tells Helms SR goal is to "break" Nosenko.
28 January	Meeting No. 5.
29 January	Meeting No. 6
30 January	Meeting No. 7. Bagley, now back in Geneva, requests Nosenko remain in place.
31 January	Meeting No. 8.
1 February	Meeting No. 9.
2 February	Meetings No. 10 and 11.
3 February	Meeting No. 12.
4 February	Meeting No. 13. Nosenko insists on immediate defection and is exfiltrated to [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)
5 February	Nosenko arrives [redacted] (b)(1) (b)(3)
6 February	Nosenko cooperates with debriefing in [redacted] FBI judges Nosenko's information "valid and valuable." (b)(1) (b)(3)
7 February	Murphy visits [redacted] to assess Nosen (b)(1) (b)(3)
8 February	Murphy confirms Bagley and Karpovich judgment that Nosenko not bona fide.
9 February	Murphy assures Nosenko we consider him bona fide, and makes detailed financial commitments to him.
10 February	Murphy, back at Headquarters, tells Karamessines Nosenko is KGB agent on mission.
11 February	McCone directs Nosenko be brought to Washington soonest because Soviets are publicizing the case. McCone also notifies President of CIA's suspicion that Nosenko is on KGB mission.
12 February	Nosenko arrives in United States.
14 February	Nosenko is confronted by Soviets and confirms desire to remain in United States.

17 February	Helms approves Murphy's plan for handling case on basis Nosenko not bona fide. Concurrently, Bagley assures Nosenko of future collaborative relationship with CIA and sets schedule of emoluments.
18--21 February	Nosenko is debriefed.
20 February	Helms agrees to bring Golitsyn into the case. Golitsyn will receive virtually full access to Nosenko material.
24 February	FBI begins debriefing of Nosenko. Nosenko complains of his treatment by FBI [redacted] (b)(6)
25 Feb--6 March	FBI debriefing continues despite Nosenko reluctance.
9 March	Murphy tells Helms little of Nosenko's information is new. Nevertheless, FBI believes Nosenko to be genuine KGB defector.
12--28 March	[redacted] (b)(6)
12 March	Deryabin reports extensive errors in "transcripts" of 1962 meetings with Nosenko.
20 March	Helms, Angleton and Murphy meet with McCone to discuss plans for confinement and hostile interrogation of Nosenko. Goal is to "break" him.
23 March	CIA disseminates to State Department Nosenko's information on microphones in U.S. Embassy, Moscow.
1 April	CIA clears its proposed handling of Nosenko with FBI, which interposes no objection. Helms advises State Department that Nosenko is not genuine defector and raises possibility of turning Nosenko back to Soviets.
2 April	Helms, Murphy, and Houston meet with Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach to discuss CIA's freedom of action under provisions for "parole" to Agency. Murphy briefs McCone on reasons why Nosenko is considered KGB plant.
4 April	Following "polygraph," Nosenko is confined in safehouse at Clinton, Maryland. Bagley confronts Nosenko, saying his KGB mission has been known to CIA for two years.
6 April	Hostile interrogations begin.

25 April	Interrogations cease, since Nosenko has not confessed.
end-April	Microphones found in U.S. Embassy, Moscow.
14 May	Interrogations resume and continue until late July.
23 June	Gittinger administers psychological test to Nosenko.
29 June	Golitsyn presents his conclusions on Nosenko.
20--21 July	CIA tells MI-5 and MI-6 that Nosenko is KGB plant and links Krotkov with wide-spread "diversionary plot."
10 November	Interrogation of Nosenko stops.
19 November	Helms orders rapid windup of Nosenko case.
1965	
5--8 January	CIA and FBI attempt to reach common position on Nosenko.
18 January	FBI tells McCone they are in no position to reach firm conclusion regarding Nosenko.
25 January	Murphy initiates planning for Nosenko's confinement at LOBLOLLY.
26 Jan--5 March	Hostile interrogations resume.
3--21 May	Gittinger interviews Nosenko.
26 July--13 Aug	Deryabin interrogates Nosenko in Russian.
27 July	Angleton, Murphy, and Osborn inspect LOBLOLLY.
13 August	Bagley tells Nosenko his position is hopeless and breaks off direct SR Division contact with him.
10 December	McCoy forwards his dissenting paper to Murphy.
1966	
12 January	Murphy tells Helms no one from SR Division has seen Nosenko since August 1965, and they discuss use of "special techniques" on Nosenko.
19 April	Murphy again discusses use of "special techniques" with Helms.
21 June	Murphy discusses sodium amytal interview and other "special techniques" with Helms.

6 July	Bagley makes first case officer visit to Nosenko in a year.
23 August	Helms instructs FitzGerald and Murphy to terminate Nosenko case within 60 days. Murphy organizes SR Division task force to meet Helms' deadline.
30 August	Murphy tells Helms chance of Nosenko confessing is not great.
1 September	Helms forbids use of sodium amytal and other "special techniques" on Nosenko. Helms considers turning Nosenko over to Soviets.
2 September	Murphy obtains from Helms extension of 60-day deadline until end of year.
18--28 October	Nosenko is interrogated extensively with assistance of polygraph.
1967	
February	SB Division produces long-awaited report on Nosenko case.
10 March	Murphy forwards portions of SB Division's report on Nosenko to Angleton.
16 March	Admiral Taylor questions Murphy on Nosenko case.
29 March	Angleton objects to manner in which SB Division report treats Golitsyn material about Nosenko.
10 May	Admiral Taylor finds SB report on Nosenko unconvincing and overly-lengthy.
26 May	Taylor requests Office of Security comments on SB report. Director of Security recommends Bruce Solie to take over interrogation of Nosenko.
19 June	Solie comments on SB Division study and recommends alternative lines of inquiry.
11 August	Solie is assigned to interrogate Nosenko.
27 October	Office of Security moves Nosenko from LOBLOLLY unbeknownst to SB Division or CI Staff.
30 October	Solie's first interview with Nosenko.
1968	
February	SB Division produces revised report on Nosenko representing compromise with CI Staff.

2--6 August	Office of Security administers first-ever, valid polygraph to Nosenko. There are no signs of deception.
September--October	FBI and CIA Office of Security reports conclude Nosenko bona fide defector and not dispatched by KGB.